dismissed H-1B Case: Information Technology

Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
MATTER OF C- INC. DATE: FEB. 27,2017 
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER DECISION 
PETITION: FORM I-129, PETITION FOR A NONIMMIGRANT WORKER 
The Petitioner, an information technology consulting company, seeks to temporarily employ the 
Beneficiary as a "WebSphere portal administrator" under the H -1 B nonimmigrant classification for 
specialty occupations. See Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). The H-lB program allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a 
qualified foreign worker in a position that requires both (a) the theoretical and practical application 
of a body of highly specialized knowledge and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in 
the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. 
The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition. The Director concluded that the record 
does not demonstrate that (1) the Petitioner meets the definition of an United States employer as that 
term is defined at 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(h)( 4 )(ii); and (2) the proffered position qualifies as a specialty 
occupation. 
On appeal, the Petitioner submits a brief and copies of previously provided evidence, and asserts that 
the evidence of record satisfies all evidentiary requirements. 
Upon de novo review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELA TTONSHlP 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 101 ( a)(l5)(H)(i)(b) of the Act defines an H -1 B nonimmigrant, in pertinent part, as an 
individual: 
[S]ubject to section 212(j)(2), who is coming temporarily to the United States to 
perform services ... in a specialty occupation described in section 214(i)(l) ... , who 
meets the requirements for the occupation specified in section 214(i)(2) ... , and with 
respect to whom the Secretary of Labor determines and certifies to the [Secretary of 
Homeland Security] that the intending employer has filed with the Secretary [of 
Labor] an application under section 212(n)(l) .... 
Matter of C- Inc. 
The term "United States employer" is defined at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) as follows: 
United States employer means a person,_ firm, corporation, contractor, or other 
association, or organization in the United States which: 
(1) Engages a person to work within the United States; 
(2) Has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees 
under this part, as indicated by the fact that it may hire, pay, fire. 
supervise, or otherwise control the work ofany such employee; and 
(3) Has an Internal Revenue Service Tax identification number. 
(Emphasis added); see Temporary Alien Workers Seeking Classification Under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act 56 Fed. Reg. 61,111, 61,121 (Dec. 2, 1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 214). 
Although "United States employer" is defined in the regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii), the terms 
"employee" and "employer-employee relationship" are not defined for purposes of the H-1 B visa 
classification. The United States Supreme Court has determined that where federal law fails to clearly 
define the term "employee," courts should conclude that the term was "intended to describe the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)). The Supreme Court stated: 
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of 
agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which 
the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the 
skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the 
duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to 
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion 
over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring 
and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring 
party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and 
the tax treatment of the hired party." 
Jd; see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445 (2003) (quoting 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323). As the common-law test contains "no shorthand formula or magic phrase 
that can be applied to find the answer, ... all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and 
weighed with no one factor being decisive." Darden, 503 U.S. at 324 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. 
of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)). 1 
1 
While the Darden court considered only the definition of "employee" under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S;C. § I 002(6), and did not address the definition of ''employer," courts have generally 
2 
Matter ofC- Inc. 
In considering whether or not one will be an "employee" in an "employer-employee relationship" with 
a "United States employer" for purposes of H-1 B nonimmigrant petitions, U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) must focus on the common-law touchstone of "control." Clackamas, 
538 U.S. at 450; see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) (defining a "United States employer" as one who 
"has an employer-employee relationship with respect to employees under this part, as indicated by the 
fact that it may hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control the work of any such employee . " 
(emphasis added)). 
Such indicia of control include when, where, and how a worker performs the job; the continuity of the 
worker's relationship with the employer; the tax treatment of the worker; the provision of employee 
benefits; and whether the work performed by the worker is part of the employer's regular business. See 
Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445; see also EEOC Compl. Man. at § 2-III(A)(l) (adopting a materially 
identical test and indicating that said test was based on the Darden decision); Defensor v. Meiss1Jer, 201 
F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2000) (determining that hospitals, as the recipients ofbeneficiaries' services, are 
the "true employers" ofH-lB nurses under 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h), even though a medical contract service 
agency is the petitioner, because the hospitals ultimately hire, pay, fire, supervise, or otherwise control 
the work of the beneficiaries). 
It is important to note, however, that the factors listed in Darden and Clackamas are not exhaustive and 
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Other aspects of the relationship between the parties 
relevant to control may affect the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists. 
