dismissed L-1A Case: Logistics

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000
Washington, DC 20529
u.S.Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
File: SRC 05 089 51666 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: FEB 0 1 2007
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5)(L)
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.
---:~::-;:7~
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office
www.uscis.gov
• I' II. •. I'
SRC 05 089 51666
Page 2
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center , denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal.
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to extend the employment of its president and
general manager as an L-l A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a )(l5)(L) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(l5)(L). The petitioner is a limited liability
company organized under the laws of the State of Texas and claims to be engaged in the business of logistics
The petitioner also claims a qualifying relationship as an affiliate with
of Brazil. The beneficiary was initially granted a one-year period of stay to open a new
office in the United States , and the petitioner now seeks to extend the beneficiary's stay for three years.
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be
employed in the United States in a primarily executive capacity.
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal , the petitioner asserts that the director erred and that
the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive. In support of this assertion, the petitioner submits
a brief and additional evidence.
To establish eligibility for the L-l nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria
outlined in section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. Specifically , a qualifying organization must have employed the
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity , for one
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary 's application for admission into the United
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial , executive, or
specialized knowledge capacity .
The regulation at 8 C.F .R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be
accompanied by:
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l )(ii)(G) of this section.
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized
knowledge capacity , including a detailed description of the services to be performed.
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of
the petition.
(iv) Evidence that the alien 's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was
managerial , executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien 's prior
education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended
services in the United States; however , the work in the United States need not be the
SRC 05 089 51666
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same work which the alien performed abroad.
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)( ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following:
(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying
organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(1)(ii)(G) of this section;
(B) Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year;
(C) A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year
and the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition;
(D) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the
number of employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence
of wages paid to employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a
managerial or executive capacity; and
(E) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation.
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of
the organization;
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department
or subdivision of the organization;
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised,
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the
function managed; and
(iv) exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory
duties unless the employees supervised are professional.
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Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the
organization;
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function;
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board
of directors, or stockholders of the organization.
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary is claiming to be primarily
engaged in managerial duties under section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under
section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Although the petitioner was specifically asked in the Request for Evidence
to indicate whether it was seeking to classify the beneficiary as an executive or as a manager, the petitioner
responded instead that the beneficiary will "occupy the position of the president." While this implies that the
petitioner is seeking an executive classification, and while counsel to the petitioner asserts in his appeal that
the beneficiary will be primarily employed as an "executive," the record is still not clear on which
classification is being sought. A beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager"
and rely on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. If the petitioner is indeed representing the
beneficiary as both an executive and a manager, it must establish that the beneficiary meets each of the four
criteria set forth in the statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition for manager. Given the
lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the petitioner is asserting that the beneficiary is acting as an
executive, or, in the alternative, as a manager, and will consider both classifications.
In a statement appended to the initial Form 1-129, the petitioner describes the beneficiary's duties as follows:
o Plans, develops, and establishes policies and objectives of the business organization
in accordance with the corporation charter;
o Plans, directs and coordinates the operations of the company;
o Establishes responsibilities and procedures for attaining objectives;
o Reviews activities reports and financial statements to determine progress and status
in attaining objectives and revises objectives and plans in accordance with current
conditions;
o Directs and coordinates formulation of financial programs to provide funding for new
or continuing operations to maximize returns on investments, and to increase
productivity;
o Evaluates office production, revises procedures, or devises new forms to improve
efficiency of workflow;
o Prepares activities reports for guidance of management. Prepares employee ratings
and conducts employee benefit and insurance programs, using computer;
o Hires, trains, and supervises clerical staff;
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o Plans and develops industrial, labor , and public relations policies designed to
improve company's image and relations with customers , employees and public; and
o Reviews project proposals or plans to determine time frame, funding limitations,
procedures for accomplishing projects, staffing requirements, and allotment of
available resources to various phases of projects.
On March 16 , 2005 , the director requested additional evidence. Specifically , the director requested evidence
establishing that the beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive capacity such as information
regarding other employees of the petitioner , wage reports , and an organizational chart.
On June 15 , 2005, the petitioner responded to the request for evidence. The petitioner provided an
organizational chart placing the beneficiary at the top of the organization supervising a logistics coordinator
who, in tum , supervises a warehouse supervisor who, in tum , supervises a material handler. The petitioner
also provided job descriptions for the subordinate employees as follows:
Position: Logistics Coordinator
Duties: Responsible for the entire life cycle of a product, including acquisition, distribution,
internal allocation, delivery , and final disposal of resources.
* * *
Position : Warehouse Supervisor
Duties: Supervise direct and direct [sic] the warehouse department , including supervision of
inventory , record keeping and supervise the material handlers.
* * *
Position: Material Handler
Duties: [A]ssisting the warehouse manager in the inventory control, record keeping,
unloading containers , stocking materials, loading outbound [freight] etc.
