dismissed L-1A Case: Jewelry Import/Wholesale

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office ofAdrninistrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC 08 166 52598 
 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: DEC 0 3 2009 
IN RE: 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
\ I, $enyRhew 
k'~hief, Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa and 
dismissed the petitioner's subsequent motion to reconsider. The matter is now before the Administrative 
Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its "Executive Manager" 
as an L- 1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a New York corporation engaged in 
the import and wholesale of precious stones and jewelry. The petitioner states that it is a subsidiary of 
Friends International, located in India. The petitioner has employed the beneficiary in L-1A status since July 
2005 and now seeks to extend his status so that he may serve as executive manager for two additional years. 
On August 12, 2008, the director denied the petition on two independent and alternative grounds, concluding 
that the petitioner did not establish: (1) that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a 
primarily qualifying managerial or executive capacity; and (2) that the petitioner and the foreign entity have a 
quali@ing relationship. The petitioner subsequently filed a motion to reconsider, which the director dismissed 
in a decision dated November 10,2008, without disturbing his original decision. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner disputes the director's findings and asserts that the beneficiary will be 
employed in a primarily executive capacity. Counsel reiterates the beneficiary's duties and those of his 
claimed subordinate employees, and asserts that all requirements for approval have been met. Counsel 
submits a brief and additional evidence in support of the appeal. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 3 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The first issue in this matter is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary would be employed by 
the United States entity in primarily managerial or executive capacity under the extended petition. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 4 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, on May 13, 2008. The petitioner 
stated on Form 1-129 that the beneficiary is employed as the executive manager of its four-person company 
and "is taking care of sales, purchase marketing of precisous [sic] stones, hire fire employees, management." 
In a letter dated May 5,2008, counsel described the beneficiary's duties as follows: 
[The beneficiary] is full time employee and is supervising the hiring, firing of all senior level 
personnel. The beneficiary will spend time to locate buyers and sellers. The beneficiary will 
also be responsible for ongoing client servicing activities. 
[The beneficiary] has been continuously working with the US entity in Business 
Development in the capacity of marketing manager and Business Development and projects 
of prospect development and client management. His duties are primarily concerned with all 
of Project development and marketing of products. The Beneficiary supervises business 
research & marketing, created marketing strategy and managed firm wide PR. The 
beneficiary is familiar with US systems since he is continuously working since 2005 and is 
indulging in sales, marketing of precious, semi precious gems, stones and diaomonds [sic] 
etc. . . . He has worked to maintain, ongoing business relationships, and management 
strategies. 
Counsel stated that the petitioner has hired the following staff 
Manager Business development: 
 This department is helping [the petitioner] to direct 
development of business in the US. 
Personal secretary/Administration Assistant: This department is taking care of the general 
administration1 negotiating with clients/ Answering phone calls/ arranging meetings etc. 
Accounting: This department is taking care of the accounts, prepare monthly statements, 
prepare yearly profit and loss account and it will also be responsible for internal auditing. 
The director issued a request for additional evidence on June 13, 2008, in which he advised the petitioner that 
the initial evidence did not demonstrate that the petitioner would be employed in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. The director noted that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary functions at a 
senior level in the organization other than in position title, or that he will be involved in the supervision and 
control of subordinate supervisory, managerial or professional employees who will relieve him from 
performing the services of the company.' 
1 
 After noting these deficiencies, the director went on to request additional evidence relating to the 
beneficiary's employment with the foreign entity. The director did not request any specific evidence 
pertaining to the beneficiary's duties in the United States or the staffing structure of the U.S. entity. 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 5 
In a response dated July 23, 2008, counsel further described the beneficiary's duties in the United States as 
folIows: 
Main duties are primarily concerned with all of [the petitioner's] Project development and 
marketing of products. The Beneficiary is supervising business research & marketing, 
developing marketing strategy and managing the business. Beneficiary is working full time to 
maintain ongoing business relationships, and management. [The beneficiary] has powers to 
hire or fire employees in the US organization. The position is an "Executive Position." [The 
beneficiary] primarily directs the management of the organization by exercising wide latitude 
in discretionary decision-making, establishing goals and policies of the organization and 
receives only general supervision or direction of the organization from the Indian parent 
company. [The beneficiary] is also responsible for implementing the organization's policies 
on a day-to-day basis, directs andlor participates in the development and recommendation of 
policies, procedures, rules, and regulations for the effective operation of US Organization. 
Counsel indicated that the beneficiary's subordinates include the following personnel: 
Purchase and marketing of products. 
The petitioner's response to the RFE included an organizational chart for the U.S. company. The chart depicts 
the beneficiary as "marketing manager" supervising an account analyst 
 an accountant - 
and a sales assistant. The chart indicates that the sales assistant supervises the 
packing and material employee. 
