dismissed L-1A Case: Hospitality

tdentitjhg &a deleted to 
* event clear!- -~iwamnted 
mvasion of perbonal privacy 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: SRC 05 093 5 1623 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: SEp 2 9 2006 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
~obki'EP. W\ie&ann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 05 093 5 1623 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as its general manager 
as an L- 1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a limited liability company organized 
under the laws of the State of Georgia and overates a hotel in Decatur, Georgia. The vetitioner claims a 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the petitioner and the 
foreign entity are qualifying organizations. Specifically, the director concluded that the United States 
operation is controlled by a franchisor and not by the majority owner of the petitioner and the foreign entity. 
The petitioner filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and forwarded the appeal 
to the AAO for review. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the franchisor does not control the petitioner and 
that the record establishes that both the petitioner and the foreign entity are owned and controlled by the same 
person, thus establishing a qualifying affiliate relationship. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimrnigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
SRC 05 093 5 1623 
Page 3 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner established that it has a qualifying relationship 
8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(i)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, or other legal entity 
which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate 
or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section." An "affiliate" is defined, in part, as "[olne of two 
subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or individual." 
In this matter, the petitioner claims that both the foreign employer, a Canadian corporation, and the petitioner, a 
Georgia limited liability company, are 51% owned and controlled by the same individual. In support of this 
assertion, the petitioner provided a schedule from a Canadian tax form indicating that Jyoti Pate1 owns 5 1% of 
the foreign entity's shares. No other information was provided regarding the ownership, governance, or 
control of the Canadian corporation. 
Additionally, the petitioner provided the following organizational documents for the Georgia limited liability 
company: a certificate of organization; evidence of the issuance of a tax identification number; articles of 
organization; an assignment of interests in the company purporting to establish that Jyoti Pate1 owns a 51% 
interest effective January 1, 2002; and organizational minutes from 1999 establishing that Bipin Pate1 and 
Jayanti Pate1 are managers of the company. The petitioner did not provide a copy of the limited liability 
company's operating agreement even though it was specifically mentioned in both the 1999 organizational 
minutes and the 2002 assignment of interests. 
Finally, in response to the request for evidence, the petitioner provided (1) a License Agreement with Ramada 
Franchise Systems, Inc. dated January 31, 2000, and (2) a Franchise Agreement with BAC Franchising, Inc., 
together with an explanation that, since filing the initial petition, the petitioner had changed franchise 
relationships, is now subject to the BAC agreement, and is currently doing business as a Country Hearth Inn. 
On May 26, 2005, the director denied the petition. The director determined that the evidence submitted by 
the petitioner was insufficient to prove the existence of a qualifying relationship. Specifically, the director 
determined that the BAC Franchise Agreement established that the franchisor controls the petitioner, not Jyoti 
Patel. 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the director's decision was made in error. Specifically, the petitioner 
alleges that the petitioner is owned and controlled by the majority owner and that the terms of the franchise 
agreement do not cede control to the franchisor. 
Upon review, petitioner's assertions are not persuasive, although the director's reliance on the BAC Franchise 
Agreement will be withdrawn. 
As a threshold issue, it must be determined which franchise agreement should be examined by Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (CIS) in determining its effect on control of the petitioner's business. In this matter, 
the petitioner indicated in its letter dated February 2, 2005 (appended to the initial petition submitted February 
11, 2005) that the petitioner operates a Ramada Limited hotel under a License Agreement. The petitioner, 
SRC 05 093 5 1623 
Page 4 
however, neglected to include a copy of this agreement and, on February 24, 2005, the director specifically 
requested a copy of the Ramada License Agreement in her request for evidence. In response to the request for 
evidence, the petition provided a copy of the Ramada License Agreement but also indicated in its letter dated 
May 12, 2005 that the petitioner is now operating a hotel at the same location under a different franchise 
agreement. In support, the petitioner provided a copy of a Franchise Agreement between the petitioner and 
BAC Franchising, Inc. permitting the petitioner to operate the hotel as a Country Hearth Inn. While signed, 
the BAC Franchise Agreement is undated and its effective date is unknown. 
In adjudicating the petition, the director reviewed the BAC Franchise Agreement and concluded that the 
petitioner had ceded control over the business to the franchisor. This was done in error. The director should 
have reviewed the Ramada License Agreement, which the petitioner indicated was in force at the time the 
petition was filed. The purpose of a request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether 
eligibility for the benefit sought has been established. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8). When responding to a request 
for evidence, a petitioner cannot materially change the basis for establishing a qualifying relationship. See 
Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248, 249 (Reg. Comm. 1978). If significant changes are made to 
the initial request for approval, the petitioner must file a new petition rather than seek approval of a petition 
that is not supported by the facts in the record. 
