dismissed L-1A Case: Footwear

identifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwonrrnted 
hien of personal privacj 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Of/e ofAdministrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: AUG 05 2010 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1 101 (a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents 
related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that 
any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional 
information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The 
specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5. All motions must be 
submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, 
with a fee of $585. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(i) requires that any motion must be filed 
within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen. 
Perry Rhew 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 

Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the nonimmigrant visa petition. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its manager as an L-1A 
nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationalitv 
Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner states that it is a 
qualified to do business in California. The beneficiary was initially granted L-1A status in 2006 and the 
petitioner now seeks to extend his status for three additional years. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish: (1) that the beneficiary 
would be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; and (2) that the U.S. 
entity is doing business. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO. On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary is responsible for managing 
a function in his role as manager of the U.S. office, and holds a position that "is so specialized and senior that 
job function itself is managerial." With respect to the petitioner's business activities, counsel notes that the 
petitioner is a representative office and as such relies on the support staff and infrastructure of its parent office 
in Korea. Counsel submits a brief and a letter from the beneficiary in support of the appeal. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within the three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the U.S. temporarily to continue rendering his or her 
services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate in a managerial, executive or specialized knowledge 
capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 

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Page 3 
services in the United States; however the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The first issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary would be 
employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity under the extended petition. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(44)(A), provides: 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or 
component of the organization; 
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the 
organization, or a department or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the 
authority to hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel 
actions (such as promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee 
is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within the organizational 
hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function 
for which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not 
considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the 
supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 10 l(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily-- 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function 
of the organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or 
function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 

Page 4 
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, 
the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner filed the Fonn 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, on December 16, 2008. The 
petitioner indicated that the company had one employee as of the date of filing. In a letter dated November 
15,2008, counsel described the offered position as follows: 
[The beneficiary] has been offered a position of manager and director of the US Office. He is 
currently responsible d market trend as well as 
new material items. irectly to coordinate new 
product schedule for future orders. 
[The beneficiary] as a manager and director has the sole discretion [sic] power to control and 
manage the US Office's operations and to make decisions on the marketing to and 
communication with Nike HQ. His discretion and power are only subject to the board of 
directors, the executive manager and the president of [the petitioner] in Korea. 
Counsel stated that the petitioner's parent company in Korea manufactures athletic shoes for companies such 
as Nike and Asics. Counsel further describes the purpose of the U.S. office as the following: 
For the better business relation with Nike and the better US customers' satisfaction, [the 
foreign entity] established its US office pursuant to the laws of the State of California. The 
purposes of the US Office were to research the continuously changing footwear and retail 
industry in the United States and to cooperate with Nike on the new products schedule. By 
virtue of the US Office's successful cooperation with Nike, [the company] could achieve its 
business goals. 
The petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the Korean entity which depicts the beneficiary as 
reporting to employees were listed on the chart. 
The director issued a request for additional evidence on January 7,2009, in which he instructed the petitioner 
to submit evidence to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity under the extended petition. Specifically, the director requested: (1) a comprehensive description of 
the beneficiary's duties; (2) a list of U.S. employees which identifies each employee by name and position 
title; (3) complete position descriptions for all U.S. employees, including a breakdown of the number of hours 
devoted to each of these employee's duties on a weekly basis; and (4) copies of the company's IRS Forms 941 
and W-2 evidencing wages paid to employees in 2007 and 2008. 
In a response dated February 12, 2008, counsel for the petitioner reiterated that the beneficiary "is currently 
responsible for research of the footwear retail industry and market trend as well as new material items," and 
"responsible for communicating with Nike HQ directly to coordinate new product schedule for future orders." 
Counsel further stated that the beneficiary "has the sole discretion power to control and manage the US liaison 
office's operations and to make decisions on the marketing to and communication with Nike HQ." 