The director denied the petition on August 12, 2008, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director found 
insufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary would function at a senior level within the organization's 
hierarchy other than in position title, or that he would supervise and control a subordinate staff of supervisory, 
managerial or professional employees. The director also noted that "the nature of your business is not such 
that it would require workers who have professional-level expertise," and determined that the beneficiary's 
proffered salary of $38,000 is "incongruous with that of an employee who is actually managing other bona 
fide managers or professionals." 
The petitioner subsequently filed a motion to reopen and reconsider. In a brief dated September 5, 2008, 
counsel for the petitioner reiterated a position description that was previously provided for the beneficiary, 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 6 
and stated that the beneficiary's subordinates include an account/business analyst 
w 
a sales 
assistant, an accountant, a packaging and material employee, and a sales executive 
On November 10, 2008, the director dismissed the petitioner's motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(4), 
finding that the petitioner failed to provide new facts or state a reason for reconsideration of the adverse 
decision. 
On appeal, counsel reiterates the beneficiary's duties "are clearly involving major executive decision on day- 
to-day basis," and notes that the beneficiary is "responsible for marketing, developing marketing strategy and 
managing the business." Counsel asserts that executives whose duties include executive-level public relations 
and lobbying are not disqualified from L-1A classification and that the beneficiary's duties are "indisputably 
way beyond" such tasks. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or 
executive capacity. While the AAO finds that the director's adverse determinations were warranted based on the 
evidence of record, it is noted that the director's underlying analysis, in part, was flawed, as the director issued an 
adverse finding on the basis of the beneficiary's salary. The AAO notes, however, that a beneficiary's salary is an 
admissibility factor and not a criterion to be used in determining his or her prospective employment capacity. The 
director's finding with regard to the latter is not supported by any statute, regulations or precedent decision. 
Further, the director based the decision, in part, on a finding that the beneficiary's subordinates are not 
professionals, and based on a finding that the petitioner's business would not require the services of professional 
workers. The statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and 
"function managers." See section 10 l(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 l(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii). 
Personnel managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other supervisory, 
professional, or managerial employees. Contrary to the common understanding of the word "manager," the 
statute plainly states that a "first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely 
by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." Section 
10 1 (a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(1)(ii)(B)(2). The term "function manager" applies generally 
when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily 
responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). Therefore, a beneficiary need not supervise professionals in order to 
qualify as a manager or executive. 
Notwithstanding the director's reasoning, the director properly found insufficient evidence to establish that the 
beneficiary would be engaged in primarily managerial or executive tasks. The AAO maintains plenary power 
to review each appeal on a de novo basis. 5 U.S.C. 557(b) ("On appeal from or review of the initial decision, 
the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the 
issues on notice or by rule."); see also, Janka v. US. Dept. of Transp., NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 
1991). The AAO's de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. See, e.g. Dor v. INS, 
89 1 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 7 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. In addition, the definitions of executive and managerial 
capacity each have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the beneficiary performs the high-level 
responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the petitioner must show that the beneficiary 
primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not spend a majority of his or her time on day-to- 
day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 
1991). 
Despite multiple opportunities to provide the detailed description of the beneficiary's duties required by the 
regulations, none of the submitted job descriptions address the specific managerial or executive job duties to 
be performed by the beneficiary. The statements made by the petitioner in the initial filing suggested that the 
beneficiary would perform some combination of qualifying and non-qualifying duties. The petitioner stated 
on Form 1-129 that the beneficiary "is taking care of sales, purchase, marketing of precious stones," duties 
which appear to be non-qualifying, and also responsible for hiring and firing employees and "management." 
The petitioner further indicated that the beneficiary "will spend time to locate buyers and sellers," "be 
responsible for ongoing client servicing activities," and that he has been "indulging in sales, marketing of 
precious, semi precious gems." The petitioner noted that the beneficiary is "primarily concerned with all of 
Project development and marketing of Products." The petitioner did not explain how the beneficiary's sales, 
product marketing and client servicing activities would rise to the level of managerial or executive duties. An 
employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and 
(B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see 
also Matter of Church Scientology Int'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). 
The AAO acknowledges that the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary will "supervise business research & 
marketing," create marketing strategy, manage public relations and perform client management duties. 
However, the petitioner simultaneously stated that the beneficiary would perform non-managerial duties 
associated with each of these functions, and did not clearly indicate which tasks would be delegated to lower- 
level staff and which non-qualifying duties would be performed by the beneficiary directly. Whether the 
beneficiary is a managerial or executive employee turns on whether the petitioner has sustained its burden of 
proving that his duties are "primarily" managerial or executive. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. 
