dismissed L-1A Case: Motion Picture

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PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Deparlmenl of Homeland Security 
 I 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
-- 
File: WAC 07 245 50125 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: YUL 0 7 2008 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1 lOl(a)(lS)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
2 ? 
-- - --.- --- - A 
C-- - 
Robert P. Wiernann, Ckef 
Administrative ~p~eals Office 
WAC 07 245 50125 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary in a new office in the United 
States as an L-1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a limited liability 
company organized under the laws of the State of Nevada, states that it is in the motion picture business. 
The director denied the petition on September 7, 2007, concluding that the petitioner did not establish the 
following three requirements: (1) that a qualifying relationship exists between the foreign company and the 
United States entity; (2) that sufficient physical premises to house the new office have been secured; and, (3) that 
the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the intended United States operation, within one year of the approval of 
the petition, will support an executive or managerial position. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal on October 1, 2007. On appeal, counsel asserts that the director 
did not give the petitioner the opportunity to satisfy its concerns by sending a Request for Evidence or a 
Notice of Intent to Deny. In addition, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the foreign company and the United 
States company are affiliates since the same two individuals have the same form of ownership of the U.S. 
company and the foreign company. Counsel for the petitioner further states that sufficient physical premises 
have been secured as the petitioner maintains an office within a separate company's office space, and the 
office space is not a private residence. Counsel for the petitioner also asserts that the petitioner submitted 
sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive capacity within 
one year of the approval of the petition. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
WAC 07 245 50125 
Page 3 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hirnlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
In addition, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(~) states that if the petition indicates that the beneficiary is 
coming to the United States as a manager or executive to open or to be employed in a new office, the 
petitioner shall submit evidence that: 
(A) 
 Sufficient physical premises to house the new office have been 
secured; 
(B) 
 The beneficiary has been employed for one continuous year in the 
three year period preceding the filing of the petition in an executive 
or managerial capacity and that the proposed employment involved 
executive or managerial authority over the new operation; and 
(C) The intended United States operation, within one year of the 
approval of the petition, will support an executive or managerial 
position as defined in paragraphs (l)(l)(ii)(B) or (C) of this section, 
supported by information regarding: 
(I) 
 The proposed nature of the office describing the scope of the 
entity, its organizational structure, and its financial goals; 
(2) 
 The size of the United States investment and the financial 
ability of the foreign entity to remunerate the beneficiary and 
to commence doing business in the United States; and 
(3) 
 The organizational structure of the foreign entity. 
As a preliminary matter, counsel for the petitioner contends that the director did not provide the petitioner 
with an opportunity to address the director's concerns through a Request for Evidence or a Notice of Intent to 
Deny. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 103.2(b)(8) clearly states that a petition shall be denied "[ilf there is 
evidence of ineligibility in the record." The regulation does not state that the evidence of ineligibility must be 
irrefutable. Where evidence of record indicates that a basic element of eligibility has not been met, it is 
appropriate for the director to deny the petition without a request for evidence. If the petitioner has rebuttal 
evidence, the adminish-ative process provides for a motion to reopen, motion to reconsider, or an appeal as a 
WAC 07 245 50125 
Page 4 
forum for that new evidence. In the present case, the evidence indicated that the petitioner did not establish 
that a qualifying relationship exists between the foreign company and the United States entity. Accordingly, 
the denial was appropriate, even though the petitioner might have had evidence or argument to rebut the 
finding. 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether a qualifying relationship exists between the foreign company and 
the United States entity. To establish a "qualifying relationship" under the Act and the regulations, the 
petitioner must show that the beneficiary's foreign employer and the proposed U.S. employer is the same 
employer (i.e. one entity with "branch" offices), or related as a "parent and subsidiary" or as "affiliates." See 
generally section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1). 
The regulations at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) state: 
Qualzfiing organization means a United States or foreign firm, corporation, or other legal 
entity which: 
(1) 
 Meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the 
definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section; 
(2) 
 Is or will be doing business (engaging in international trade 
is not required) as an employer in the United States and in at least 
one other country directly or through a parent, branch, affiliate, or 
subsidiary for the duration of the alien's stay in the United States as 
an intracompany transferee; and 
(3) 
 Otherwise meets the requirements of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Act. 
The regulations at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(H) state: 
Doing business means the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or 
services by a qualifying organization and does not include the mere presence of an agent or 
office of the qualifying organization in the United States and abroad. 
