dismissed EB-2 NIW Case: Unknown

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: FEB. 26, 2025 In Re: 37068323 
Appeal of Texas Service Center Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (National Interest Waiver) 
The Petitioner seeks employment-based second preference (EB-2) immigrant classification as an 
individual of exceptional ability, as well as a national interest waiver of the job offer requirement 
attached to this classification. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b )(2), 
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish eligibility for the requested EB-2 immigrant classification or a national interest waiver. The 
matter is now before us on appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.3. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). We review the questions in this matter 
de novo. Matter of Christa's, Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537,537 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de novo review, 
we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LAW 
To qualify for the underlying EB-2 visa classification, a petitioner must establish they are an advanced 
degree professional or an individual of exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business. Section 
203(b )(2)(A) of the Act. 
Exceptional ability means a degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered in the 
sciences, arts, or business. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). A petitioner must initially submit documentation 
that satisfies at least three of six categories of evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A)-(F). 1 Meeting 
at least three criteria, however, does not, in and of itself, establish eligibility for this classification. See 
generally 6 USCIS Policy Manual F.5(8)(2), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual. If a petitioner 
does so, we will then conduct a final merits determination to decide whether the evidence in its totality 
shows that they are recognized as having the requisite degree of expertise and will substantially benefit 
the national economy, cultural or educational interests, or welfare of the United States. Section 
203(b )(2)(A) of the Act. 
1 If these types of evidence do not readily apply to the individual 's occupation, a petitioner may submit comparable 
evidence to establish their eligibility. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(iii). 
If a petitioner establishes eligibility for the underlying EB-2 classification, they must then demonstrate 
that they merit a discretionary waiver of the job offer requirement "in the national interest." 
Section 203(b)(2)(B)(i) of the Act. Matter ofDhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884,889 (AAO 2016), provides 
the framework for adjudicating national interest waiver petitions. Dhanasar states that U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may, as matter of discretion, 2 grant a national interest 
waiver if the petitioner demonstrates that: 
• The proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance; 
• The individual is well-positioned to advance their proposed endeavor; and 
• On balance, waiving the job offer requirement would benefit the United States. 
Id. 
II. SIGNATURE ON APPEAL 
As a preliminary matter, we have determined that the Petitioner's Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or 
Motion, contains an electronically generated "signature" under Part 4 in the Petitioner's signature 
block. Accordingly, this appeal was not properly filed and dismissal on that basis alone is appropriate. 
A. Legal Framework 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(2) provides that "[u]nless otherwise specified in this chapter, an 
acceptable signature on a benefit request that is being filed with the USCIS [U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services] is one that is either handwritten or, for benefit request filed electronically 3 as 
permitted by the instructions to the form, in electronic format." 
Similarly, USCIS policy explains that a valid signature is "any handwritten mark or sign made by a 
person" who is the affected party with standing to file the benefit request to signify that "[t]he person 
knows of the content of the request and any supporting documents; [t]he person has reviewed and 
approves of any information contained in such request and any supporting documents; and [ t ]he person 
certifies under penalty of perjury that the request and any other supporting documents are true and 
correct." 4 And although the "regulations do not require that the person signing submit an 'original' 
or 'wet ink' signature on a petition, application, or other request to USCIS," we do "not accept 
signatures created by a typewriter, word processor, stamp, auto-pen, or similar device." 5 Accordingly, 
while a signature may be considered valid if it is "photocopied, scanned, faxed, or similarly reproduced 
... the copy must be of an original document containing an original handwritten signature, unless 
otherwise specified." Id. 
2 See Flores v. Garland, 72 F.4th 85, 88 (5th Cir. 2023) (joining the Third, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals in concluding that USCTS' decision to grant or deny a national interest waiver is discretionary in nature). 
3 Because this Form T-290B was not filed electronically, none of the provisions governing electronic filings apply. 
4 See generally 1 USC1S Policy Manual B.2(B), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual ( emphasis added). 
5 Id. See also generally 1 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at A (stating that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically authorized, a 
benefit requestor must personally sign his or her own request before filing it with USCIS"). 
2 
A person's signature on an immigration form establishes a strong presumption that the signer knows 
and has assented to its contents, absent evidence of fraud or other wrongful acts by another person. 
