dismissed L-1A Case: Dry Cleaning

P IC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
File: EAC 06 219 5015 1 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: MAR 1 0 2008 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S .C. § 1 1 0 1 (a)( 1 5)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robe 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 06 219 50151 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary in the position of president 
to open a new office in the United States as an L-1A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to 
section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 8 1 101 (a)(15)(L). The 
petitioner, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida, is allegedly a dry cleaning business.' 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that it has secured sufficient 
physical premises to house the new office. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner established that it 
has secured sufficient physical premises to house the new office. Specifically, counsel asserts that the 
petitioner's lease for a "virtual office" establishes that sufficient physical premises have been secured. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
'~ccordin~ to Florida state corporate records, the petitioner's corporate status in Florida was "administratively 
dissolved" on September 14, 2007. Therefore, since the corporation may not carry on any business except 
that necessary to wind up and liquidate its affairs, the company can no longer be considered a legal entity in 
the United States. See 8 607.1405, Fla. Stat. (2006). Therefore, if this appeal were not being dismissed for 
the reasons set forth herein, this would call into question the petitioner's continued eligibility for the benefit 
sought. 
EAC 06 219 50151 
Page 3 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hider to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
In addition, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(~) states that if the petition indicates that the beneficiary is 
coming to the United States as a manager or executive to open or to be employed in a new office, the 
petitioner shall submit evidence that: 
(A) 
 Sufficient physical premises to house the new office have been 
secured; 
(B) 
 The beneficiary has been employed for one continuous year in the 
three year period preceding the filing of the petition in an executive 
or managerial capacity and that the proposed employment involved 
executive or managerial authority over the new operation; and 
(C) The intended United States operation, within one year of the 
approval of the petition, will support an executive or managerial 
position as defined in paragraphs (l)(l)(ii)(B) or (C) of this section, 
supported by information regarding: 
(1) 
 The proposed nature of the office describing the scope of the 
entity, its organizational structure, and its financial goals; 
(2) 
 The size of the United States investment and the financial 
ability of the foreign entity to remunerate the beneficiary and 
to commence doing business in the United States; and 
(3) 
 The organizational structure of the foreign entity. 
The primary issue in this matter is whether the petitioner has established that it has secured sufficient physical 
premises to house the new office. 8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(3)(v)(A). 
In support of the petition, the foreign employer submitted a letter dated July 13, 2006 describing the United 
States operation as follows: 
[The petitioner] intends to purchase an existing and operational dry cleaning retail business or 
purchase sufficient land to construct a new dry cleaning facility. Additional "drop" stores 
will be established to increase the volume of business, with all processing to be done at the 
main location. Once operations commence in the US and the business is operating smoothly, 
[the petitioner] then intends to lease or purchase a 5000 square foot industrial unit for the 
EAC 06 219 50151 
Page 4 
creation of a central processing facility for dry cleaning and laundry services. When this is 
accomplished, existing plant and machinery from the initial store will be transferred to the 
factory unit. The cost for equipment and installation is estimated at approximately $280,000. 
The company will also expand into linen and laundry services for hotels and fine dining 
restaurants. 
virtual office agreement with [HQ] for initial business 
premises at 
 in Orlando, Florida. This location will be used until the 
first dry cleaning location is determined. The decision to purchase an existing retail outlet or 
to construct a new outlet will be one of the first tasks of the President in operating the new 
US office. 
The petitioner also submitted a document titled "HQ Agreement" and "Virtual Office, Virtual Office Plus[,] 
Mailbox Plus & Telephone Answering" (the "Agreement"). The Agreement identifies its start date as July 1, 
2006, and lists four product offerings at the top of the first page - Mailbox Plus, Telephone Answering, 
Virtual Office, and Virtual Office Plus. The only product checked on the Agreement is "Mailbox Plus." The 
"Mailbox Plus" product is described under the "Terms & Conditions" section of the Agreement as follows: 
Mailbox Plus product is a service operated by [HQ] that entitles [the petitioner] to use the 
address of the HQ center specified in this Agreement as hisher business address ("the 
Center") subject to exception in certain locations and not as hisher registered office address. 
The "Virtual Office" and "Virtual Office Plus" products, both of which were not checked on the Agreement, 
include telephone service, facsimile service, and office usage privileges. The "Mailbox Plus" product, the 
product apparently acquired by the petitioner, does not list these additional services. 
On August 4, 2006, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested evidence establishing 
that the petitioner has secured sufficient physical premises to house the new office, and evidence that the 
United States operation, within one year of the approval of the petition, will support an executive or 
managerial position. 
