dismissed L-1A

dismissed L-1A Case: Investment

๐Ÿ“… Date unknown ๐Ÿ‘ค Company ๐Ÿ“‚ Investment

Decision Summary

The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The petitioner did not provide sufficient detail on the duties of the beneficiary's subordinates, which prevented a determination that the beneficiary was relieved from performing non-qualifying day-to-day tasks. The director also found the petitioner failed to establish a qualifying relationship or that the proposed U.S. position would be primarily managerial.

Criteria Discussed

Managerial Capacity Abroad Managerial Capacity In The U.S. Qualifying Relationship

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
identifLing data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwanantd 
invasion of personal privacy 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: 
 WAC 05 073 50701 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: 00 2 4 
IN RE: 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office 
that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
7 
v ,' & 
Robert Fwiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seelung to employ the beneficiary as an L-1A nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 
The petitioner, an Arizona corporation, claims to be the subsidiary of Industrias 
n Trujillo, Venezuela. The petitioner claims to be an investment company which owns 
and real estate, including L;aundromats, which the petitioner remodels for resale or 
improved operation. It seeks to employ the beneficiary as its business manager. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that (1) the beneficiary had 
been employed abroad in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; (2) the beneficiary will be employed 
in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; or (3) the petitioner and the foreign entity 
maintained a qualifying relationship as required by the regulations. 
The petitioner filed an appeal in response to the denial. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner alleges that the 
director's decision was erroneous, and submits a detailed brief in support of this contention. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. !j 214.2(1)(3) provides that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment abroad 
with a qualifying organization withn the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive, or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended services 
in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work 
which the alien performed abroad. 
WAC 05 073 5070 1 
Page 3 
The first issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. ยง 1 101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In a letter from the petitioner dated January 12, 2005, the petitioner explained that the foreign entity produces 
food products for mass distribution. It further noted that the beneficiary possesses a Master's Degree in 
Business Engineering from the University of Simon Bolivar in Caracas, Venezuela with a specialty in 
marketing management. When regard to her position within the foreign entity, the petitioner indicated that 
the beneficiary had been employed as its manager of marketing and sales since 1991, and described her duties 
as follows: 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 4 
In this position, [the beneficiary] is responsible for the operations of the marketing and sales 
department. These duties include creating and implementing budgets for sales and 
marketing, planning sales on a national level, and directing and coordinating department 
activities to meet company goals and needs. [The beneficiary's] duties for the past 13 years 
provide her will the managerial and executive skills necessary to propel the continued growth 
of [the petitioner's] investments and businesses in the U.S. 
On January 24, 2005, the director requested additional evidence pertaining to the business activities of the 
foreign entity, its current staffing levels, and the duties of its employees, including the beneficiary. A request 
for the organizational hierarchy and the position titles of all employees was likewise requested. 
In a response dated March 30, 2005, the petitioner provided a copy of the foreign entity's organizational 
chart, which demonstrated the various departments and divisions of the entity. Accompanying this chart was 
a list of employees, which demonstrated their positions in the hierarchy, their functions, their education 
levels, and their annual salaries. The list indicated that the beneficiary oversaw two sales assistants, one 
marketing assistant, one process technician, one logistics staff member, twelve salespersons, and ten drivers. 
Despite the director's request for a brief description of the duties of these employees, the petitioner failed to 
provide this information. 
