dismissed L-1A

dismissed L-1A Case: Shipping

📅 Date unknown 👤 Company 📂 Shipping

Decision Summary

The appeal was dismissed because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary would be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The director determined that based on the proposed duties, and the fact the beneficiary would have no subordinate employees, the beneficiary would be performing non-qualifying operational tasks rather than primarily managerial or executive functions.

Criteria Discussed

Managerial Capacity Executive Capacity Employment Abroad New Office Requirements

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preve.ntclearlyunwarranted.
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PUQLICCOpy.·.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave ., N.W., Rm. A3000
Washington, DC 20529
U.S.Citizenship
and Immigration .
Services ·
FILE: SRC 05 16950627 . Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: HAR e1 2007
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
-.
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L} of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(15)(L)
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
. INSTRUCTIONS:
. .
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeal s Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office
that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made t~ that office.
--- ~ ----- . . ,_ ..__.
-=- ".........-:- .
RobefrP:-Wiemann, Chief
Administrative Appeals Office
\ .
www.uscis.gov
SRC 05 169 50627
Page 2
DISCUSSION: The Director , Texas .Service Center , denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1A nonimmigrant
intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8
U.S.c. § 1101(a)(l5)(L) . The petitioner, a New Jersey corporation, claims to be ' the subsidiary of Zai Cargo
E.U., located in Cali, Colombia. The petitioner claims to bea shipping company and seeks to employ the ,
, beneficiary as Zone Director.
The director denied the pet ition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that (1) the beneficiary will be
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity ; or(2) the beneficiary had been
employed abroad in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.
, '
The petitioner filed an 'appeal in response to the denial. On appeal , counsel for the petitioner alleges that the
director's decision was erroneous , and submits a detailed .statement in support of this contention.
To establish eligibility for the L-l nonimmigrant visa classification , the petit ioner must meet the criteria '
outlined in section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executi ve capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one
continuous year within three years preceding the ,beneficiary ' s application for admission into the United
, States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial , executive, or
specialized knowledge capacity .
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) provides that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be
accompanied by:
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(l)(ii)(G)of this section.
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial , or specialized
knowledge capacity, including a detailed descriptionof the services to be performed.
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment abroad
. with a qualifying organization within the threeyears preceding the filing of the petition.
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was
managerial, 'executive, or invol ved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior
education, training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended services
in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work
which the alien performed abroad.
"C 05 16950627
rage 3
In addition, the regulation at 8C.F.R. § 2l4.2(1)(3)(v) provides that, if the petition indicates that the beneficiary is
coming to the United States as a manager or executive to open or to be employed in a new office in the United
States, the petitioner shall submit evidence that:
(A) Sufficient physical premises to house the ?ew office have been secured;
(B) The beneficiary has been employed for one continuous year in the three year
period preceding the filing of the petition in an executive or managerial capacity
and that the proposed employment involved executive or managerial authority
over the new operation; and
(C) The intended United States operation, within one year of the approval of the
petition, will support an executive or managerial position as defined in
paragraphs (l)(l)(ii)(B)or (C) of this section, supported by information
regarding:
(1) The proposed nature of the office describing the scope of the entity, its
organizational structure, and its financial goals;
(2) The sizeof the United States investment and the financial ability of the
foreign entity to remunerate the beneficiary and to commence doing
business in the United States; and
(3) The organizational structure of the foreign entity.
The first issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a primarily
managerial or executive capacity.
(
Section lOl(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of
the organization;
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department
or subdivision of the organization; .
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to .
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised,
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the
function managed; and
SRC 05 169 50627
Page 4
(iv) exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory
duties unless the employees supervised areprofessional.
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act , 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
directs the management of the organization .or a major component or function of the
organization;
establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component , or function;
exercises'wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and
receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board
of directors, or stockholders ofthe organization. .
