dismissed L-1A Case: Freight/Shipping Insurance

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
identifyiag data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwamixlted 
invasion of personal privacy 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
FUl3LlC COPY 
7 
File: WAC 07 143 50617 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: JUL 17 ?oo8 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
jmobert P. ~iemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 07 143 50617 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as its president as an L- 
1A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 1 O 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of Florida and is allegedly a "freighdshipping insurance brokerage" business. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred and that the beneficiary's duties will primarily be those of an executive. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hirnlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States 
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
WAC 07 143 50617 
Page 3 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial 
duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of 
the Act, although counsel on appeal appears to limit the beneficiary to the executive classification. 
Furthermore, while the petitioner claims in the petition that the beneficiary will be employed in an executive 
capacity, it also asserts that beneficiary will "temporarily" assume the duties of the general manager. Given 
the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the petitioner is claiming that the beneficiary will be employed 
in either an executive or a managerial capacity and will consider his eligibility under both classifications. 
Counsel describes the beneficiary's proposed duties and employment in the United States in a letter dated 
April 9, 2007 as follows: 
WAC 07 143 50617 
Page 4 
[The beneficiary] is replacing Mr. Ahmet Erkan as the President of [the petitioner]. His 
position is one that is Executive and his duties include the following: 
Direct and coordinate an organization's financial and budget activities in order to 
fund operations, maximize investments, and increase efficiency. 
Confer with board members to discuss issues, coordinate activities, and resolve 
problems. 
Analyze operations to evaluate performance of a company and to determine areas of 
potential program improvement, or policy change. 
Direct, plan, and implement policies, objectives, and activities of organizations or 
businesses in order to ensure continuing operations, to maximize returns on 
investments, and to increase productivity. 
Prepare budgets for approval, including those for funding and implementation of 
programs. 
Negotiate or approve contracts and agreements with customers, federal and state 
agencies, and other organizational entities. 
The petitioner claims in the Form 1-129 to currently employ three workers. 
On June 28, 2007, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, a list of all 
employees in the United States, an organizational chart for the United States operation, job descriptions for 
both the beneficiary and any subordinate employees, and quarterly wage reports. 
In response, counsel submitted a letter dated September 17, 2007 in which he asserts that, "at the present 
moment, there is only one employee in the U.S. company," but that the petitioner foresees "hiring four U.S. 
employees over the next six months." Counsel also claims that the beneficiary will assume his ascribed duties 
as well as the duties of the general manager, who "will be stepping down." 
The petitioner also submitted a quarterly wage report, which indicates that it currently employs one worker, 
, whom the beneficiary will replace. The organizational chart further indicates that the petitioner 
one worker, the beneficiary, after 
 resigns. While the chart includes five 
additional positions, these positions are all 
 ccordingly, the beneficiary will be the 
petitioner's sole employee. The petitioner does not explain why it claimed to employ three people in the Form 
1-129 when the record clearly indicates that the petitioner has employed, and will employ in the near future, 
only one employee. 
Finally, the petitioner submitted a more detailed job description for the beneficiary as follows: 
Plan, formulate and implement administrative and operational policies and 
procedures for the company; (4 hrs./week) 
Set and review company objectives; (3 hrs./week) 
Setting up and adapting existing company systems and controls; (3 hrs./week) 
Approving all expenses for the company, including all outsourced services in 
accordance with the policies and procedures set by the parent company; (4 hrs./week) 
WAC 07 143 50617 
Page 5 
Hirelfire personnel and train and evaluate them; (112 hr.1week) 
Recruit new sales professionalslaccount managers as needed; (112 hr./week) 
Identify and develop business opportunities and project feasibility[;] (3 hrs.1week) 
Finding the best suited, high quality shipping and insurance services in the USA and 
forging a business relationship and commercial agreements with these numerous 
companies, ensuring that the services provided meet company standards; (3 
hrs.1week) 
Coordinate and manage the company's shipping broker and insurance broker to 
ensure the company service standards are kept for all shipments. This includes the 
loadinglunloading of freight in the U.S., tracking their transit and the preparation of 
the corresponding bills of lading and other shipping documents. Notification of 
consignees or customers of the arrival of freight and arrange for the delivery, 
including the clearing through customs, coordinating with U.S. stevedores for the off- 
loading from the ships; (12 hrs.1week) 
Develop the infrastructure and ability to sell the range of services offered by [the 
petitioner]; (2 hrs.1week) 
Acting as the essential interface between [the petitioner] and [the foreign employer] 
in order to ensure that smooth operation between both companies and exploit the use 
of economies of scale in order to improve competitiveness and increase profitability 
of the operations; (5 hrs./week) 
Supervise the production of accurate and representative marketing material: This 
material, including but not limited to printed matter and Web-based applications, are 
to be communicated and promoted professionally; See www.horizonship.us (1 
hr./week) 
Responding to all inquiries, requests and ad hoc requirements of the Shipping and 
Insurance Broker Community and channeling all communication from this source to 
the various personnel; (2 hrs.lweek)[.] 
