dismissed L-1A Case: Jewelry Business

CI 
' idenwin~ deg drletd to 
p~mt cleslly ummmmted 
invasion af privsy 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC 07 139 52641 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: 2 2 2008 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
g 
Robert P. iemann, Chief 
/ 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 07 139 52641 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (MO) on appeal. The MO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to extend the employment of its president as an L- 
1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 1 O 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of Texas and is allegedly in the jewelry business. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review-. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred and that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of a manager. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States 
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
EAC 07 139 52641 
Page 3 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction fi-om higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary will primarily perfonn managerial 
duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of 
the Act, although counsel on appeal appears to restrict the beneficiary to the managerial classification. Given 
the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the petitioner is asserting that the beneficiary will be employed 
in either a managerial or an executive capacity and will consider both classifications. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's proposed duties in a letter dated April 9, 2007 as follows: 
[The beneficiary] will continue to manage the operations of the company. As president he 
would still be responsible for the recruitment, and hiring of the employees, including 
EAC 07 139 52641 
Page 4 
managers, and lower level staff as well as their training and termination in the course of our 
business. Additionally, [the beneficiary] would continue to provide direction to the 
organization with respect to long term goals, and policies. He would also be responsible for 
making decisions regarding the partnerships [the petitioner] engages in; and in the contracts 
that it procures, the negotiations that it enters into as well as acting as mentor, and liaison 
with other managers and executives on production, marketing and sales issues. 
The petitioner also submitted copies of its quarterly wage reports. These reports indicate that the petitioner 
employed four workers in the fourth quarter of 2006. The instant petition was filed on April 17,2007. 
On June 1, 2007, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, a more 
detailed description of the beneficiary's job duties and position descriptions for each of the petitioner's 
claimed subordinate employees. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a letter dated August 20, 2007 in which the beneficiary's duties are 
further described as follows: 
Responsibilities include defining the objectives of the company and directing the overall 
operations of the U.S. company. Responsible for initiating and implementing expansion 
plans for the company as well as establishing and maintaining budgets, meeting profitability 
levels, and ensuring the overall growth of the company. Responsible for overseeing the 
management of the company; Recruiting and terminating managerial and subordinate 
employees where the need arises; Liaising with Vice President and Store Manager to oversee 
daily activities of the company and establishment of procedures and policies; Reviews 
activity and operations of management division progress toward stated goals and objectives. 
(100% time spent weekly) He directly oversees the Vice President and Store Manager. 
[The beneficiary] is responsible for managing our organization by directing and coordinating 
the activities of subordinate managerial personnel involved in operating our retail stores in 
assigned areas[.] In addition, he has discretionary authority to hire and terminate store 
managers whose performance does not meet company standards. He acts in a managerial 
capacity by directing, through subordinate managerial personnel, compliance of workers with 
established company policies, procedures, and standards, such as safekeeping of company 
funds and property, personnel and grievance practices, and adherence to policies governing 
acceptance and processing of customer credit card charges. 
Furthermore, the petitioner described the duties of the beneficiary's two direct subordinates, the vice president 
and the store manager, as follows: 
Vice Presidentminancial Manager Hasmmat Subzali 
He is in charge of reviewing financials and budgets; reviewing profit/loss statements; meeting 
with accountant to file tax returns. (30% time spent weekly) Participates in formulating and 
administering company policies and developing long range goals and objectives; (35% time 
spent weekly) Reviews activity and operations of store management division progress toward 
EAC 07 139 52641 
Page 5 
stated goals and objectives; (35% time spent weekly) Reports directly to President. 
Store Manager, Ali Zahid 
Supervises assistant manager and store employees; (40% time weekly) Plans and prepares 
work schedules and assigns employees to specific duties; (10% time weekly) Formulates 
pricing policies on merchandise according to requirements for store profitability; (10% time 
weekly) Supervises employees engaged in sales work, taking of inventories, reconciling cash 
with sales receipts, keeping operating records; (20% time spent weekly) Ensures compliance 
of employees with established security, sales and record keeping procedures; (10% time spent 
weekly) Trains new employees; (10% time spent weekly) Reports directly to President and 
V.P. 
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart for the United States operation. The chart shows the 
beneficiary at the top of the organization directly supervising the vice president who, in turn, is shown 
supervising the store manager who, in turn, is shown supervising three sales clerks. 
Finally, the petitioner submitted a quarterly wage report which indicates that the petitioner employed five 
workers in the first quarter of 2007. 