Matter of Valdez, 27 I&N Dec. 496,499 (BIA 2018) (citing Thompson v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 638,647 
(6th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011). In the same way that one 
person signing a declaration "for" another person carries no evidentiary force, neither will an image 
of a signature duplicated using some electronic means or method. Without the signatory's actual and 
personal signature as the declarant, the declaration under the penalty of perjury on immigration forms 
has no evidentiary force. See in re Rivera, 342 B.R. 435, 458-459 (D. N.J. 2006). USCIS has 
implemented these regulations and associated policies "to maintain the integrity of the immigration 
benefit system and validate the identity of benefit requestors." Id. Accordingly, if we determine that 
a benefit request does not contain a valid or a proper signature, we reject, deny, or dismiss it without 
providing an opportunity to correct or cure a deficient signature. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii)(A); see 
generally 1 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at A. 
B. Analysis 
As stated, the record reflects that the appellate Form I-290B contains an electronically generated 
"signature" under Part 4 in the Petitioner's signature block. We determined this is an electronic 
"signature" because along with his Form I-290B, the Petitioner submitted a document entitled 
"Drop box Sign 6 audit trail," indicating that the Petitioner signed the form using Drop box Sign to affix 
an electronic signature to the form. This document identifies Form I-290B as one of the documents 
the Petitioner signed through Dropbox Sign's service, and also assigns a unique document ID to the 
document being electronically signed. This document ID is identical to the document ID that appears 
at the bottom of each page of the Form I-290B submitted by the Petitioner. We also note that the 
Petitioner's signatures on the appellate forms (Form I-290B and the Form G-28) are identical and 
indistinguishable, to include each line, loop, slant, and spacing. 
Therefore, considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that it is more likely than not 
that the image of the signature on the Form I-290B is not a "valid signature" as required by the 
regulation 7, and is not the Petitioner's "originally handwritten signature," as required by the USCIS 
Policy Manual. See generally 1 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at B. And because we conclude the 
signature is not "any handwritten mark or sign made by a person," we are not primarily basing this 
decision on a signature that appears inconsistent with other signatures in the record, and will not issue 
a notice seeking additional information relating to the appearance of the signature. 
Accordingly, the Petitioner did not properly sign the Form I-290B, and we cannot recognize the appeal 
to have been properly filed by an affected party with legal standing in these proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.3(a)(l)(iii)(B). Nor can we decide that the Petitioner properly filed this appeal, and we must 
dismiss this filing. See generally I USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at B.2(8). Additionally, we also 
note that the same issues present with the Petitioner's signature on the Form 1-290B also appear on 
the underlying Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers. And, if the petition was not 
properly filed, then again this appeal is not properly before us and dismissal would be appropriate. 
6 According to its website, Dropbox Sign provides its users with eSignature solutions, stating that "[e]ach signature on a 
document is imposed and affixed to the document" through its electronic service. Dropbox Sign Legality Statement, 
Dropbox Sign. https://www.dropboxsign.com/about/legal. 
7 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii)(A). 
3 
II. NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER 
The Director concluded the Petitioner did not establish eligibility for the requested EB-2 immigrant 
classification as an individual of exceptional ability or the requested national interest waiver. Upon 
de novo review, we conclude the Petitioner is not eligible for a national interest waiver under the 
Dhanasar framework, and we will therefore decline to reach and hereby reserve the issue of his 
eligibility for EB-2 immigrant classification. 8 Accordingly, even if we were not dismissing the 
Petitioner's appeal on the signature issue, we would nonetheless dismiss it on the merits because he 
has not established eligibility for a national interest waiver. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that, pursuant to the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Loper 
Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S.Ct. 2244 (2024), Matter ofDhanasar is no longer controlling 
precedent with respect to our adjudication of national interest waivers. Notably, the Petitioner has not 
provided any support for this assertion, and appears to misinterpret Loper's reach. Loper overturned 
Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), in holding that federal 
courts need not defer to agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous federal laws. Therefore, 
Loper provides the judiciary with the sole prerogative to "say what the law is," stating that "[c]ourts 
must exercise their independent judgement in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory 
authority." Loper, 144 S. Ct. at 2257, 2273 . While Loper guides federal courts that review our 
interpretation of ambiguous statutes, it does not modify our own adjudication of immigrant petitions . 9 
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by the Petitioner's assertion and will conduct a de novo review of 
the record considering Dhanasar 's analytical framework. 
