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U.S. Department of Elomeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: WAC 04 220 53962 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: SEP 0 5 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. ~iemann, dhief 
[ Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1A nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 
U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a California corporation engaged in the provision of international 
freight forwarding, warehousing and customs clearance services. The petitioner claims that it is the parent 
company of the beneficiary's foreign employer, located in 
China. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its "International Shipping Manager, Outbound." 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish (1) that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; or (2) that the beneficiary has 
been employed by the foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the evidence 
submitted was sufficient to establish that the beneficiary will be employed in an executive or managerial 
position. Counsel contends that, contrary to the director's findings, the position description is sufficiently 
detailed and represents duties "normally" performed by senior managerial personnel. Counsel does not 
address the issue of the beneficiary's qualifying employment with the foreign entity. Counsel submits a brief 
in support of the appeal. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. Finally, counsel contends that the beneficiary's organizational structure is 
sufficiently complex to support the beneficiary in a position that is primarily managerial. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 3 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary will be employed 
by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 4 
The nonirnrnigrant visa petition was filed on August 6, 2004. In an appended letter dated May 6, 2004, the 
petitioner described the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States as follows, noting the company's 
need for "an experienced, senior executive officer": 
[The beneficiary] will fill the position of International Shipping Manager - Outbound, in this 
position, he is responsible for supervising and directing the outbound shipping operation, 
supervise [sic] the staff in coordinating and consolidating cargo and freight forwarding to the 
ports in China, negotiating with the corporate clients for long-term shipping service contracts, 
reviewing and approving service package pricing. Also, he will formulate short and long 
range business objectives, devise business policy and approve business plans; further, to 
direct development of the shipping networking in China and other Asian countries. 
The director issued a request for evidence on September 23,2004, in part instructing the petitioner to submit a 
more detailed description of the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States, including the percentage 
of time the beneficiary will allocate to each of his job duties. The director indicated that the petitioner should 
be specific, indicate exactly who the beneficiary directs, and provide job titles and position descriptions for 
his proposed subordinates. The director also requested an organizational chart for the U.S. company 
identifying the names of all current executives, managers, and supervisors, the number of employees within 
each department, and the identification of the beneficiary's subordinates by name and job title. Finally, the 
director requested a brief description of job duties, educational level, annual salarieslwages and immigration 
status for all employees who would work under the beneficiary's supervision. 
In a response dated December 15, 2004, the petitioner included the same job description recited above, and 
noted that the beneficiary will spend "70% of work time in supervising lower staff; 30% engaged in long term 
business planning and development." 
The petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the U.S. company's Los Angeles, California office, whch 
identifies a total of 17 positions. The chart indicates that the beneficiary will report to a vice president, who 
will in turn report to the company's president. The chart does not provide the requested names and job titles 
of the beneficiary's subordinates, but indicates that he will supervise "Shipping Operation Sales (staffing 2)," 
"Customer Export Permit (staffing I)," and "Logistics (staffing 2, 1 vacant)." 
The petitioner also provided an employee list for the Los Angeles office which lists seventeen employees by 
name and job title, along with their educational level, immigration status, 
and monthly wages. The petitioner indicated that its employees include a president, two vice presidents, a 
manager/personnel, two import supervisors, two import clerks, an export supervisor, an export clerk, a sales 
employee, a customer service employee, an accounting manager, three accounting clerks, and a "VP 
Assistant." The petitioner indicated that thirteen of its employees possess bachelor's degrees. The petitioner 
did not provide the requested job descriptions for the beneficiary's proposed subordinate employees, nor did it 
identify these employees by name and job title. 
The director denied the petition on December 3 1,2004, concluding that the petitioner had not established that 
the beneficiary would be employed in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity The director observed 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 5 
that the initial description of the beneficiary's duties was vague and generalized, and noted that the petitioner 
failed to submit a more detailed description in response to the director's specific request for such evidence. 
The director found that the position description was "too broad and nonspecific" to convey any understanding 
of the actual duties of the proffered position and included "no quantifiable definitions" for the beneficiary's 
broad responsibilities. 
The director further noted that the job description for the beneficiary's proposed position was identical to a 
description for an "Operation Manager" position submitted by the petitioner in connection with another L-1A 
petition (WAC 04 233 51681). The director noted "the language in each description is exact in its vagueness 
and generalization, and the petitioner does not attempt to provide specific duties of the respective positions." 
