dismissed L-1A

dismissed L-1A Case: Courier And Money Remittance

๐Ÿ“… Date unknown ๐Ÿ‘ค Company ๐Ÿ“‚ Courier And Money Remittance

Decision Summary

The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, with the proposed duties appearing to be non-managerial day-to-day operations. The petitioner also failed to provide evidence of the beneficiary's required one year of continuous employment abroad and did not submit sufficient evidence to prove a qualifying corporate relationship between the U.S. and foreign entities.

Criteria Discussed

Managerial Capacity Executive Capacity One Year Abroad Qualifying Relationship

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PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
3 FILE: 
EAC 03 137 52257 
 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: ,)UL 1 1 
IN RE: 
 Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. ยง 1101(a)(15)(L) 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
bert P. Wiemann, Ch 
c 
Administrative ~~~ed~ffice 
a 
EAC 03 137 52257 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be summarily 
dismissed. 
The petitioner states that it operates as a courier service and money remitter. 
 It seeks to employ the 
beneficiary temporarily in the United States as its general manager as a nonimmigrant intracompany 
transferee, pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 
1101(a)(15)(L). The director denied the petition on October 6, 2003, concluding that the petitioner did not 
establish: (1) that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a managerial or executive 
capacity; or (2) that the beneficiary was employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity with the 
foreign entity for one full year within the three years prior to entering the United States as a nonimrnigrant. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal on November 6, 2003. The director declined to treat the appeal as 
a motion and forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On the Form I-290B Notice of Appeal, counsel for 
the petitioner asserts: "The service erred in finding that the beneficiary does not qualify for classification 
under section 10 1(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Naturalization [sic] Act." 
Counsel indicated on Form I-290B that she would submit a brief andlor evidence to the AAO within 60 days, 
and explained that the additional time was needed in order to obtain "original evidentiary documentation" 
from Ecuador which would require translation. As no additional evidence has been incorporated into the 
record, the AAO contacted counsel by facsimile on May 4,2006 to request that counsel acknowledge whether 
the brief andlor evidence were subsequently submitted, and, if applicable, to afford counsel an opportunity to 
re-submit the documents. To date, counsel has not responded to the AAO's request. Accordingly, the record 
will be considered complete. 
To establish eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must meet certain criteria. 
Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a 
firm, corporation, or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof, must have employed the 
beneficiary for one continuous year. Furthermore, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
Upon review, the AAO concurs with the director's decision and affirms the denial of the petition. Counsel's 
general objections to the denial of the petition, without specifically identifying any errors on the part of the 
director, are simply insufficient to overcome the well-founded and logical conclusions the director reached 
based on the evidence submitted by the petitioner. The assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. 
Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); 
Matter ofRamirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). 
As noted by the director, the petitioner failed to provide a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's 
proposed role as general manager of the petitioner's four-person company. In a May 6, 2003 request for 
evidence, the director specifically requested that the petitioner submit a breakdown of the number of hours the 
beneficiary will devote to each of his proposed job duties on a weekly basis and an organizational chart for 
EAC 03 137 52257 
Page 3 
the U.S. entity. In response, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary would serve as "a member of the 
Board of Representatives7' and claimed to already employ another individual in the offered position of 
"general manager." It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice 
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Mutter ofHo, 19 
I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). A petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to 
make a deficient petition conform to CIS requirements. See Matter of Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 (Assoc. 
Comm. 1998). 
Further, the petitioner's response to the director's request for evidence did not describe duties to be performed 
by the beneficiary in a managerial or executive capacity. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary would 
devote two to three hours per day to piclung up bank deposits from the petitioner's two locations and taking 
them to the bank; two to three hours "scouting new locations for offices and marketing opportunities"; and 
two to three hours "malung contacts at banks." Without further explanation, it appears the beneficiary will be 
primarily performing the non-managerial day-to-day operations of the company. An employee who 
"primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be 
"primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act 
(requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of 
Church Scientology Int'l, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). Counsel's brief statement on the Form I- 
290B fails to acknowledge, much less resolve the deficiencies discussed in the denial. 
With respect to the beneficiary's employment with the foreign entity, the petitioner was specifically instructed 
to provide evidence that the beneficiary had one continuous year of full-time employment within the previous 
three years. The beneficiary entered the United States as a nonimrnigrant on January 4, 2003. The petitioner 
provided the foreign entity's payroll statements for the months of March and April 2001 only, evidencing the 
payment of wages to the beneficiary as a "manager" during those months. The petitioner did not submit 
documentary evidence to establish that the beneficiary had completed a full year of qualifying employment 
with the foreign entity. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be 
grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 9 103.2(b)(14). 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence to establish that the U.S. 
company and foreign entity have a qualifying relationship, as required by 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(i). The 
petitioner stated on Form 1-129 that the U.S. entity is a subsidiary of the foreign entity and indicated the 
ownership of each entity as follows: "[the foreign entity] - 50% of corporation stock in Ecuador"; [the 
petitioner] - 50% of corporation stock in U.S.A." The petitioner submitted an "Actualization Form" for the 
which indicates that the company is owned by six individuals, with 
as the majority shareholder with 60 percent of the company's stock. 
The petitioner submitted insufficient evidence regarding the U.S. company's ownership. There is no evidence 
that the foreign entity owns the U.S. company, and therefore the petitioner has not substantiated its claim that 
the entities have a parent-subsidiary relationship. The petitioner submitted copies of its stock certificates 
numbers three through five indicating ownership of its 100 authorized shares as follows: (1) 
- 25 shares (stock certificates number 3); (2) - 51 shares (stock certificates 
EAC 03 137-52257 
Page 4 
number 4); and (3- - 24 shares (stock certificate number 5). All of the submitted stock 
certificates were issued on February 21, 2003. The petitioner did not provide a copy of its stock certificates 
numbers one and two, or its stock transfer ledger, which would show the total number of shares issued, to 
whom they were issued, and whether any stock certificates were transferred and/or canceled. Going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California. 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Based on the limited evidence submitted. it avvears that 
\ L? /, , .. 
U.S. company is and the majority shareholder of the foreign 
entity is 
 The evidence does not support a determination that the U.S. entity and the 
foreign entity are affiliates based on common ownership and control. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(L). For 
this additional reason, the petition will not be approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the 
AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
Regulations at 8 C.F.R. 5 103.3(a)(l)(v) state, in pertinent part: 
An officer to whom an appeal is taken shall summarily dismiss any appeal when the party 
concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of 
fact for the appeal. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1361. Inasmuch as counsel has failed to identify specifically an 
erroneous conclusion of law or a statement of fact in this proceeding, the petitioner has not sustained that 
burden. Therefore, the appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
ORDER: 
 The appeal is summarily dismissed. 
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