Finally, the petitioner provided copies of wage reports indicating that it employs four people including the
beneficiary .
On August 4 , 2005, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity .
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive . In support of
this appeal , the petitioner submits a brief and additional evidence.
Upon review , the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive.
Pursuant to section 1 o1(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C . § 1101(a)(44)(C) , if staffing levels are used as a factor
in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive capacity, Citizenship and
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Immigration Services (CIS) must take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the
overall purpose and stage of development of the organization. In the present matter, however, the regulations
provide strict evidentiary requirements for the extension of a "new office" petition and require CIS to examine
the organizational structure and staffing levels of the United States operation. See 8 C.F.R. §
214.2(l)(l4)(ii)(D). Title 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(v)(C) allows the "new office" operation one year within the
date of approval of the petition to support an executive or managerial position. There is no provision in CIS
regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the business does not have sufficient
staffing after one year to relieve the beneficiary from primarily performing operational and administrative
tasks, the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an extension. In the instant matter, the United States
operation has not reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary in a predominantly managerial or
executive position.
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. The petitioner must specifically state whether the
beneficiary is primarily employed in a managerial or executive capacity. As explained above, a petitioner
cannot claim that some of the duties of the position entail executive responsibilities, while other duties are
managerial. A beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial
sections of the two statutory definitions.
The petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties has failed to prove that the beneficiary will act in a
"managerial" capacity. In support of its petition, the petitioner has provided a vague and nonspecific
description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day
basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary establishes policies and objectives, directs the
company's operation, establishes responsibilities, prepares activity reports, and devises new forms to improve
efficiency of workflow. The petitioner did not, however, specifically define or explain the policies,
objectives, reports, forms, or responsibilities. Moreover, since some of the duties vaguely described by the
petitioner include non-managerial duties, i.e., training and supervising clerical staff, it is essential that the
petitioner specifically define his duties and provide a breakdown of how much time is spent by the
beneficiary performing such non-qualifying duties. Otherwise, it cannot be concluded that the beneficiary is
"primarily" employed in a managerial capacity. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary
to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or
executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N
Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's
duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a
matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd,
905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990).
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees. While the petitioner supplied job descriptions and an
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organizational chart for the United States operation, the job descriptions and organizational chart provided do
not establish that the beneficiary supervises and controls the work of supervisory, managerial, or professional
employees. As explained above, the petitioner employs four people, including the beneficiary. Although the
organizational chart indicates that the beneficiary supervises a logistics coordinator who, in turn, supervises a
warehouse supervisor, who, in turn, supervises a material handler, it is not credible that two of the three
employees directly subordinate to the beneficiary are supervisory or managerial employees. Not only do the
vague job descriptions fail to reveal how much of the subordinate employees' time is spent performing
supervisory or managerial duties, the job descriptions appear to describe employees performing the tasks
necessary to produce a product or to provide services. In view of the above, the beneficiary would appear to
be a first-line supervisor, the provider of actual services, or a combination of both. A managerial or executive
employee must have authority over day-to-day operations bey~:md the level normally vested in a first-line
supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter
of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Also, since the record fails to reveal the
educational or skill levels necessary for entry into the positions held by the subordinate employees, it cannot
be determined if they rise to the level of professional employees.' Therefore, the record does not prove that
the beneficiary is acting in a managerial capacity.'
)In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the
subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor.
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(32), states that "[t]he term profession shall include but not
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968);
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education
required by the position, rather than the degree held by subordinate employee.
2While the petitioner has not specifically argued that the beneficiary manages an essential function of the
organization, the record nevertheless would not support this position. The term "function manager" applies
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has
not provided evidence that the beneficiary manages an essential function. The petitioner's vague job
description fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be managerial functions and
what proportion would be non-managerial. This failure of documentation is important because several of the
beneficiary's duties, as explained above, do not fall directly under traditional managerial duties as defined in
the statute. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties,
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Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization.
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making"
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or
stockholders of the organization." Id. As indicated above, while the petitioner may have provided a vague
job description which reiterates the regulations, the petitioner has failed to prove that the beneficiary, who is
managing no more than three employees who apparently perform tasks necessary to produce a product or
provide a service, will be acting primarily in an executive capacity. Therefore , it must be concluded that the
reasonable needs of the petitioner, in light of the overall purpose and stage of development of the
organization , do not require the services of an executive employee.
It is appropriate for CIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant
factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non­
managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business
in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001).
Accordingly , the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial
or executive capacity as required by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3).
Beyond the decision of the director, a related issue is whether the petitioner has established that it has a
qualifying relationship with the foreign entity.
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 2 14.2(l)(l4)(ii)(A) states that a petition to extend a "new office" petition filed on
Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by:
(A) Evidence that the United States and the foreign entity are still qualifying
organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section[.]