The director concluded that "simply submitting a statement broad and general enough to encompass any 
number of distinct positions does not meet the burden of proof in these proceedings." 
Accordingly, the director found the evidence of record insufficient to establish that the beneficiary will be 
primarily managing the organization or a department of the organization, or that he will be primarily 
supervising an essential function or a subordinate staff of professional, managerial or supervisory personnel 
who would relieve the beneficiary from performing non-qualifying duties. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner's description of the proffered position "is in 
compliance with the regulatory requirement as for the specificity and is the normally [sic] the job duties a 
senior managerial personnel [sic] will perform." Counsel argues that the description submitted conveys 
"precisely what a senior managerial personnel [sic] should do in managing the operation," and asserts that 
routine duties such as preparing shipping documents, reviewing import and export documentation, and 
preparing customs documentation are "generally delegated to subordinate staff, which are mostly college- 
educated professional level workers." 
Counsel further argues that "[ilt is unrealistic to require the petitioner to 'quantify' the specific job duties as 
stated in the Service denial notice." Counsel asserts that the duties of senior managerial personnel "are 
generally interactive, he exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making, it is unrealistic to calculate 
how much time to spend on a specific matter; the senior manager interacts with lower managers and 
supervisors, he may handle multiple matters at the same time." Counsel further claims that "an attempt to 
quantify specific matters handled by a senior managerial personnel will not be precise or realistic, therefore, 
to require such an attempt is unreasonable and not required by the L regulations." 
With respect to the director's observations regarding an identical position description submitted with a 
different petition for a different position within the U.S. company, counsel asserts that the beneficiary's 
proposed position and the "operation manager" position are in different departments, with one position 
responsible for domestic shipping and one responsible for international outbound shipping. Finally, counsel 
cites several unpublished decisions to stand for the proposition that a small- or medium-sized company may 
support an L-1A manager or executives. 
Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. Upon review of the petition and supporting evidence, the petitioner 
has not established that the beneficiary will serve in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. When 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 6 
examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job duties must 
clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are either in an 
executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
In the instant case, counsel refers to the beneficiary as both an "executive officer" and a "senior manager," 
and therefore suggests that the beneficiary will serve in both an executive and managerial capacity. To sustain 
such an assertion, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set forth in 
the statutory definition for executive duties under section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, and the statutory 
definition for managerial duties under section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act. At a minimum, the petitioner must 
establish that the beneficiary is primarily employed in one or the other capacity. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
As observed by the director, the petitioner's vague description of the beneficiary's duties does not clearly 
depict an individual primarily engaged in the high-level tasks associated with the statutory definitions of 
managerial and executive capacity. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will "supervise and 
direct the outbound shipping operation" but fails to identify the specific managerial or executive tasks this 
responsibility entails on a day-to-day basis. The petitioner further indicates that the beneficiary will negotiate 
with corporate clients for long-term shipping service contracts and "direct development of the shipping 
network in China and other Asian countries." Without further explanation these responsibilities suggest that 
the beneficiary may be directly involved in promoting and selling the petitioner's services to new and existing 
clients, rather than directing others to do so. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to 
produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or 
executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Int 'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 
604 (Comm. 1988). 
The petitioner also stated that the beneficiary will "formulate short and long range business objectives, devise 
business policy and approve business plans." While these responsibilities are couched in the language of the 
statutory definition of "executive capacity," the petitioner did not further explain the beneficiary's areas of 
responsibility with respect to planning and policy-making or explain how this responsibility would be shared 
with the petitioner's two vice presidents and president, who would reasonably be expected to oversee the 
company's overall objectives and policies. Conclusory assertions regarding the beneficiary's employment 
capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the 
petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 
905 F. 2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990); Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). 
Finally, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary would "supervise staff in coordinating and consolidating 
cargo and freight forwarding," but provided no information regarding the number of subordinates or the types 
of positions they would hold, and thus did not establish that the beneficiary's subordinates would include 
managerial, supervisory or professional employees. A managerial or executive employee must have authority 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 7 
over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised 
employees are professionals. See Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 
1988). 
Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the 
regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to 
answer a critical question in this case: What does the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? The actual 
duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. at 
1108. 