On October 5, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
As a threshold matter, it must be noted that the petitioner's plans to expand its business or to hire additional 
staff members does not establish that the beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. A visa petition 
may not be approved based on speculation of future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes 
eligible under a new set of facts. See Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978); 
Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comm. 1971). Accordingly, the petitioner's employment, or 
planned employment, of additional staff members is not relevant to the instant petition. Based on the payroll 
records and organizational chart pertaining to the time period in which the instant petition was filed, it appears 
that the petitioner only employed one person and that this employee will be "stepping down." Therefore, as 
WAC 07 143 50617 
Page 6 
further explained below, the petitioner's business has not reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary 
in a predominantly managerial or executive position. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a 
day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will develop policies, procedures, and 
objectives as well as set up "company systems and controls." However, the petitioner does not specifically 
define any of these policies, procedures, objectives, systems, or controls. Furthermore, the petitioner states 
that the beneficiary will supervise, coordinate, or manage the production of marketing materials and the 
performance of various tasks necessary to the provision of the petitioner's services. However, the petitioner 
does not explain what, exactly, the beneficiary will do in "managing" the performance of these tasks when he 
will be the sole employee of the business. Vague, executive-sounding duties and an inflated job title are not 
probative of the beneficiary actually performing qualifying duties as the petitioner's sole employee. Specifics 
are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties will be primarily executive or managerial 
in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin 
Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on 
record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
Consequently, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties as its "president" and temporary "general manager." To the contrary, it appears more likely 
than not that the beneficiary will primarily perform non-qualifying administrative or operational tasks 
inherent to the operation of a one-employee business. In addition to being vague, the job duties ascribed to 
beneficiary appear to concern primarily non-qualifying tasks and not managerial or executive duties. For 
example, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary will devote most of his time to developing infrastructure, 
interacting with the foreign employer, responding to inquiries, and "coordinating" the company's services. 
However, not only is the record not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary's "coordination" of the 
company's services constitutes a qualifying duty, the remaining tasks appear to be operational or 
administrative tasks necessary to the petitioner's provision of a service. An employee who "primarily" 
performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that 
one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). 
Also, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary will be relieved of the need to perform 
the non-qualifying tasks inherent to the petitioner's business by a subordinate staff. As discussed above, the 
record indicates that the beneficiary will be the petitioner's sole employee. While the petitioner claims that 
the beneficiary will be relieved of the need to perform non-qualifying tasks by future employees, the 
WAC 07 143 50617 
Page 7 
speculative employment of subordinate workers does not establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform 
qualifying duties immediately upon petition approval. See Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248. 
Accordingly, it is more likely than not that the beneficiary will primarily perform the non-qualifying tasks 
necessary to the provision of the petitioner's services, e.g., freight tracking, contacting customers and 
consignees, customs tasks, and marketing services, rather than "manage" the provision of these services. 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
As indicated in the record, the beneficiary will be the petitioner's sole employee and will not immediately 
supervise any workers. Furthermore, while the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an 
essential function of the organization, the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. 
The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the 
organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute 
or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must 
furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, 
i.e., identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the 
proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 9 
214.2(1)(3)(ii). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that 
the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the tasks related to the function. 
In this matter, the petitioner has not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. 
