dismissed L-1A Case: Furniture

PUBLlC COPY 
r 
ichti*g data hleted to 
prevent ddy unwarranted 
wasion of pmonal privacy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W ., Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC 05 195 52379 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: JUN 0 4 2007 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
- /3---4L 
~obemiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 05 195 52379 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonirnrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary in the position of vice 
president as an L-1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. fj 1101(a)(15)(L). 
 The petitioner, a corporation 
organized under the laws 
 to be in the furniture business and alleges a 
qualifying relationship wit of China. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish (1) that it and the 
organization which employed the beneficiary in China are qualifying organizations as defined by 8 C.F.R. fj 
214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G); or (2) that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that, after the filing of the 
instant petition, it became 100% owned by the foreign entity. 
 The petitioner further asserts that the 
beneficiary will be employed in an executive or managerial capacity. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hirnher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
EAC 05 195 52379 
Page 3 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that it and the organization which 
employed the beneficiary in China are qualifying organizations as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G). 
To establish a "qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer are the same employer (i.e., one entity with 
"branch" offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See generally section 
101(a)(15)(L) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1). A "subsidiary" is defined in pertinent part as a corporation "of 
which a parent owns, directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity." 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(K). 
In support of its assertion of a qualifying relationship, the petitioner submitted correspondence, business 
records, 
 1 documents. 
 While the petitioner's 2004 Form 1120 indicates that it was 100% 
owned b 
 at that time, the petitioner also submitted 
 , 2005 in which it 
asserts that half of its stock was sold in 2005 to the foreign entity an amiw a subsidiary of the 
foreign entity. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the petitioner became a subsidiary of the foreign entity 
in 2005 because it now owns, directly or indirectly, half of the petitioner. 
The petitioner also submitted, inter alia, the following documents: 
A translation of minutes from a meeting of the foreign entity's board of directors on 
December 14, 2004 at which the board allegedly decided to acquire a 50% interest in the 
petitioner. The board further decided that 95% of this 50% share would belong to the 
entity and 5% of this 50% share would belong to "the US subsidiary company," 
m 
An undated "contract" (executed and notarized on April 25, 2005) in which the petitioner 
agrees to sell 50% of its shares to the foreign entity and its United States subsidiary, - 
Paragraph 9 of the contract states that 90% of the 50% share would be sold to the 
foreign entity and 10% of the 50% share would be sold to ; and 
A shareholders' a eement dated May 3 1, 2005 in which the shareholders of the petitioner are 
identified as -100 shares or 50%),(90 shares or 45%), and the 
beneficiary (10 shares or 5%); 
On July 12, 2005, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, copies of all 
share certificates, stock ledgers, or other evidence documenting ownership and control of the petitioner. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a letter dated September 12, 2005 in which it asserts that the foreign 
entity owns 100% of the petitioner's stock. 
 In support, the petitioner submitted 20 stock certificates. 
Certificates 4 through 20 are blank. Certificates 1 (10 shares), 2 (100 shares), and 3 (90 shares) collectively 
EAC 05 195 52379 
Page 4 
represent the issuance of 200 shares of stock to the foreign entity. All three stock certificates are dated May 
3 1,2005. The initial petition was filed on July 1,2005. 
On September 29, 2005, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that it and the organization which employed the beneficiary in China are qualifying organizations as 
defined by 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G). 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that, after the filing of the instant petition, it became 100% owned by the 
foreign entity. Therefore, the petitioner asserts that it has established that it has a qualifying relationship with 
the foreign entity. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive. 
In this matter, the petitioner has not established that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity. 
The record is so rife with unresolved inconsistencies regarding the petitioner's ownership and control that it is 
impossible for Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) to confirm the identities of the petitioner's owner 
or owners. As outlined above, the petitioner has provided three different descriptions of its 2005 ownership 
and control. Initially, the petitioner described itself as being 45% owned by the foreign entity, 5% owned by 
the foreign entity's unitedstates subsidiary, ., and 50% owned by a third party. This third 
party is presumably since he was listed as the 100% owner in the petitioner's 2004 Form 1120. 
However, since Mr. individually join in the "contract" signed on April 25, 2005, this issue 
remains unclear. Moreover, the petitioner submitted no evidence that the foreign entity owns or controls 
, an essential element in establishing indirect control of the petitioner by the foreign entity, 
and did not explain how the petitioner could "sell" a 50% interest in itself when, according to the 2004 Form 
1120, Mr. had already been issued stock.' 