In a letter dated May 25, 2005, counsel for the petitioner provided thefollowing overview of the beneficiary's
proposed duties in the United States:
[The beneficiary's] experience at [the foreign entity] makes [him] exceptionally
well-qualified for the 'position of Zone Director that we are offering him. As the Zone
Director in North .Carolina , [the beneficiary] will manage the territory covering .North and
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia . He will be responsible for managing all operations
and activities in this zone. His duties in the United States will be almost identical to the work, .
he has fulfilled in Colombia, including managing the financing and resources function related
to processing all paperwork and records to release and transport cargo, such as payment of all
fees and taxes required ; coordinating and directing logistics to prepare and distribute cargo
within the United States and internationally; ensuring proper delivery of cargo of Colombia
and other international destinations ; and management of human resource functions in this
zone. Additionally, he will direct and develop logistical and management systems and will
be involved with -marketing and developing new contracts for our company. He will report
directly to the company president.
On June 7, 2005, the director requested additional evidence pertammg to the beneficiary's proposed
employment in the United States . : Specifically, an organizational chart outlining the U.S. hierarchy was
requested, as well as more details pertaining to the beneficiary 's position as well as the positions of his
subordinates. In a response dated August 29, 2005, the petitioner clarified that the beneficiary 's proposed
duties would be identical to those he performed in Colombia. Specifically, the petitioner stated:
SRC 05 16950627
Page 5
[The beneficiary's] duties are as follows: establish , formulate, and approve policies and
programs; determine and create positions in the regional offices and analyze employee wages,
promotions, and profiles , with complete authority to hire, terminate , and promote employees
in this department ; represent [the foreign entity] and delegate outsidecounsel/attorneys to act
on behalf of the company in negotiations of contracts and other executive functions; keep
informed about customs and tax laws and regulations and changes in the laws ; analyze the
market to study and determine potential customers, sales volumes! concurrence, capture, arid
retention of new customers; prepare and submit monthly status reports directly to the
company president.
(
The petitioner further indicated that despite having a number of offices throughout the United States , the
beneficiary would have no co-workers or subordinate employees at hisylace of duty.
The director denied the petition on September 13 , 2005. Specifically , the director determined that based on
the description of the beneficiary's duties contained in the record , it appeared that the beneficiary would
perform more non-qualifying duties than actual managerial duties. The director specifically noted that the
proposed organizational structure of the U.S . entity, with no other employees , did not support the premi se that
the beneficiary would enter employment with the Unit.ed States entity in a primarily managerial or executive
capacity.
The AAO concurs with the director 's determination . First, the description of the beneficiary 's duties, as
provided in the initial petition and which was not supplemented in the response to the request for evidence , is
extremely broad : Reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is .
.. not sufficient ; the regulations require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The
petitioner has failed to . answer a critical question in this case: What will the beneficiary primarily do on a
daily basis? The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd..
v. Sava, 724 F.,Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d41 (2d. Cir. 1990).
Although some specifics are fisted, the petitioner identifies numerous duties for the beneficiary that are not
traditionally managerial or executive. The petitioner lists the beneficiary's duties as including both
managerial and administrative or operational tasks, but fails to quantify the time the beneficiary spends on
each. This failure of documentation is important because several of the beneficiary's daily tasks, such as
"analyze the market " and "prepare and submit monthly status reports ," do not fall directly under traditional
managerial duties as defined in the statute . Specifically, these duties identify crucial tasks that are necessary
for the petitioner to promote .and provide its products and services. An employee who primarily performs the
tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be employed in a managerial
or executive capacity. See -Matter of Churcli Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988).
Without a breakdown of the percentage of time the beneficiary will devote to each of his duties , the AAO
cannot determine whether the beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of a function manager. See IKEA
US, Inc. v. u.s. Dept. ofJustice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D .D.C. 1999).
A managerial employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a
first-line supervisor , unless the supervised employees are professionals. See Marter ofChurch Scientology
j
SRC 05 169 50627
Page 6
International, 19 :I&N Dec. at 604.
beneficiary.