In this matter, the petitioner claims to be an affiliate of the foreign employer. The petitioner claims that both 
it and the foreign employer are owned and controlled by the same two individuals, and - 
:. However, as evidence that the ' purchased their interests in the petitioner, counsel submits 
documents which indicate that both members paid $100.00 for their respective interests. The record also 
indicates that the petitioner's primary funding source was not the foreign employer or its stockholders. 
Instead, most of the petitioner's funding originated with third parties such as a Hong Kong company called 
Audience Alliance Motion Picture Studios Limited and two Wyoming limited liability companies. The 
record is devoid of evidence establishing that either the Hong Kong company or the Wyoming limited 
WAC 07 245 50125 
Page 5 
liability companies are qualifying organizations. 
 It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where 
the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591 -92. 
While the funding of the petitioner and its enterprise by third parties is not alone disqualifying, it calls into 
question whether the petitioner is truly controlled by the two members of the limited liability company or, 
whether, control has been ceded to the various entities providing funds. It must be emphasized that the 
burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the 
Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1361. Absent full disclosure of the conditions related to the funding of the petitioner by third 
parties, it is impossible for CIS to discern the exact control of the petitioner, and the petition will not be 
approved. 
In addition, the petitioner submitted an operating agreement for the U.S. company. The operating agreement 
lists as the only member of the limited liability company and as the member who owns 100 
percent interest in the company. 
 On appeal, the petitio 
 one-page document entitled, 
"Admission of New Member," signed by and 
 on July 15, 2007, stating that 
contributed $100.00 and is admitted as a full member of the company. In reviewing the 
operating agreement for the U.S. company, under section VII. General Provisions, the agreement states that, 
"a list of the names and addresses of the current membership of the LLC also shall be maintained at this 
address, with notations on any transfers of members' interests to nonmember or persons being admitted into 
membership in the LLC." However, the petitioner did not provide this documentation with the petition. 
Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofzci, 22 I&N Dec. 15 8, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter 
of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for purposes 
of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see also 
Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 
(Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the direct or indirect legal right of 
possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to control; control means the direct or 
indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, and operations of an entity. Matter 
of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. The petitioner has not submitted evidence on 
appeal to overcome the director's determination on this issue. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Furthermore, because 
 owns half of the parent company, the record does not establish that the 
parent company is still doing business abroad and still maintains a qualifying relationship with the U.S. entity 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 4 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(G). The petitioner did not provide evidence that the parent company is 
still operating since-, the part owner, is currently in the United States. 
The second issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has secured sufficient physical premises to house 
the new office in the United States as required under the regulations 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(~). 
WAC 07 245 50125 
Page 6 
At the time of filing the petition, the petitioner submitted a lease agreement for office space, dated August 8, 
2007. The lease agreement states that the office space is part of a larger office building. Under Section 1 of 
the agreement, the use of the premise leased by the petitioner "shall consist of office space number(s) Suite 
200 having a maximum occupancy capacity of one (1) person(s)." Section 2 of the lease agreement states that 
the premise shall be used for "film production, marketing, distribution and such other use as is normally 
incident thereto and for no other purpose.. . ." 
In the denial decision, the director stated that the petitioner did not provide evidence that it secured sufficient 
physical premises since "it appears that the premises will be used as a home-based office." The AAO 
disagrees with the director on this point as the lease submitted by the petitioner stated that the leased office 
space shall be used for "film production, marketing, distribution and such other use as is normally incident 
thereto and for no other purpose. . . . " The AAO withdraws the director's statement that the secured physical 
premises is a home-based office. 
However, the appeal will not be approved since the petitioner did not establish that it secured sufficient 
physical premises because the agreement stated that the leased office space has a maximum occupancy 
capacity of one individual. The petitioner did not submit documentation of the space it requires to start the 
new office, however, the petitioner stated that it filed four L-1A visa petitions, thus, the petitioner wishes to 
employ at least four individuals. An office space for one individual is not sufficient physical premises for the 
business if the petitioner wishes to employ at least four individuals. Based on the insufficiency of the 
information furnished, it cannot be concluded that the petitioner had secured sufficient space to house the new 
office. For this additional reason, the appeal is dismissed. 
The third issue to be addressed in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary 
would be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity within one year of the approval of the 
petition, as required by 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C). 