The petitioner's vague job description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily 
managerial. Also, as explained above, the record indicates that the beneficiary will more likely than not 
primarily perform non-qualifying operational or administrative tasks. Absent a clear and credible breakdown 
of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine what proportion of his 
duties will be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily perform the duties of a 
function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the 
beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce with any certainty what the beneficiary will do on a day- 
to-day basis. Moreover, as explained above, it appears that the beneficiary will primarily perform the tasks 
WAC 07 143 50617 
Page 8 
necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed 
that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) "may properly consider an organization's small size as one 
factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. US. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval Republic of 
Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 41,42 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2003)). Furthermore, it is 
appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant factors, 
such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non-managerial 
or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a regular 
and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 'The size of a 
company may be especially relevant when CIS notes discrepancies in the record and fails to believe that the 
facts asserted are true. Id. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship 
with the foreign employer in Turkey. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by 
"[elvidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying 
organizations." Title 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, 
or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a 
parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing 
business." "Subsidiary" is defined in pertinent part as a corporation "of which a parent owns, directly or 
indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity." 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(K). "Doing business" is 
defined in part as "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services." 8 C.F.R. 3 
2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(H). 
In this matter, the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are qualifying 
organizations for two reasons. 
First, the petitioner has failed to establish that the foreign employer truly owns and controls the United States 
operation, a Florida corporation. The petitioner claims in the Form 1-129 to be 100% owned by the foreign 
employer, a Turkish company. However, not only has the petitioner failed to submit any evidence to 
substantiate this claim, the record contains inconsistencies which undermine this assertion. In support of its 
petition, the petitioner submitted a copies of its Forms 1120-A, U.S. Corporation Short-Form Income Tax 
Return, which indicate that no single individual or entity owns more than 50% of the petitioner's stock. 
Accordingly, it appears fi-om the Forms 1120-A that the petitioner is not majority owned by anyone, including 
the foreign employer. It is also noted that the instructions to the Form 1120-A clearly prohibit its use for 
United States corporations having "foreign shareholders that directly or indirectly own 25% of more of its 
WAC 07 143 50617 
Page 9 
stock." I.R.S. Form 1120-A (Instructions) (2006). The petitioner failed to explain why it repeatedly filed 
Forms 1120-A when the instructions to this form clearly prohibit its use by taxpayers who are principally 
owned by foreign individuals or entities. The petitioner also failed to explain why it averred in the Forms 
1120-A not to be majority owned by a single interest. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where 
the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the 
petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining 
evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Id. at 591. 
Second, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the foreign employer is currently doing business. 
While the petitioner submitted various documents pertaining to the foreign employer's organization and its 
claimed business activities, none of the invoices or other business documents is translated. Therefore, the 
AAO cannot determine whether the evidence supports the petitioner's claim that the foreign employer is 
engaged in the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services. See 8 C.F.R. fj 
103.2(b)(3). As this evidence is not probative and cannot be accorded any weight in this proceeding, the 
petitioner has failed to establish that the foreign employer is a qualifying organization engaged in doing 
business. Once again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190. 
Accordingly, as the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are qualifying 
organizations, the petition will not be approved. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad 
in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
Counsel described the beneficiary's duties abroad in a letter dated April 9,2007. As this letter is in the record, 
the job description will not be repeated here verbatim. Generally, the beneficiary is described as being the 
foreign employer's "director of operations" and as directing the foreign employer's finances, analyzing 
operations, implementing policies and objectives, and negotiating contracts. 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a 
managerial or executive capacity. First, counsel submitted a vague description of the beneficiary's job duties 
which fails to specifically describe the beneficiary's job duties abroad. Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties were primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise 
meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 
724 F. Supp. 1103, aff'd, 905 F.2d 41. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to describe the duties of the 
beneficiary's purported subordinates abroad. Absent detailed descriptions of the duties of both the beneficiary 
and his purported subordinates, it is impossible for CIS to discern whether the beneficiary was "primarily" 
engaged in performing managerial or executive duties abroad. See sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act; 
see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
WAC 07 143 50617 
Page 10 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity for one continuous year in the three years preceding the filing of the petition, and the 
petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afyd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.