In this matter, however, there are no employee~ other than the.,
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director 's decision on this issue was erroneous and that the record contains
ample information to establish the beneficiary 's qualifications . In addition, counsel asserts that despite the
director's findings, the beneficiary will In fact oversee an accountant, and will eventually oversee a
warehouse manager who will be hired after the approval of the petition on behalf of the beneficiary. Counsel
further contends that despite the director's findings, there are in fact other employees working for the
petitioner at the other United States offices. Counsel further claims that the U.S . petitioner should be treated
. as a new office as this is the petitioner's newest worksite in the United States. The AAO disagrees.
There are two major problems with counsel's arguments. First, although the petitioner claims for the first
time on appeal that the petitioner should be treated asa new office, it is evident that , based on the petitioner 's
claim on Form 1-129 that it has been operating its shipping business since 1996 , this is not the case .
Therefore , the staffing levels of the office in which the beneficiary will work are particularly relevant for
purposes of this matter. As required by section 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, if staffing levels are,used as a factor
in determining whether an individual is acting in a ' managerial or executive capacity, Citizenship and
Immigration Services (CIS) must take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in light of the
overall purpose and stage of development of the organization..
At the time of filing, the petitioner was allegedly a 9-year-old shipping company that claimed to have a gross
annual income of $1,143,IS( Thepetitioner further claimed that it employed 30 persons throughout the
United States. With regard to the proposed work location of the beneficiary, however, the firm employed no
other persons on site. In addition to the fact that the petitioner's comprehensive organizational chart for
locations in the United States is vague and omits the names of its alleged 'employees, the fact remains that no
other employees have been designated as permanent workers in the North Carolina office in which the
. petitioner intends to transfer the beneficiary. As the petitioner clearly indicated that the beneficiary was not
coming to the United States to open a new office, this skeletal structure at the beneficiary's proposed duty
station does n~t appear to meet the reasonable needs of an established corporation able to support a primarily
managerial or executive position at that location . The petitioner did not submit evidence that it employed any
subordinate staff members who would perform the actual day-to-day, non-managerial operations of the
company. Based on the petitioner's representations , i t does not. appear that the reasonable needs . of the
petitioning company in that region might plausibly be met by the services of the beneficiary alone .
Regardless, the reasonable needs of the petitioner serve only as a factor in evaluating the lack of staff in the
context of reviewing the claimed managerial or executive duties. The petitioner must still establish that the
beneficiary is to be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executi ve capacity, pursuant to
sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) or the Act. As discussed above , the petitioner has not established this
essential element of eligibility.
I
No evidence to overcome the director 's specific basis for the denial is submitted on appeal , nor are any
additional arguments in Support of the beneficiary 's qualifications submitted. Counsel merely claims' that 'by
virtue of the beneficiary 's position and his vast experience abroad , he is qualified for the benefit sought.
Going on record without supporting documentary e vidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the
SRC 05 169 50627
Page 7
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter ofSoffici , 22 I&N Dec. 158 , 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter
of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec: 190 (Reg . Comm. 1972)). In addition, without documentary
evidence to support the claim; the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. The
unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 , 534
(BIA 1988); Matter ofLaureano , 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter ofRamirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,
506 (BIA 1980). '
. The director determined that the petitioner lacked the organizational complexity to support the beneficiary .in
a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Specifically, the director noted that absent evidence to the
contrary, the beneficiary would be required to perform all administrative, clerical , and non-qualifying duties
based on the nature ·of the business and the lack of other staff members. While the petitioner claims that a
warehouse manager will eventually be hired to assist the beneficiary, a visa petition may not be approved. ,
based on speculation of future eligibility or after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new
set of facts. See Matter ofMichelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978); Matter ofKatigbak, ·14
I&N Dec. 45 , 49 (Comm. 1971) . The petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the
nonimmigrant vi sa petition, which has not been establi shed here. For this reason, the petition may not be
.approved. .
