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PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of EIomeland Security 
20 Mass Ave., N.W., Room 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
File: WAC 04 038 52569 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: 
 SEP 0 8 2006 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 10 l(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
-2- 
- 
,/"-- 
Rob-emann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 04 038 52569 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its president as an L-1A 
nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of Hawaii that 
is engaged in the marketing, sales and trading of air filter products. The petitioner claims that it is the 
subsidiary of Koair CO., Ltd. located in Kimpo, Korea. The beneficiary was initially granted a one-year 
period of stay to open a new office in the United States and the petitioner now seeks to extend the 
beneficiary's stay. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary would be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner addresses the director's 
grounds for denial and asserts that a favorable decision is warranted. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
WAC 04 038 52569 
Page 3 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(A) 
 Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying organizations 
as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(B) 
 Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) 
 A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year and the 
duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) 
 A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the number of 
employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence of wages paid to 
employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity; and 
(E) 
 Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
At issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary would be employed by the United States entity in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
WAC 04 038 52569 
Page 4 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In a letter dated November 14, 2003 accompanying the Form 1-129, the petitioner described the beneficiary's 
the job duties as follows: 
[The beneficiary] is essentially unsupervised and her duties entail directing the overall 
management and control enterprise [sic], including participating in the establishing of policy 
and goals. She is exercising wide latitude in discretionary decision-making and subject only 
to supervision by the parent company's board of directors. 
The key elements of her duties are as follow: 
I. Managerial capacity 
(1) Human resource management is the significant company strategy that she concerns [sic]. 
Currently, the petitioner has 4 employees including [the beneficiary], but, as president, 
[she] supervises and manages 3 all other employees [sic]. In addition, they have planned 
to hire more employees within next year according to business plan and recruit 
independent contracted sales agents. [The beneficiary] also supervises them indirectly. 
(2) She directs and manages communication with customers and vendors direct [sic] to sales 
 . 
manager and employees. 
(3) She plans marketing strategy for new customers and new products. 
(4) She research[es] and review[s] market trend and situation in [the U.S.] and South 
America and makes report to BOD of the foreign parent company and evaluates business 
activities and make necessary changes according to the new market situation and adapts 
them to new business policies and goals. 
(5) She makes strategies to improve corporate image and satisfy the local customers' needs in 
the US. 
11. Professional knowledge of the parent company's business 
(6) Increase company recognition in the U.S. market; approval of marketing strategies for the 
petitioner's business and parent company's products. 
WAC 04 038 52569 
Page 5 
(7) Search potential customers and business partners: meet potential clients and business 
partners and discuss & negotiate with them for future contacts [sic]. 
(8) Cooperate with the parent company: Coordination with parent company regarding 
technical trends to improve quality of products. 
In addition, as president, [the beneficiary] is responsible for managing and controlling the 
company including hiring, firing, promoting and demoting personnel. The beneficiary is also 
responsible for managing and controlling the work of other enterprise officers, managers and 
supervisors, including hiring, firing, promoting and demoting personnel [sic]. She plans and 
formulate[s] aspects of research and development projects, and developing long range goals 
and objectives. Finally, she exercises complete discretion over the enterprise's day-to-day 
operations. 
The petitioner submitted a proposed organizational chart for the U.S. entity showing that the beneficiary's 
subordinate staff consists of (1) a sales department with one manager and one sales staff, and with additional 
customer service staff yet to be hired, (2) an administration department with one person responsible for 
accounting and an assistant to be hired when there is greater business volume, and (3) an importlexport 
department which was not yet staffed. 
On December 6, 2003, the director requested additional evidence to establish that the beneficiary has been 
performing the duties of a manager or executive with the U.S. company, including (1) the total number of 
employees at the U.S. office where the beneficiary would work, (2) copies of the U.S. entity's Federal Form 
941, Quarterly Wages Reports, for all employees for the preceding two quarters, (3) copies of the U.S. 
company's payroll summary and Forms W-2 and W-3, and (4) copies of the U.S. entity's California 
Employment Development Department Form DE-6, Quarterly Wages Reports, for all employees for the 
preceding two quarters, noting that if the U.S. company is not located in California then the wage reports for 
the appropriate state. 
