dismissed L-1A Case: Import And Export

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 30°0 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
data dejeted to 
clearly unwarranleo U. S. citizenship of&m~al pfivasr and Immigration 
Services 
File: EAC 06 224 50019 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: MAR 0 2 2009 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonirnmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(l5)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. $ 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
John F. Grissom, Acting Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 06 224 50019 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimrnigrant visa petition seeking to extend the employment of the beneficiary as an 
L-1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101 (a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of New Jersey and is allegedly in the import and export business. The beneficiary was granted a 
one-year period of stay to open a new office in the United States, and the petitioner now seeks to extend the 
beneficiary's stay. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish (1) that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; or (2) that the petitioner and 
the foreign employer are qualifying organizations. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred, that the beneficiary will perform primarily qualifylng duties in the United States, and that the 
beneficiary owns and controls the petitioner as the largest shareholder. In support, counsel submits a brief 
and additional evidence, including an amended 2006 tax return and evidence pertaining to business and 
employment activity occurring after the filing of the petition in July 2006. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifylng managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
EAC 06 224 50019 
Page 3 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(A) 
 Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying 
organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(B) 
 Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) 
 A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year 
and the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) 
 A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the 
number of employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence 
of wages paid to employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity; and 
(E) 
 Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in 
a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential hnction within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
EAC 06 224 500 19 
Page 4 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
It is not clear whether the petitioner is claiming that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial duties 
under section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of the Act. 
Given the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the petitioner is asserting that the beneficiary will be 
employed in either a managerial or an executive capacity and will consider both classifications. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's proposed job duties in the United States in the Form 1-129 as 
follows: 
[The beneficiary] assumes the responsibility of running the daily operations of the company, 
implementing policies required for the success of the [clompany. She will hire managerial 
and support staff. As PresidentICEO she excercises [sic] broad discretionary powers which 
includes sourcing contacts for appropriate storage and warehousing space. 
The petitioner claims to employ one person in the Form 1-129, presumably the beneficiary. 
On March 28, 2007, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, job 
descriptions for all subordinate employees in the United States, a description of the skills required to perform 
the beneficiary's proposed duties, an organizational chart for the United States operation, and a breakdown of 
the amount of time devoted by the beneficiary to performing executive or managerial duties. 
In response, counsel submitted a letter dated June 13, 2007 in which he further describes the beneficiary's 
proposed duties as follows: 
Formulating and implementing policies and strategies necessary for the company's 
growth and sustainability. 
Articulating the company's corporate vision and developing ways and means of 
actualizing them. 
Setting achievable goals and targets for the company and monitoring its progress in 
EAC 06 224 50019 
Page 5 
relation to set goals. 
Interviewing and subsequently hiring qualified employees. 
Setting compensation packages for all employees. 
Attending meetings with executives from other successful organizations with a view 
to forming corporate partnerships. 
Presiding over company board meetings. 
Overseeing all day[-]to[-]day operation[s] of the company. 
Selecting capable contractors, buyers and companies with whom [the petitioner] will 
do business. 
Formulating the yearly budget for the company in conjunction with the General 
Manager for ratification by the board. 
Retaining competent organizations to provide professional services for the company. 
Making all executive decisions with regard to the company. 
Counsel also claims in the Jun 13,2007 letter that "the beneficiary has three subordinate supervisors under her 
management." Counsel describes the claimed duties of these subordinates (the general manager, the 
warehouse manager, and the sales and marketing manager) and asserts that the beneficiary "allots ninety 
percent of her time to executivelmanagerial duties." 
The warehouse manager and the sales and marketing manager are described as performing the tasks necessary 
to the provision of a service or the production of a product, and the general manager is described as follows: 
Responsible for coordinating the affairs of all departments of the company; assisting the 
[beneficiary] in the implementation of company policies; evaluating current company policies 
and strategies and recommending same to the CEO for possible review; receiving instruction 
from the CEO for onward dissemination to all other employees; supervising the Account 
Officer to ensure that all company taxes are properly filed with the Internal Revenue Service. 
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart for the United States operation. The chart shows the 
beneficiary supervising the general manager who, in turn, is shown supervising the warehouse manager and 
the marketing manager. The warehouse and marketing managers are, in turn, shown supervising subordinate 
workers (store officer, exhibition/demonstration officer, and account officer), who are also described as 
performing the tasks necessary to the operation of the business. 