The director reviewed the vague description provided by the petitioning company and reasonably requested 
additional evidence regarding the beneficiary's actual duties, the petitioner's organizational structure, and the 
beneficiary's proposed subordinate employees. When examining the managerial or executive capacity of a 
beneficiary, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) reviews the totality of the record, including 
descriptions of a beneficiary's duties and those of his or her subordinate employees, the nature of the 
petitioner's business, the employment and remuneration of employees, and any other facts contributing to a 
complete understanding of a beneficiary's actual role in a business. The evidence submitted with the initial 
petition did not provide a clear understanding of the petitioner's business or the beneficiary's proposed role 
within it. CIS will not accept a vague job description and speculate as to what managerial or executive duties 
the beneficiary may perform. 
The regulation states that the petitioner shall submit additional evidence as the director, in his or her 
discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of the request for evidence is to elicit further information that 
clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been established, as of the time the petition is filed. See 
8 C.F.R. $9 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The petitioner failed to submit the requested evidence in response, and 
instead re-submitted the same vague job description that was already found to be insufficient by the director. 
The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying 
the petition. 8 C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(14). 
Contrary to counsel's assertions on appeal, it is not sufficient to provide a broad job description and assert 
that such duties are typically performed by any employee at the senior management level. The regulations 
require a detailed description of the actual duties to be performed by the instant beneficiary as a managerial or 
executive employee within the context of this petitioner's organization. Nor is it unreasonable for the director 
to request that the petitioner "quantify" the beneficiary's actual duties and the portion of time he will allocate 
to them. The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show 
that the beneficiary performs the high level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second the 
petitioner must show that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not 
spend a majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 
(Table) 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. 1991). Whether the beneficiary is a managerial or executive employee 
turns on whether the petitioner has sustained its burden of providing that his duties are "primarily" managerial 
or executive. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. The word "primarily" is defined as "at first," 
principally,' or "chiefly." Webster's 11 New College Dictionary 877 (2001). Where an individual is 
"principally" or "chiefly" performing the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service, that 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 8 
individual cannot also be "principally" or "chiefly" performing managerial or executive duties. Contrary to 
counsel's contention that there is no regulation requiring a percentage of time devoted to each of the 
beneficiary's duties, CIS must determine that the beneficiary is primarily engaged in a managerial or 
executive capacity. To make such a determination it is necessary to require a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's duties and the time the beneficiary devotes to these duties. It is especially relevant when several 
of the beneficiary's claimed responsibilities, as discussed above, do not fall directly under traditional 
managerial or executive duties as defined in the statute. See e.g. IKEA US, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. 
Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
Finally, as noted by the director, the petitioner's use of identical position descriptions for two distinct 
positions within its organization raises questions regarding the credibility of the petitioner's claims regarding 
both beneficiaries' duties. The petitioner has not explained its need for two employees to perform exactly the 
same duties. Although counsel explains on appeal that one manager will be responsible for outbound shipping 
and one will be responsible for domestic operations, the position descriptions are identical and both 
descriptions clearly reference outbound shipping. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of 
course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of 
the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591 (BIA 1988). 
The only new information provided in response to the request for evidence was the petitioner's statement that 
the beneficiary would devote the majority of his time, 70 percent, to "supervising lower staff' and an 
organizational chart showing that the beneficiary would supervise two "shipping operation sales" staff, one 
"customs, export permit" staff and one "logistics" staff. The director clearly and specifically requested that 
the petitioner identify all employees to be supervised by the beneficiary by name and job title, and provide 
position descriptions for each employee. The petitioner failed to submit the requested evidence in response. 
This evidence is critical, as it would assist in determining whether the beneficiary will primarily supervise 
managerial, supervisory or professional staff, as well as whether the beneficiary's subordinates would 
reasonablly be able to relieve him from performing non-qualifying duties associated with the "international 
shipping" function. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be 
grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 3 103.2(b)(14). 
Although the beneficiary is not required to supervise personnel, if it is claimed that his duties involve 
supervising employees, the petitioner must establish that the subordinate employees are supervisory, 
professional, or managerial. See 9 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the 
subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1 101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely slull, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 9 
Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education required by the position, rather than the degree held 
by the subordinate employee. Although the petitioner provided job titles for its seventeen employees, it is not 
clear how the employee list corresponds to the organizational chart, and it is impossible to determine which 
employees would be supervised by the beneficiary. In addition, although the petitioner indicates that the 
majority of its employees possess bachelor's degrees, the possession of a bachelor's degree by a subordinate 
employee does not automatically lead to the conclusion that an employee is employed in a professional 
capacity as that term is defined above. In the instant case, the petitioner has not provided the requested job 
descriptions for the beneficiary's subordinate employees, and therefore it cannot be concluded that any of 
them would be performing professional duties. Similarly, the organizational chart does not clearly show that 
the beneficiary would be supervising supervisory or managerial employees. Thus, the petitioner has not 
shown that the beneficiary's subordinate employees are supervisory, professional, or managerial, as required 
by section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 
158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 
1972)). Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's primary responsibility of 
supervising lower level employees will be managerial in nature. 
