dismissed L-1A Case: Real Estate And Trade

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenshiv and Immimation Services 
id&ifying data deleted to 
OAice Washington, of ddm~iistrcltive DC 20529-2090 ~pbeals, MS 2090 
prevent clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy 
 U. S. Citizenship and Immigration 
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File: Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: SE P 0 3 2009 
SRC 95 257 50913 
IN RE: 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 3 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 9 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
cting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, initially approved the nonimmigrant petition on 
September 28, 1995, but subsequently revoked the petition's approval. The matter is now before the 
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-IA nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 
U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L). The petitioner, a Texas corporation engaged in real estate investment and import 
and export activities, claims to be an affiliate of PAL Fashions, a sole proprietorship located in Leicester, 
United Kingdom. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its president for a period of three years. 
The director initially approved the petition in September 1995, but revoked the approval on November 8, 
2002, based on the two separate grounds, determining: (1) that the petitioner failed to maintain a qualifying 
relationship with a foreign entity as of 1996, and that the beneficiary had no intent to maintain such 
relationship with the foreign entity upon his transfer to the United States; and (2) the beneficiary "willfully 
misrepresented facts regarding himself, his sister and the companies involved" in the petition. In the Notice 
of Intent to Revoke issued on September 24, 2002, the director advised that the petitioner that "this proposed 
revocation is based upon evidence provided by, sister of the alien beneficiary, in an in-depth 
interview with an immigration inspector when she attempted to enter the country in July of 1999." 
The petitioner subsequently filed a timely appeal on November 25, 2002, which is now before the AAO.' A 
review of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) records indicates that the beneficiary in this 
matter is also the beneficiary of an approved employment-based immigrant visa petition filed by the 
petitioning company. The beneficiary adjusted status to that of a U.S. permanent resident as of December 12, 
1996. While the petitioner has not withdrawn the appeal in this proceeding, it would appear that the 
beneficiary is presently a lawful permanent resident and the issues in this proceeding are moot. Therefore, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
Although the appeal will be dismissed, the AAO will briefly address the issues raised by counsel. Counsel for 
the petitioner argues that the beneficiary entered the United States with the intent of continuing the operations 
of his sole proprietorship in the United Kingdom. Counsel further emphasizes that the petitioner submitted 
evidence to establish that the foreign entity was actively doing business at the time the beneficiary was 
granted L-1A status. Citing to Matter of Chartier, 16 I&N Dec. 284 (BIA 1977) and Matter of Thompson, 18 
I&N Dec. 169, (Cornm. 198 1 ), counsel contends that "just because [the beneficiary's] affiliate company 
closed does not mean his status as a nonimmigrant alien worker should be terminated." 
Counsel's reliance on Matter of Chartier, 16 I &N Dec. 284 (BIA 1977) and Matter of Thompson, 18 I&N 
Dec. 169, (Comm. 198 I), is misplaced. The beneficiary in Chartier had been employed directly by the United 
States petitioner in Canada and had a position abroad to which he could be transferred after his temporary 
assignment in the United States. The petitioner also had a qualifying affiliate company in Belgium and 
therefore was doing business in the United States and in at least one other country. The petitioner in that 
' The director forwarded the appeal to the AAO more than six years after it was filed. There is no explanation 
in the record for the indefensible delay. The regulations at 8 C.F.R. $9 103.3(a)(2)(iii) and (iv) allow the 
director 45 days from receipt to review the appeal and then the appeal must be "promptly" forwarded to the 
AAO. If there are problematic issues related to the appeal that prevent its prompt processing, the director is 
urged to contact the AAO to discuss the available options. 
matter would meet the current regulatory definition of a qualifying organization, although the case itself pre- 
dates the current regulations defining that term. 
Counsel's reliance on Matter of Thompson is also not persuasive. The Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS, now USCIS) found the decision in Thompson to be an inappropriate application of the holding in 
Matter of Chartier, and overturned that decision by regulation. 52 Fed. Reg. 5741 (Feb. 26, 1987). The final 
rule defining qualifying organizations is set forth at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G). 
The petitioner in this matter, based on the evidence of record, no longer has a qualifying relationship with any 
foreign entity, nor is it doing business directly or through a branch, parent, affiliate or subsidiary outside of 
the United States. Thus, as of 1996, the petitioner no longer meets the definition of a qualifying organization. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(9)(iii)(A)(l) provides for the revocation of a petition if one or more 
entities are no longer qualifying organizations, as that term is defined at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G). The fact 
that the beneficiary may have intended that the foreign entity remain operational is irrelevant. The AAO finds 
that the petition was properly revoked on these grounds. 
Counsel bher asserts on appeal that the director erred by basing its decision, in part, on statements made by 
the beneficiary's sister, 
 when "there is no correlation between 
 interview in 1999 
and [the beneficiary's] entry into the United States as an intracompany transferee in 1995." Counsel objects to 
the director's conclusion that the beneficiary misrepresented facts regarding himself, his sister, or the 
companies involved. 
Upon review, the AAO concurs with counsel that the director did not adequately support his finding that the 
beneficiary had willfully misrepresented facts in connection with the instant L-1A visa petition filed in 1995. 
The beneficiary's sister was not questioned regarding the petitioning company or the circumstances under 
which the beneficiary was admitted to the United States in L-1A status, nor did she volunteer any information 
in this regard. Rather, she was interviewed regarding her own eligibility for L-1A classification with respect 
to a separate petition filed by a different U.S. petitioner. While the beneficiary's sister's responses suggest that 
the beneficiary may have encouraged his sister to seek an L-1A visa when she was not in fact entitled to such 
status, that matter is unrelated to the instant petition, and does not provide either a proper basis for revocation, 
or a legitimate basis for entry of a finding of willhl misrepresentation on the part of the beneficiary in 
connection with the instant L-1A petition. The director did not point to any specific or material 
misrepresentation of fact in connection with the beneficiary's L-1 A petition that would warrant revocation of 
the approval. 
Revocation of the petition approval cannot be based upon the serious allegations of the director without 
evidence offered in support of those conclusions. Just as the unproven assertions of counsel are not evidence, 
neither are the unsupported conclusions of the director. CJ: Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 note 
(BIA 1988); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 (BIA 1980). 
The petition approval may not be revoked on inferences or conclusions that are not supported by the record. 
Observations contained in an investigative report that are conclusory, speculative, equivocal, or irrelevant do 
not provide good and sufficient cause for the issuance of a notice of intent to revoke the approval of a visa 
petition and cannot serve as the basis for revocation. Matter of Arias, 19 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 1988). 
Accordingly, the MO will withdraw the director's decision, in part, as it relates to a finding of willful 
misrepresentation on the part of the beneficiary. 
ORDER: 
 The appeal is dismissed as moot.