However, in view of the petitioner's averment in the Form 1-129 to employ only one worker, counsel does not 
address when these claimed workers were hired by the petitioner. Accordingly, it appears that all of these 
subordinate workers, assuming any were actually employed by the petitioner, were hired after the filing of the 
instant petition in July 2006. If not, counsel fails to reconcile the petitioner's claim to employ a variety of 
workers arranged in a complex, multi-tiered hierarchy with its claim in the initial petition to employ only one 
worker. 
Finally, the petitioner submitted its 2006 Form 1120-A, U.S. Corporation Short-Form Income Tax Return. 
This return purports to pertain to calendar year 2006. As noted above, the instant petition was filed in July 
2006. The tax return indicates that the petitioner had no employees in all of 2006. The return indicates that 
EAC 06 224 50019 
Page 6 
no compensation was paid to officers and no salaries or wages were paid to employees. Furthermore, the 
return indicates that, after the petitioner paid for goods sold and its rental expenses, it only generated 
$4,926.00 in income in 2006. 
On October 2, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary will primarily perform qualifying duties in the United States. 
Counsel also submits an "amended" 2006 tax return dated November 19, 2007. This amended return, 
apparently prepared and signed after the denial of the petition, claims almost triple the gross receipts for 2006 
and indicates that the petitioner paid $71,196.00 as officer compensation. However, counsel does not explain 
how, exactly, these "errors in accounting" were made in the first place or to whom this officer compensation 
was paid other than to the beneficiary. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. A petitioner cannot claim that some of the duties of the 
position entail executive responsibilities, while other duties are managerial. A petitioner may not claim that a 
beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial sections of the two statutory 
definitions. 
Title 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of 
the petition to support an executive or managerial position. There is no provision in U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the 
beneficiary is not performing qualifying duties within one year of petition approval, the petitioner is ineligible 
by regulation for an extension. In the instant matter, the petitioner has not established that the United States 
operation has reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary in a predominantly managerial or executive 
position. 
As a threshold issue, it is noted that business expansion strategies and future hiring plans may not be 
considered in determining whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will be employed in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity in the United States. Likewise, employees hired after the filing of 
the petition may not be considered. The petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the 
nonimmigrant visa petition. A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or 
beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. 
Comm. 1978). Accordingly, only those subordinate workers, and those duties ascribed to the beneficiary and 
her subordinates at the time the instant petition was filed, may be considered in determining whether the 
record establishes that the beneficiary will more likely than not primarily perform qualifying managerial or 
executive duties in the United States. In this case, the petitioner claimed to employ only one worker at the 
time the petition was filed, presumably the beneficiary. 
EAC 06 224 50019 
Page 7 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a 
day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will formulate and implement policies 
and strategies, articulate "corporate vision," set goals, oversee operations, and make "all executive decisions." 
However, the petitioner does not define these policies, strategies, goals, or "corporate vision," and fails to 
specifically describe what, exactly, the beneficiary will do to oversee operations and make executive 
decisions when the record indicates that the beneficiary was the petitioner's only employee at the time the 
petition was filed. The fact that a petitioner has given a beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has 
prepared a vague job description which includes inflated job duties does not establish that a beneficiary will 
actually perform managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the def~tions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
Consequently, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary will primarily perform 
qualifying duties in her operation of the business. The record does not establish that the beneficiary will be 
relieved of the need to perform the non-qualifying tasks inherent to her vaguely described duties by any 
subordinate workers. As noted above, the petitioner claims in the Form 1-129 that the beneficiary is its only 
employee. The petitioner also submitted its 2006 Form 1120-A, which indicates that the petitioner did not 
pay any compensation to officers or non-officer employees in 2006. Although counsel claims in the response 
to the director's Request for Evidence that the petitioner employs a variety of workers arranged in a multi- 
tiered organization, the record is not persuasive in establishing that any of these workers was employed at the 
time the petitioner was filed. Also, the amended tax return submitted on appeal does not establish that any of 
these claimed workers was employed in July 2006 when the petition was filed. Not only does the amended 
return lack credibility (see infra), it fails to specifically identify which employees, other than the beneficiary, 
were employed in July 2006, if any. Accordingly, it appears that the beneficiary will "primarily" perform the 
tasks necessary to the provision of a service or the production of a product as the petitioner's sole employee. 
An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and 
(B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see 
also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
,As noted above, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the petitioner employed any subordinate 
workers at the time the instant petition was filed in July 2006. Accordingly, it appears more likely than not 
that the beneficiary was the petitioner's sole worker at that time and that she will not supervise supervisory, 
managerial, or professional employees. 
