dismissed L-1A Case: Legal Consulting

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: AUG. 1, 2023 In Re: 27640623 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (L-lA Manager or Executive) 
The Petitioner , a foreign law consulting firm, seeks to employ the Beneficiary temporarily as its 
Executive Director under the L-lA nonimmigrant classification for intracompany transferees. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 10l(a)(l5)(L) , 8 U.S.C. § 110l(a)(l5)(L) . The L-lA 
classification a11ows a corporation or other legal entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a 
qualifying foreign employee to the United States to work temporarily in a managerial or executive 
capacity. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did 
not establish that the Beneficiary was employed abroad and would be employed in the United States 
in a managerial or executive capacity. We dismissed a subsequent appeal. The matter is now before 
us on a motion to reopen. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). Upon review, we will dismiss the 
motion. 
A motion to reopen must state new facts and be supported by documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(2). Our review on motion is limited to reviewing our latest decision. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(l)(ii). We may grant motions that satisfy these requirements and demonstrate eligibility 
for the requested benefit. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464, 473 (BIA 1992) (requiring that 
new evidence have the potential to change the outcome). 
In dismissing the appeal, we determined that the Petitioner had not provided sufficient evidence 
establishing that it had the organizational structure and staffing to support the Beneficiary in a position 
where the primary portion of her time would be a11ocated to duties of an executive nature. 
Additionally , we noted ambiguities regarding the Beneficiary's job duties and determined that the 
Petitioner did not establish that the Beneficiary would dedicate her time primarily to performing 
executive-level tasks. We further explained that because this basis for denial was dispositive of the 
Petitioner's appeal, we would reserve the Petitioner's arguments regarding the Beneficiary's 
employment abroad in a managerial or executive capacity. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 
(1976) ("courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is 
unnecessary to the results they reach"); see also Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 n.7 (BIA 
2015) (declining to reach alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
On motion, the Petitioner submits a brief: its articles of incorporation, corporate documentation 
pertaining to some of the companies with whom it claims to have business relationships, and 
documentation pertaining to an individual employed by the Petitioner who holds H-lB nonimmigrant 
status. It also resubmits copies of previously submitted documents including its organizational charts. 
The issue at hand is whether the Petitioner has offered new facts or established that we incorrectly 
applied the law or U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) policy to the evidence in the 
record at the time of our prior decision dismissing the appeal. We note that the new facts in a motion 
to reopen must possess such significance that "the new evidence offered would likely change the result 
in the case." See Matter o_f Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. at 473. In other words, a motion to reopen should 
only be granted under a limited set of circumstances where the Petitioner demonstrates that the new 
evidence would result in a different outcome. See id. 
As noted in our prior decision, the Petitioner submitted multiple job descriptions for the Beneficiary 
but did not explain how the conflicting job descriptions corresponded or overlapped with each other. 
We farther noted that the duty descriptions were largely comprised of vague job duties that conveyed 
no meaningful information about the tasks the Beneficiary would perform in the daily course of 
business. Finally, we determined that the record was devoid of evidence showing that the businesses 
and individuals listed as the Petitioner's service providers constituted "the management" whom the 
Beneficiary would oversee in carrying out her executive role. 
On motion, the Petitioner claims that it previously submitted extensive supporting documentation 
showing that the Beneficiary is its highest-paid employee and that she supervises a subordinate staff 
of independent contractors, and argues that we, as well as the Director, incorrectly excluded the 
independent contractors from the Petitioner's overall employee count for purposes of determining 
whether the Petitioner had sufficient subordinate staffing to relieve the Beneficiary from performing 
non-qualifying duties. 
Here, although the Petitioner provides a brief and some additional documentation pertaining to its 
business associates, it does not present new facts to establish that we erred in dismissing the appeal. 
The Petitioner's motion relies primarily on evidence in the record, and restates, nearly verbatim, most 
of the arguments it submitted in its appellate brief The Petitioner also reiterates on motion the 
information provided in the original job descriptions and claims that its original submissions 
adequately described the Beneficiary's proposed employment. 
We disagree with the Petitioner's assertion that it previously provided sufficient duty descriptions and 
evidence to demonstrate that the Beneficiary will be employed in a primarily executive capacity. This 
issue was raised previously by the Director in denying the petition as well as when a request for 
additional supporting documentation was made prior to adjudication. Although the Petitioner was 
informed of the evidentiary deficiencies and had multiple opportunities to supplement the record with 
additional evidence in support of the Beneficiary's claimed executive capacity, the Petitioner declined 
do so and instead maintained that its original submissions were sufficient to satisfy its evidentiary 
burden. Although the Petitioner had the opportunity to address this evidentiary deficiency on appeal 
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with us, it declined at that time to submit any additional new evidence specific to the Beneficiary's 
claimed executive capacity or its staffing structure, and we note that this evidentiary deficiency formed 
the primary basis upon which we dismissed the Petitioner's appeal. 
We note the Petitioner's submission on motion of corporate summaries from the State of Florida's 
Division of Corporations for its claimed business associates, which confirm the active corporate status 
of these companies. Although the Petitioner claims to provide international consulting, professional 
alliances, financial auditing, foreign legal consulting, real estate consulting, and tax consulting, and 
indicated that it employed these entities to provide such services, we noted in our prior decision that 
the Petitioner provided no formal contractual agreements documenting the claimed business 
relationships with these service providers. The evidence submitted on motion does not overcome this 
evidentiary deficiency or otherwise present new facts that would warrant reopening of the proceeding, 
but merely verifies their active corporate status. 
The Petitioner also provides evidence pertaining to one of its employees who was approved for H-1 B 
nonimmigrant status in January of 2022, and questions why this individual's visa application was 
approved given the fact that the Beneficiary in the instant petition has more responsibilities and holds 
a higher rank within the Petitioner's organizational hierarchy. The H-lB nonimmigrant classification 
for specialty occupations, set forth in section 10l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 110l(a)(l5)(H)(i)(b), allows a U.S. employer to temporarily employ a qualified foreign worker in a 
position that requires both (a) the theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized 
knowledge and (b) the attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in the specific specialty ( or its 
equivalent) as a minimum prerequisite for entry into the position. The requirements for the 
nonimmigrant classification for intracompany transferees, however, fall under section 101(a)( 15)(L) of 
the Act. The two classifications have different evidentiary requirements, and each petition filing is a 
separate proceeding with a separate record. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(d). The Petitioner's attempt to 
compare the facts of an approved H-lB petition to the facts of the instant petition does not constitute 
a new fact and is not a basis for reopening the proceeding. 
As stated in our prior decision, the Petitioner did not adequately describe the Beneficiary's proposed 
job duties but rather provided multiple incongruent job descriptions that offered little insight as to the 
specific activities the Beneficiary would undertake within the Petitioner's operation. We further noted 
that the Petitioner's primary focus appeared to be outsourcing consulting services in various business 
sectors, and the record as constituted did not establish that the Petitioner had an organizational 
structure for the Beneficiary to manage in an executive capacity as contemplated by section 
10l(A)(44)(B) of the Act. Nothing on motion addresses or overcomes this issue. Because the 
Petitioner has not established new facts that would warrant reopening of the proceeding, we have no 
basis to reopen our prior decision. 
Motions for the reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored for the same reasons as petitions 
for rehearing and motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. See INS v. 
Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988)). With this motion, the 
Petitioner has not met that burden. 
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ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. 
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