In response to the WE, the petitioner added that the beneficiary "primarily directs the management of the 
organization by exercising wide latitude in discretionary decision-making, establishing goals and policies of 
the organization and receives only general supervision or direction of the organization from the Indian parent 
company." The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary "is responsible for implementing the organization's 
policies on a day-to-day basis," and "directs and/or participates in the development and recommendations of 
policies, procedures, rules and regulations." These statements merely paraphrase the statutory definition of 
executive capacity and do not add any additional clarity to the job description initially provided. Reciting the 
beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations 
require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to provide any 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 8 
detail or explanation of the beneficiary's activities in the course of his daily routine. 
 The actual duties 
themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 1 03, 
1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Whether the beneficiary is a managerial or executive employee turns on whether the petitioner has sustained 
its burden of proving that his duties are "primarily" managerial or executive. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and 
(B) of the Act. Here, the petitioner fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be 
managerial functions and what proportion would be non-managerial. The petitioner lists the beneficiary's 
duties as including both managerial and administrative or operational tasks such as sales, marketing and 
customer service, but fails to quantify the time the beneficiary spends on them. This failure of documentation 
is important because several of the beneficiary's daily tasks, as discussed above, do not fall directly under 
traditional managerial duties as defined in the statute. For this reason, the AAO cannot determine whether the 
beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of a manager or executive. See, e.g. IKEA US, Inc. v. US. 
Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
When examining the managerial or executive capacity of a beneficiary, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) reviews the totality of the record, including descriptions of a beneficiary's duties and those 
of his or her subordinate employees, the nature of the petitioner's business, the employment and remuneration 
of employees, and any other facts contributing to a complete understanding of a beneficiary's actual role in a 
business. 
In this case, the record contains conflicting and uncorroborated claims regarding the number and types of 
employees working under the beneficiary's supervision. At the time of filing, in May 2008, the petitioner 
stated that it employs a total of four employees, including the beneficiary, a "manager business development," 
a personal secretaryladministrative assistant, and an accounting employee. In August 2008, in response to 
the RFE, the petitioner stated that it employs the beneficiary, a business analyst, an assistant marketing 
manager, a sales executive and a packing and materials employee. The petitioner assigned different job titles 
to the same employees in an attached organizational chart. The employee referred to as a sales executive is 
identified as an accountant on the organizational chart, while the assistant marketing manager is identified as 
a sales assistant. The person identified as a "business analyst" in the petitioner's letter does not appear on the 
organizational chart, while another individual is identified as an "account analyst." On motion and on appeal, 
counsel has provided additional employee lists in which the employees' names and job titles now coincide 
with the information provided on the organizational chart, and a fifth subordinate, a sales executive, has been 
added. 
The AAO cannot determine based on the conflicting information provided how many employees actually 
worked for the petitioner as of May 2008 when the petition was filed or what positions they filled. It is 
incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. 
Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits 
competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 
1988). Here, the petitioner provided no explanations regarding its various employee lists, and no 
documentary evidence of its staffing levels in 2008. 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 9 
Furthermore, the petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. A 
visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a 
new set of facts. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). At the time of filing, 
the petitioner indicated that it had a total of four employees and that the subordinate employees included an 
accounting employee, a secretaryladministrative assistant, and a manager, business development. The 
petitioner has not identified who held these positions nor described the duties they performed. 
Furthermore, as noted above, the petitioner initially stated that the beneficiary himself is "taking care of sales, 
purchasing, marketing of precious stones," and the petitioner did not claim to employ sales, marketing or 
purchase staff as of May 2008. When responding to a request for evidence, a petitioner cannot offer a new 
position to the beneficiary, or materially change a position's title, its level of authority within the 
organizational hierarchy, or its associated job responsibilities. The petitioner must establish that the position 
offered to the beneficiary when the petition was filed merits classification as a managerial or executive 
position. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248, 249 (Reg. Comm. 1978). As noted above, the 
information provided by the petitioner in its response to the director's request for further evidence did not 
clarify or provide more specificity to the original duties of the position, but rather added new generic duties to 
the job description. 
As noted above, the statutory definition of "managerial capacity" allows for both "personnel managers" and 
"function managers." See section 101(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(44)(A)(i) and (ii). 
Personnel managers are required to primarily supervise and control the work of other supervisory, 
professional, or managerial employees. Contrary to the common understanding of the word "manager," the 
statute plainly states that a "first line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity merely 
by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are professional." Section 
101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(l)(ii)(B)(2). If a beneficiary directly supervises other 
employees, the beneficiary must also have the authority to hire and fire those employees, or recommend those 
actions, and take other personnel actions. 8 C.F.R. 5 214,2(l)(ii)(B)(3). 
