dismissed L-1A Case: Aluminum Products Distribution

identifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office ofAdministrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC 07 121 52493 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: NL 2 E/ 2009 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 10 1(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any firther inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 9 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
~ohn F. Grissom 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 07 121 52493 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: 
 The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonirnmigrant 
visa. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will 
dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonirnmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its general 
manager as an L-1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a 
corporation organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico that is engaged in the 
sale and distribution of aluminum products. The petitioner claims that it is a branch of Aluminio 
Dominican0 CA located in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. The beneficiary was initially 
granted a one-year period of stay to open a new office in the United States, and subsequently granted 
a one-year extension of status. The petitioner now seeks to extend the beneficiary's stay for three 
additional years. 
The director denied the petition on two separate and alternative grounds, concluding that the 
petitioner did not establish (1) that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity, or (2) that the beneficiary was employed by the foreign 
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the 
director's decision is in error. Counsel contends that the director incorrectly analyzed the evidence 
and included facts that are different from what was on record. Counsel further contends that the 
director did not ask for evidence regarding the position that the beneficiary occupied in the foreign 
company, and, moreover, that evidence was already part of the record as it was previously submitted 
as part of the initial L-1A petition for which this petition is an extension. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the 
criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the 
United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a 
subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will 
employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph 
(l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
' EAC 07 121 52493 
Page 3 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or 
specialized knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the 
services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time 
employment abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years 
preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position 
that was managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the 
alien's prior education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform 
the intended services in the United States; however, the work in the United 
States need not be the same work which the alien perfonned abroad. 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary would be employed by the United 
States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" 
as an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential hction within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is 
directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered 
to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's 
supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" 
as an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function 
of the organization; 
' EAC 07 12 1 52493 
Page 4 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In the L Supplement to Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, filed on March 29, 2007, 
the petitioner described the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States as "[mlanagement of 
day to today [sic] operation of [the petitioner] including: sales, promotions, warehouse and 
distribution. Reporting to company president." The petitioner indicated that it has five employees. 
On May 21, 2007, the director issued a request for additional evidence (RFE). 
 The director 
requested a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States, 
indicating how the beneficiary's duties will be managerial or executive in nature. The petitioner was 
also asked to demonstrate that the beneficiary will function at a senior level within an organizational 
hierarchy as well as in position title, or that he will be managing a subordinate staff of professional, 
managerial, or supervisory personnel who will relieve him from performing non-qualifying duties. 
The director also requested additional evidence showing the management and personnel structure of 
the company, including information regarding: the number of subordinate supervisors under the 
beneficiary's management and the title and job description of each of those employees, the 
executive/managerial or technical skills required to perform the beneficiary's duties and the amount 
of time to be spent by the beneficiary on those duties as compared to other non-qualifying functions, 
and the degree of discretionary authority in day-to-day operations the beneficiary will have. In 
addition, the petitioner was asked to provide an organizational chart showing the beneficiary's 
position within the company. 
In a letter dated August 15, 2007 responding to the RFE, counsel for the petitioner described the 
beneficiary's job responsibilities as follow: 
As CommerciaVGeneral Manager of PPA, [the beneficiary] is responsible for sales, 
marketing, information technology, logistics, human resources, finance and public 
affairs of the company in Puerto Rico. He is in charge of establishing sales prices and 
objectives, overseeing the ordering of the purchase of materials, responsible for the 
validation of inventory, setting and managing the company's budget, approving credit 
for customers, acquiring commercial credit for the company, as well as contracting 
and supervising personnel, representin the ALDOM conglomerate in the island, 
reporting to the General Directorate, who maintains his office in 
the Dominican Republic. 
The petitioner provided an organizational chart showing the beneficiary at the top of the 
organizational structure in the Puerto Rico company. Below him are an attorney, an accountant, and 
a human resources employee. The chart also shows under the beneficiary's chain of command a 
sales manager and receptionist in the general office in Caguas, Puerto Rico; a sales assistant in the 
' EAC 07 121 52493 
Page 5 
Bayamon, Puerto Rico branch office; and an unspecified number of drivers and dispatchers in the 
warehouse located in Caguas. The petitioner did not submit job descriptions for all employees under 
the beneficiary's supervision as the director requested. However, counsel for the petitioner stated the 
following with respect to the beneficiary's supervision of certain subordinate employees: 
[The beneficiary] oversees the work of [the attorney] in charge of all contractual 
agreements between buyers and the company, notarization of all warranty deeds of 
the transactions, lawsuits to recoup and enforce letters of credit with buyers, and all 
other general legal matters. 