Furthermore, not all or even a majority of the listed criteria need be met; however, the fact finder must 
weigh and compare a combination of the factors in analyzing the facts of each individual case. The 
determination must be based on all of the circumstances in the relationship between the parties, 
refused to extend the common law agency definition to ERISA 's use of employer because "the definition of 'employer' 
in ERISA, unlike the definition of 'employee,' clearly indicates legislative intent to extend the definition beyond the 
traditional common law definition." See, e.g., Bowers v. Andrew Weir Shipping, Ltd., 810 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
In this matter, the Act does not exhibit a legislative intent to extend the definition of "employer" in section 
I 0 I (a)(I5)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, "employment" in section 212(n)(l )(A)(i) of the Act, or "employee'' in section 
212(n)(2)(C)(vii) of the Act beyond the traditional common law definitions. Instead, in the context of the H-1 8 visa 
classification, the term "United States employer" was defined in the regulations to be even more restrictive than the 
common law agency definition. Specifically, the regulatory definition of "United States employer" requires H-1 8 
employers to have a tax identification number, to engage a person to work within the United States, and to have an 
"employer-employee relationship" with the H-1 8 "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
The lack of an express expansion ~f the definition regarding the terms "employee" or "employer-employee relationship" 
combined with the agency's otherwise generally circular definition of United States employer in 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(ii) indicates that the regulations do r\ot intend to extend the definition beyond "the traditional common law 
definition" or, more importantly, that construing these terms in this manner would thwart congressional design or lead to 
absurd results. Cf Darden, 503 U.S. at 318-19. A federal agency's interpretation of a statute whose administration is 
entrusted to it is to be accepted unless Congress has spoken directly on the issue. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). 
3 
(b)(6)
Matter of C- Inc. 
regardless of whether the parties refer to it as an employee or as an independent contractor relationship. 
See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448-49; EEOC Compl. Man. at§ 2-III(A)(l). 
When examining the factors relevant to determining control, USCIS must assess and weigh each actual 
factor itself as it exists or will exist and not the claimed employer's right to influence or change that 
factor, unless specifically provided for by the common-law test. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24. For 
example, while the assignment of additional projects is dependent on who has the right to assign them, 
it is the actual source of the instrumentalities and tools that must be examined, and not who has the 
right to provide the tools required to complete an assigned project. See id. at 323. 
Lastly, the "mere existence of a document styled 'employment agreement'" shall not lead inexorably to 
the conclusion that the worker is an employee. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450. "Rather, ... the answer to 
whether [an individual] is an employee depends on 'all of the incidents of the relationship ... with no 
one factor being decisive.'" !d. at 451 (quoting Darden, 503 U.S. at 324). 
B. Analysis 
Applying the Darden and Clackamas tests to this matter, we find that the Petitioner has not 
established that it will be a "United States employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" 
with the Beneficiary as an H-lB temporary "employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
In the instant case, the Petitioner, which is located in North Carolina, indicated that it will assign the 
Beneficiary to work for the end-client, in Missouri, for the duration 
of the validity period requested. The contractual chain through which the Beneficiary's assignment 
has been arranged is as follows: the Petitioner contracted with the mid-vendor, 
which contracted with another mid-vendor, which in turn 
contracted with 
Although the Beneficiary will work in a remote location on another company's project, the 
Petitioner maintains that it will supervise the Beneficiary and control his work. The Petitioner stated 
that it is "the beneficiary's employer with exclusive authority over his specialty occupation work." 
The Petitioner further stated that "[t]he beneficiary will be operating at all times under [the 
Petitioner's] management, and all activities, including the ability to hire, fire, pay, and supervise the 
beneficiary, and administer taxes and benefits, will be controlled by [the Petitioner] throughout the 
requested validity period." Nevertheless, the evidence of record does not meaningfully demonstrate 
how the Petitioner will provide such claimed supervision and control in this situation. 
For instance, the Petitioner has not identified which of its employees will supervise the Beneficiary's 
substantive work on a daily basis. According to the Beneficiary's two performance evaluations 
(completed in February and July 2016), his supervisor appears to be the Petitioner's human 
4 
(b)(6)
Matter of C- Inc. 
resources manager. 2 But the Petitioner has not further explained such aspects as (1) how the human 
resources manager will exercise supe17Vision and control, and (2) the basis of his or her knowledge, 
as a human resources manager, to oversee the substantive work of the Beneficiary in his position as a 
WebSphere portal administrator. Furthermore, both performance evaluations purport to have been 
completed at different times and by different individuals, but the content in each of them is identical. 