On October 17, 2007, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity.' 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of a manager. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the MO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a 
day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will define objectives, direct overall 
operations, implement expansion plans, ensuring overall growth, work towards stated goals and objectives, 
'It is noted that, in denying the petition, the director indicated that the beneficiary's proposed $30,000.00 
annual salary was "incongruous with that of an employee who is actually managing other bona fide managers 
or professionals in a major metropolitan business market." The AAO will withdraw this comment. The 
director's comment is not supported by the Act, or by any pertinent regulations, as these do not contain any 
salary provisions or requirements. However, that being said, and for the reasons set forth below, the 
petitioner has nevertheless failed to establish that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a 
primarily managerial or executive position, and the petition will be denied. 
EAC 07 139 52641 
Page 6 
and direct, through subordinate workers, compliance with "established company policies, procedures, and 
standards." However, the petitioner does not specifically define any of these objectives, goals, plans, policies, 
procedures, or standards or explain what, exactly, the beneficiary will do to ensure the "overall growth" of the 
petitioner's jewelry business. Furthermore, general managerial-sounding duties such as directing "overall 
operations" and "overseeing the management of the company" are not probative of the beneficiary performing 
qualifying duties. The fact that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has. 
prepared a vague job description which includes inflated job duties does not establish that the beneficiary will 
actually perform managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. As asserted in the record, the beneficiary will directly supervise a vice 
president who, in turn, will supervise a store manager who, in turn, will supervise three sales clerks. 
However, it has not been established that either the vice president or the store manager is truly a managerial 
or supervisory employee. First, neither the vice president nor the store manager is clearly described as 
performing supervisory or managerial duties. The job description for the vice president fails to ascribe to him 
any supervisory or managerial authority over subordinates. Furthermore, while the job description for the 
store manager includes some supervisory responsibilities related to the sales clerks, e.g., he allegedly devotes 
10% of his time to creating schedules and assigning tasks to the clerks, the job description fails to specifically 
describe the store manager's remaining "supervisory" duties. Vaguely claiming that the store manager 
"supervises" the three clerks and ensures their compliance with certain procedures will not establish that this 
worker is truly a supervisory employee. An employee will not be considered to be a supervisor simply 
because of a job title, because he or she is arbitrarily placed on an organizational chart in a position superior 
to another employee, or even because he or she supervises daily work activities and assignments. Rather, the 
employee must be shown to possess some significant degree of control or authority over the employment of 
subordinates. In this matter, it has not been credibly established that the store manager is a supervisory 
employee. Once again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Id. 
Second, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory or managerial employees because it has not been credibly established that the petitioner's business 
possesses an organizational complexity which reasonably requires the employment of a subordinate tier of 
supervisory or managerial workers. As explained in the record, the petitioner claims to operate a six- 
employee retail jewelry b~siness.~ While the petitioner claims to operate three locations, it appears that all 
'1t is noted that the petitioner claims in its petition to employ four workers, but also claims in the 
organizational chart to employ six workers. The petitioner's wage records indicate that, as of the date the 
petition was filed, the petitioner employed four workers. The petitioner offers no explanation for this 
inconsistency in the record. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
EAC 07 139 52641 
Page 7 
three locations are actually kiosks or small retail enterprises located within the same shopping facility. It is 
simply not credible that three of the petitioner's six employees would be employed in supervisory or 
managerial positions within a four-tiered hierarchy in which only three employees are left to perform the day- 
to-day tasks necessary to the operation of the kiosks. To the contrary, it appears more likely than not that the 
beneficiary and his claimed subordinate employees will all primarily perform the tasks necessary to the 
operation of the jewelry business. See generally Family, Inc. v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
469 F.3d 13 13 (9th Cir. 2006). 
In view of the above, the beneficiary would appear to be, at most, a first-line supervisor of non-professional 
workers, the provider of actual services, or a combination of both. An employee who "primarily" performs 
the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed 
in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one 
"primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). A managerial employee must have authority over day- 
to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees 
are professionals. 10l(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. at 604. Moreover, as the petitioner failed to establish the skills or education required to perform the 
duties of the subordinate positions, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will manage 
professional employees.3 Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed 
primarily in a managerial capacity.4 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice 
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 
I&N Dec. 582,591-92 (BIA 1988). 
3 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary will manage professional employees, the MO must evaluate whether 
the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 10 1(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1 101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
4 
While the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization, 
the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function manager" applies 
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is 
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written 
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In 
EAC 07 139 52641 
Page 8 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the 
beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis. 