In response, counsel reiterated that the petitioner has secured a "virtual office" which will be used as its initial 
business premises until "the first dry cleaning location is determined." Counsel also submitted the Agreement 
and an undated letter from the foreign entity indicating that the petitioner will use the "virtual office" for a 
"temporary period only." 
On August 22, 2006, the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that it 
has secured sufficient physical premises to house the new office. The director reasoned that the "virtual 
office" allegedly secured by the petitioner will not be sufficient to permit the petitioner to commence "doing 
business." The director further states that "[tlhe physical premises referred to in the regulations are the 
premises where the actual business will take place, not the planning of where the business will be located." 
EAC 06 219 50151 
Page 5 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner established that it has secured sufficient physical premises to 
house the new office. Specifically, counsel asserts that the petitioner's lease for a "virtual office" establishes 
that sufficient physical premises have been secured. Counsel further argues that the regulations do not 
prohibit a "new office" from operating from temporary quarters and then moving to a larger or otherwise 
different facility as the business grows. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive. 
As the beneficiary is coming to the United States to open a "new office," the petitioner must establish that 
"[slufficient physical premises to house the new office have been secured." 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(v)(A). 
While the regulations do not define what type of premises should be considered~"sufficient" for purposes of 
the "new office" regulations, the regulations do clearly require the petitioner to secure "physical" premises. 
The regulations also require all petitioners, including "new offices," to be "qualifying organizations." See 8 
C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(i); 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G). A "qualifying organization" is defined in part as a 
corporation which "[ils or will be doing business. . . for the duration of the alien's stay in the United States as 
an intracompany transferee." In turn, "doing business" is defined in part as "the regular, systematic, and 
continuous provision of goods and/or services by a qualifying organization and does not include the mere 
presence of an agent or office of the qualifying organization in the United States and abroad." 
In view of the above, a "new office" must secure "physical" premises which will be sufficient to permit the 
enterprise to commence "doing business" and to expand to the point where there would be an actual need for a 
manager or executive who will primarily perform qualifying duties. While there is no prohibition on a "new 
office" moving to a different location during its first year of operation, the "new office" petitioner must 
nevertheless establish that the physical premises secured will sufficiently permit the petitioner to both "do 
business" and to develop to the point that the beneficiary will be primarily performing qualifying duties at the 
end of the first year of operations. 
In this matter, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has secured sufficient physical premises to house the 
new office. First, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has secured "physical" premises. As indicated 
above, the Agreement submitted by the petitioner as evidence that it has rented a "virtual" office does not 
indicate that the petitioner actually acquired a service that would permit it to occupy any "physical" space. 
Instead, the Agreement indicates that the petitioner purchased the "Mailbox Plus" roduct which does not 
appear to include a right to utilize physical space within the building at . The "Mailbox 
Plus" product only permits the petitioner to use the facility as its mailing address. Therefore, for this reason 
alone, the petition may not be approved. 
Second, the petitioner has failed to establish that the premises secured will be sufficient to permit the 
enterprise to commence "doing business" and to expand to the point where there would be an actual need for a 
manager or executive who will primarily perform qualifying duties. As indicated above, the peti i ner lan 
to operate a dry cleaning business. As the premises in question, i.e., the right to receive mail a m 
-would not be sufficient to accommodate a dry cleaning business which will be "doing business" 
and would not permit the business to expand during its first year in operations, the petitioner has failed to 
EAC 06 219 50151 
Page 6 
establish that the premises are "sufficient." In fact, given the petitioner's admission that the arrangement will 
be "temporary," it appears that even the petitioner acknowledges that this arrangement is insufficient. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has secured sufficient physical premises to house the 
new office, and the petition may not be approved for this reason. 8 C.F.R. tj 2 14.2(1)(3)(v)(A). 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with 
the foreign entity. 
To establish a "qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed United States employer are the same employer (i.e., one 
entity with "branch" offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See generali'y section 
101 (a)(15)(L) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1). The petitioner must also establish that it and the foreign 
employer "[ils or will be doing business . . . for the duration of the alien's stay in the United States as an 
intracompany transferee." 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(G)(2). Once again, "doing business" is defined in part as 
"the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods andlor services." 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(H). 
In this matter, the petitioner has failed to establish that it is a qualifying organization because it has failed to 
establish that it is or will be doing business for the duration of the alien's stay in the United States. The 
petitioner admits that it is not ready to commence "doing business" in the United States. In fact, the petitioner 
is seeking to classify the beneficiary as an intracompany transferee to come to the United States to decide 
whether "to purchase an existing retail outlet or to construct a new outlet." As "due diligence" or "business 
planning" does not constitute the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods andlor services, the 
petitioner is not eligible for the benefit sought. 