We therefore must question the accuracy and credibility of these evaluations. 
The Petitioner also has not explained in detail such aspects as the manner and frequency with which 
it communicates with the Beneficiary about his substantive work. While the record contains weekly 
"status sheets" about the tasks the Beneficiary has completed and is in progress, we note that these 
reports were completed by the Beneficiary. 3 That the Beneficiary is the one providing the Petitioner 
with such information, and not the other way around, raises additional questions as to how much 
knowledge and control the Petitioner has over the Beneficiary's,daily assignments. 
Significantly, the evidence of record does not contain any official documentation directly from the 
end-client that is ultimately receiving the Beneficiary's services. The record contains letters and 
contracts from or between the Petitioner and the mid-vendors; however, such documentation is not 
probative 
towards establishing the terms and conditions of the Beneficiary's assignment as imposed 
by the end-client. See Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88 (requiring evidence from the end-client about 
the proposed position). While the Petitioner submitted an "Affidavit of Co-Worker" from 
whom the Petitioner identifies as an employee of the en d-el ient, we find that this letter 
does not constitute official, reliable evidence directly from the end-client. Even if it did (which it 
does not), this letter lacks critical information such as who assigns and reviews the Beneficiary's 
onsite work, and the writer's relationship to the Beneficiary in terms of the organizational or team 
hierarchy. The Petitioner must support its assertions with relevant, probative, and credible 
evidence. See Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 376 (AAO 2010). 
The work orders executed between the Petitioner and identify the "client" as not 
\ 
Also, these work orders state that "[f]inal_ execution of this SOW is subject to client 
acceptance and approval." But the Petitioner has not submitted corroborating evidence of 
final acceptance and approval of the work orders. Further, the work orders state that: "Direct 
interactions between you [the Beneficiary] and the above mentioned client are appropriate in matters 
related to your job duties and responsibilities and not related to the pay/bill rate (violation of 
contract)." The professional services agreement between the Petitioner and similarly states 
that the Petitioner's "personnel provided ~mder this Agreement shall perform their assignments in 
accordance with the directions of the client as specified in [the work orders]." The 
Petitioner has not further explained the nature of the "directions" on "matters related to [his] job 
duties and responsibilities" that the Beneficiary receives from Considering this language 
2 
Both performance evaluations identified the "reviewer" as the Petitioner's "HR Manager," although they identified two 
different individuals in this position. 
3 The Petitioner stated in its support letter that "[ e ]ach [Petitioner's] employee completes a weekly status sheet." 
5 
(b)(6)
Matter ofC- Inc. 
found in the work orders and the professional services agreement governing them, we must further 
question the extent of the Petitioner's supervision and control over the Beneficiary. 
The Petitioner did not submit the master service agreement between and claiming 
that it is "confidential and will not be disclosed to any third-party." Nevertheless, the Petitioner 
submitted the task order between ("Consultant") and which identifies the 
Beneficiary as the "Consultant's Personnel." This task order specifically identifies an 
employee, as the project coordinator who "shall assume operational responsibility for this 
Task Order" and who is "[r]esponsible for signing off acceptance of service [as the 
employee who is based onsite."4 The task order further identifies a 
employee, as the "Consultant Representative," i.e., the Beneficiary's representative. Critically, 
however, the Petitioner has not further explained the relationship between 
and the Petitioner's human resources manager (or another employee) with respect to the 
Beneficiary's work. Thus, the Petitioner has not sufficiently explained how it nevertheless retains 
"exclusive authority" over the Beneficiary's work when an employee is the on-site project 
coordinator responsible for the task order, and a employee is designated as the Beneficiary's 
"representative." 
We acknowledge the copies of the Beneficiary's emails regarding the end-client project. At most 
these emails demonstrate the Beneficiary's assignment to the end-client project. They do not, 
however, illuminate the nature of the Beneficiary's work relationship with the Petitioner. They do 
not answer the question of who, on behalf of the Petitioner, oversees, directs, assigns, reviews, 
affects, supervises, or otherwise controls the Beneficiary's day-to-day work. Therefore, the key 
element in this matter, which is who exercises actual control over the Beneficiary, has not been 
substantiated. 