That being said, the director's reliance on the BAC Franchise Agreement was harmless error because a review 
of the Ramada License Agreement yields the same result, i.e., that the petitioner ceded primary control over 
the petitioner's enterprise to the franchisor. The petition will still be denied for that reason. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes 
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see also 
Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 
(Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of 
possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or 
indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter 
of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
Although a franchise may be an asset of an independently owned and operated company, and pursuit of a 
franchise business model alone does not automatically disqualify a petitioner from establishing that it has a 
qualifying relationship with a foreign entity, the petitioner must prove that it has retained the necessary 
latitude to control, direct, and develop the enterprise. See Matter of Kung, 17 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 1978). In 
this case, the petitioner has ceded control over the enterprise to the franchisor, Ramada Franchise Systems, 
Inc. As explained in the License Agreement, the franchisor controls the name of the business; the manner in 
which the hotel is equipped, supplied, and operated through a set of System Standards; the training of its 
managers; the making of reservations; and the marketing of the business. The petitioner has agreed to permit 
the audit of its financial books and records, and the inspection of its premises, by the franchisor at any time, 
and has agreed not to make any physical modifications to its premises without the permission of the 
franchisor. Finally, the petitioner has agreed not to transfer the premises, or an ownership interest in its 
business, without the permission and involvement of the franchisor. Given these terms, the petitioner has lost 
any realistic ability to control, direct, or develop the enterprise. Therefore, there is no qualifying relationship 
SRC 05 093 5 1623 
Page 5 
between the foreign entity and the petitioner as control over the petitioner's business has been ceded to the 
franchisor. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not proven that the petitioner and the foreign entity have a qualifying 
relationship as defined by 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G), and the petition will be denied for that reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship 
with the foreign entity for reasons other than those related to its franchise agreement(s). 
First, as explained above, as evidence of ownership and control of the foreign company, the petitioner 
provided a schedule from a Canadian tax form indicating that 
h 
owns 5 1% of the foreign entity's 
shares. The petitioner provided no other evidence of owners ip or control. 
 As general evidence of a 
petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, evidence of stock ownership alone is not sufficient evidence to 
determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The corporate stock 
certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder 
meetings must also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to 
the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a 
petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, 
the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. 
See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., supra. Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, CIS is 
unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. In this case, as the petitioner failed to supply this 
evidence, the petitioner has failed to establish the existence of a qualifying relationship.' 
Second, as evidence of ownership and control of the petitioner, the petitioner relies on an assignment of 
- 
interests in the limited liability company purporting to establish thatowns a 5 1% interest effective 
January 1, 2002. The petitioner did not provide a copy of the 
 of the petitioner, even 
though the assignment of interests specifically imposes its terms on 
 s an assignee. The petitioner 
also did not provide any 
 e of the management of the LLC other than the initial organizational 
documents, which appoint and as managers. As explained above, evidence of 
ownership of a majority interest in a company alone is not sufficient to establish that the owner maintains 
both ownership and control over the entity. In this case, full disclosure of the terms of the operating 
agreement is essential, especially since there is no evidence that Jyoti Pate1 is a manager or managing member 
of the LLC. 
Moreover, given other gaps in the record,true ownership and control over the LLC is highly 
questionable. For example, while the Ramada License Agreement appears to regulate the transfer of interests 
 oreov over, as indicated in the petitioner's letter dated May 12, 2005, is a "floor manager" for the 
foreign entity who "reports to [the beneficiary] in all matters of her work." It is not credible that one who 
truly owns and controls a business would report to an employee like the beneficiary, who is not identified as 
having any ownership interest in the foreign entity. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of 
course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of 
the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 59 1 (BIA 1988). 
SRC 05 093 5 1623 
Page 6 
in the LLC, such as the transfer purportedly made toin 2002, the petitioner did not provide any 
evidence that the franchisor acquiesced to this transaction. Additionally, the commitment letter from Oconee 
State Bank regardine the financing of the ~etitioner's acauisition of the hotel in 1999 calls for a ~ersonal 
" u " 
guaranty from the majority owner of the LLC at that time. 
surrendered both ownership and control over the LLC to 
 in 2002, there is no evidence that 
replaced with- or that Oconee State Bank released 
paid anything for this interest. There is also no evidence that 
 personal guaranty was 
a refinance of the original mortgage. Without further eviden 
or her interest in, the LLC, the petitioner's claim that it is owned and controlled by 
If CIS fails to believe that a fact stated in the petition is true, CIS may reject that fact. Section 204(b) of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1154(b); see also Anetekhai v. I.N.S., 876 F.2d 1218, 1220 (5th Cir.1989); Lu-Ann Bakev 
Shop, Inc. v. Nelson, 705 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D.D.C.1988); Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 
2001). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the petitioner and the foreign entity are qualifying 
organizations as required by 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(3). 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has been employed 
by the foreign entity in a primarily managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity for at least one 
continuous year within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1 101 (a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
SRC 05 093 5 1623 
Page 7 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner does not clarify whether the beneficiary is claiming to be primarily engaged in managerial 
duties under section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 101(a)(44)(B) of 
the Act. While the petitioner's letter dated February 2, 2005 identifies the beneficiary as an "executive," his 
title is "general manager." A beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and 
rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. If the petitioner is indeed representing the beneficiary 
as both an executive and a manager, it must establish that the beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set 
forth in the statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition for manager. 