1 
It must be noted that, on appeal, the petitioner attempts to submit a copy of a stock certificate purporting to 
establish that the foreign entity owns and controls. The petitioner was put on notice of 
required evidence and given a reasonable opportunity to provide it for the record before the visa petition was 
adjudicated. The petitioner failed to submit the requested evidence and now submits it on appeal. However, 
the AAO will not consider this evidence for any purpose. See Matter of Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 
1988); Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988). Moreover, the petitioner implies on appeal that, 
because. allegedly established that it is owned and controlled by the foreign entity in an 
unrelated petition, CIS was charged with this knowledge. However, each petition filing is a separate 
proceeding with a separate record. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.8(d). In making a determination of statutory eligibility, 
CIS is limited to the information contained in the record of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. €j 103.2(b)(16)(ii). 
Therefore, the petitioner was obligated to establish that . was owned and controlled by the 
foreign entity in this proceeding. 
Finally, it is noted for the record that, according to the corporate documents of the State of New York, 
- is "inactive." Therefore, even if the 
 had established that it is owned and 
controlled by the foreign entity both directly and indirectly through., this would call into 
question the petitioner's current ownership and control and its continued eligibility for the benefit sought. 
EAC 05 195 52379 
Page 5 
Second, the petitioner provid 
 ' agreement dated 
 5 in which the petitioner's 
shareholders are identified as 
 100 shares or 50%), 
 90 shares or 45%), and the 
beneficiary (10 shares or 5%). The petitioner makes no attempt to reconcile this shareholders' agreement with 
the "contract" or its assertions in the May 25,2005 letter. 
Third, in response to the Request for Evidence, the petitioner described itself as being 100% owned by the 
foreign entity. In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted stock certificates dated May 31, 2005. 
The instant petition was filed on July 1, 2005. The petitioner makes no attempt to reconcile this new 
characterization of its ownership and control with the two earlier variations. 
While the petitioner attempts to explain on appeal that it became 100% owned by the foreign entity after the 
filing of the instant petition, this explanation fails for two reasons. First, the petitioner must establish 
eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. A visa petition may not be approved at a future 
date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of Michelin Tire 
Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). Second, this explanation on appeal is inconsistent with the 
petitioner's evidence submitted in response to the Request for Evidence. In that response, the petitioner 
produced stock certificates dated May 31, 2005 which purport to represent the issuance of 100% of the 
petitioner's stock to the foreign entity. As explained above, the instant petition was filed on July 1, 2005, over 
one month after the purported issuance of 100% of the petitioner's stock to the foreign entity. The petitioner 
makes no attempt to explain why the May 31, 2005 stock certificates were not submitted with the initial 
petition or to reconcile this inconsistency in the evidence. 
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective 
evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner 
submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591- 
92 (BIA 1988). Accordingly, given the numerous unresolved inconsistencies in the record, the petitioner has 
failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity, and the petition may not be 
approved for that reason. 
The second issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will be 
employed in a primarily executive capacity. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
EAC 05 195 52379 
Page 6 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary is claiming to be primarily 
engaged in managerial duties under section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under 
section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Based presumably on the executive title of the proposed position, the 
director considered the petition as if the petitioner is asserting that the beneficiary will be performing 
primarily executive duties. The AAO, however, will consider the managerial classification as well given the 
lack of clarity in the petition. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101 (a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's job duties in a letter dated May 25, 2005 appended to thc initial 
petition. 
 As this letter is in the record, the job description will not be repeated here. 
 Generally, the 
beneficiary is described as taking "full charge of the business development and management" of the petitioner 
and as increasing "the company's presence and market share throughout North America and China." 
On July 12, 2005, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, a description 
of the petitioner's employees, wage reports, and an organizational chart for the petitioner. 
In response, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart. The chart indicates that the beneficiary will 
report to the president and supervise a controller, a sales assistant, a marketing assistant, and a shipping 
assistant. 
 The petitioner also submitted job descriptions for each of the petitioner's employees. 