The AAO notes that the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of 
the U.S. company. The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or 
control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential 
function" within the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). If 
a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. In addition, the petitioner must 
provide a comprehensive and detailed description of the beneficiary's daily duties demonstrating that the 
beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the duties relating to the function. See sections 
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or 
executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Int'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). In this 
matter, the petitioner has not provided evidence that the beneficiary will primarily manage an essential 
function. 
Whether the beneficiary is an "activity" or "function" manager turns in part on whether the petitioner has 
sustained its burden of proving that his duties are "primarily" managerial. As discussed above, the 
beneficiary's primary duty of supervising lower-level personnel, which accounts for 70 percent of his time, 
has not been demonstrated to be managerial in nature, and thus the petitioner has not met this essential 
element of eligibility. 
On appeal, counsel refers to the beneficiary as "an executive officer" but fails to establish how the beneficiary 
qualifies as an executive of the petitioning organization. The statutory definition of the term "executive 
capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex organizational hierarchy, including major 
components or functions of the organization, and that person's authority to direct the organization. Section 
lOl(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(B). Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to 
"direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 10 
the organization must have a subordinate level of managerial employees for the beneficiary to direct and the 
beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than on the day-to- 
operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute simply because 
they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole managerial employee. 
The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" and receive only "general 
supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the 
organization." Id. The beneficiary's job description describes an employee performing primarily supervisory 
duties, rather than one who would be employed primarily to establish goals and policies or to focus on the 
broad objectives of the company. Counsel's unsupported statements regarding the beneficiary's executive 
capacity on appeal are not persuasive. Conclusory assertions regarding the beneficiary's employment capacity 
are not sufficient. Merely repeating the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's 
burden of proof. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F. 2d 41 
(2d. Cir. 1990); Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). The petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary will be employed by the petitioner in an executive capacity. 
Counsel further refers to unpublished decisions in which the AAO determined that beneficiaries met the 
requirements of serving in a managerial and executive capacity for L-1 classification even though they were 
employed by small or medium-sized organizations. Counsel has furnished no evidence to establish that the 
facts of the instant petition are analogous to those in the unpublished decisions. While 8 C.F.R. 4 103.3(c) 
provides that AAO precedent decisions are binding on all CIS employees in the administration of the Act, 
unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. 
The AAO has long interpreted the regulations and statute to prohibit discrimination against small or medium 
size businesses. However, the AAO has also long required the petitioner to establish that the beneficiary's 
position consists of primarily managerial or executive duties and that the petitioner has sufficient personnel to 
relieve the beneficiary from performing operational and administrative tasks. As discussed above, the 
petitioner has failed to meet its evidentiary burden with respect to describing the beneficiary's actual duties, 
the duties performed by his subordinates, and the petitioner's organizational structure. Again, going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed 
in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. For this reason, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
The second issue in this matter is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary has been employed by 
the foreign entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner indicated on Form 1-129 that the beneficiary has served as the operation manager of the foreign 
entity's Qingdao branch office since 2001, and provided the following position description: 
Directs, supervise [sic] and coordinates export shipping and international freight forwarding 
operations; supervise [sic] staff including sales, customs clearance personnel, warehousing 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 11 
and ground transportation; negotiates and approves with corporate clients on international 
freight shipping service contracts; directs business planning. 
In its May 6, 2004 letter, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary has served as the branch manager of the 
foreign entity's Qingdao branch since 2001 and provided the following description: 
Under his leadership are approximately 30 employees including managers and shipping 
account executives. The position is managerial and has full authority of hiring and making 
major corporate business decisions. Qingdao is a major seaport in Northern China and [the 
foreign entity's] Qingdao branch handles hundreds of import and export shipments annual 
[sic] for the industrial and commercial companies, both domestic and international. 