With regard to the beneficiary, counsel to the petitioner provided the following updated description of her 
position abroad: 
The beneficiary is the Manager of the Marketing and Sales Department of [the foreign entity]. As 
illustrated by [the organizational chart], the beneficiary's duties abroad include the supervision of all 
employees in the Marketing and Sales Department. Specifically, [the beneficiary] is solely 
responsible for the operation and management of the Sales and Marketing Department. Her 
responsibilities will include: 
Creating an operating budget and directing department operations to meet that budget 
Creating and implementing sales strategies to boost [the foreign entity's] sales and 
distribution 
Directing the operations of department personnel to meet department sales strategies 
and objectives 
Directing the marketing personnel to create strategies and/or advertisements to focus 
on various [foreign entity] products and the manner in which such products will be 
advertised to the public and industrial clients 
Supervising department employees, including exercising discretion over hirelfire and 
promotion determinations, and inter-department working groups and objectives 
Planning and coordinating the dispatch of products to meet buyer contracts and 
demand 
Directing department to meet [the foreign entity's] goals and meeting with [the 
foreign entity's] administration and officers to set objectives, report results, and 
coordinate department needs. 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 5 
On April 16, 2005, the director denied the petition. Specifically, the director noted that based on the newly 
submitted description of the beneficiary's duties, it appeared that the beneficiary was performing the majority 
of the services necessary to provide the petitioner's products and services. In addition, the director noted that 
the petitioner's failure to adequately describe the nature of the duties of the beneficiary's subordinate 
employees precluded a finding that the beneficiary was a qualified manager overseeing a staff of subordinate 
professional, supervisory, or managerial employees. 
Upon review, the AAO concurs with the director's determination. First, the description of the beneficiary's 
duties, as provided in the initial petition and supplemented in response to the request for evidence, identifies 
numerous duties that are not traditionally managerial or executive. Whether the beneficiary is a managerial or 
executive employee turns on whether the petition/er has sustained its burden of proving that her duties are 
"primarily" managerial or executive. See sections 10 1 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. Here, the petitioner fails 
to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be managerial functions and what proportion 
would be non-managerial. The petitioner lists the beneficiary's duties as including both managerial and 
administrative or operational tasks, but fails to quantify the time the beneficiary spends on them. This failure 
of documentation is important because several of the beneficiary's daily tasks, such as "creating an operating 
budget," "creating and implementing sales strategies," and "planning and coordinating the dispatch of 
products" do not fall directly under traditional managerial duties as defined in the statute. Specifically, these 
duties identify crucial tasks that are necessary for the petitioner to promote its products and services. An 
employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 
19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). Despite the director's specific request for the percentage of time the 
beneficiary devoted to each of her duties, the petitioner omitted this information. For this reason, the AAO 
cannot determine whether the beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of a function manager. See IKEA 
US, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
A managerial or executive employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level 
normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. See Matter of 
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Although the beneficiary is not required to supervise 
personnel, if it is claimed that her duties involve supervising employees, as in this case, the petitioner must 
establish that the subordinate employees are supervisory, professional, or managerial. See 9 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) 
of the Act. 
Though requested by the director, the petitioner did not provide the level of education required to perform the 
duties of the beneficiary's subordinate employees. It is noted, however, that a brief statement was provided 
next to each person's name (i.e., "specialized," "technician," "university," etc.). However, these brief 
explanations did little to indicate the level of education required to perform the duties of these positions. 
Thus, the petitioner has not established that these employees possess or require an advanced degree, such that 
they could be classified as professionals. Nor has the petitioner shown that any of these employees supervise 
subordinate staff members or manage a clearly defined department or function of the petitioner, such that they 
could be classified as managers or supervisors. The minimal information provided, coupled with the failure 
to specifically describe the duties of these employees despite the director's request, precludes the AAO from 
finding that the beneficiary supervises qualifying employees. Any failure to submit requested evidence that 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 6 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 9 103.2(b)(14). The 
petitioner, therefore, has not shown that the beneficiary's subordinate employees are supervisory, professional, 
or managerial, as required by section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director's decision was erroneous, and that the response to the request for 
evidence provided ample information to establish the beneficiary's qualifications. The AAO disagrees. As 
discussed above, the petitioner failed andfor refused to address two specific requests by the director; namely, 
to provide a brief description of the positions and duties of all of the beneficiary's subordinates, and 
additionally, to provide a percentage breakdown of the time the beneficiary devotes to each of her stated 
duties. No evidence to overcome the director's specific basis for the denial is submitted on appeal, nor are 
any additional arguments in support of the beneficiary's qualifications. Counsel merely claims that by virtue 
of the beneficiary's position, she is qualified for the benefit sought. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). In addition, without documentary evidence to support the claim, the 
assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel 
do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of laureano, 19 
I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
The petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. For this reason, the petition may not be approved. 