Here, due to the discrepancies discussed above, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary is 
primarily acting as a personnel manager. As it has not been established how many or what types of employees 
the beneficiary actually supervised at the time of filing, it cannot be concluded that the beneficiary is 
primarily engaged in the supervision of managerial, supervisory or professional employees. 
The term "function manager" applies generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the 
organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential 
function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an 
essential function, the petitioner must provide a detailed job description that clearly explains the duties to be 
performed in managing the essential function, i.e. identifies the function with specificity, articulates the 
essential nature of the function, and establishes the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to 
managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 9 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii). In addition, the petitioner's description of the 
beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary manages the function rather than performs the 
duties related to the function. Here, the petitioner has not claimed that the beneficiary manages an essential 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 10 
function of the petitioning organization, nor does the evidence support such a finding. As discussed, the 
petitioner has not provided a detailed description of the beneficiary's duties or the proportion of his time 
allocated to managing a function or functions of the organization. 
The statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a 
complex organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that 
person's authority to direct the organization. Section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1 10 1(a)(44)(B). 
Under the statute, a beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and 
policies" of that organization. Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of 
managerial employees for the beneficiary to direct and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad 
goals and policies of the organization rather than the day-to-operations of the enterprise. An individual will 
not be deemed an executive under the statute simply because they have an executive title or because they 
"direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide 
latitude in discretionary decision making" and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level 
executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization." Id. 
As discussed above, the only executive duties attributed to the beneficiary are those which counsel directly 
paraphrased from the statutory definition of "executive capacity." See section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. 
Descriptions which do not provide any detail or explanation of the beneficiary's actual duties are not 
probative. On appeal, counsel states that the beneficiary's duties are "clearly involving major executive 
decisions on day-to-day basis," but once again, neither counsel nor the petitioner have provided a 
comprehensive description of the beneficiary's duties or examples of what he actually does on a day-to-day 
basis. Without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the 
petitioner's burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of 
Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of 
Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
Overall the evidence of record suggests that the beneficiary exercises discretion over the U.S. company, but 
participates in both managerial and non-managerial aspects of the petitioner's sales, marketing, purchasing 
and other operational functions. Whether the beneficiary is a managerial or executive employee turns on 
whether the petitioner has sustained its burden of proving that his duties are "primarily" managerial or 
executive. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act. Here, the petitioner fails to document what 
proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be managerial or executive functions and what proportion would 
be non-managerial and non-executive operational duties. For this reason, the AAO cannot determine whether 
the beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of a manager or executive. See e.g. IKEA US, Inc. v. US. 
Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
Furthermore, as discussed above, the petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence that it employs a 
subordinate staff who would relieve the beneficiary from performing non-qualifying duties, particularly given 
its initial claimed staffing structure, which includes no marketing, sales, or purchasing staff. In sum, the 
petitioner's arguments primarily fail on an evidentiary basis. The lack of a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's actual duties, considered in conjunction with the petitioner's failure to document the 
employment of the claimed subordinate staff that would relieve the beneficiary from performing day-to-day 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 11 
activities of the company, precludes a finding that the beneficiary would be performing primarily managerial 
or executive duties under the extended petition. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The second issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that the U.S. and foreign 
entities have a qualifying relationship. To establish a "qualifying relationship" under the Act and the 
regulations, the petitioner must show that the beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer 
are the same employer (i.e. one entity with "branch" offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as 
"affiliates." See generally section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1). 
The pertinent regulations at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii) define the term "qualifying organization" and related 
terms as follows: 
(G) 
 Qualzfying organization means a United States or foreign firm, corporation, or other 
legal entity which: 
(1) Meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the 
definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in 
paragraph (I)(l)(ii) of this section; 
(2) 
 Is or will be doing business (engaging in international trade is not 
required) as an employer in the United States and in at least one other 
country directly or through a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary for the 
duration of the alien's stay in the United States as an intracompany 
transferee; and, 
(3) 
 Otherwise meets the requirements of section 10 1 (a)(] 5)(L) of the Act. 
(I) 
 Parent means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which has subsidiaries. 
(J) 
 Subsidiary means a firm, corporation, or other legal entity of which a parent owns, 
directly or indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, 
directly or indirectly, half of the entity and controls the entity; or owns, directly or 
indirectly, 50 percent of a 50-50 joint venture and has equal control and veto power 
over the entity; or owns, directly or indirectly, less than half of the entity, but in fact 
controls the entity. 