Regardless, even assuming that the subordinate employees described in the record were employed by the 
petitioner, the record is not persuasive in establishing that any of these claimed workers is a supervisory, 
EAC 06 224 50019 
Page 8 
managerial, or professional employee. The petitioner claims that its workers are vertically organized, i.e., the 
beneficiary supervises a general manager, who supervises two "managers," who supervise other workers. 
However, arbitrarily arranging workers in an artificial, multi-tiered organizational chart, or simply alleging 
that one worker "supervises" another, will not establish that a worker is a bona fide managerial or supervisory 
employee. Rather, it must be established that the worker has control over the employment of one or more 
subordinates and that the business needs of the enterprise could reasonably require and support such an 
organizational structure. In this matter, the petitioner has not described the subordinate employees as being 
managerial or supervisory employees. To the contrary, all the subordinate workers are described as primarily 
performing essential tasks. Given these job descriptions and the nature and size of the business in general, it 
is not credible any of these workers will be engaged in the supervision or management of subordinate 
employees. A managerial employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level 
normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. 5 
101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
Furthermore, as the petitioner failed to establish the education required to perform the duties of the 
subordinate positions, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will manage professional 
employees.' Accordingly, as it appears that the beneficiary will be, at most, a first-line supervisor of non- 
professional workers, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a 
managerial capacity.2 
1 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary will manage professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether 
the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe termprofession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 8 17 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
2 
Although counsel does not argue that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization, 
the record would not support this position if taken. The term "hction manager" applies generally when a 
beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible 
for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The 
term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary will 
manage an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to 
be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the function with specificity, articulate the 
essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to 
managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. @ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In addition, the petitioner's description of the 
beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary will manage the function rather than perform 
the tasks related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has not provided evidence that the beneficiary 
will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job description fails to document that the 
beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial. Also, as explained above, it appears more likely than not 
that the beneficiary will primarily perform non-qualifying administrative or operational tasks as the 
beneficiary's sole employee. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary 
EAC 06 224 50019 
Page 9 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. As explained above, it appears 
instead that the beneficiary will primarily perform the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a 
service as the petitioner's sole employee. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will 
be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
Finally, it is important to note that, in reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, 
federal courts have generally agreed that USCIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one 
factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. US. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 13 13, 13 16 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval Republic of 
Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Suva, 905 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2003)). Furthermore, it is 
appropriate for USCIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant 
factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perfonn the non- 
managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business 
in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
The size of a company may be especially relevant when USCIS notes discrepancies in the record and fails to 
believe that the facts asserted are true. Id. 
In this matter, the record contains serious inconsistencies pertaining to the staffing of the United States 
operation. As explained above, the petitioner claims in the Form 1-129 to employ only one person, 
presumably the beneficiary. The petitioner also submitted its 2006 tax return, which indicates that the petition 
paid no salaries in 2006. As the instant petition was filed in July 2006, it does not appear as if the petitioner 
had any employees at the time the petition was filed. However, in response to the Request for Evidence, the 
petitioner claims to employ at least seven workers, including the beneficiary. The petitioner fails to resolve 
this inconsistency in the record which undermines the credibility of the petition. It is incumbent upon the 
petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to 
explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective 
evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on 
performing her duties, the.A.40 cannot determine what proportion of her duties will be managerial, nor can it 
deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily perform the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. 
US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
EAC 06 224 5001 9 
Page 10 
any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of 
the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Id. at 591. Although the petitioner submitted 
an "amended" tax return on appeal, this return was apparently prepared after the director's denial of the 
petition and, thus, lacks evidentiary value. Furthermore, although the petitioner claims that its understatement 
of 2006 revenue by approximately two-thirds and its omission of the payment of compensation were "errors 
in accounting," the petitioner does not explain how those "errors" were made in the first place. Accordingly, 
the amended return lacks credibility and fails to adequately resolve the inconsistencies in the record. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
The second issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that it and the foreign 
employer are qualifying organizations. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by 
"[elvidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying 
organizations." Likewise, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(A) requires petitioners seeking to 
extend "new office" petitions to submit "[elvidence that the United States and foreign entities are still 
qualifying organizations." Title 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm, 
corporation, or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the 
definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or 
will be doing business." An "affiliate" is defined in part as "[olne of two subsidiaries both of which are owned 
and controlled by the same parent or individual" or "[olne of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same 
group of individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each 
entity.' 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(1)(L)(I)-(2). 
In this matter, the petitioner submitted its certificate of incorporation dated October 27,2005, which describes 
the petitioner's ownership as follows: 
[The beneficiary] is entitled to 800 shares of the grant 
is entitled to 400 shares of the granted 2000 shares[.] 
shares of granted 
 is entitled to 200 shares of 
granted shares[.] 