In a letter dated May 12,2005, the petitioner described the beneficiary's job duties abroad as follows2: 
[The beneficiary] is the General Manager at [the foreign entity]. He is responsible for 
overall supervision of the company including the acquisition and purchase of clothing, 
sale and marketing to various retailers, supervision of managers, and quality control of 
the received products. He is also responsible for advising the owners of [the petitioner] 
about the various investment opportunities in the import-export business; supervise the 
preparation of the annual reports and financial statements; presentation of various growth 
ideas and business plans; and implementation if the new policies and procedures. The 
owners of [the foreign entity] expanded into the U.S. business market upon advice and 
consultation of [the beneficiary]. 
The petitioner further asserts that the beneficiary has been employed by the foreign entity since July 2001 as 
the "general manager," and that the foreign entity employs 10 people including the beneficiary. Finally, the 
petitioner explains in its May 12, 2005 letter that the beneficiary directly supervises two people, who, in turn, 
supervise the rest of the employees either directly or through other subordinate employees. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has been employed by the foreign entity in 
a primarily managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity for at least one continuous year within 
the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
First, the petitioner has not provided any documentary evidence supporting its assertion that the beneficiary 
has been employed by the foreign entity since July 2001. While the petitioner provided a letter confirming 
2 
It should be noted this letter is dated May 18,2005 on all pages other than the first page and is unsigned. 
SRC 05 093 5 1623 
Page 8 
Dilan Patel's employment, no payroll records or other evidence was provided corroborating the requisite one- 
year of employment with the foreign entity. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish that the 
beneficiary has been employed for one year as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(iii). 
Second, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has been employed primarily in an executive or 
managerial capacity. When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will 
look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). The 
petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary 
and indicate whether such duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
The petitioner has failed to prove that the beneficiary has acted in a "managerial" capacity. In support of its 
application, the petitioner has provided a vague and nonspecific description of the beneficiary's duties that 
fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that 
the beneficiary's duties include overall supervision of a company with ten employees, presenting growth 
ideas and business plans, and implementing new policies and procedures. The petitioner did not, however, 
define these policies and procedures or explain his growth ideas or business plans. Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Treasure Crafi of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). Specifics are 
clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in 
nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. 
Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner also failed to prove that the beneficiary supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, 
professional, or managerial employees, or manages an essential function within the organization. The 
petitioner provided vague and nonspecific job descriptions for the subordinate employees along with an 
incredible organizational scheme consisting of three layers of management. The general manager (the 
beneficiary) is described as supervising two subordinates -- an administrative manager and a floor manager. 
The administrative manager, in turn, supervises two clerks, while the floor manager supervises two 
supervisors who, in turn, supervise three other clerks. However, the petitioner does not specify how much 
time each of these managers spends supervising subordinates and how much time is spent performing tasks 
necessary to produce a product or provide a service. Given the reasonable needs of a ten-employee 
organization, it is not credible that five of the employees would be primarily engaged in performing 
supervisory or managerial duties. Therefore, without more detailed job descriptions, it cannot be determined 
whether the subordinate employees supervised by the beneficiary are supervisory or managerial employees. 
Given the above, the beneficiary would appear to be either a first-line supervisor, the provider of actual 
services, or a combination of both. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a 
product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. at 604. A managerial or executive employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the 
level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. 
101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Since 
the record fails to reveal the educational or skill level of the subordinate employees, it cannot be determined if 
SRC 05 093 5 1623 
Page 9 
they rise to the level of professional employees.3 Therefore, the record does not prove that the beneficiary is 
acting in a managerial capacity.4 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to prove that the beneficiary is acting in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. As indicated above, the petitioner has failed to prove that the 
beneficiary, who is allegedly managing employees who are apparently engaged in providing services to 
3 
 In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the 
subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
4 
While the petitioner has not specifically argued that the beneficiary manages an essential function of the 
organization, the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function 
manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff 
but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written 
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In 
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary 
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has 
not provided evidence that the beneficiary manages an essential function. The petitioner's vague job 
description fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties have been managerial functions and 
what proportion have been non-managerial. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent by the 
beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine what proportion of his duties are managerial, 
nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of a function manager. See IKEA 
US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
SRC 05 093 5 1623 
Page 10 
customers, is acting primarily in an executive capacity. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has been employed by the foreign entity in 
a primarily managerial or executive capacity, or in a position which required specialized knowledge, as 
required by 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary's prior education, 
training, and employment qualifies him to perform the intended services in the United States as required by 8 
C.F.R. 9 2 14.2(1)(3)(iv). 
The petitioner seeks to employ to the beneficiary as the general manager of its hotel in Decatur, Georgia. 
However, the petitioner has not provided any evidence that the beneficiary has received any training or 
education, or has any experience whatsoever, in being a manager or executive. While the petitioner has 
provided evidence that the beneficiary was educated as a geologist in India, the petitioner has not explained 
how this qualifies him to manage a hotel. Moreover, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary's 
experience as a "general manager" of a clothing merchant actually constitutes management or executive 
experience. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary's prior education, training, and 
employment qualifies him to perform the intended services in the United States as required by 8 C.F.R. 9 
214.2(1)(3)(iv), and the petition will also be denied for that reason. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.