Accordingly, the petitioner failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity, and 
the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's services will be 
used for a temporary period and that the beneficiary will be transferred to an assignment abroad upon 
completion of the temporary assignment in the United States. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(vii). 
In this matter, the petitioner claims to be 50% owned by the foreign employer and 25% owned by the 
beneficiary. The petitioner claims that the foreign employer is 50% owned and controlled by the beneficiary. 
As a purported owner of the petitioner, the petitioner is obligated to establish that the beneficiary's services 
will be used for a temporary period and that he will be transferred to an assignment abroad upon completion 
of the assignment. Id. However, the record is devoid of any evidence establishing that the beneficiary's 
services will be used temporarily. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient 
for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 
(Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craj of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Accordingly, as the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's services will be used for a temporary 
period and that the beneficiary will be transferred to an assignment abroad upon completion of the temporary 
EAC 06 219 50151 
Page 7 
assignment in the United States, the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that the intended United States 
operation, within one year of the approval of the petition, will support an executive or managerial position. 
When a new business is established and commences operations, the regulations recognize that a designated 
manager or executive responsible for setting up operations will be engaged in a variety of activities not 
normally performed by employees at the executive or managerial level and that often the full range of 
managerial responsibility cannot be performed. In order to qualify for L-1 nonimmigrant classification during 
the first year of operations, the regulations require the petitioner to disclose the business plans and the size of 
the United States investment, and thereby establish that the proposed enterprise will support an executive or 
managerial position within one year of the approval of the petition. See 8 C.F.R. €j 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C). This 
evidence should demonstrate a realistic expectation that the enterprise will succeed and rapidly expand as it 
moves away from the developmental stage to full operations, where there would be an actual need for a 
manager or executive who will primarily perform qualifying duties. 
As contemplated by the regulations, a comprehensive business plan should contain, at a minimum, a 
description of the business, its products and/or services, and its objectives. See Matter of Ho, 22 I&N Dec. 
206, 2 13 (Assoc. Cornrn. 1998). Although the precedent relates to the regulatory requirements for the alien 
entrepreneur immigrant visa classification, Matter of Ho is instructive as to the contents of an acceptable 
business plan: 
The plan should contain a market analysis, including the names of competing businesses and 
their relative strengths and weaknesses, a comparison of the competition's products and 
pricing structures, and a description of the target,market/prospective customers of the new 
commercial enterprise. The plan should list the required permits and licenses obtained. If 
applicable, it should describe the manufacturing or production process, the materials required, 
and the supply sources. The plan should detail any contracts executed for the supply of 
materials and/or the distribution of products. It should discuss the marketing strategy of the 
business, including pricing, advertising, and servicing. The plan should set forth the 
business's organizational structure and its personnel's experience. It should explain the 
business's staffing requirements and contain a timetable for hiring, as well as job descriptions 
for all positions. It should contain sales, cost, and income projections and detail the bases 
therefor. Most importantly, the business plan must be credible. 
Id. 
For three reasons, the petitioner in this matter has failed to establish that the United States operation will succeed 
and rapidly expand as it moves away from the developmental stage to full operations, where there would be 
an actual need for a manager or executive who will primarily perform qualifying duties. The petitioner has 
failed (1) to establish that a sufficient investment has been made in the United States operation, (2) to 
establish that the foreign entity has the financial ability to commence doing business in the United States, or 
EAC 06 219 50151 
Page 8 
(3) to sufficiently describe the nature, scope, organizational structure, and financial goals of the new office. 8 
C.F.R. tj 2 14.2(1)(3)(v)(C). 
First, the petitioner failed to establish that the United States operation will support an executive or managerial 
position within one year because it failed to establish that a sufficient investment has been made in the 
enterprise. 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C)(Z). In support of its petition, the petitioner submitted evidence that it 
opened a bank account and that a $2,000.00 deposit was made on June 28, 2006. The petitioner also 
submitted a document titled "business plan" and a letter dated July 13, 2006 in which the petitioner projects 
start-up costs of approximately $120,000.00. Accordingly, as the investment made at the time of the filing of 
the instant petition would not be adequate to fund the start-up and growth of the business, the petitioner has 
failed to establish that the intended United States operation, within one year of the approval of the petition, 
will support an executive or managerial position. The petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing 
the nonirnmigrant visa petition. A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or 
beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. 