(L) AfJiate means 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 12 
(I) 
 One of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the 
same parent or individual, or 
(2) 
 One of two legal entities owned and controlled by the same group of 
individuals, each individual owning and controlling approximately the 
same share or proportion of each entity. 
The petitioner stated on Form 1- 129 that it is a subsidiary of ''1 
" located in India. The petitioner indicated that the Indian parent company owns 5 1 percent of the 
petitioner's shares. In its letter dated May 5, 2008, the petitioner stated that Friends International purchased 
102 of the petitioner's 200 shares in 2005. 
The petitioner did not submit any primary documentary evidence of the ownership of the U.S. company, such 
as copies of the petitioner's stock certificates, stock ledger, by-laws, or articles of incorporation. However, 
the petitioner did submit copies of the U.S. company's IRS Forms 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, 
for the years 2005 and 2006. Both tax returns indicate at Schedule E and Schedule K that the petitioning 
company is wholly owned by an individual,- 
In the WE issued on June 13, 2008, the director advised the petitioner that the initial evidence did not 
establish that the petitioner and foreign entity have a qualifying relationship. The director also requested 
evidence to establish to establish that the foreign entity has been doing business as defined in the regulations, 
for the previous year. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a number of invoices and export documents issued by Friends 
International between January and August 2007. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the petitioner and 
foreign entity have a qualifying relationship. The director emphasized that the petitioner did not address this 
issue in its response to the RFE. The director further found that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
foreign entity is presently engaged in the regular, systematic and continuous provision of goods andlor 
services. 
On motion, the petitioner submitted additional evidence of the foreign entity's business activities, including 
invoices and shipping documents from 2007 and evidence of a major sales transaction in August 2008. As 
noted above, the director found that the petitioner did not meet the requirements for a motion to reopen or 
reconsider and dismissed the motion. 
On appeal, the petitioner submits copies of previously submitted evidence with respect to the foreign entity's 
business activities. The evidence submitted on appeal also includes a copy of the petitioner's IRS Form 1 120, 
U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return, for 2007. According to information provided at Schedule E and 
Schedule K, the petitioning company is wholly owned by 
- 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 13 
Upon review, the petitioner has not established that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity, 
Friends International. The AAO finds that the petitioner has submitted sufficient evidence to establish that 
the foreign entity, Friends International is doing business; however, the record remains devoid of evidence to 
corroborate the claimed parent-subsidiary relationship between the foreign entity and the U.S. petitioner. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes 
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see also 
Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 
(Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of 
possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or 
indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter 
of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient 
evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The 
corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant 
annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact 
number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate 
control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the 
distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual 
control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., supra. Without full disclosure of all 
relevant documents, USCIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. 
While the petitioner claims that the foreign entity owns 102 out of the U.S. company's 200 issued shares, the 
petitioner has submitted no documentary evidence in support of this claim. Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of Califonia, 14 I&N 
Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Furthermore, the petitioner's claim that it is majority-owned by an Indian company is contradicted by the 
information contained in the U.S. company's corporate tax returns for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. As 
noted above, according to the information reported on the Forms 1120, the petitioner is wholly owned by an 
individual, . It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record 
by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice 
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 
I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, of course, lead to a 
reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. 
Id. at 582. The record does not contain any evidence of the foreign entity's ownership so it cannot be 
determined whether the two companies may have an affiliate relationship based on common ownership by a 
common individual or parent company. 
EAC 08 166 52598 
Page 14 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign entity. For 
this additional reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The AAO acknowledges that the beneficiary was previously granted L-1A status for employment with the 
petitioning company. It must be emphasized that each petition filing is a separate proceeding with a separate 
record. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.8(d). In making a determination of statutory eligibility, USClS is limited to the 
information contained in that individual record of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(16)(ii). 
While USCIS previously approved a petition for L-1A status filed on behalf of the beneficiary, the prior 
approval does not preclude USCIS from denying an extension of the original visa petition based on a 
reassessment of the beneficiary's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556,2004 WL 
1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). If a previous nonimmigrant petition was approved based on the same unsupported 
assertions and conflicting evidence that are contained in the current record, the approval would constitute 
material and gross error on the part of the director. Due to the lack of evidence of eligibility in the present 
record, the AAO finds that the director was justified in departing from the previous approval by denying the 
present request to extend the beneficiary's status. 
The AAO is not required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, 
merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology 
International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency 
must treat acknowledged errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court 
of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), afd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, USCIS does 
not have the authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in 
a subsequent petition. See section 291 of the Act. 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an 
independent and alternative basis for the decision. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative 
grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with 
respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 
2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.