In a letter dated January 29, 2004, responding to the request for evidence, counsel for the petitioner indicated 
that the petitioner has four employees, including the beneficiary, a sales manager, a sales specialist, and an 
administrative staff. Counsel included brief descriptions of these employees' job duties and stated that the 
petitioner plans to hire three more employees by June 2004. The petitioner submitted its Hawaii wage reports 
for the last two quarters in 2003, the company's payroll summary for the year 2003, and Forms W-2 for all 
four employees for the year 2003. 
On February 13, 2004, the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the 
beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Specifically, the director noted that, although the beneficiary is claimed to be an executive, the job description 
does not indicate that she "establish[es] goals and policies for the U.S. company" as the regulations require. 
In addition, the director found the evidence indicates that a preponderance of the beneficiary's time would be 
spent on non-managerial duties. Finally, the director found that there is no evidence on record of a 
subordinate staff of managerial, supervisory or professional employees to relieve the beneficiary from 
performing non-qualifying duties. 
WAC 04 038 52569 
Page 6 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner addresses the director's grounds for denial and assert that a favorable 
decision is warranted because (1) the beneficiary does function in an executive capacity, (2) the 
preponderance of the beneficiary's time is spent on duties of a managerial nature, and (3) one of the 
beneficiary's subordinate qualifies as a manager. 
Upon review of the record, the AAO concurs with the director's conclusion that the record is insufficient to 
demonstrate that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will 
look first to the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The 
petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary 
and indicate whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. The petitioner must 
specifically state whether the beneficiary is primarily employed in a managerial or executive capacity. A 
petitioner cannot claim that some of the duties of the position entail executive responsibilities, while other 
duties are managerial. A beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely 
on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. If the petitioner chooses to represent the beneficiary as 
both an executive and a manager, it must establish that the beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set forth 
in the statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition for manager. 
In this matter, while the petitioner did not make an explicit claim in the initial petition that the beneficiary is 
employed both in a managerial capacity and in an executive capacity, the job description the petitioner 
provided attempts to characterize the beneficiary's job under both categories. However, the AAO finds that 
the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's "executive" duties is vague and generally paraphrases the 
statutory definition of executive capacity. See section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(44)(A). 
For instance, the petitioner states that the beneficiary's "duties entail directing the overall management and 
control enterprise [sic], including participating in the establishing of policy and goals. She is exercising wide 
latitude in discretionary decision-making and subject only to supervision by the parent company's board of 
directors." As counsel claimed on appeal, the petitioner did include the "establish goals and policies" 
language in this description. Nonetheless, the description is merely a reiteration of the four criteria in the 
statutory definition of "executive capacity" and no more. Without specific details regarding what the 
beneficiary actually does on a daily basis, conclusory assertions regarding the beneficiary's employment 
capacity are not sufficient to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. Merely repeating the language of the 
statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. 
Supp. 1 103, 1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); Avyr Associates Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 
WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two main parts. First, the petitioner must show 
that the beneficiary performs the high level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the 
petitioner must prove that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not 
spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 
(Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). Here, the director concluded that the evidence indicates 
that a preponderance of the beneficiary's time would be spent on non-managerial duties. Counsel asserts on 
appeal that the petitioner is still in the developing stage and will hire additional employees. Thus, counsel 
WAC 04 038 52569 
Page 7 
states, at this stage of business operations, the beneficiary is not entirely relieved from non-managerial duties, 
but a preponderance of the beneficiary's time is still spent on duties that are managerial in nature. 
