dismissed L-1A Case: Engineering

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invasionofpersona) privacy
PUBLICCOpy
V.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000
Washington, DC 20529
u.s.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
File: SRC 04 063 50355 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date:
JEC 0:3 2001
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5)(L)
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.
/~.,._._"-
/ /
Rob P. . mann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office
www.uscis.gov
SRC 04 063 50355
Page 2
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal.
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as a lead applications
engineer as an L-l A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5)(L). The petitioner is a limited liability
company organized under the laws of the State of Texas and is allegedly an engineering, design, and
manufacturing business. 1
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director
erred and that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily those of an executive or a function manager.
To establish eligibility for the L-l nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria
outlined in section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or
specialized knowledge capacity.
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be
accompanied by:
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section.
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description ofthe services to be performed.
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of
the petition.
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was
'u should be noted that, according to Texas state corporate records, the petitioner's corporate status in Texas is
not in good standing. Therefore, as the State of Texas has forfeited the petitioner's corporate privileges, the
company can no longer be considered a legal entity in the United States. Therefore, this would call into
question the continued eligibility of the petitioner for the benefit sought if the appeal were not being
dismissed for the reasons set forth herein.
SRC 04 063 50355
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managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior
education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the
same work which the alien performed abroad.
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of
the organization;
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department
or subdivision of the organization;
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised,
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the
function managed; and
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory
duties unless the employees supervised are professional.
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the
organization;
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function;
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board
of directors, or stockholders of the organization.
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial
duties under section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 101(a)(44)(B) of
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the Act. A petitioner may not claim that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and
rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. If the petitioner is indeed representing the beneficiary
as both an executive and a manager, it must establish that the beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set
forth in the statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition for manager.
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's proposed duties in a letter dated December 10, 2003 as follows:
[The beneficiary] will be employed by the Petitioner in the United States as the Production
Manager, and will be responsible for performing the following duties for the Petitioner; such
duties to include: coordinate between U.S. office and Indian team to collect complete
product information required for development phase; coordination with design team for new
product development; core team member of product development think tank; preparation of
concept drawings using advanced CAD software like AutoCAD and Pro-E; coordinate with
suppliers throughout the product development phase; on-site inspection and approval of tools,
jigs and fixtures required for prototype development and production of components; and
supervise and guide the manufacture of specialty Low Speed Application Tires. In the
performance of his duties, the Beneficiary will receive minimum supervision from the Board
of Directors, and the Beneficiary will exercise wide discretion and latitude in the performance
of his duties.
The petitioner also submitted wage reports indicating that the petitioner employed three people in the quarter
immediately preceding the filing of the instant petition.
On January 6, 2004, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, an
organizational chart for the United States operation including employee names, position titles, and job
descriptions.
In response, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart and list of employees for the United States
operation. The list and chart indicate that the petitioner currently employs a vice president of international
marketing, a custom engineer, and a laminated tire construction specialist. The remaining positions on the
organizational chart, including those subordinate to the beneficiary in the "application engineering group,"
appear to be vacant. None of the existing employees is portrayed as being subordinate to the beneficiary. The
petitioner indicates in a letter dated January 22, 2004 that it intends on hiring additional employees.
On February 13, 2004, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity.
On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive or a function
manager.
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive.
As a threshold issue, it must be noted that the petitioner's future hiring and business expansion plans are not
relevant to the instant petition. The petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant
SRC 04 063 50355
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visa petition. Matter ofMichelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). A visa petition may not
be approved based on speculation of future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible
under a new set of facts. See id.; Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). Therefore, the
petitioner must establish that it is prepared to employ the beneficiary in a primarily managerial or executive
employee at the time of filing the petition and not at some later date.
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. A petitioner cannot claim that some of the duties of the
position entail executive responsibilities, while other duties are managerial. As explained above, a petitioner
may not claim that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial
sections of the two statutory definitions.
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary
will primarily act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. To the contrary, the duties ascribed to the
beneficiary appear to be primarily non-qualifying administrative or operational tasks which will not rise to the
level of being managerial or executive in nature. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will
coordinate with the design team "for new product development," prepare "concept drawings using advanced
CAD software like AutoCAD and Pro-E," work with suppliers, perform on-site inspections, and approve
"tools, jigs and fixtures required for prototype development and production of components." However, these
duties appear to be non-qualifying administrative or operational tasks, and the petitioner has not established
that the beneficiary will be relieved from the need to perform such tasks by a subordinate staff. As the
petitioner has not explained how much time the beneficiary will devote to these non-qualifying tasks, it has
not been established that he will be "primarily" employed as a manager or an executive. An employee who
"primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be
"primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act
(requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988).