 The 
beneficiary is described as follows: 
EAC 05 195 52379 
Page 7 
As Vice President, [the beneficiary] is the one who is [sic] obtained the authorization from 
the parent company to be the No. 2 CEO of the US entity. His job duties are working as 
Acting President at the President's absence in the overall matters of the U.S. company, which 
include management & administration, finance and business, etc.; therefore he will conduct 
all top decisions when president is absent. [H]e will participate in organizing and presiding 
over the company, designating business plans & policies, taking charge in all trading affairs 
of the US entity, managing employees, recruiting, training, evaluating employees, keeping in 
close touch with parent company and reporting to the parent company about the directions the 
US company is going towards; he will give instructions to Dept. Managers and writing 
comments upon the reports submitted to her; finally, he is the person who has the right to 
report to the parent company in case that he believes that the expense checks signed by the 
President are not for the benefit of [sic] in the best interest of the company. 
The petitioner described the subordinate employees as administering accounts and performing tasks related to 
sales, marketing, and shipping. 
The petitioner also submitted a breakdown of the number of hours that the beneficiary will devote to his 
various duties. Generally, the beneficiary is described as working with the president in supervising the 
various subordinate employees. 
The petitioner did not, however, provide copies of its employees' 2004 Forms W-2.' 
On September 29, 2005, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive or manager. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
The petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act 
in a "managerial" capacity. In support of its petition, the petitioner has provided a vague and nonspecific 
description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day 
basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will organize and preside over the company; will 
21t is noted that the director determined that the petitioner failed to provide copies of its Forms 941 for the first 
and second quarters of 2005. However, upon a review of the record, the AAO has confirmed that the 
petitioner did in fact provide this documentation, and the AAO has given it full consideration in adjudicating 
the instant appeal. 
EAC 05 195 52379 
Page 8 
designate business plans and policies; and will take charge of the petitioner's trading affairs. However, the 
petitioner did not define what plans and policies will be designated or what, exactly, the beneficiary will do to 
"organize" the company or "take charge" of its trading affairs. The fact that the petitioner has given the 
beneficiary a manageriaVexecutive title and has prepared a vague job description which includes lofty duties 
does not establish that the beneficiary will actually perform managerial duties. Specifics are clearly an 
important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; 
otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., 
Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), ard, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of Cal$ornia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
As explained in the organizational chart and job descriptions for the subordinate employees, it appears that 
the beneficiary will manage a staff of four employees. While the petitioner has given these subordinate 
employees lofty titles, the petitioner has not established that these employees are primarily engaged in 
performing supervisory or managerial duties. To the contrary, the subordinate employees appear to be 
engaged in performing tasks related to providing a service or producing a product, i.e., sales, account 
administration, marketing, and shipping. In view of the above, the beneficiary would appear to be primarily a 
first-line supervisor of non-professional employees, the provider of actual services, or a combination of both. 
An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and 
(B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see 
also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). A managerial or 
executive employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a 
first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see 
also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Moreover, as the petitioner has not 
revealed the educational or skill level of the subordinate employees, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will manage "professional" employees.3 Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial capacity.4 
3 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the 
subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1 101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 8 17 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
4 
While the petitioner has not specifically argued that the beneficiary manages an essential function of the 
organization, the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function 
EAC 05 195 52379 
Page 9 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision malung" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be acting primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided 
for the beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day 
basis. Moreover, as explained above, it appears that the beneficiary will be primarily employed as a first-line 
supervisor. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an 
executive capacity. 
It is appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant 
factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non- 
managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business 
in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g., Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
The size of a company may be especially relevant when CIS notes discrepancies in the record and fails to 
believe that the facts asserted are true. Id. In this matter, the beneficiary's job description appearing in the 
manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff 
but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written 
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In 
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary 
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has 
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job 
description fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be managerial functions, if 
any, and what proportion would be non-managerial. Also, as explained above, the record establishes that the 
beneficiary will be primarily a first-line manager of non-professional employees. Absent a clear and credible 
breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine what 
proportion of his duties would be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily 
perform the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 
(D.D.C. 1999). 
EAC 05 195 52379 
Page 10 
letter dated May 25, 2005 makes reference to an unrelated company (Beijing Holyworld Tec Co., Ltd.) and 
refers to the beneficiary as a "she." The petitioner offers no explanation for these inconsistencies which lead 
one to conclude that the job description now being attributed to the beneficiary really belongs to a different 
worker employed by a different company. 
Accordingly, in this matter, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will be primarily 
performing managerial or executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.