The term "managerial capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily- 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department or 
subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to hire 
and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as promotion and leave 
authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, functions at a senior level within 
the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for which the 
employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be acting in a managerial capacity 
WAC 07 245 50125 
Page 7 
merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory duties unless the employees supervised are 
professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1 10l(a)(44)(B), provides: 
The term "executive capacity" means an assignment within an organization in which the employee 
primarily- 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-malung; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
When a new business is established and commences operations, the regulations recognize that a designated 
manager or executive responsible for setting up operations will be engaged in a variety of activities not 
normally performed by employees at the executive or managerial level and that often the full range of 
managerial responsibility cannot be performed. In order to qualify for L-1 nonimmigrant classification during 
the first year of operations, the regulations require the petitioner to disclose the business plans and the size of 
the United States investment, and thereby establish that the proposed enterprise will support an executive or 
managerial position within one year of the approval of the petition. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C). This 
evidence should demonstrate a realistic expectation that the enterprise will succeed and rapidly expand as it 
moves away from the developmental stage to full operations, where there would be an actual need for a 
manager or executive who will primarily perform qualifying duties. 
The nonimmigrant petition was filed on August 16, 2007. The Form 1-129 indicates that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the position of director of marketing and communications. The petitioner submitted a position 
description that described the duties to be performed by the beneficiary as the following: 
The role is responsible for the development and implementation of the global Marketing and 
Communications strategy, which includes Global Brand Management; design and creation of 
Premium Entertainment Properties for Web/TV/Film; Marketing Support and Merchandising for 
each of the featured films released by Audience Alliance; Strategic Alliances with other major 
global and US brands; Public Relations and Advertising functions; active Web Community of 
several millions of unique individuals. 
In addition, on appeal, the petitioner explained that the organizational structure of the U.S. company will be the 
President and CEO, the director of marketing and communications and the Chief Creative Officer, "all of whom 
report independently to the petitioner's Board." 
WAC 07 245 50125 
Page 8 
The director denied the petition on October 6,2007, concluding that the submitted evidence is not persuasive 
in establishing that the beneficiary's proposed position is in a capacity that is managerial or executive in 
nature. The director noted that the petitioner did not establish the employer's business activities in order to 
provide a clear understanding of the products and services that are provided by the employer and how the 
beneficiary's position fits into its organizational hierarchy. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary's proposed position will be an "essential role 
in the management and ongoing operations of the petitioner." Counsel further states that the beneficiary's 
position will not be managerial but rather an executive level position. Counsel also states that the 
beneficiary's only supervisor will be the petitioner's Board and thus he will have "almost complete discretion 
in establishing the goals and policies of the marketing and communications department and will have nearly 
exclusive discretionary decision-making in relation to its operations." 
Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. Upon review of the petition and evidence, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. When examining 
the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the petitioner's description 
of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job duties must clearly 
describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are either in an 
executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the petitioner 
must prove that the beneficiary primarily perfoms these specified responsibilities and does not spend a 
majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 
1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). 
Based on the current record, the AAO is unable to determine whether the claimed managerial duties constitute 
the majority of the beneficiary's duties, or whether the beneficiary primarily performs non-managerial, 
administrative, or operational duties. 
On review, the petitioner provided a vague and nonspecific description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to 
demonstrate what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states vague duties 
such as the beneficiary will be responsible for the "development and implementation of the global Marketing 
and Communications strategy." The petitioner did not, however, define the petitioner's goals and policies, or 
clarify the role of the marketing and communications department and the subordinates in the department that 
the beneficiary will supervise. Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business 
objectives is not sufficient; the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. 
The petitioner has failed to provide any detail or explanation of the beneficiary's activities in the course of her 
daily routine. The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., 
Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1108. The petitioner's descriptions of the beneficiary's position do not identi@ 
the actual duties to be performed, such that they could be classified as managerial or executive in nature. 
WAC 07 245 50125 
Page 9 
The job description also includes several non-qualifying duties such as the beneficiary will be responsible for 
the "design and creation of Premium Entertainment Properties for Web/TV/Finn," the "marketing support and 
merchandising," and "public relations and advertising functions." It appears that the beneficiary will be 
developing and marketing the services of the business rather then directing such activities through subordinate 
employees. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide 
services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 
101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or 
executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Intn 'I., 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
According to the proposed U.S. organizational structure explained on appeal, it does not appear that the U.S. 
company plans to hire a marketing and communications manager or marketing associates to develop and 
manage the marketing and communications operations for a company that plans to produce several movies. 