Furthermore, the petitioner has submitted a vague and non-specific job description which fails to specifically
describe the beneficiary as performing qualifying duties. For example, the petitioner states that the
beneficiary will "coordinate" various activities, will be a "core team member of product development think
tank," and will "supervise and guide the manufacture of specialty Low Speed Application Tires." However,
the petitioner does not specifically explain what, exactly, the beneficiary will do in coordinating, supervising,
and guiding these activities. This is particularly important given that the petitioner does not employ any
subordinate staff members who could relieve the beneficiary from performing the non-qualifying duties
inherent to the activities he will supposedly coordinate, supervise, and guide. The fact that the petitioner has
given the beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has prepared a vague job description which includes
inflated job duties does not establish that the beneficiary will actually perform managerial or executive duties.
Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties will be primarily executive or
managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the
regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir.
1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting
SRC 04 063 50355
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the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg.
Comm. 1972).
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization.
As explained above, it appears that the beneficiary will not supervise any employees. Moreover, the record
does not establish that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization. The term
"function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the
organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute
or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must
furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function,
i.e., identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the
proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. §
214.2(1)(3)(ii). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that
the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function.
In this matter, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The
petitioner's vague job description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial.
As explained above, the record establishes that it is more likely than not that the beneficiary will primarily
perform non-qualifying operational or administrative tasks. Given that the petitioner does not employ any
subordinate staff members dedicated to relieving the beneficiary of performing the tasks inherent to his duties,
it is therefore likely that the beneficiary will perform the duties related to the function rather than "manage"
the function. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his
duties, the AAO cannot determine what proportion of his duties will be managerial, nor can it deduce whether
the beneficiary will primarily perform the duties of a function manager. See lKEA US, Inc. v. u.s. Dept. of
Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1999).
Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial
capacity.
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization.
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making"
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the
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beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis .
Moreover, as explained above , it appears that the beneficiary will primarily perform the tasks necessary to
produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore , the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary
will be employed primarily in an executive capacity .
In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed
that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) "may properly consider an organization's small size as one
factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc . v. U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9 th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval Republic of
Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ; Fedin Bros. Co. v. Sava , 905 F.2d 41,42 (2d Cir. 1990)
(per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D .D.C. 2003). Furthermore, it is
appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant factors,
such as a company's small personnel size , the absence of employees who would perform the non-managerial
or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a regular
and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7 , 15 (D.D.C. 2001). Finally, the
reasonable needs of the petitioner will not supersede the requirement that the beneficiary be "primarily"
employed in a managerial or executive capacity as required by the statute. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B)
of the Act, 8 U.S .C. § 1101(a)(44).2
Accordingly , the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 3
2Counsel cited the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) in his brief as authority . It must be noted that the FAM is
not binding upon CIS. See Avena v. INS, 989 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997); Matter of Bosuego, 17 I&N 125
(BIA 1979). The FAM provides guidance to employees of the Department of State in carrying out their
official duties, such as the adjudication of visa applications abroad. The FAM is not relevant to this
proceeding.
3It is noted that counsel to the petitioner cited the unpublished opinion in Matter ofIrish Dairy Board , A28­
845-42 (AAO Nov. 16 , 1989), in support of his contention that the beneficiary is primarily employed as an
executive or manager. In that decision, the AAO recognized that the sole employee of the petitioner could be
employed primarily as a manager or executive provided he or she is primarily performing executive or
managerial duties. However, counsel's reliance on this decision is misplaced. First, counsel has furnished no
evidence to establish that the facts of the instant petition are analogous to those in the unpublished decision.
Second, while 8 C .F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that AAO precedent decisions are binding on all CIS employees
in the administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding . Third, as explained above,
the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will primarily be employed in an executive or
managerial capacity. This is paramount to the analysis, and a beneficiary may not be classified as a manager
or an executive if he or she will not primarily perform managerial or executive duties regardless of the
number of people employed by the petitioner. Therefore, as the petitioner has not established this essential
element, the decision in Matter ofIrish Dairy Board would be irrelevant even if it were binding or analogous.
