dismissed L-1A

dismissed L-1A Case: Jewelry Manufacturing

๐Ÿ“… Date unknown ๐Ÿ‘ค Company ๐Ÿ“‚ Jewelry Manufacturing

Decision Summary

The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to overcome the director's findings on two key points. The petitioner did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity, offering only vague job descriptions. Additionally, the petitioner failed to submit new evidence on appeal to prove a qualifying relationship of ownership and control between the U.S. and foreign entities.

Criteria Discussed

Managerial/Executive Capacity Qualifying Relationship New Office Requirements

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invdw of wrsonal prlvw 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: WAC 01 071 54458 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: JUL 2 ? 26g)6 
IN RE: 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 10 l(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All docuinents have been returned 
to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Administrative Appeals Office 
' WAC 01 071 54458 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The nonimmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, California Service Center, 
and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (MO) on appeal. The appeal will be summarily 
dismissed. ' 
The petitioner-b~~, Inc. dba Signatures, a Nevada coporation, states 
that it is engaged-in the jewelry manufacturing business. The petitioner claims that it is an affiliate of 
located in New Delhi, India. 
 It seeks to employ the beneficiary 
temporarily as a new employee and as its chief executive officer of its new office in the United States, 
pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 3 
1 10 l(a)(15)(L). 
The director denied the petition based on the following conclusions: 1) the petitioner's failure to establish 
that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; and, 
2) the petitioner's failure to establish a qualifying relationship between the U.S. entity and the 
beneficiary's foreign employer. 
On the Form 1-290B Notice of Appeal, counsel for petitioner asserts: "[the] service did not take into 
account position, duties and responsibilities of beneficiary which clearly proves executive position." 
Counsel for petitloner fwther asserts that the beneficiary will hold an executive position since the 
beneficiary has the "responsibility and ability to sign all lease agreements, open bank accounts with 
authority to sign checks ... authority to slgn all documents required to open a business." In addition, the 
appeal states that the beneficiary is a partner in the business and directs all components of the business in 
the United States. Finally, the petitioner asserts that the same stockholders own and control both the 
foreign parent company and the United States entity. 
To establish eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must meet certain criteria. 
Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States, a firm, corporation, or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof, must have employed 
the beneficiary for one continuous year. Furthermore, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporanly to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate 
thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
Upon review the director concurs with the director's decision and affirms the denial of the petition. The 
director's decision states that the evidence submitted does not establish that the beneficiary will hold a 
position of managerial or executive capacity in the United States. The dlrector found that the petitioner 
has not established that the beneficiary will be performing duties which primarily require her to plan, 
1 
 It is noted that the petitioner is represented by an attorney that has been suspended from the practice of 
immigration law. See U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review website, 
"List of Disciplined Attorneys," http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/profcond/chart.htm (as of December 3, 
2004). In addition, on March 5, 2003, the petitioner's attorney requested that the AAO withdraw his 
name as the attorney of record. The attorney based his withdrawal upon the suspension of his license to 
practice law by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington on December 12, 2002. For this reason, 
the petitioner will be treated as self-represented. 
" WAC01 071 54458 
Page 3 
organize, direct and control the organization's major functions by working through other managerial or 
professional employees in the United States. The petitioner's general objections to the denial of the 
petition, without specifically identifying any errors on the part of the director or providing new evidence 
to support that the beneficiary is in a position of managerial capacity, are simply insufficient to overcome 
the well-founded and lopcal conclusions the director reached based on the evidence submitted by the 
petitioner. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I & N Dec. 158, 165 (Comrn. 
1998)(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. at 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
On the Form 1-129, the petitioner described the beneficiary's United States duties as: "manage and 
oversee all aspects." In addition, on appeal, the petitioner states, "This high level of authority is not given 
to anyone else, including day to day employees. [The petitioner] has the responsibility and ability to sign 
all lease agreements, open bank account with authority to sign checks." The petitioner goes on to state, 
"it is inconceivable that a company would allow this type of control to a person who is not in an executive 
or managerial position." 
Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; 
the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has 
failed to provide any detail or explanation of the beneficiary's activities in the course of his daily routine. 
The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 
724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afyd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
In addition, the petitioner does not clarify whether the beneficiary is claiming to be primarily engaged in 
managerial duties under section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 
101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary will function as both a 
managerial and executive employee. A beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid 
"executive/manager" and rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. If the petitioner chooses 
to represent the beneficiary as both an executive and a manager, it must establish that the beneficiary 
meets each of the four criteria set forth in the statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition 
for manager. 
Furthermore, when a new business is established and commences operations, the regulations recognize 
that a designated manager or executive responsible for setting up operations will be engaged in a variety 
of activities not normally performed by employees at the executive or managerial level and that often the 
full range of managerial responsibility cannot be performed. In order to qualify for L-1 nonimmigrant 
classification during the first year of operations, the regulations require the petitioner to disclose the 
business plans and the size of the United States investment, and thereby establish that the proposed 
enterprise will support an executive or managerial position within one year of the approval of the petition. 
See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C). This evidence should demonstrate a realistic expectation that the 
enterprise will succeed and rapidly expand as it moves away from the developmental stage to full 
operations, where there would be an actual need for a manager or executive who will primarily perform 
qualifying duties. The petitioner fails to submit evidence on appeal to demonstrate the requirements as 
descnbed above. 
; WAC 01 071 54458 
Page 4 
The director also stated in his decision that the petitioner did not submit sufficient evidence to establish a 
qualifying relationship exists between the petitioner and the foreign company. On appeal, the petitioner 
repeats the same information submitted initially with the petition. The petitioner asserts that foreign 
company and the U.S. company have the same exact ownership. However, the appeal does not provide 
any new evidence regarding the qualifying relationship. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for 
purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 
1988); see also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of 
Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Cornm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the 
direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to 
control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, 
management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 
595. 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, the articles of incorporation alone 
are not sufficient evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a 
corporate entity. The corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and 
the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to determine the total number 
of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership 
and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all agreements 
relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, 
and any other factor affecting actual control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 
supra. Without full disclosure of all relevant documents, CIS is unable to determine the elements of 
ownership and control. 
In this case, the director specifically requested that the petitioner submit copies of the U.S. company's 
stock certificates, stock ledger, and evidence that the petitioner's claimed shareholders have in fact paid 
for their stock ownership. The petitioner failed to submit the requested evidence in response to the 
director's request, and as a result, the record is devoid of evidence of the petitioner's ownership and 
control. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be ground for 
denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. ยง 103.2(b)(14). 
Despite theunsupported assertions from the petitioner on appeal, based on the minimal documentation in 
the record, it cannot be determined that the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will be in a 
managerial or executive capacity position, or that the United States entity and the entity in India have a 
qualifying relationship. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sof$ci, 22 I&N 
Dec. at 165. 
WAC0107154458 
Page 5 
Further, the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 
 103.3(a)(l)(v) state, in pertinent part: 
An officer to whom an appeal is taken shall summarily dismiss any appeal when the party 
concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or statement of 
fact for the appeal. 
Inasmuch as the petitioner has failed to identify specifically an erroneous conclusion of law or a statement 
of fact in this proceeding, the appeal must be summarily dismissed. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligbility for the benefit sought remains entirely with 
the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1361. The petitioner has not met this burden. 
ORDER: 
 The appeal is summarily dismissed. 
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