The second issue in this matter is whether the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily managerial or
executive capacity.
In a letter dated May 25 , 2005, counsel for .the petitioner discussed the nature of the beneficiary's
employment abroad. Specifically, counsel explained that the beneficiary had been hired by the foreign entity
in October 2002 as a Zone Coordinator. With regard to his duties, counsel stated:
[The beneficiary 's] duties include managing the daily operations of the offices in Colombia.
He has full responsibility for the financing and resources function.related to [processing] all
paperwork and records to release and transport cargo, including payment of all fees and taxes
required. Additionally , he coordinates and directs logistics to prepare and distribute cargo
nationally and across international lines and is responsible for communications with and
reporting US operations. [The beneficiary] also manages human resources functions . in
Colombia. Furthermore , he directs and develops logistical and management systems for [the
foreign entity]. .
. \
On June 7, 2005 , the director requested additional evidence pertaining to the beneficiary's employment
abroad. Specifically , the director requested a more detailed description of the exact nature of the
beneficiary's duties, in addition to an organizational chart outlining the petitioner 's hierarchy abroad. Finally ,
details pertaining to the beneficiary 's subordinates,and the nature of their positions were also requested. Ina
response dated August 29 , 2005, the petitioner clarified that the beneficiary's proposed duties would be
identical to those he performed in Colombia , and provided the following description (which was first noted
above but repeated her for simplicity):
SRC 05 169 50627
Page 8
[The beneficiary 's] duties are as follows : establish, formulate , and approve policies and
programs; determine and create positions in the regional offices and analyze employee wages,
promotions, and profiles, with complete authority to hire, terminate, and promote employees
, I
in this department ; represent [the foreign entity] and delegate outside counsel/attorneys to act
on behalf of the company in negotiations of contracts and other execut ive functions; keep
informed about customs and tax laws and regulations and changes in the laws; analyze the
market to study and determine potential customers , sales volumes , concurrence, capture, and
retention of new customers; prepare and submit monthly status reports directly to the
company president.
The letter further outlined positions and duties of the beneficiary's subordinates in the foreign entity.
Specifically, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary oversaw the following : (1) Factory Manager/General
Coordinator; (2) Warehouse Chief; (3) Warehouse Assistant; (4) Secretary; (5) three full-time drivers; and (6)
one part-time employee who serves as a driver and warehouse assistant during the night shift as needed.
The director denied the petition on September 13, 2005. ' Specifically, the d irector determined that based oil
the description of the beneficiary 's duties contained inthe record, it appeared that the beneficiary would
perform more non-qualifying duties than actual manager ial duties.
Once again , the AAO concurs with the director 's determination. First , the description of the beneficiary 's
duties, as provided both in the initial petition and in the response to the request for e vidence, is extremely '
broad. As discussed above , reciting the beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or 'broadly-cast business
objectives is not sufficient because the regulations require a detailed description of the,beneficiary's daily job
duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive
or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the
regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., u« v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir.
1990).
The main problem, however, is that the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's tasks abroad focus on two
major areas: financing and distribution of cargo, and human resources. Neither of these area~ encompass tasks
that are exclusively or traditionally manageria.l or executive. Although the petitioner claims that , the
beneficiary oversees a staff of at least seven people , there is no explanation as to why the beneficiary is
required to focus primarily on these non-qualifying tasks. The petitioner fails to quantify the time the
beneficiary spends on other duties, such as superv ising subordinate staff members and directing the
organization. This failure of documentation is important because finance and human' resources are typically
areas not normally overseen by managerial or executive employees. In fact, these duties identify crucial tasks
that are necessary for the petitioner to promote and pro vide its products and services. An employee who
primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See Matter of Church Sci entology International, 19 I&N
Dec. 593 ,604 (Cornrn. 198.8). Without a breakdown of the percentage of time the beneficiary will devote to
each of his duties , the AAO cannot determine whether the beneficiary is primarily performing the duties of a
function manag~r. See IKEA US, Inc. v. Us. Dept. ofJustice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22 ; 24 (D.D.C. 1999).