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Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad
for at least one continuous year in a position that was managerial or executive in nature. 8 C.F.R. §§
214.2(l)(3)(iii) and (iv).
The petitioner described the beneficiary's duties abroad in a letter dated December 10, 2003 as follows:
[The beneficiary's] duties include: coordinate between U.S. office and Indian team to collect
complete product information required for development phase; coordination with design team
for new product development; core team member of product development think tank;
preparation of concept drawings using advanced CAD software like AutoCAD and Pro-E;
coordinate with suppliers throughout the product development phase; on-site inspection and
approval of tools, jigs and fixtures required for prototype development and production of
components; and supervise and guide the manufacture of specialty Low Speed Application
Tires.
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart for the foreign employer indicating that the beneficiary
supervised two "systems" employees.
Upon review, and for the same reasons explained above, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the
beneficiary was employed abroad in a managerial or executive capacity. The petitioner failed to specifically
describe the beneficiary as performing primarily managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an
important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties were primarily executive or managerial in nature;
otherwise meeting the defmitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co.,
Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, aff'd, 905 F.2d 41. Furthermore, the beneficiary's duties abroad, which are
similar to his proposed duties in the United States, appear to be primarily non-qualifying operational or
administrative tasks. Finally, the petitioner failed to describe the duties of the beneficiary's purported
subordinates abroad. Absent detailed descriptions of the duties of both the beneficiary and his purported
subordinates, it is impossible for CIS to discern whether the beneficiary was "primarily" engaged in
performing managerial or executive duties abroad. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act; see also
Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. To the contrary, it appears that the
beneficiary was, at most, a first-line supervisor of non-professional employees. A managerial employee must
have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless
the supervised employees are professionals. Section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604.
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed in a primarily managerial or
executive capacity abroad for one continuous year in the three years preceding the filing of the petition, and
the petition may not be approved for this reason.
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are
qualifying organizations.
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by
"[e]vidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying
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organizations." Title 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(i)(I)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a finn, corporation,
or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a
parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (1)(1)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing
business." "Subsidiary" is defined in pertinent part as a legal entity "of which a parent owns, directly or
indirectly, more than half of the entity and controlsthe entity."
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593; see also Matter of
Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter ofHughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm.
1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of
the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right
and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595.
In this matter, the petitioner describes its relationship to the foreign employer,
letter dated December 10, 2003 asfollows:
The petitioner also submitted its 2002 tax return (Form 1065). Schedule K to the Form 1065 indicates that an
entity call_wns a 100% interest in the petitioner. The record is devoid of evidence
connectin_he foreign employer. Furthermore, the petitioner does not attempt to explain
why the 2002 Schedule K is fundamentally inconsistent with the ownership scheme described in the letter dated
December 10, 2003. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter ofHo, 19
I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988).
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that it and the foreign entity are qualifying organizations. For
this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (B.D. Cal. 2001), affd, 345 F.3d 683
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews
appeals on a de novo basis).
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
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In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the
appeal will be dismissed."
Finally, in view of petitioner's failure to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign
employer, a review of other L-l nonimmigrant petitions (EAC 07 157 52855, SRC 06 099 50616, and SRC
06 222 51140) approved on behalf of other beneficiaries, and which are currently valid, is warranted to
determine if they were approved in error. Therefore, the director shall review these prior petitions approved
for possible revocation in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(9).
ORDER:
FURTHER ORDERED:
The appeal is dismissed.
The director shall review prior L-l nonimmigrant petitions approved for the
petitioner for possible revocation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(9).
4n is noted that, on appeal, counsel requests in the alternative "that if the district director cannot approve this
application as an L-IA, that it be approved as an L-IB." However, a petitioner cannot offer a new position to
the beneficiary, or materially change a position's title, its level of authority within the organizational
hierarchy, or the associated job responsibilities. The petitioner must establish that the position offered to the
beneficiary when the petition was filed merits classification as a managerial or executive position. Matter of
Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. at 249. Furthermore, the regulations clearly defme an intracompany
transferee as one coming to the United States in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves
specialized knowledge. 8 C.F.R. § 2l4.2(1)(l)(ii)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). If significant
changes are made to the initial request for approval, the petitioner must file a new petition rather than seek
approval of a petition that is not supported by the facts in the record. Regardless, upon review, the record is
devoid of evidence that the beneficiary will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge or
that he possesses specialized knowledge.