dismissed L-1A Case: Jewelry

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: WAC 08 062 50563 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: OCT 0 2 2008 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimtnigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
40- 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 08 062 50563 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimrnigrant visa petition seeking to extend the employment of the beneficiary as an 
L-1A nonimrnigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1 lOl(a)(lS)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of Delaware and is allegedly in the jewelry business. The beneficiary was granted a one-year 
period of stay to open a new office in the United States, and the petitioner now seeks to extend the 
beneficiary's stay. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred and that the beneficiary will be employed in a "qualifying managerial/executive capacity." 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualikng organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
WAC 08 062 50563 
Page 3 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(A) 
 Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying 
organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(B) 
 Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) 
 A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year 
and the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) 
 A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the 
number of employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence 
of wages paid to employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity; and 
(E) 
 Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States 
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(44)(A), defmes the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
WAC 08 062 50563 
Page 4 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or hction; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial 
duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of 
the Act. A petitioner may not claim that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and 
rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. Given the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that 
the petitioner is asserting that the beneficiary will be employed in either a managerial or an executive capacity 
and will consider both classifications. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's proposed duties as "general manager" in a letter dated December 13, 
2007 as follows: 
[The beneficiary] has complete executive and managerial authority for the business. He is 
responsible for hiring employees, overseeing sales, establishing marketing policies, and 
managing product distribution. [The beneficiary] meets with purchasing agents for 
department stores, as well as independent and chain jewelry stores to whom [the petitioner] 
sells its products on a wholesale basis, and executes contracts on behalf of [the petitioner] for 
the sale of jewelry to those businesses. He receives shipments from [the foreign employer], 
and manages the distribution and customer service aspects of the wholesale business. 
[The beneficiary] oversees all executive and management aspects of the enterprise, including 
establishing sales, marketing, pricing and distribution policies that are consistent with [the 
petitioning organization's] worldwide policies, hiring employees, and overseeing business 
practices and results. 
[The beneficiary] is also responsible for managing [the petitioner's] flagship retail store in the 
USA, which is located at the Century City Mall in Los Angeles, California. [citation omitted]. 
According, [the beneficiary] occupies a role that is both executive and managerial in the U.S. 
business. 
On January 4, 2008, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, an 
indication of the total number of employees at the United States location; an organizational chart for the 
United States operation; job descriptions and educational credentials for all employees under the beneficiary's 
supervision; quarterly wage reports; and payroll summaries. 
WAC 08 062 50563 
Page 5 
In response, counsel submits a letter dated February 12, 2008 which indicates that the petitioner employed 
three subordinate workers in 2007. Although counsel claims that the petitioner hired an additional worker 
) in 2008, the instant petition was filed on December 26, 2007. Counsel also claims that the 
petitioner employs five "temporary" workers through an agency (Manpower) and six "independent 
contractors" who are compensated through sales commissions. Finally, counsel describes the independent 
sales contractors as "professionals." 
The petitioner also submits organizational charts for the United States operation. These charts show the 
beneficiary at the top of the organization directly supervising two employees (an office manager and a store 
manager) and one independent contractor (sales manager). 
 The office mana er is in turn, portrayed as 
supervising four employees; however, only one of these four workers, , appears to have 
been an employee of the petitioner at the time the petition was filed in December 2007. The store manager is 
portrayed as supervising the "temporary" workers acquired through Manpower. The sales manager, an 
independent contractor, is portrayed as supervising the other sales representatives, who are also independent 
contractors. The petitioner, however, did not describe the job duties of any of the employees, temporary 
workers, or independent contractors. The petitioner also did not submit any evidence addressing the amount 
of compensation paid to Manpower, or the independent contractors, other than uncorroborated projections. 
On February 26, 2008, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director erred and that the beneficiary will be employed in a "qualifying 
managerial/executive capacity." 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
Title 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of 
the petition to support an executive or managerial position. There is no provision in Citizenshp and 
Immigration Services (CIS) regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the beneficiary 
is not performing qualifying duties within one year of petition approval, the petitioner is ineligible by 
regulation for an extension. Future hiring plans, business expansion strategies, and workers employed after 
the filing of the petition may not be considered. A visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of 
future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See Matter of 
Michelin Tire Carp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Cornm. 1978); Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Comrn. 
1971). In the instant matter, the petitioner has not established that the United States operation has reached the 
point that it can employ the beneficiary in a predominantly managerial or executive position. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. A petitioner cannot claim that some of the duties of the 
position entail executive responsibilities, while other duties are managerial. Again, a petitioner may not claim 
that a beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial sections of the two 
statutory definitions. 
WAC 08 062 50563 
Page 6 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a 
day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will establish "sales, marketing, 
pricing and distribution policies" and will oversee sales, product distribution, and "business practices and 
results." However, the petitioner fails to specifically describe these policies or explain what, exactly, the 
beneficiary will do to oversee the business other than to act as a first-line supervisor of three subordinate 
workers. The fact that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has 
prepared a vague job description which includes inflated job duties does not establish that the beneficiary will 
actually perform managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
Consequently, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary will primarily perform 
qualifying duties in his operation of the business. As noted above, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary 
will "manage" the petitioner's business operations through subordinate employees, temporary workers, and 
independent contractors. However, the record does not establish that the beneficiary will be relieved of the 
need to perform the non-qualifying tasks inherent to his ascribed duties by a subordinate staff. For example, 
the petitioner claims that the beneficiary will "[meet] with purchasing agents for department stores, as well as 
independent and chain jewelry stores to whom [the petitioner] sells its products on a wholesale basis, and 
[will execute] contracts on behalf of [the petitioner] for the sale of jewelry to those businesses." The 
petitioner also claims that the beneficiary will "[receive] shipments from [the foreign employer], and [will 
manage] the distribution and customer service aspects of the wholesale business." However, it has not been 
established these tasks constitute qualifying managerial or executive duties. To the contrary, these appear to 
be administrative, operational, or sales related tasks which do not rise to the level of being qualifying duties. 