We turn to the letter from stating that the Petitioner "shall function as [the Beneficiary's] 
employer and shall undertake responsibilities such as Filing/Extending his H 1 B Visa, taking care of 
all immigration-related matters, Payroll, hiring and controlling his work and any additional 
employee benefits according to relevant federal and/or state law." As discussed above, the Petitioner 
has not demonstrated that it exercises actual control over the Beneficiary's work. It therefore 
appears that the Petitioner's role and responsibilities are essentially limited to the administration of 
the Beneficiary's payroll and other related benefits, including the filing of immigration benefits. 
Accordingly, we are unable to find that the requisite employer-employee relationship will exist 
between the Petitioner and the Beneficiary. See Defensor, 201 F.3d at 388 (with the Petitioner's role 
limited to essentially the functions of a payroll administrator, the Beneficiary is even paid, in the 
end, by the client or end client). 
Based on the tests outlined above, the Petitioner has not established that it will be a "United States 
employer" having an "employer-employee relationship" with the Beneficiary as an H-1 B temporary 
"employee." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii). 
4 
is also the "client manager" who signed off on the Beneficiary's time sheet. 
Matter of C- Inc. 
II. SPECIALTY OCCUPATION 
We also find that the record does not sufficiently demonstrate that the proffered position qualities as 
a specialty occupation. 
A. Legal Framework 
Section 214(i)(l) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(l), defines the term "specialty occupation" as an 
occupation that requires: 
(A) theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge, and 
(B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its 
equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(ii) largely restates this statutory definition, but adds a non­
exhaustive list of fields of endeavor. In addition, the regulations provide that the proffered position 
must meet one of the following criteria to qualify as a specialty occupation: 
(I) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the minimum 
requirement for entry into the particular position; 
(2) The degree requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among 
similar organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its 
particular position is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an 
individual with a degree; 
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or 
( 4) The nature of the specific duties [is] so specialized and complex that 
knowledge required to perform the duties is usually associated with the 
attainment of a baccalaureate or higher degree. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A). We have consistently interpreted the term "degree" in the criteria at 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) to mean not just any baccalaureate or higher degree, but one in a 
specific specialty that is directly related to the proposed position. See Royal Siam Corp. v. Cherto.ff, 
484 F.3d 139, 147 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing "a degree requirement in a specific specialty" as "one 
that relates directly to the duties and responsibilities of a particular position"); Defensor, 201 F.3d at 
387. 
As recognized in Defensor, 201 F.3d at 387-88, it is necessary for the end-client to provide sufficient 
information regarding the proposed job duties to be performed at its location(s) in order to properly 
Matter of C- Inc. 
ascertain the minimum educational requirements necessary to perform those duties. In other words, 
as the beneficiaries in that case would provide services to the end-client hospitals and not to the 
petitioning staffing company, the petitioner-provided job duties and alleged requirements to perform 
those duties were insufficient for a specialty occupation determination. See id. It is the duties 
described by the end-client that control in this situation. 
B. Analysis 
Because it is necessary for the end-client to provide sufficient information regarding the proposed 
job duties to be performed, it is the end-client's position description that controls in this situation. 
See id. As previously discussed, however, the Petitioner has not provided any reliable 
documentation directly from the end-client verifying the Beneficiary's assignment, job duties, or job 
requirements. Without sufficient information from the end-client regarding the proposed position, 
we cannot find that the Petitioner has satisfied its burden of proof in establishing the substantive 
nature of the proffered position. 
While Petitioner-provided job duties and requirements are generally outside the scope of 
consideration for establishing whether the position qualifies as a specialty occupation in cases such 
as this (i.e., in cases where the Petitioner is not the entity ultimately receiving the Beneficiary's 
services), we are nevertheless considering the Petitioner's job descriptions for the purpose of 
highlighting their insufficiency. 
Here, the Petitioner stated that the Beneficiary will serve as a "WebSphere portal administrator" and 
will perform the following duties (verbatim): 
• Incident support and enhancements. 10% 
• Support WebSphere Portal, Web Content Management, WebSphere Application 
Server. 20% 
• Design/Create new portal pages, Add/Configure portlets, Content syndication from 
one environment to another and User provisioning. 5% 
• Apply fixes/fix packs/perform Upgrades/Migrations based on the need/requirement. 
20% 
• Support WebSphere Portal deployments from development to pre-production and 
production environments. 5% 
• Troubleshoot performance problems considering infrastructure, database and other 
portal interfaces. I 0% 
• Install/Configure/Support Webservers- Apache, HIS, liS. 2% 
• Support WebSphere Application Server and Web Servers (Apache, HIS, liS) in 
WebSphere environments. 3% 
• Provide day to day administration of WebSphere Application Server environments 
including configuration changes. 10% 
• Support production environment during non-business hours. 10% 
8 
(b)(6)
-----------------------------------~-------~-----------------------------
Matter of C- Inc. 