The first prong of the Dhanasar framework, substantial merit and national importance, focuses on the 
specific endeavor that the individual proposes to undertake. Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. at 
889. The endeavor's merit may be demonstrated in a range of areas such as business, 
entrepreneurialism, science, technology, culture, health, or education. Id. In determining whether the 
proposed endeavor has national importance, we consider its potential prospective impact. Id. 
Here, the Petitioner intends to work in the United States as a commercial airline pilot for the 
transportation of passengers and cargo. According to the record, the Petitioner has experience and 
authority to operate a variety of aircrafts, including but not limited to the Boeing 7 57 and 7 67, Boeing 
73 7-7 and 800, Boeing 777, and Boeing 787. The Petitioner asserted that, due to the unprecedented 
pilot shortage impacting the U.S. economy as well as the country's national security, the Petitioner's 
endeavor of working as an airline pilot in the United States is nationally important. And he asserted 
that his employment as a commercial airline pilot would "reduce the strain on the U.S. aviation 
industry caused by the pilot shortage." In support of his endeavor, he provided evidence of his 
experience as a pilot, including his relevant pilot licenses, flight logs, and letters of recommendation 
8 Where a case warrants a dismissal regardless of other eligibility considerations , it is unnecessary that we address those 
other considerations. Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022) (citing INS v. Bagamasbad , 429 U.S. 24, 25- 26 (1976) 
(finding agencies are not required to make "purely advisory findings" on issues that are unnecessary to the ultimate 
decision)). 
9 Moreover, when a "decision is committed to agency discretion [,like the adjudication of a national interest waiver,] Loper 
Bright Enterprises' mandate does not apply." See Onyenanu v. Garland, No. 8:23-CV-138, 2024 WL 5078098, at *6 n 5 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 11 , 2024) (concluding that, because the decision to adjudicate national interest waivers is committed to 
agency discretion, Loper does not apply). 
4 
from his prior employers and colleagues in the field. In addition, the Petitioner submitted several 
articles, industry reports, and government publications discussing the importance of the aviation field, 
and providing facts and figures related to pilots in the United States, as well as articles discussing how 
the shortage of qualified pilots impacts the U.S. economy and supply chain processes throughout the 
United States. 10 
Upon review, the Director concluded that, while the Petitioner had established the substantial merit of 
his proposed endeavor, the record did not support his claims that his proposed work as a pilot was 
nationally important. Regarding the national importance of the proposed endeavor, the Director 
determined that the Petitioner had not shown the prospective impact of his work would broadly impact 
the field or otherwise result in national or global implications at a level commensurate with national 
importance. And, while acknowledging the Petitioner's economic claims in the record, the Director 
concluded that the Petitioner had not shown that his specific work had significant potential to employ 
U.S. workers or otherwise result in substantial economic benefits contemplated in Dhanasar. 
Moreover, the Director concluded that a shortage of qualified workers alone was not sufficient to 
establish the national importance of the Petitioner's endeavor. 
On appeal, the Petitioner generally disagrees with the Director's conclusions, and asserts that the 
Director's decision misinterprets Dhanasar as it relates to the requirement that a petitioner establishes 
that their "specific endeavor" has national importance. The Petitioner contends that the phrase 
"specific endeavor," does not require a Petitioner to establish their endeavor will differ from the 
general duties of their proposed occupation, but rather requires a petitioner to "distinguish the 
characteristics of the job a [petitioner] means to perform within the United States from the 
characteristics of the [petitioner] himself." And the Petitioner asserts that "there are certain jobs within 
the United States that, while ubiquitous and fungible, are nevertheless nationally important." 
However, this misinterprets our Dhanasar precedent. 
First, USCIS policy explains that when considering the prospective impact of a petitioner's proposed 
endeavor, "[t]he term '[e]ndeavor' is more specific than the general occupation; a petitioner should 
offer details not only as to what the occupation normally involves, but what types of work the person 
proposes to undertake specifically within that occupation." This is consistent with our decision in 
Dhanasar which not only considered Dr. Dhanasar's occupation, but his specific proposed endeavor 
"to engage in research and development relating to air and space propulsion systems, as well as to 
teach aerospace engineering." Here, the Petitioner asserts that he provided "at least seven proposed 
endeavors delineated by the capabilities of the aircraft [the Petitioner] is currently rated to fly." 
However, while he has provided a summary of his expertise in aviation, and his authority to fly several 
different aircrafts, he has not explained how his specific work flying these aircrafts would result in 
broader implications to his field. Instead, the Petitioner continues to rely on the general importance 
of his proposed occupation. 