The second issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
As previously stated above but repeated here for convenience, section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 
1 10 1 (a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an assignment within an organization in which the 
employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 7 
(v) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
In the petitioner's letter of support dated January 12, 2005, the petitioner proposed to employ the beneficiary 
as its business manager, and indicated that her duties would be as follows: 
In this position, [the beneficiary] will be responsible for overseeing and directing [the 
petitioner's] various investment ventures in the United States. [The beneficiary] will also be 
responsible for devising and initiating the expansion of [the petitioner's] investments in the 
United States. Specifically, [the beneficiary] will exercise unlimited discretion in developing 
investment opportunities and business plans, establishing procedures to maintain profitability, 
creating and implementing budgets, and hiring/firing personnel. In this position, [the 
beneficiary] will exercise executive authority over [the petitioner's] operations and only be 
required to report to [the petitioner's] president and the foreign entity's governing board. 
In the request for evidence issued on January 24,2005, the director issued a request for additional information 
pertaining to the beneficiary's proposed employment in the United States, which was similar to the 
information requested about the foreign position. Specifically, an organizational chart outlining the U.S. 
hierarchy was requested, as well as more details pertaining to the beneficiary's position as well as the 
positions of her subordinates. 
 In the response dated March 30, 2005, the petitioner indicated on its 
chart that the beneficiary would oversee one investment manager, namely, - 
and "future personnel." 
 Counsel to the petitioner indicated that the U.S. entity was currently 
operating as an investment venture and thus the current staffing of the entity would include only the 
investment manager and the beneficiary. However, counsel claimed that the beneficiary would be solely 
responsible for the petitioner's operations and financials, and provided the following updated description of 
her proposed duties: 
As Business Manager, the beneficiary's duties will include: 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 8 
Directing and managing all of [the petitioner's] operations in the United States, 
which essentially, operates as the U.S. investment branch or affiliate of [the foreign 
entity] 
Creating an operating budget and directing [the petitioner's] operations to meet that 
budget 
Directing and managing [the petitioner's] investments in the United States, including, 
the development of invest [sic] opportunities, researching the probability of an 
investment's success, and planning investments in coordination with [the 
petitioner's] budget 
Developing [the petitioner's] investments to finance the company's expansion in the 
United States through further investments andlor larger operations 
Exercising complete discretion over the day-to-day operations of [the petitioner], 
including, determining the ventures in which [the petitioner] will invest and ensuring 
the profitability of these ventures through additional investment, sale, transfer, or 
reorganization. 
Reporting to [the foreign entity's] governing board to set objectives, report results, 
and coordinate the needs of the U.S. company with the financing objectives and 
allowances of [the foreign entity] 
As discussed above, the director denied the petition on April 16, 2005. Similar to the determination made 
with regard to the beneficiary's duties abroad, the director determined that based on the description of the 
beneficiary's duties contained in the record, it appeared that the beneficiary would perform more non- 
qualifying duties than actual managerial duties. The director specifically noted that the proposed 
organizational structure of the U.S. entity, with just one other employee, did not support the premise that the 
beneficiary would entkr employment with the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. 
The AAO again concurs with the director's determination. First, the description of the beneficiary's duties, as 
provided in the initial petition and supplemented in response to the request for evidence, is extremely broad. 
Despite the director's request for a specific breakdown of the beneficiary's proposed duties and the time to be 
spent on each, the petitioner merely provided a vague synopsis of the beneficiary's proposed role in the 
company. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not 
sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner 
has failed to answer a critical question in this case: What will the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? 