In his September 23, 2004 request for evidence, the director instructed the petitioner to submit additional 
evidence to establish that the beneficiary has been employed by the foreign entity in a managerial or executive 
capacity. Specifically, the director requested: (1) a more detailed description of the beneficiary's duties 
abroad, including the percentage of time the beneficiary spends in each of the listed duties; (2) the total 
number of employees at the foreign location where the beneficiary is employed; and (3) the foreign entity's 
organizational chart, clearly identifying the beneficiary's position, and listing all employees under the 
beneficiary's supervision by name and job title. The director also requested a brief description of the job 
duties and educational levels for all of the beneficiary's subordinates. 
The petitioner's December 15, 2004 response to the director's request for evidence included a certificate of 
employment from the foreign entity, dated November 1, 2004, which provided the following information 
regarding the beneficiary's foreign employment: 
This is to verify that [the beneficiary] joined [the foreign entity's] Qingdao Branch in August 
1999 and promoted to Operation Manager, responsible for directing the international freight 
forwarding operation. On September 27, 2002, he was appointed Qingdai [sic] Regional 
Manager, responsible for overall international shipping agency business and liaison with the 
U.S. parent company. . . . 
The petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the foreign entity which depicts the beneficiary as branch 
manager with authority over a customs department manager, customer service manager, operation manager 
and finance manager, who in turn supervise a total of more than 30 lower level personnel in their various 
departments. The chart shows that the beneficiary reports to a vice general manager, who in turn reports to the 
vice president for North China. The organizational chart was accompanied by an employee list which lists all 
employees in the Qingdao branch office by name, job title, job function, educational level, and salary. The 
beneficiary's title is identified as "operation manager" on the employee list. 
The director denied the petition, in part concluding that the petitioner had not established that the beneficiary 
was employed in a qualifymg capacity with the foreign entity. The director noted that the petitioner provided 
minimal documentation describing the beneficiary's position overseas and "simply submits verification 
claiming the beneficiary has been worlung for the foreign company in a positions [sic] with managerial titles." 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 12 
The director observed that "assertions or 'verifications' regarding the beneficiary's employment capacity are 
not sufficient without additional evidence." 
On appeal, counsel does not address the director's determination that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that 
the beneficiary is employed in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity with the foreign entity. 
Upon review, the AAO affirms the director's determination on this issue. When examining the executive or 
managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. 
See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to 
be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial 
capacity. Id. 
Preliminarily, the AAO notes that the petitioner initially provided two different job titles and job descriptions 
for the beneficiary, noting his employment as "operation manager" on Form 1-129 and as "branch manager" 
in its May 6, 2004 letter. Based on a review of the petitioner's job descriptions and the foreign entity's 
organizational chart, these are two distinct positions within the foreign organization, with significantly 
different levels of authority. Although the employment certificate mentions that the beneficiary previously 
served as "operation manager" and was promoted to "regional manager" in 2002, the petitioner failed to 
explain why it initially identified the beneficiary as the foreign entity's operation manager. Accordingly, the 
beneficiary's actual job title remains unresolved. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where 
the truth lies. Matter ofHo, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591-92 (BIA 1988). 
Neither job description submitted with the initial petition was sufficient to establish that the beneficiary 
currently serves in a primarily managerial or executive capacity with the foreign entity. Both descriptions 
consisted of broad statements which failed to identify the tasks performed by the beneficiary on a day-to-day 
basis. The AAO will not speculate as to the managerial or executive job duties to be performed by the 
beneficiary in connection with supervising and coordinating export shipping and freight forwarding 
operations, nor will it accept the petitioner's blanket assertion that "this position is managerial and has full 
authority of hiring and malung major corporate business decisions." Again, reciting the beneficiary's vague 
job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed 
description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a critical question in this 
case: What does the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal the 
true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. at 1 108. 
In the request for evidence, the director specifically instructed the petitioner to submit a detailed description 
including specific duties performed by the beneficiary and the percentage of time he spends on each duty. 
The petitioner failed to provide the requested evidence in response, instead submitting a "certification of 
employment" from the foreign entity which provided that the beneficiary "is responsible for overall 
international shipping agency business" and liaison with the U.S. company. 
WAC 04 220 53962 
Page 13 
This evidence is critical as it would have established the actual duties performed by the beneficiary and 
whether those duties are primarily managerial or executive in nature. The regulation states that the petitioner 
shall submit additional evidence as the director, in his or her discretion, may deem necessary. The purpose of 
the request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought 
has been established, as of the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. $9 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The failure to 
submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 
C.F.R. 9 103.2(b)(14). For this additional reason, the petition will not be approved. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.