Page 5 
The petitioner submitted copies of IRS Forms 1099, Miscellaneous Income, for wages paid to the beneficiary 
in 2007 and 2008. The petitioner did not submit evidence of wages paid to any other employees or 
contractors. 
The director denied the petition on March 18, 2009, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity under the extended petition. In denying 
the petition, the director emphasized that the petitioner failed to respond to his request for a comprehensive 
description of the beneficiary's job duties and had otherwise failed to explain exactly what the beneficiary 
would be doing to qualify as a manager or executive in the context of the petitioner's staffing arrangement. 
The director determined that the beneficiary, as the petitioner's sole employee, would be primarily engaged in 
providing the services of the organization and performing other non-qualifying duties. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts: 
The service failed to consider beneficiary position in light of the functional manager. [The 
beneficiary's] job title is office manager and has the sole leadership to control and oversee the 
US Office's operations and provides strategic guidance. Also he is to make decisions on the 
marketing and coordinate communication with clients. 
Considering his job title and position, it is so specialized and senior that [the] job function 
itself is managerial position in nature. As a head of a representative office, he routinely is in 
touch with Korean support staff that follows his direction and he is in constant touch with 
board of directors and managers of the company. 
Upon review, and for the reasons discussed herein, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity under the extended petition. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity each have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that 
the beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the 
petitioner must show that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not 
spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 
(Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). While the AAO does not doubt that the beneficiary 
exercises discretion over the petitioner's office as its manager and apparently only U.S.-based employee, the 
totality of the evidence submitted does not demonstrate that the beneficiary's actual duties will be primarily 
managerial or executive in nature. 
Counsel's initial description of the beneficiary's duties was vague and failed to provide any insight into what it 
is the beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis as the petitioner's manager. For example, counsel stated that the 
beneficiary "has the sole discretion power to control and manage the US Office's operations and to make 

Page 6 
decisions on the marketing," and that such "discretion and power are only subject to the board of directors, the 
executive manager and the president of [the foreign entity]." While such responsibilities provide a broad 
view of the scope of the beneficiary's activities, they fail to illustrate what specific tasks the beneficiary 
performs to accomplish his objective of managing the U.S. office. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job 
responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed 
description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner failed to provide any detail or explanation of 
the beneficiary's activities in the course of his daily routine. The actual duties themselves will reveal the true 
nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 
F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Furthermore, counsel stated that the beneficiary is directly responsible for researching the footwear industry 
and its marketing trends and new materials, as well as for directly communicating with Nike headquarters to 
coordinate the manufacturing schedule for future orders. Without further explanation, these duties cannot be 
distinguished from marketing and sales tasks. While performing non-qualifying tasks necessary to produce a 
product or service will not automatically disqualify the beneficiary as long as those tasks are not the majority 
of the beneficiary's duties, the petitioner still has the burden of establishing that the beneficiary is "primarily" 
performing managerial or executive duties. Section 101(a)(44) of the Act; see also Brazil Quality Stones, Inc. 
v. Chertoff, 53 1, F.3d 1063,1069-70 (9th Cir. 2008). Given that the only stated purposes of the U.S. office are 
to research the U.S. market and to communicate with the petitioner's major customer, it appears that the 
beneficiary is performing the functions of the U.S. office rather than managing or overseeing such functions. 
Accordingly, the director requested a comprehensive description of the beneficiary's duties and a breakdown 
of the number of hours he will allocate to specific job duties on a weekly basis. In response to the RFE, 
counsel simply reiterated the job description provided at the time of filing, which was already reviewed by the 
director and found to be deficient. Any failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of 
inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 9 103.2(b)(14). 
Whether the beneficiary is a managerial or executive employee turns on whether the petitioner has sustained 
its burden of proving that his duties are "primarily" managerial or executive. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and 
(B) of the Act. Here, the petitioner fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be 
managerial functions and what proportion would be non-managerial. The petitioner lists the beneficiary's 
duties as including both general managerial and operational tasks, but fails to quantify the time the beneficiary 
spends on them. This failure of documentation is important because several of the beneficiary's tasks, such as 
performing market research or communicating with the petitioner's client regarding manufacturing orders, do 
not fall directly under traditional managerial duties as defined in the statute. For this reason, the AAO cannot 
determine whether the beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of a manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. 
Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
Overall, the descriptions of the beneficiary's duties submitted prior to the adjudication of the petition included 
a combination of vaguely described managerial duties and non-qualifying duties suggesting that the 
beneficiary, despite being the "head" of the U.S. office, actually performs all non-managerial duties 
associated with the operation of the office. 