We agree with the Petitioner's assertion that Dhanasar does not mandate that "a proposed endeavor 
must be unique" in order to have national importance, but a petitioner nonetheless must establish that 
their proposed endeavor will lead to broader implications at a level commensurate with national 
10 While we do not discuss each piece of evidence contained in the record individually, we have reviewed and considered 
each one. 
5 
importance. Here, the Petitioner continues to rely primarily on evidence establishing the importance 
of the aviation industry, pilots, and the shortage of qualified pilots in the United States to assert the 
national importance of his endeavor. While this evidence supports the substantial merit of the 
proposed endeavor, it does not establish how the Petitioner's specific work will lead to broader 
implications to the industry or otherwise implicate matters rising to the level of national importance. 
On appeal the Petitioner also notes that the Director erroneously used a female pronoun for the 
Petitioner (who identifies as male), which he asserts raises concerns as to the sufficiency of the 
Director's review of the record. We have noted and considered the instances of incorrect pronoun 
usage by the Director in their decision, but conclude it did not impact the ultimate decision in this 
matter, and is, at most, harmless. See generally Matter of O-R-E-, 28 I&N Dec. at, 350 n.5 (citing 
Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696, 701 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that error is harmless where there 
is no "reason to believe that ... remand might lead to a different result" ( citation omitted))). It is not 
enough to generally assert errors in a decision. The Petitioner must also establish that they were 
prejudiced by any claimed errors. Errors can be overlooked when they had no bearing on the substance 
of an agency's decision. See e.g., Aguilar v. Garland, 60 F.4th 401, 407 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing 
Prohibition Juice Co. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 45 F.4th 8, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2022)). 
In Dhanasar we said that, in determining national importance, the relevant question is not the 
importance of the field, industry, or profession in which a petitioner may work; instead, we focus on 
"the specific endeavor that the foreign national proposes to undertake." Dhanasar at 889. We 
therefore "look for broader implications" of the proposed endeavor, noting that "[a]n undertaking may 
have national importance for example, because it has national or even global implications within a 
particular field." Id. We also stated that "[a]n endeavor that has significant potential to employ U.S. 
workers or has other substantial positive economic effects, particularly in an economically depressed 
area, for instance, may well be understood to have national importance." Id. at 890. 
Throughout the record, the Petitioner relies on the shortage of airline pilots in the United States to 
establish the national importance of his endeavor, asserting that he is ideally suited to help the U.S. air 
cargo and passenger industries meet growing demand. However, we are not persuaded by the 
Petitioner's argument that his proposed endeavor is of national importance because of a potential to 
address labor shortages in the field. The Petitioner has not established that his proposed endeavor 
stands to significantly reduce the claimed national shortage. Moreover, shortages of qualified workers 
are directly addressed by the U.S. Department of Labor through the labor certification process. 
Additionally, while we acknowledge the importance of the aviation field, and its impact to the U.S. 
economy, the Petitioner has not provided evidence establishing the benefits to the regional or national 
economy resulting from his specific work. Without sufficient information or evidence regarding any 
projected U.S. economic impact or job creation directly attributable to his future work (as opposed to the 
general economic impact of the industry), the record does not show that benefits to the U.S. regional or 
national economy resulting from the Petitioner's endeavor would reach the level of "substantial positive 
economic effects" contemplated by Dhanasar. Id. 
For the reasons discussed, the Petitioner has not demonstrated that his proposed endeavor would be of 
national importance, and he therefore does not meet the requirements of the first prong of the 
Dhanasar analytical framework. 
6 
III. CONCLUSION 
The appeal must be dismissed because the Form I-290B does not contain a valid signature as 
contemplated by the regulations and USCIS policy. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(7)(ii)(A); see generally I 
USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at A. Moreover, because the Petitioner has not met the requisite first 
prong of the Dhanasar analytical framework, we conclude that he has not established that he is eligible 
for, or otherwise merits, a national interest waiver as a matter of discretion. Since the identified 
reasons for dismissal are dispositive of the Petitioner's appeal, we decline to reach and hereby reserve 
the Petitioner's eligibility and appellate arguments under Dhanasar's second and third prongs as well 
as a determination as to whether the Petitioner has met the requirements of EB-2 classification. See 
INS v Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 ("courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues 
the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reached"). 
The appeal will be dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered an independent and 
alternative basis for the decision. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
7