Title 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(i)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm , corporation, or other legal
entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, branch,
affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(1)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing business ." "Doing
business" is defined as "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services by a qualifying
the AAO cannot determine what proportion of his duties would be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the
beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of a function manager. See lKEA US, Inc. v. U.s. Dept. of
Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999).
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organization and does not include the mere presence of an agent or office of the qualifying organization in the
United States and abroad." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(i)(l)(ii)(H). An "affiliate" is defined in pertinent part as "[o]ne of
two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or individual." In this case, the
petitioner asserts that it is an affiliate of the overseas entity because both the petitioner and the foreign employer
are 1000/0 owned by the beneficiary.
The petitioner has failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign employer for two
reasons.
First, the petitioner failed to establish that the foreign employer is still doing business as defined in the
regulations. The petitioner provided the following evidence regarding the foreign entity's business activities:
(1) an untranslated document purported to be a commercial registration of the foreign employer; (2) a
translated incorporation deed for the foreign employer; and (3) a collection of untranslated business
documents purported to be invoices and other evidence of business activity. Because the petitioner failed to
submit certified translations of the registration and business documents, the AAO cannot determine whether
the evidence supports the petitioner's claims. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(3). Accordingly, the evidence is not
probative and will not be accorded any weight in this proceeding. Moreover, the incorporation deed alone
does not establish that the foreign entity is actually doing business as defined in the regulations. Therefore,
the petition may also not be approved for this reason.
Second, the petitioner failed to establish ownership and control of the United States entity. The regulation
and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in determining
whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes of this visa
classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593; see also Matter of Siemens
Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter ofHughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). In
the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets
of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and
authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology
International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595.
In support of its petition, the petitioner provided articles of organization for the United States entity,
confirming that the petitioner is a Texas limited liability company, along with a certificate of organization
dated December 31, 2003 confirming that the articles conform to Texas law. The articles of organization
state the name of the limited liability company and that the manager is the beneficiary. The articles do not
identify the initial members of the petitioner since the limited liability company is not reserving management
to the members. The petitioner did not supply any other organizational documents for the United States.
While limited liability companies do not issue share certificates like corporations, the petitioner has failed to
provide sufficient evidence demonstrating the ownership of the United States entity. Texas limited liability
companies formed in 2003 are regulated by the Texas Limited Liability Company Act. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. Art. 1528n.3 This law provides guidance on how to interpret the articles of organization of a Texas
3While the Texas Limited Liability Company Act was substantially amended in 2005, and was made effective
in 2006, these revisions do not generally affect limited liability companies formed in 2003, such as the
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limited liability company as these relate to ownership interests, and how a Texas limited liability company
can evidence ownership interests by members.
Sections 3.02 and 4.01 permit a person to become a member of a limited liability company upon formation
and to be identified as an "initial member" in the articles of organization. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art.
1528n, §§ 3.02 and 4.01. Section 4.01 also permits new members to be added after formation of the limited
liability company. Id. Furthermore, section 2.22 requires Texas limited liability companies to maintain
records including, but not limited to, a list identifying each member by name, address, and percentage of
ownership; a written statement of the contributions made by each member, the times at which additional
contributions are to be made, events requiring the dissolution of the limited liability company, and the date on
which each member became a member; and copies of the regulations of the limited liability company, if any.
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 1528n, § 2.22.
In the current matter, the only evidence provided by the petitioner to prove that the beneficiary "owns" the
petitioner was a copy of the articles of organization identifying the beneficiary as the "initial manager." The
petitioner did not provide a copy of the list, which it is compelled to maintain by Texas law, identifying the
members of the limited liability company or any other company records which could have proven who, as of
the date of the petition, are the members of the limited liability company.
Therefore, given the lack of evidence, the petitioner has not established that the petitioner and the
organization which employed the beneficiary overseas are qualifying organizations as defined by 8 C.F.R. §
214.2(1)(1)(ii)(G). The owner or owners of the petitioner have not been adequately identified. For this
additional reason, the petition may not be approved.
Beyond the decision of the director, according to Texas state corporate records, the petitioner's corporate
status in Texas is not in good standing. Therefore, as the State of Texas has forfeited the petitioner's
corporate privileges, the company can no longer be considered a legal entity in the United States. Therefore,
as this clearly and unequivocally renders the petitioner ineligible for the classification sought, the petition
could not be approved for this additional reason even if all of the other grounds for dismissal were overcome
on appeal.
The initial approval of an L-1A new office petition does not preclude CIS from denying an extension of the
original visa based on a reassessment of petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ., 99 Fed. Appx. 556,
2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, CIS does not have
any authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a
subsequent petition. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd, 345 F.3d 683
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews
petitioner. The petitioner, therefore, is still regulated by the Act as it appeared in 2003. Tex. Bus. Org. Code
Ann. Chapter 101.
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appeals on a de novo basis).
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be
dismissed.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.