Page 7 
The statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and "function 
managers." See section 101(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii). Personnel 
managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other supervisory, professional, or 
managerial employees. Contrary to the common understanding of the word "manager," the statute plainly 
states that a "first line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of 
the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." Section 
10 1 (a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(B)(Z). If a beneficiary directly supervises other 
employees, the beneficiary must also have the authority to hire and fire those employees, or recommend those 
actions, and take other personnel actions. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(B)(3). 
The petitioner has not submitted evidence that the beneficiary has any subordinate personnel in the United 
States. Counsel claims for the first time on appeal that the beneficiary is "in touch with Korean support staff 
that follows his direction," however, this vague and unsupported statement is insufficient to establish that the 
beneficiary is primarily engaged in the direction and control of the foreign staff, that such staff is comprised 
of managerial supervisory or professional employees, or that the beneficiary has the authority to hire and fire 
such employees. The unsupported statements of counsel on appeal or in a motion are not evidence and thus 
are not entitled to any evidentiary weight. 
Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503 (BI 
qualifies as a "personnel manager." 
The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the 
organization. See section 10 l(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential 
function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an 
essential function, the petitioner must furnish a detailed job description clearly stating the duties to be 
performed in managing the essential function, i.e. identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential 
nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the 
essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's 
daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties 
related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has not provided evidence that the beneficiary manages 
an essential function. As noted above, the petitioner has not provided the requested comprehensive 
description of the beneficiary's duties and it cannot be concluded that his primary duties are managerial in 
nature. 
Counsel states on appeal that the beneficiary is responsible for overseeing the overall operation of the 
petitioner, including management of essentially all of the company's functions. However, it is the petitioner's 
obligation to establish that the day-to-day non-managerial tasks of the functions managed are performed by 
someone other than the beneficiary. While the AAO does not doubt that the beneficiary is in contact with the 
foreign entity's personnel, the petitioner has not explained how the Korean employees obviate the need for the 
beneficiary to primarily perform the day-to-day functions of the U.S. office, which include conducting market 
research and communicating with the petitioner's client. 
Pursuant to section 10l(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(C), if staffing levels are used as a factor 
in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive capacity, USCIS must take into 

Page 8 
account the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of 
the organization. In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have 
generally agreed that USCIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one factor in assessing 
whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family Inc. v. US. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services 469 F. 3d 13 13, 13 16 (9' Cir. 2006) (citing with approval Republic of Transkei v. INS, 
923 F 2d. 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 41,42 (2d Cir. 1990)(per curiam); Q 
Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25,29 (D.D.C. 2003)). Other relevant factors may include the 
absence of employees who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or 
a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics 
Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 200 1). 
Here, the petitioner has not established that a company established for the purpose of researching U.S. market 
trends and communicating with a major client regarding manufacturing orders has a reasonable need for its 
sole employee to perform primarily managerial duties associated with the "oversight" of the one-person 
office. Thus, while the beneficiary may exercise discretion over his own activities and act with minimal 
supervision, the petitioner has failed to explain how the beneficiary's actual duties are managerial in nature 
when he is the only person available to perform the office's day-to-day, non-managerial operational and 
administrative functions. While some of the beneficiary's tasks as manager of the U.S. office could 
conceivably be deemed as qualifying if they were adequately described, the petitioner has the burden of 
establishing that a majority of his tasks would be qualifying. This determination cannot be based on the 
beneficiary's job title, the fact that he is the "head" of an office, or a job description that fails to explain his 
daily tasks. Again, the actual duties themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., 
Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1 108. 
The AAO has long interpreted the regulations and statute to prohibit discrimination against small or medium- 
size businesses. However, the AAO has required the petitioner to establish that the beneficiary's position 
consists of primarily managerial or executive duties and that the petitioner will have sufficient personnel to 
relieve the beneficiary from performing operational andlor administrative tasks. Our holding is based on the 
conclusion that the beneficiary is not primarily performing managerial duties; our decision does not rest on 
the size of the petitioning entity. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed 
in a primarily managerial or executive capacity under the extended petition. Accordingly, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
The second issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner is a qualifying organization doing 
business in the United States. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) defines "qualifying 
organization" as a United States or foreign firm, corporation, or other legal entity which: 
(1) Meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a 
parent, branch affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section; 
(2) Is or will be doing business (engaging in international trade is not required) as an 
employer in the United States and at least one other country directly or through a 