[The beneficiary] also oversees the work of the accountants in charge of the corporate 
account, financial auditing and preparation of reports for [the beneficiary's] 
presentation to the [parent company.] 
[The beneficiary] also oversees the work of [the human resources employee] in 
charge of the governmental reporting of all personnel and corporate tax liabilities, 
worker compensation, insurance fund, etc. at state, municipal, and local level, payroll 
and others. 
In the August 2007 letter, counsel also indicated that the company has been working with an entity 
called Labor Ready, which provides contract labor for the company's operations. Counsel indicated 
that the beneficiary is responsible for the final interview and acceptance, and the training and 
supervision, of workers selected and sent to the U.S. company by Labor Ready. Counsel stated that 
Labor Ready is responsible for payroll expenses and tax obligations for such contract workers, who 
are not counted towards the full-time staff of the U.S. company. The petitioner provided a copy of a 
document confirming the rates and services of Labor Ready and copies of four work tickets under 
the arrangement - three for eight hours of work each on June 22,2007 and the last for an unspecified 
amount of time on July 16, 2007, all by different individuals. 
Counsel also stated in the August 2007 letter that the beneficiary is in charge of the expansion plan 
to increase the company's commercial retail service with showrooms in Caguas, Bayamon and 
Ponce. Counsel claimed that the beneficiary has selected and trained sales and customer service 
personnel for the new office in Bayamon who would be reporting to the beneficiary. However, 
counsel did not identify those employees or provide any information with respect to their job 
responsibilities or titles. Counsel stated that the beneficiary "visits prospects and established 
customers of the company to introduce them [to] the company's products, offer them raw materials 
to other windows and door assembly companies in the island besides overseeing their local retail 
market of windows and doors to clients [sic]." Counsel stated that the beneficiary will have "100% 
discretionary authority" over the operations of the U.S. company and will report directly to the 
president of the U.S. company and the petitioner's parent company in the Dominican Republic. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary 
will be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director 
found the record does not demonstrate that the beneficiary would be primarily performing duties that 
EAC 07 121 52493 
Page 6 
are managerial or executive in nature. Specifically, the director noted that the beneficiary would 
likely be directly involved in the sale and marketing of the U.S. company's products as the 
organizational chart shows no sales or marketing staff. Further, the director noted that the petitioner 
has failed to provide job descriptions for the beneficiary's subordinate staff, therefore, the record is 
insufficient to show that the beneficiary supervises subordinate managerial employees who would 
relieve him from performing non-qualifying duties. The director also noted that the beneficiary's 
salary is not commensurate with a bona fide manager or executive position in a major metropolitan 
business market. Cumulatively, the director concluded, these factors indicate that the beneficiary 
does not occupy a managerial or executive position in the U.S., company. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the director's decision is in error. With respect to 
the beneficiary's position in the U.S. company, counsel asserts that the director failed to take into 
account contract workers such as those provided by Labor Ready. Counsel states that, contrary to 
the director's comment that the petitioner has no sales staff, the organizational chart shows a sales 
manager in the Caguas office and an sales assistant in Bayamon. Counsel argues that the beneficiary 
is in charge and responsible for the sales, marketing, information technology, logistics, human 
resources, finance and public affairs of the company. Counsel claims that the beneficiary does not 
perform the tasks involved in those areas, but rather oversees work performed by his staff in those 
areas. Counsel argues that the type of industry, needs and purpose of the company must be taken 
into account, and in this case, the company is young and Puerto Rico is going through a recession. 
Counsel asserts that the beneficiary's salary and benefits fall within the average range for 
comparable positions in Puerto Rico, and in any case, the beneficiary's salary level should not be a 
factor in the assessment of his eligibility for L-IA status. 
On reviewing the petition and the evidence, the AAO concurs with the director's conclusion that the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed in the U.S. in a managerial or 
executive capacity. When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the 
AAO will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the 
beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
The petitioner has provided a vague and nonspecific description of the beneficiary's duties that fails 
to demonstrate what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states 
generally that the beneficiary "is responsible for sales, marketing, information technology, logistics, 
human resources, finance and public affairs of the company." The petitioner further lists duties such 
as "in charge of establishing sales prices and objectives, overseeing the ordering of the purchase of 
materials, responsible for the validation of inventory, setting and managing the company's budget," 
and "contracting and supervising personnel." Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or 
broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a critical question in this case: 
What does the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal 
the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence 
is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 
EAC 07 121 52493 
Page 7 
22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Cornm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 
190 (Reg. Cornrn. 1972)). 