The AAO does not find counsel's assertion to be persuasive. The job description provided by the petitioner 
indicates that the beneficiary is engaged in significant marketing activities for the company (i.e., "plans 
marketing strategy for new customers and new products," "research[es] and review[s] market trend and 
situation in [the U.S.] and South America," "makes strategies to improve corporate image and satisfy the local 
customers' needs in the US," "increase company recognition in the U.S. market; approval of marketing 
strategies for the petitioner's business and parent company's products"). Even though the petitioner claims 
that the beneficiary plans, makes and approves of marketing strategies for the company, the record does not 
indicate that any other employee of the petitioner is involved in the implementation of these marketing 
strategies. Thus, it would appear that the beneficiary herself directly engages in the day-to-day 
implementation of the company's marketing strategies as well as the planning. As such, some of the 
beneficiary's work in marketing would be considered tasks that are necessary to provide the company's 
services or product, and would not be considered managerial or executive in nature. In listing the 
beneficiary's duties, the petitioner has not quantified the time the beneficiary spends on them. Because the 
beneficiary's job involves tasks that are not executive or managerial in nature, as described above, the 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) cannot determine what proportion of the beneficiary's duties 
would be managerial or executive in nature and what proportion would not qualify as such. An employee 
who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to 
be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act 
(requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of 
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). Based on the foregoing, the AAO 
concurs with the director's conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the beneficiary's job 
duties are "primarily" managerial in nature. 
Although the beneficiary is not required to supervise personnel, if it is claimed that her duties involve 
supervising employees, as is the case here, the petitioner must establish that the subordinate employees are 
supervisory, professional, or managerial. See 9 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. On appeal, counsel does not 
contest the director's finding that the beneficiary does not supervise professional employees. Counsel claims, 
however, that the beneficiary does supervise a managerial employee. The AAO finds that the record does not 
support this claim. In response to the director's request for further evidence, counsel has described the sales 
manager's duties as "mainly engaged in managing local clients, developing new business partners and 
customers and searching and developing effective distribution channels;" and the sales specialist's duties are 
described as "meets with customers and makes reports of customer requirements, claims and needs [and] 
manages the importlexport schedules." Thus, it would appear that these two employees share the different 
responsibilities in the sales department, but it is not clear that the sales manager actually "manages" the sales 
specialist, or the entire sales function, such that he can be considered a "manager" other than in title. As such, 
the petitioner has not shown that the beneficiary supervises subordinate employees who are supervisory, 
managerial, nor has the petitioner shown that any of the beneficiary's subordinates are professionals, as 
required by section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
WAC 04 038 52569 
Page 8 
In light of the foregoing, the AAO finds that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the beneficiary 
would be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, as required by 8 
C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3). 
Beyond the director's decision, the petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that a 
qualifying relationship continues to exist between the U.S. and foreign entities. The regulations and case law 
confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in determining whether a qualifying 
relationship exists between the United States and foreign entities for purposes of this visa classification. 
Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 593; see also Matter of Siemens Medical 
Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comrn. 1982). In the 
context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of 
an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority 
to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
On the L Supplement to Form 1-129, the petitioner indicated that the U.S. entity is wholly owned by the 
foreign entity. In support of this claim, the petitioner submits a copy of share certificate number 1 of the U.S. 
entity, which indicates that the foreign entity owns 10,000 shares of the U.S. entity. The petitioner submitted 
no other evidence of ownership interest in the U.S. entity. As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed 
qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient evidence to determine whether a stockholder 
maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate 
registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to 
determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent 
percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose 
all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, the management and direction of the 
subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, 
Inc, 19 I&N Dec. 362. Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, CIS is unable to determine the 
elements of ownership and control, and therefore cannot conclude that a qualifling relationship between the 
U.S. and foreign entities continues to exist as claimed. For this additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
In addition, the record contains insufficient evidence to establish that the overseas company employed the 
beneficiary in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. On the L Supplement to Form 1-129, the 
petitioner indicated that the beneficiary was the director of the foreign company's research and development 
department from January 2000 through December 2002. The petitioner also submitted copies of certificates 
of income showing wages paid to the beneficiary by the foreign entity in the years 2001 and 2002. However, 
the petitioner has failed to include any description of the beneficiary's job duties with the foreign entity. 
Without such information, CIS is unable to determine whether the beneficiary's "prior year of employment 
abroad was in a position that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge" as required under 
8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(iv). For this additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afyd, 345 F.3d 683 
WAC 04 038 52569 
Page 9 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if she shows that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligbility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.