The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 
F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Although some specifics are listed, the petitioner identifies numerous duties for the beneficiary that are not 
traditionally managerial or executive. As with the list of duties abroad, the petitioner lists the beneficiary's 
duties as including both managerial and administrative or operational tasks, but fails to quantify the time the 
beneficiary spends on each. This failure of documentation is important because several of the beneficiary's 
daily tasks, such as "creating an operating budget" and "developing and managing the petitioner's 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 9 
investments," do not fall directly under traditional managerial duties as defined in the statute. Specifically, 
these duties identify crucial tasks that are necessary for the petitioner to promote its products and services, 
particularly since it is in the early stages of establishing an investment company. As previously stated, an 
employee who primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 
19 I&N Dec. at 604. Despite the director's specific request for the percentage of time the beneficiary will 
devote to each of her duties, the petitioner omitted this information. For this reason, the AAO cannot 
determine whether the beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, 
Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 24. 
A managerial or executive employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level 
normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. See Matter of 
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Although the beneficiary is not required to supervise 
personnel, if it is claimed that her duties will involve supervising employees, as in this case, the petitioner 
must establish that the subordinate employees are supervisory, professional, or managerial. See $ 
10 1 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
In this case, only one person, an investment manager, is listed under the beneficiary's supervision.' Despite 
the director's request, no additional information was provided regarding his position, his duties, or the 
educational requirements to fill the position. Thus, the petitioner has not established that this employee 
possesses or requires an advanced degree, such that he could be classified as a professional. Nor has the 
petitioner shown that he supervises subordinate staff members or manages a clearly defined department or 
function of the petitioner, such that he could be classified as a manager or supervisor. The minimal 
information provided, coupled with the failure to specifically describe his duties, precludes the AAO fiom 
finding that the beneficiary supervises qualifying employees. Any failure to submit requested evidence that 
precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(14). The 
petitioner, therefore, has not shown that the beneficiary's subordinate employee is supervisory, professional, 
or managerial, as required by section 101 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. 
It should be noted that in the petitioner's initial letter of support, it indicates that in the United States, the 
beneficiary would answer only to the petitioner's president. The Form 1-129 is signed by - 
as president of the petitioner. However, the organizational chart indicates that he is not the president, 
manager, and that he will be a subordinate of the beneficiary. This conflicting information 
has not been explained. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice 
1 
 While it is noted that the organizational chart indicates that "future personnel" will be hired, there is no 
indication that any additional persons were on the petitioner's staff at the time of the petition's filing. 
Therefore, the potential hiring of additional staff members in the future will not be considered for purposes of 
this analysis. The petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. A 
visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a 
new set of facts. Matter ofMichelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 10 
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 
I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to 
a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa 
petition. Id. at 59 1. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director's decision on this issue was likewise erroneous, and that the 
response to the request for evidence provided ample information to establish the beneficiary's qualifications. 
The AAO disagrees. As discussed above, the petitioner failed andlor refused to address two specific requests 
by the director; namely, to provide a brief description of the positions and duties of all of the beneficiary's 
subordinates, and additionally, to provide a percentage breakdown of the time the beneficiary devotes to each 
of her stated duties. No evidence to overcome the director's specific basis for the denial is submitted on 
appeal, nor are any additional arguments in support of the beneficiary's qualifications. Counsel merely 
claims that by virtue of the beneficiary's position, she is qualified for the benefit sought. Going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient ,for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190). In addition, without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel 
will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute 
evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. at 534; Matter of Jaureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1; Matter of 
Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. at 506. 
The petitioner has failed to establish any clear distinctions between the proposed qualifying and 
non-qualifying duties of the beneficiary. Specifically, the petitioner submitted no information to establish the 
percentage of time the beneficiary or will perform the claimed managerial or executive duties. It has been 
noted in the record that there is only one other employee working for the petitioner in the capacity of 
investment manager or perhaps president. There is no mention in the record of any administrative staff, 
secretary, or sales person working for the petitioning enterprise. Collectively, this brings into question how 
much of the beneficiary's time would actually be devoted to managerial or executive duties. As stated in the 
statute, the beneficiary must be primarily performing duties that are managerial or executive. See sections 
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. Furthermore, the petitioner bears the burden of documenting what portion 
of the beneficiary's duties will be managerial or executive and what proportion will be non-managerial or non- 
executive. Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 Given the lack of these 
percentages, the record does not demonstrate that the beneficiary will function primarily as a manager or 
executive. For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved. 