Further, it is noted that although the petitioner claims that the beneficiary supervises a staff of 
subordinate employees, the evidence of record does not reveal exactly how many employees are 
under the beneficiary's supervision, or what it is that the beneficiary's subordinate employees 
actually do. In response to the director's request for an explanation of the job duties, level of 
authority, and responsibilities of all employees under the beneficiary's supervision, the petitioner 
only provided one-sentence descriptions of the general areas of responsibilities of the attorney, 
accountant, and human resource employee. No job description was provided for the remaining staff, 
nor did the petitioner state exactly how many dispatchers and drivers are in its employ. The 
regulation states that the petitioner shall submit additional evidence as the director, in his or her 
discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit further 
information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established, as of the 
time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. $5 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The failure to submit requested 
evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
4 103.2(b)(14). 
In this instance, the job descriptions of the beneficiary's subordinates are crucial to the determination 
of whether the beneficiary functions in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Without 
sufficient information regarding the job responsibilities of the staff, the petitioner's claims regarding 
the beneficiary's managerial responsibilities cannot be ascertained, especially as the beneficiary's job 
description itself lacks specific details. 
For example, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary is responsible for the U.S. company's "sales, 
marketing, information technology, logistics, human resources, finance and public affairs activities." 
Counsel reiterates this claim on appeal and argues that "a reasonable person" would understand that 
the beneficiary does not actually perform the tasks involved in these area, but rather, would 
supervise the work of his subordinates in these areas. However, without documentary evidence to 
support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The 
unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 
533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 
17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). Without the requested descriptions of the job responsibilities of 
the beneficiary's subordinates, it cannot be ascertained who, if anyone, on the petitioner's staff other 
than the beneficiary actually performs the required tasks in the areas of "sales, marketing, 
information technology [and] logistics." If the beneficiary is performing these functions, the AAO 
notes that an employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to 
provide services is not considered to be primarily employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
Matter of Church of Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Cornrn. 1988). In any case, 
the AAO is left to question the validity of the petitioner's claim and the remainder of the 
beneficiary's claimed duties. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead 
to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the 
visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,59 1 (BIA 1988). 
EAC 07 121 52493 
Page 8 
It is noted that the petitioner claims to use the services of a number of contract workers through an 
outsourcing agency. However, the petitioner has neither presented sufficient evidence to document 
the existence of these contract workers nor explained how the services of these contractors obviate 
the need for the beneficiary to primarily conduct the petitioner's business. Without documentary 
evidence to support its statements, the petitioner does not meet its burden of proof in these 
proceedings. 
 Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 165. 
 Moreover, it is noted that the document 
confirming rates and services with Labor Ready is dated July 6, 2007, and the work tickets were 
dated June 21 and July 16, 2007, several months after the petition was filed. The petitioner must 
establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. A visa petition may not be 
approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. 
Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). 
Additionally, counsel contends on appeal that the "reasonable needs" of the U.S. company should be 
taken into account when assessing the beneficiary's role in the company. Pursuant to section 
101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(C), if staffing levels are used as a factor in 
determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive capacity, the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) must take into account the reasonable needs of the 
organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of the organization. To 
establish that the reasonable needs of the organization justify the beneficiary's job duties, the 
petitioner must specifically articulate why those needs are reasonable in light of its overall purpose 
and stage of development. In the present matter, the petitioner has not explained how the reasonable 
needs of the petitioning enterprise justify the beneficiary's performance of non-managerial or non- 
executive duties. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 
165 (Cornrn. 1998). Moreover, the reasonable needs of the petitioner serve only as a factor in 
evaluating the lack of staff in the context of reviewing the claimed managerial or executive duties. 
The petitioner must still establish that the beneficiary is to be employed in the United States in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity, pursuant to sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) or the Act. 
As discussed above, the petitioner has not established this essential element of eligibility. 