Moreover, as explained above, it appears that the beneficiary will be primarily employed as a first-line 
supervisor and will perform the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed 
that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) "may properly consider an organization's small size as one 
factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. US. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d at 1316 (citing with approval Republic of Transkei v. INS, 
923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 41,42 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q 
Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25,29 (D.D.C. 2003). Furthermore, it is appropriate for CIS to 
consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as a company's 
small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive 
operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous 
manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 200 1). The size of a company may 
be especially relevant when CIS notes discrepancies in the record and fails to believe that the facts asserted 
are true. Id. As discussed, the petitioner has not established that its staff of four (or six) employees would 
relieve the beneficiary from primarily performing non-qualifying duties associated with operating the three 
retail jewelry kiosks. 
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary 
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has 
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job 
description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial. Also, as explained 
above, the record indicates that the beneficiary will more likely than not be a first-line supervisor of non- 
professional employees and/or will perform non-qualifying operational or administrative tasks. Absent a 
clear and credible breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot 
determine what proportion of his duties will be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will 
primarily perform the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 
2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
EAC 07 139 52641 
Page 9 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are 
qualifying organizations. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by 
"[elvidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying 
organizations." Title 8 C.F.R. 3 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, 
or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a 
parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing 
business." "Subsidiary" is defined in pertinent part as a corporation "of which a parent owns, directly or 
indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity." 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(K). "Doing business" is 
defined in part as "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods andlor services." 8 C.F.R. $ 
214.2(1)(1)(ii)(H). 
In this matter, the petitioner asserts in the Form 1-129 that the foreign entity owns 5 1% of the petitioner's stock 
and is thus a subsidiary. In support of this claim, the petitioner submits a stock certificate indicating that 510 
shares of stock were issued to the foreign employer. However, the record contains a serious inconsistency which 
undermines this claim. The petitioner also submitted copies of its 2004 and 2005 Forms 1120S, U.S. Income 
Tax Return for an S Corporation. To qualify as a subchapter S corporation, a corporation's shareholders must 
be individuals, estates, certain trusts, or certain tax-exempt organizations, and the corporation may not have 
any foreign corporate shareholders. See section 1361 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. $ 1361. A 
corporation is not eligible to elect S corporation status if a foreign entity owns it in any part. Accordingly, 
since the petitioner would not be eligible to elect S-corporation status with a foreign parent, it appears that the 
United States petitioner is owned by one or more individuals residing within the United States rather than by a 
foreign entity. In fact, the petitioner claims in the Schedules K attached to the Forms 1120s to be 100% 
owned by the beneficiary. As this evidence has not been reconciled with the stock certificate and the 
petitioner's conflicting claims in the Form 1-129, the petitioner's ownership and control has not been clearly 
established. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent 
objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the 
petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 
582,591-92 (BIA 1988). 
Furthermore, the record is devoid of evidence of the foreign employer currently doing business. The record 
does not contain any current evidence addressing the regular, continuous, and systematic provision of goods 
andlor services by the entity abroad. Once again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence 
is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that it and the foreign entity are qualifying organizations. For 
this additional reason, the petition may not be approved. 
EAC 07 139 52641 
Page 10 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's services will be 
used for a temporary period and that the beneficiary will be transferred to an assignment abroad upon 
completion of the temporary assignment in the United States. 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(vii). 
In this matter, the petitioner claims to be owned and controlled by the beneficiary. While the record contains 
inconsistencies which render it impossible to discern the exact ownership and control of the petitioner, the 
petitioner is nevertheless obligated to establish that the beneficiary's services will be used for a temporary 
period and that he will be transferred to an assignment abroad upon completion of the assignment. Id. 
However, the record is devoid of any evidence establishing that the beneficiary's services will be used 
temporarily. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190). 
Accordingly, as the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary's services will be used for a temporary 
period and that the beneficiary will be transferred to an assignment abroad upon completion of the temporary 
assignment in the United States, the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the record reflects that the petitioner did not file the petition for an 
extension within the required time frame. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. fj 214,2(1)(14)(i) provides, in pertinent 
part, that a petition extension may be filed only if the validity of the original petition has not expired. In the 
present case, the beneficiary's authorized period of stay expired on Sunday, April 15, 2007. However, the 
petition for an extension of the beneficiary's L-1A status was filed on Tuesday, April 17, 2007, two days after 
the expiration of the beneficiary's status. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 3 214.1(~)(4), an extension of stay may not be 
approved for an applicant who failed to maintain the previously accorded status or where such status expired 
before the application or petition was filed. As the extension petition was not timely filed, it is noted for the 
record that the beneficiary would be ineligible for an extension of stay in the United States even if the instant 
petition were approved. 
The previous approval of an L-1A petition does not preclude CIS from denying an extension based on a 
reassessment of the petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 
1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, CIS does not have any 
authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a subsequent 
petition. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1361. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
EAC 07 139 52641 
Page 11 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.