Page 9 
parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary for the duration of the alien's stay in the United 
States as an intracompany transferee; and 
(3) Otherwise meets the requirements of section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Act. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(H) defines "doing business" as "the regular systematic, and 
continuous provision of goods and services by a qualifying organization and does not include the mere 
presence of an agent of office of the qualifying organization in the United States and abroad." 
address where the beneficiary will work, if different from the mailing address. The petitioner left that item 
blank. The petitioner indicated that the type of business is a "liaison office," and did not complete the gross 
or net annual income information on the Form 1-129. 
The petitioner submitted a Certificate of Oualification issued bv the California Secretarv of State in Julv 2002 . 
which indicates that the foreign entity will do business in California as The petitioner 
also provided the foreign entity's certificates of tax payment and expo 
conducted by the foreign entity, and the petitioner's IRS Forms 1120-F, U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign 
Corporation and Pennsylvania Corporate Tax Reports for the years 2005 through 2007. The tax returns show 
no sales or other income, but do include expenses such as rent, insurance, cable service, professional fees, 
office expense, minimal utilities, and telephone service. 
In the RFE issued on January 7, 2009, the director requested the following evidence to establish that the U.S. 
entity is doing business: (1) photographs of the interior and exterior of the premises secured for the U.S. 
entity, clearly depicting the organization and operation of the entity; (2) addresses and directions to each 
facility used by the entity; (3) copies of the petitioner's phone records for the last three months; (4) a copy of 
the petitioner's business phone listing; (5) samples of advertising copy for print media; and (6) proof of 
business conducted at the location listed on the petition, including utility bills, rent receipts, copies of all 
local, county and state licenses, and a letter from the owner of the leased premises confirming the petitioner's 
occupancy. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a copy of its 2008 IRS Form 1120-F, U.S. Income Tax Return of a 
Foreign Corporation, and its IRS Forms 1096 and 1099 for 2007 and 2008 evidencing payments to the 
beneficiary. The petitioner's response also included three photocopies of photographs depicting the interior of 
an office. 
The director denied the petition based on the petitioner's failure to provide the requested evidence regarding 
the U.S. business. Accordingly, the director noted that "the veracity of the instant petitioning entity as a 
functioning business for immigration purposes is called into question." The director further noted that the 
petitioner's tax return shows that no compensation or wages were paid, and questioned whether the 
beneficiary is employed by or compensated by the petitioner. 
On appeal, counsel states: 

Page 10 
The service failed to properly consider the records in support of the petitioner and overly 
emphasized and relied upon not available documents which were not submitted in support of 
the petition. The filed corporate tax return itself is proof that the entity is existing under the 
laws of the United States and complying with all the relevant regulations and duly paying 
taxes. Furthermore, there was ample evidence in regards to petitioner's parent company which 
produces Nike shoes. The fact that the current office is a representative office heavily relies 
on the support staff and infrastructure of the parent company. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the petitioner is a 
qualifying organization doing business in the United States. 
A representative office is not specifically excluded by the definition of "doing business," provided that it 
shows that it is engaged in the provision of goods or services, albeit on behalf of a related foreign entity. 
However, contrary to counsel's assertions, the fact that the foreign entity registered in California and files tax 
returns is insufficient to establish that the company is doing business pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(H). 
Although the petitioner claims to be primarily performing market research and customer liaison activities on 
behalf of the foreign entity and is not selling a product or service, it is reasonable to expect the petitioner to 
provide certain basic types of evidence to establish that the company, though small, exists and is performing 
the functions stated. The petitioner was unwilling or unable to provide basic evidence such as an office 
address, directions to its office, the requested photographs clearly depicting the operation of the entity, a letter 
from its lessor, or any other evidence of business activities, all of which were specifically requested in the 
RFE. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for 
denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). The non-existence or other unavailability of required evidence 
creates a presumption of ineligibility. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(2)(i). Accordingly, the petition will be denied for 
this additional reason. 
The AAO acknowledges that USCIS has approved two prior petitions granting the beneficiary L-1A status. 
The prior approvals do not preclude USCIS from denying an extension of the original visa based on a 
reassessment of the beneficiary's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556,2004 WL 
1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). In matters relating to an extension of nonimmigrant visa petition validity involving 
the same petitioner, beneficiary, and underlying facts, USCIS will generally give deference to a prior 
determination of eligibility. However, the mere fact that USCIS, by mistake or oversight, approved a visa 
petition on one occasion does not create an automatic entitlement to the approval of a subsequent petition for 
renewal of that visa. Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertofi 484 F.3d 139, 148 (I st Cir 2007); see also Matter of 
Church Scientology Int'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). Each nonimmigrant petition filing is a 
separate proceeding with a separate record and a separate burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.8(d). In 
making a determination of statutory eligibility, USCIS is limited to the information contained in that 
individual record of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(16)(ii). 
If the previous nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported assertions that are 
contained in the current record, the approvals would constitute material and gross error on the part of the 
director. Due to the lack of evidence of eligibility in the present record, the AAO finds that the director was 

Page 11 
justified in departing from the previous approvals by denying the present request to extend the beneficiary's 
status. 
The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, 
merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency 
must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court 
of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for the decision. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff 
can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the 
AAO's enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1025, 1043 
(E.D. Cal. 2001). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.