The final issue in this matter is whether the petitioner and the foreign organization are qualified organizations 
as defined by 8 C.F.R. ?j 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G). The regulation defines the term "qualifying organization" as a 
United States or foreign firm, corporation, or other legal entity which: 
(I) 
 Meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, 
branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section; 
(2) 
 Is or will be doing business (engaging in international trade is not required) as an 
employer in the United States and in at least one other country directly or through a 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 11 
parent, branch, affiliate, or subsidiary for the duration of the alien's stay in the United 
States as an intracompany transferee; and 
(3) 
 Otherwise meets the requirements of section 10l(a)(15)(L) of the Act. 
Additionally, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(l)(ii) provides: 
(I) 
 Parent means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which has subsidiaries. 
(J) 
 Branch means an operating division or office of the same organization housed in a 
different location. 
(K) 
 Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power over 
the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact controls 
the entity. 
(L) Affiliate means 
(I) 
 One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent 
or individual, or 
(2) 
 One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, 
each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion 
of each entity, or 
(3) 
 In the case of a partnership that is organized in the United States to provide 
accounting services along with managerial andlor consulting services and that 
markets its accounting services under an internationally recognized name under an 
agreement with a worldwide coordinating organization that is owned and controlled 
by the member accounting firms, a partnership (or similar organization) that is 
organized outside the United States to provide accounting services shall be 
considered to be an affiliate of the United States partnership if it markets its 
accounting services under the same internationally recognized name under the 
agreement with the worldwide coordinating organization of which the United States 
partnership is also a member. 
In this case. the ~etitioner claims that the U.S. entitv and the foreim entitv are affiliates. S~ecificallv. on the 
d, 
L supplement td the Form 1-129, the petitioner indicates that 
 is the $ole owner of the 
U.S. petitioner, and owns 20% of the foreign entity in equal shares with four other persons, including the 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 12 
beneficiary. While corporate documents demonstrating the ownership of the U.S. entity were submitted, no 
evidence of the ownership of the U.S. entity was submitted. 
Consequently, a request for evidence was issued on January 24,2005. In the request, the director required the 
petitioner to submit evidence that established its qualifying relationship with the foreign entity. On March 30, 
2005, the petitioner's response included a letter from president of the 
foreign entity, alleging that the U.S. petitioner was a family business funded by him. Also included were 
copies of wire transfers, evidencing the transfer of money to various individuals, including the beneficiary. 
The petitioner relied on these documents as evidence that a qualifying relationship existed between the 
parties, as they allegedly established that the shareholders of the U.S. entity were the beneficiary and 
-~ 
Upon review of the evidence submitted, the director concluded that the petitioner has failed to submit 
sufficient evidence to establish a qualifying relationship between the U.S. petitioner and the foreign entity. 
Consequently, the director denied the petition. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner provided "adequate documentation" of the 
uali ing relationship. Counsel reasserts that the petitioner's initial submissions indicated that B~ 
wb clearly owned 20% of the foreign entity and 100% of the U.S. entity. Counsel further asserts that the letter from further explained the nature of the relationship between the 
companies, and that the subsequent wire transfers were further proof of the qualifying relationship between 
the parties. The AAO disagrees. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes 
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593; see also Matter of 
Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 
1982). In context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the 
assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and 
authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology, 
19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
Upon review of the record of proceeding, the petitioner has not established that it has the required qualifying 
relationship with the foreign entity. There are two specific problems with the petitioner's claims. First, the 
petitioner has provided minimal documentary evidence outlining the shareholder interests in the U.S. entity, 
which is the primary focus of this qualifying relationship issue. While the petitioner has supplemented this 
evidence with explanatory statements which discuss the percentages of shareholder ownership, no definitive 
documentation has been provided. 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates, the corporate stock 
certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder 
meetings must be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the 
shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 13 
petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, 
the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. 
See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., supra. Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. 