Furthermore, as the record is devoid ofjob descriptions for the subordinate workers and contractors, it has not 
been established that any of these workers will relieve the beneficiary of the need to perform the non- 
qualifying tasks inherent to his ascribed duties or to the "management" of the three-employee enterprise in 
general. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for 
denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 3 103.2(b)(14). 
 Accordingly, it appears more likely than not that the 
beneficiary will primarily perform non-qualifying first-line supervisory, administrative, or operational tasks in 
his administration of the business. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a 
product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593, 604 (Comrn. 1988). A managerial employee must have authority over day-to-day operations 
beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. 
10l(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
WAC 08 062 50563 
Page 7 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
As asserted in the record, the beneficiary will directly supervise a store manager, an office manager, and a 
sales manager, who is an independent contractor. The office manager purportedly supervises a single1 
"customer service'' employee, the store manager supervises the "temporary" Manpower workers, and the sales 
manager supervises the other independent contractors who are engaged in selling the petitioner's products. 
However, the record is not persuasive in establishing that any of these subordinate workers is a bona fide 
supervisory or managerial employee. First, as noted above, the petitioner fails to specifically describe the 
duties of these subordinate workers even though this evidence was requested by the director. Once again, 
failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the 
petition. 8 C.F.R. 103.2(b)(14). An employee will not be considered to be a supervisor simply because of a 
job title, because he or she is arbitrarily placed on an organizational chart in a position superior to other 
workers, or even because he or she may supervise some daily work activities and assignments. Rather, the 
employee must be shown to possess some significant degree of control or authority over the employment of 
subordinates. Absent detailed job descriptions for the subordinate workers, it cannot be concluded that any of 
these workers is a bona fide supervisory or managerial employee. 
Second, it is noted that the beneficiary's purported supervision of independent contractors, such as the sales 
manager, is a non-qualifying duty. The Act is quite clear that only the management of employees may be 
considered a qualifying managerial duty for purposes of this visa classification. Section 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of 
the Act. 
Furthermore, as the petitioner failed to establish the education required to perform the duties of the 
subordinate positions, even though this evidence was requested by the director, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary will manage professional employees.* Once again, failure to submit requested 
evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. $ 
1 
As noted supra, the petitioner claims that the office manager supervises four employees. However, only one 
of these employees appears to have been employed at the time the instant petition was filed in December 
2007. Accordingly, the AAO will not consider the post-petition employment of the other three "employees" 
in its adjudication of the appeal. Once again, a visa petition may not be approved based on speculation of 
future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. See Matter of 
Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248; Matter of Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. at 49. 
2 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary will manage professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether 
the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe termprofession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comrn. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
WAC 08 062 50563 
Page 8 
103.2(b)(14). The petitioner's claim that the independent contractors are "professionals" is not supported by 
any evidence. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial 
capacity." 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. The beneficiary's job description is 
so vague that it cannot be discerned what, exactly, the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis. As explained 
above, it appears more likely than not that the beneficiary will be primarily employed as a first-line supervisor 
and will perform the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, the petitioner 
has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
3 
While the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization, 
the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function manager" applies 
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is 
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written 
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In 
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary 
manages the function rather than performs the tasks related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has 
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job 
description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerialt Also, as explained 
above, the record indicates that the beneficiary will primarily be a first-line supervisor of non-professional 
workers or will perform non-qualifying tasks. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent by the 
beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine what proportion of his duties will be 
managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily perform the duties of a function manager. 
See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. ofJustice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
WAC 08 062 50563 
Page 9 
In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed 
that CIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one factor in assessing whether its operations 
are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 
F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991)); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Suva, 905 F.2d 41, 42 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. 
INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25,29 (D.D.C. 2003). Furthermore, it is appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the 
petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the 
absence of employees who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, 
or a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics 
Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7,15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad 
in a position that was managerial or executive in nature. 8 C.F.R. $3 214.2(1)(3)(iii) and (iv). 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's job duties abroad as "export manager" in the December 19, 2007 
letter as follows: 
[The beneficiary] was responsible for overseeing the international sales and distribution 
functions of [the foreign employer] in Europe, the Americas and Afiica. [The beneficiary's] 
primary function was to locate exclusive distributors in each country, and to manage those 
distributors' marketing, sales, pricing and distribution practices in order to ensure 
effectiveness and consistency with [the foreign employer's] worldwide business practices. 
[The beneficiary] had decision-making authority in this role as to both the selection of 
distributors and their management, and had overall responsibility for the international export 
function in those countries. 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. To the contrary, it is appears that the beneficiary primarily 
performed non-qualifying tasks abroad, e.g., locating and working with distributors of the foreign employer's 
products. Furthermore, the record does not establish that the beneficiary was relieved of the need to perform 
non-qualifying duties by a subordinate staff. See sections lOl(a)(44)(A) of the Act; see also Matter of 
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity, and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
The previous approval of L-1A petitions does not preclude CIS from denying an extension based on a 
reassessment of the petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 
1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, CIS does not have any 
authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a subsequent 
petition. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. 
WAC 08 062 50563 
Page 10 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. AccordingIy, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.