In light of the foregoing, the AAO concurs with the director's conclusion that the petitioner has 
failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in the U.S. in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
Also at issue in this matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary was 
employed overseas in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
In the L Supplement to Form 1-129, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary was employed by 
Aluminio Dominican0 C. por A., located in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic," from 1994 to 
present." The petitioner provided no other information regarding the beneficiary's foreign 
employment at the time the Form 1-129 was filed. 
In the letter dated August 15, 2007 responding to the RFE, counsel for the petitioner stated the 
following with respect to the beneficiary's employment prior to his transfer to the U.S. company: 
' EAC 07 121 52493 
Page 9 
[The beneficiary] was contracted by the petitioner's parent company . . . in 1994 as 
Custom Broker. He also held the positions of Traffic and Logistic Controller, 
Purchase Manager and Sales Manager. 
 In April 2005, [the beneficiary] was 
transferred to San Juan, PR to direct all the operations of the [U.S. company] as 
CommerciaVGeneral Manager. 
[The beneficiary] managed the Customs Department of [the parent company in] the 
Dominican Republic and was responsible for ensuring that raw materials needed by 
[the parent company] amved in time by clearing customs and paying the necessary 
and applicable tariffs. 
The beneficiary was promoted to Purchase Manager of [the parent company and 
another affiliate of the parent company] because of his vast knowledge in glass and 
aluminum suppliers market. In this position, [the beneficiary ensure that the quality 
of the supplied goods met the company's standards and kept the inventories balance 
with the demand. 
The petitioner provided no other information or evidence in connection with the beneficiary's 
claimed position with the foreign entity prior to his transfer to the U.S. company. 
In his decision denying the petition, the director noted that the beneficiary has provided several job 
titles which the beneficiary has held with the foreign company, but has not provided a description of 
these positions. Therefore, the director found that the record does not establish the beneficiary was 
employed overseas in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel contends that the director did not ask for evidence regarding the position that the 
beneficiary occupied in the foreign company, and, moreover, that evidence was already part of the 
record as it was previously submitted as part of the initial L-1A petition for which this petition is an 
extension. Counsel states, "We acknowledge that we erred in not including such evidence since we 
understood that such evidence was already part of the record as evidenced by the status of the 
beneficiary." Counsel submitted no evidence on appeal, but stated that the petitioner is "available to 
provide it." 
In the absence of any evidence relating to the beneficiary's claimed positions with the foreign entity, 
the AAO must conclude that the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed 
overseas in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, as required by the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 
2 14.2(1)(3)(iv). 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(iv) requires that the petitioner submits with the Form 1-129 
"[elvidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was managerial, 
executive or involved specialized knowledge . . ." Although the petitioner claims that evidence 
relating to the beneficiary's overseas position was previously provided, as evidenced by the approval 
' EAC 07 121 52493 
Page 10 
of his initial L-1A petition, it must be noted that the record of proceeding does not contain copies of 
the visa petition that the petitioner claims was previously approved. It must be emphasized that each 
petition filing is a separate proceeding with a separate record. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(d). In making a 
determination of statutory eligibility, USCIS is limited to the information contained in that 
individual record of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(16)(ii). The burden of proving eligibility 
for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. 
Here, the petitioner has failed to meet that burden with respect to establishing the beneficiary's prior 
overseas employment in a managerial or executive capacity. For this additional reason, the petition 
will be denied. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO finds that the record is insufficient to establish that a 
qualifying relationship exists between the foreign and U.S. entities as required under 8 C.F.R. $ 
214.2(1)(3)(i). The regulations and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that 
must be examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between the U.S. and 
foreign entities for purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 
19 I&N Dec. 593 (Comm. 1988); see also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 
362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). Ownership refers to the direct 
or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with hll power and authority to control; 
control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, 
management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 
at 595. 
The petitioner claimed on the L Supplement to Form 1-129 that the U.S. company is 100%-owned by 
the majority shareholder of the foreign company. However, the petitioner provided no evidence of 
ownership interest in either company as of the time of filing. Documents evidencing ownership 
interest in each company, such as corporate stock certificates, stock ledgers, stock certificate 
registries, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings must be 
examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, 
and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a 
petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of 
profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control 
of the entity. 
 See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362. 
 Without full 
disclosure of all relevant documents, USCIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership and 
control. For this additional reason, the petition will be denied. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be 
denied by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the 
initial decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. 
Cal. 2001), affd, 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 
1989) (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a 
plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with 
' EAC 07 121 52493 
Page 11 
respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 
F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely 
with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
Accordingly, the director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.