• Provide Technical support to application developers. 3% 
• Document all the changes/issues/resolutions. 2% 
The duties that the Petitioner attributes to the proffered position are vague and could apply to many 
different computer-related positions. For example, the Petitioner has not explained what exactly it 
meant by stating that the Beneficiary will provide "support." The Petitioner stated that the 
Beneficiary will provide "incident support," "support WebSphere Portal," "support WebSphere 
Portal deployments," "support WebSphere Application Server and Web Servers," "support 
Webservers," "support production environment," and "technical support." But the word "support" 
does not adequately communicate the actual work that the Beneficiary will perform, and whether 
such work is consistent with the "Database Administrators" occupational classification selected on 
the labor condition application. It also does not convey the complexity, uniqueness and/or 
specialization of the tasks, and the correlation between that work and a need for a particular level of 
education and knowledge in a specific specialty. 
The Petitioner also has not adequately distinguished each of the listed job duties. The Petitioner 
listed at least two different job duties expressly calling for the Beneficiary to support the WebSphere 
portal, and at least three different job duties expressly involving the support of the WebSphere 
Application Server. It is not apparent from the record how these duties differ from one another, e.g., 
the difference in his "support" duties and the difference between the "WebSphere Portal," 
"WebSphere Application Server," and "Web Servers." 
On a more fundamental level, the 
record lacks a detailed explanation about the particular end-client 
project(s) to which the Beneficiary will be assigned. For instance, the letter from simply 
states that the Beneficiary will be assigned to the "Websphere Portal Admin for the 
and/or ongoing related projects." There is no additional explanation, whether in the 
letter or other record evidence, about the "Websphere Portal Admin" project or any of the 
other "ongoing related projects." There is not even an explanation of what type of company the end­
client is. 
According to the Petitioner, the only contractual parties involved in the Beneficiary's assignment are 
the two mid-vendors and and the end-client However, the Petitioner's 
performance evaluations reference several other parties whose roles and responsibilities have not 
been identified. More specifically, the performance evaluations state that the Beneficiary "has 
keenly worked with and "has actively been part of vendor meetings with They 
also state that the Beneficiary was able to "get the team to work on the issue." We also 
recall our earlier finding that, despite these evaluations' purported completion at different times by 
different individuals, the content found therein is identical. As such, we must question the accuracy 
and reliability of the performance evaluations with respect to their descriptions of the Beneficiary's 
work. The Petitioner must resolve the inconsistencies with independent, objective evidence pointing 
to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). 
9 
Matter ofC- Inc. 
Finally, the Petitioner stated on several occasions that the position requires at least a bachelor's 
degree in computer science, electrical engineering, or a related field, or the equivalent. In contrast, 
one of the mid-vendor's letters states that the proffered position requires a "Master of Science 
[degree] in Software engineering." Again, it is incumbent upon the Petitioner to resolve 
inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. !d. The Petitioner has not 
reconciled this and the other inconsistencies in the record. Without more, we find the record of 
proceedings insufficient to explain and document what exactly the Beneficiary will do for the entire 
period of time requested, why the proffered job duties require a particular level of education, and 
what that particular level of education is. 
In other words, we find the record of proceedings insufficient to demonstrate the substantive nature 
of the proffered position. We are therefore precluded from finding that the proffered position 
satisfies any criterion at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), because it is the substantive nature of that 
work that determines (1) the normal minimum educational requirement for entry into the particular 
position, which is the focus of criterion 1; (2) industry positions which are parallel to the proffered 
position and thus appropriate for review for a common degree requirement, under the first alternate 
prong of criterion 2; (3) the level of complexity or uniqueness of the proffered position, which is the 
focus of the second alternate prong of criterion 2; ( 4) the factual justification for a petitioner 
normally requiring a degree or its equivalent, when that is an issue under criterion 3; and (5) the 
degree of specialization and complexity of the specific duties, which is the focus of criterion 4. 
Accordingly, as the Petitioner has not established that it has satisfied any of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A), it cannot be found that the protiered position qualifies for classification as a 
specialty occupation. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The burden is on the Petitioner to show eligibility for the immigration benefit sought. Section 291 of 
the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
Cite as Matter ofC- Inc., ID# 200479 (AAO Feb. 27, 2017) 
10