 400 shares of granted 2000 
shares [.I 
Although some names are spelled differently, a similar ownership structure is described in the petitioner's 
Articles of Incorporation submitted in response to the director's Request for Evidence. 
The ownership structure of the foreign entity is described in a Nigerian document titled "Memorandum and 
Articles of Association" as follows: 500,000 shares owned by the beneficiary, 300,000 shares owned by 
, and 200,000 shares owned by- 
On October 2, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that, since the beneficiary owns 
50% of the foreign entity but a minority interest in the petitioner, the petitioner has not established that the 
EAC 06 224 50019 
Page 11 
two entities are qualifying organizations sharing ownership and control. It is noted that the director states that 
the beneficiary appears to own 20% of the petitioner's stock. 
On appeal, counsel argues that the director erred in concluding that the beneficiary owns only 20% of the 
petitioner's stock. Counsel asserts that the record establishes that the beneficiary owns 40% of the petitioner's 
stock. Furthermore, counsel argues that the beneficiary's "submitted job description" establishes that she 
"controls" the petitioner even though she owns iess than a 50% interest. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined'in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes 
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593; see also Matter of 
Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comrn. 
1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of 
the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right 
and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
In this matter, it has not been established that the petitioner and the foreign entity are "affiliates." First, the 
record does not establish that the two entities are owned and controlled by the same individual. 8 C.F.R. fj 
214.2(1)(1)(L)(I). Although the beneficiary owns 50% of the foreign entity, it has not been established that she 
"controls" the petitioner as its 40% owner. As noted above, "control" means the legal right and authority to 
direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Although the beneficiary, as its apparent 
sole employee, has authority over the operation of the business, the record is devoid of evidence that she has 
any legal right to serve in this capacity. Accordingly, it has not been established that she controls the 
petitioner as a minority stockholder, and it has not been established that the two entities are affiliates. 
Second, the record does not establish that the petitioner and the foreign entity are "owned and controlled by the 
same group of individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of 
each entity." 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(1)(L)(2). 
 As explained above, the beneficiary owns a 40% interest in the 
petitioner and a 50% interest in the foreign entity. It appears that the beneficiary is the only person who owns 
shares in both entities. Accordingly, as the two entities are not owned by the same group of individuals, each 
individual owning and controlling the approximate proportion in each, the record does not establish that the two 
entities are affiliates. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are qualifying organizations, 
and the petition may not be approved for this additional rea~on.~ 
31t is noted that the director's calculation that the beneficiary owns a 20% interest in the petition is erroneous 
and will be withdrawn in part. As explained above, the beneficiary's purported 800-share interest appears to 
be a 40% interest. However, as both ownership interests are minority interests, this error was harmless, and 
the appeal will be dismissed. 
EAC 06 224 50019 
Page 12 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed 
abroad in a position that was primarily managerial or executive in nature. 8 C.F.R. §$214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's job duties abroad in a letter dated June 13, 2007. As this job 
description is in the record, it will not be repeated here verbatim. Generally, the beneficiary is described as 
formulating company policy and overseeing the "supervisory team." 
The petitioner also describes the organization of the foreign entity. The petitioner claims that the beneficiary 
supervised a five-tiered organization consisting of a general manager, two layers of subordinate supervisors, 
and workers. The petitioner also submitted job descriptions for the general manager, warehouse manager, and 
sales and marketing manager. 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. The beneficiary's vague job description fails to describe the 
beneficiary as primarily performing managerial or executive duties abroad. Once again, the fact that a 
petitioner has given a beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has prepared a vague job description 
which includes inflated job duties does not establish that a beneficiary actually performed managerial or 
executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties were 
primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of 
reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 
41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Once again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient 
for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190. 
Furthermore, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the foreign business reasonably required the 
services of a managerial or executive employee who supervised four tiers of managers, supervisors, and 
workers. The vague job descriptions for the subordinate "supervisors" fail to establish that any of these 
workers was a bona fide managerial or supervisory employee. To the contrary, it appears more likely than not 
that the beneficiary was, at most, a first-line supervisor of non-professional workers abroad and primarily 
performed the tasks necessary to provide a service or to produce a product, including first-line supervisory 
tasks. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act; Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. at 604. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity, and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
The previous approval of an L-1A petition does not preclude USCIS from denying an extension based on a 
reassessment of the petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 
1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, USCIS does not have any 
authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a subsequent 
petition. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
EAC 06 224 50019 
Page 13 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.