Comm. 1978). 
Second, the petitioner failed to establish that the foreign employer has the financial ability to commence 
doing business in the United States. As indicated above, the petitioner projects start-up costs of 
approximately $1 20,000.00. However, the foreign employer's balance sheet only shows &55,8 1 3 .OO in assets. 
As this would not be sufficient to fund the start-up of the business and continue doing business abroad, the 
petitioner has failed to establish that the foreign employer has the financial ability to commence doing 
business in the United States. Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the United States 
operation will support an executive or managerial position within one year for this additional reason. 
Third, the petitioner failed to establish that the United States operation will support an executive or 
managerial position within one year, because the petitioner has failed to sufficiently describe the nature, 
scope, organizational structure, and financial goals of the new office. 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C)(I). The 
petitioner's "business plan" vaguely describes the United States operation as a proposed dry cleaning business. 
However, the plan fails to specifically describe the nature of the business. Instead, the plan vaguely outlines 
two "options" for the business -- purchase an existing business or purchase vacant premises and build a 
facility. The plan fails to identify competitors, pricing, or locations and fails to corroborate its projections 
regarding revenue, income, expenses, or financial goals. The record does not contain any independent 
analysis. Absent a detailed, credible description of the petitioner's proposed United States business operation 
addressing the petitioner's proposed product, marketing plan, customers, staffing, and incomelexpense 
projections, it is impossible to determine whether the proposed enterprise will succeed and rapidly expand as 
it moves away from the developmental stage to full operations, where there would be an actual need for a 
manager or executive who will primarily perform qualifying duties. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the United States operation will support an executive or 
managerial position within one year as required by 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C), and the petition may not be 
approved for the above reasons. 
EAC 06 219 50151 
Page 9 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary has been 
employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity with the foreign entity for one year within the 
preceding three years. 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(v)(B). 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1 101 (a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The foreign employer, a laundry business, described the beneficiary's duties abroad in a letter dated July 13, 
2006 as follows: 
a 
 Held responsibility for overall performance and ultimate management of company. 
a 
 Established company and all divisions within. 
EAC 06 219 50151 
Page 10 
Directed the general management of the company. 
a 
 Developed company into a thriving and profitable business. 
a 
 Established company goals and policies. 
a Supervised operations. 
a 
 Hired, fired and supervised staff. 
The petitioner also submitted a list of six employees purportedly under the beneficiary's supervision abroad. 
Upon review, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad in an executive 
or managerial capacity. 
The petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties has failed to establish that the beneficiary acted in 
a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of its petition, the petitioner has provided a vague and 
nonspecific description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary did on a day- 
to-day basis. For example, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary "established company goals and 
policies." However, the petitioner does not define these goals and policies. Overly broad statements such as 
"held responsibility for the overall performance and ultimate management of the company" are not probative 
of the beneficiary performing managerial or executive duties. The mere fact that the petitioner gave the 
beneficiary a managerial title and may have been the sole managerial employee does not establish that the 
beneficiary was actually performing "managerial" or "executive" duties. Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting 
the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. 
Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary supervised and controlled the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or managed an essential function of the organization. As 
explained in the record, the beneficiary appears to have supervised a staff of six employees. However, the 
petitioner has not established that any of these employees was primarily engaged in performing supervisory or 
managerial duties. To the contrary, it appears that these employees, as well as the beneficiary, were 
performing the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service in the operation of the laundry 
business. 
In view of the above, the beneficiary would appear to have been primarily a first-line supervisor of non- 
professional employees, the provider of actual services, or a combination of both. An employee who 
"primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be 
"primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act 
(requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of 
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). A managerial employee must have 
authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the 
supervised employees are professionals. Section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Moreover, the petitioner has not established that the 
EAC 06 219 50151 
Page 11 
beneficiary managed professional employees. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
was employed primarily in a managerial capacity. 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary acted in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary acted primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the 
beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary did on a day-to-day basis. 
Moreover, as explained above, the beneficiary appears to have been primarily employed as a first-line 
supervisor and was performing the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, 
the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed primarily in an executive capacity 
Finally, in reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally 
agreed that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) "may properly consider an organization's small size 
as one factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 13 13, 13 16 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval 
Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Suva, 905 F.2d 41,42 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25,29 (D.D.C. 2003). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has been employed in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity for one continuous year in the three years preceding the filing of the petition 
as required by 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(v)(B), and the petition may not be approved for this reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afyd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
EAC 06 219 50151 
Page 12 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.