The regulations specifically allow the director to request additional evidence in appropriate cases. See 8 
C.F.R. ยง 214.2(1)(3)(viii). As ownership is a critical element of this visa classification, the director may 
reasonably inquire into the means by which stock ownership was acquired. As requested by the director, 
evidence of this nature should include documentation of monies, property, or other consideration furnished to 
the entity in exchange for stock ownership. Additional supporting evidence would include stock purchase 
agreements, subscription agreements, corporate by-laws, minutes of relevant shareholder meetings, or other 
legal documents governing the acquisition of the ownership interest. 
In this matter, the director, in the request for evidence, requested definitive evidence establishing the 
ownership structure of the petitioner and the qualifying relationship between the parties. In response, the 
petitioner submitted a letter from the president of the foreign entity alleging that he funded the U.S. entity and 
were its shareholders. This statement clearly contradicted the 
of the U.S. company. To add to the confusion, evidence 
individual bank accounts, as opposed to the corporate 
bank account of the U.S. petitioner, were offered as evidence of the purchase of the U.S. entity. It is 
incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. 
Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits 
competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. 
The U.S. entity is an Arizona Corporation. As such, it is required to file Articles of Incorporation with the 
Secretary of State, as well as issue stock certificates, maintain a corporate stock ledger, and keep minutes of 
its shareholder meetings. These documents would serve as primadacie evidence of the ownership of the U.S. 
entity, thereby allowing a thorough review of the viability of a qualifying relationship between the parties. 
However, no such documentation has been submitted. Theqetitioner and counsel continually allege that a 
qualifying relationship exists, most likely on the basis that these entities appear to be family-owned 
organizations. However, the regulations require specific documentation of ownership and control, and have 
specific provisions which must be satisfied in order to be declared qualifying organizations. The petitioner 
failed andlor rehsed to submit adequate documentation to allow a thorough review of the ownership structure 
of the U.S. entity. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be 
grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. ยง 103.2(b)(14). 
The second problem is that even if adequate and sufficient documentation had been submitted to support the 
petitioner's claims, an affiliate relationship, by definition, would not exist. 
The critical regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(L) states in pertinent part: 
Affiliate means: 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 14 
(1) 
 One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent 
or individual, or 
(2) 
 One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of individuals, 
each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion 
of each entity. 
According to the claims of counsel and the petitioner, the U.S. and foreign entities were not owned in the 
and were not owned in their entirety by the exact same persons. In particular, 
llegedly owns 100% of the U.S. entity and 20% of the foreign entity. Therefore, the 
ezuelan company were not owned and controlled by the "same group of individuals, 
each individual owning and controlling approximately the same share or proportion of each entity," per the 
definition at 8 C.F.R. ยง 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(L)(2). 
The AAO has historically required that the same group of individuals own and control approximately the 
same share or proportion of each entity. 
 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(L)(2). 
 As clearly indicated in the 
regulation, while it is not required that each individual own the exact same percentage of each entity, it is 
required that the group of individuals who own each entity, albeit directly or indirectly, be the same. Id.; see 
also 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(K) (defining "subsidiary"). It is important the same group of individuals own 
and control both entities to ensure that both entities are part of the same organization as intended by Congress. 
Otherwise, CIS faces a situation in which diversely-held business associations would meet the requirements 
of a qualifying affiliate relationship, through means "such as ownership of a small amount of stock in another 
company without control, exchange of products or services, and membership of the directors of one company 
on another company's board of directors." 52 Fed. Reg. 5738,5742 (Feb. 26, 1987). 
The additional allegations of the foreign entity's president, which claim that the wire transfers establish a 
family ownership interest in both companies, are likewise unsupported by documentary evidence, precluding 
further inquiry in this matter. The ultimate conclusion is that absent documentary evidence to clearly 
establish the ownership of the petitioner, a qualifying relationship between the parties cannot be declared. 
Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft 
of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190). Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of 
counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not 
constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. at 534; Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1; Matter 
of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. at 506. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established in these proceedings that a qualifying relationship exists 
between the petitioner and the foreign entity, as required by 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(A) and (3)(i). For this 
reason, the petition must be denied. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
WAC 05 073 50701 
Page 15 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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