Thus, it appears that the beneficiary will be developing and implementing the marketing and communication 
functions and, rather then supervising the work prepared by subordinate employees. The lack of employees 
for the beneficiary to direct and coordinate raises questions as to whether the beneficiary will be managing 
these activities or actually performing the petitioner's marketing and communication duties. Thus, it appears 
the beneficiary will spend a majority of his time perfoming non-managerial duties associated with marketing 
and communication functions. 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction fi-om higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided for the 
beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary would do on a day-to-day basis. 
Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary would be employed primarily in an executive 
capacity. 
Furthermore, as contemplated by the regulations, a comprehensive business plan should contain, gt a 
minimum, a description of the business, its products andlor services, and its objectives. See Matter of Ho, 22 
I&N Dec. 206, 213 (Assoc. Comm. 1998). Although the precedent relates to the regulatory requirements for 
the alien entrepreneur immigrant visa classification, Matter of Ho is instructive as to the contents of an 
acceptable business plan: 
WAC 07 245 50125 
Page 10 
The plan should contain a market analysis, including the names of competing businesses and 
their relative strengths and weaknesses, a comparison of the competition's products and 
pricing structures, and a description of the target market/prospective customers of the new 
commercial enterprise. The plan should list the required permits and licenses obtained. If 
applicable, it should describe the manufacturing or production process, the materials required, 
and thk supply sources. The plan should detail any contracts executed for the supply of 
materials and/or the distribution of products. It should discuss the marketing strategy of the 
business, including pricing, advertising, and servicing. The plan should set forth the 
business's organizational structure and its personnel's experience. It should explain the 
business's staffing requirements and contain a timetable for hiring, as well as job descriptions 
for all positions. It should contain sales, cost, and income projections and detail the bases 
therefore. Most importantly, the business plan must be credible. 
Id. 
In the petitioner's support letter, dated August 13, 2007, the petitioner states that the first three films it will 
produce will start production in 2007 and "at least five film products commencements are expected in 2008." 
The petitioner also stated that the petitioner holds the intellectual property right for approximately $15 million 
of film projects and "new projects (film concepts, popular books, treatments, and screenplays) are being 
added regularly." The petitioner did not submit a business plan that outlines how the U.S. entity will reach 
the listed goals and plans and if it is financially feasible to do so. Moreover, the petitioner did not submit any 
documentation of agreements or contracts indicating that the petitioner will start production of movies or the 
projects planned for the first year of operation. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is 
not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N 
Dec. at 165. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the record as presently constituted is not persuasive in demonstrating that 
the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily managerial or executive position. The petitioner did not 
submit a description of the job duties performed by the beneficiary when employed abroad. The petitioner 
also did not describe the supervisory structure of the beneficiary's subordinate workers, or specifically 
describe the day-to-day duties of the subordinate workers, or submit a breakdown of the beneficiary's duties, 
which describes how much time the beneficiary devoted to each of his ascribed duties. For this additional 
reason, the petition will not be approved. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the 
AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afjd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
WAC 07 245 50125 
Page 11 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
Finally, on appeal, counsel for the petitioner indicated that the petitioner filed four L-1A visa applications and 
"all four petitions were initially supported by identical evidence." Counsel explains that the only difference 
between the four petitions is the beneficiaries and their proposed positions. Counsel further states that two of 
the petitions were approved by the California Service Center. If the previous nonimmigrant petitions were 
approved based on the same unsupported and contradictory assertions that are contained in the current record, 
the approval would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. The AAO is not required to 
approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been demonstrated, merely because of prior 
approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 
593, 597 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency must treat acknowledged 
errors as binding precedent. Sussex Engg. Ltd. v. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084, 1090 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Furthermore, the AAO's authority over the service centers is comparable to the relationship between a court 
of appeals and a district court. Even if a service center director had approved the nonimmigrant petitions on 
behalf of the beneficiary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory decision of a service 
center. Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E.D. La.), afd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 51 (2001). 
Under CIS regulations, the approval of an L-1A petition may be revoked on notice under six specific 
circumstances. 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(9)(iii)(A). To properly revoke the approval of a petition, the director must 
issue a notice of intent to revoke that contains a detailed statement of the grounds for the revocation and the 
time period allowed for rebuttal. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(9)(iii)(B). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.