)
SRC 05 169 50627
.Page 9
(
A managerial employee must have authority o ver day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a
first-line supervisor , unless the supervised employees areprofessionals. See Matter of Church Scientology
International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Although the beneficiary is not required to supervise personnel , if it is
claimed that his duties involve supervising employees, the petitioner must establish that the subordinate
employees are supervisory , professional, or managerial. See § lql(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. In this matter ,
while the petitioner claims that the beneficiary oversees all the employees identified in the response to the
request for evidence , it remains to be established that these employees are professional,supervisory, or
managerial in nature.
As requested by the director. .the petitioner explained that the subordinate employees had completed high
school but possessed no advanced degrees. Based on this evidence, it is apparent that the petitioner has not
established that these employees require an advanced degree to perform the duties of their positions, such that
they could be classified as professionals. Nor has the petitioner shown that any of these employees supervise
subordinate staff members or manage aclearly defined department or function of.the petitioner, such that they
could be classified as managers or supervisors : Although it is alleged that the warehouse chief oversees the
warehouse assistant , the exact nature of their rank and duties within the organ izational hierarchy are unclear.
Thus, the petitioner has not shown that the beneficiary's subordinate employees are supervisory , professional,
or managerial, as requiredby section 10I(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act.
As previously stated, counsel asserts on appeal that the record contains sufficient evidence to establish that
the beneficiary ' was employed in a qualifying position abroad. However , counsfl provides no independent
evidence to corroborate these claims , nor does she seek to explain why the beneficiary 's position abroad
required him to handle finance and human resource duties which fall outside the realm of traditional
managerial or executive duties.
The petitioner has failed to establish any 'clear distinctions between the proposed qualifying and
non-qualifying duties of the beneficiary. Specifically, the petitioner submitted no information to establish the
percentage of time the beneficiary actually performs .or will perform the Claimed managerial or executive
duties. , Although the record contends that a secretary is employed by the foreign entity , the petitioner still
alleges that t~e beneficiary performs the human resource functions. There is no mention in the record of any
additional administrative ·assistant who could relieve the beneficiary from this non-qualifying task.
Collectively, therefore, this brings into question how much of the beneficiary's t ime can actually be de voted to
managerial or executive dut ies.. As stated in the statute , the beneficiary mustbe primarily performing duties
that are managerial or execut ive. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) arid (B) of the Act. Furthermore , the petitioner
bears the burden of documenting what portion of the beneficiary's duties will be managerial or executive and
what proportion will be non-managerial or non-e xecutive. Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175 , 177
(D.C. Cir. 1991). Given the lack of these percentages , the record does not demonstrate that the beneficiary
will function primarily as a manager or executive .
As previously stated , no e vidence to overcome the director's specific basis for the denial is submitted on
appeal, nor are any additional arguments in support of the beneficiary 's qualifications submitted. Counsel
merely claims that by v irtue of the beneficiary's position. and his vast experience abroad, he is qualified for
the benefit sought. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes
SRC 05 169 50627
Page 10
of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 1&N Dec. at 165. In addition,
without documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's
burden of proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19
1&N Dec. at 534; Matter ofLaureano, 19 1&N Dec.' l ; Matter ofRamirez-Sanchez, 17 1&N Dec. at 506. For
this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.
Beyond the decision of the director, there is insufficient evidence in the record that a qualifying relationship
exists between the U.S. petitioner and the foreign entity. For example, on the petitioner's Form 1120, U.S.
Corporation Income Tax Return for 2004, the petitioner indicates that it has no foreign shareholders with
more than a 25% interest, and further indicates that it has no shareholders with more than a 50% interest in its
voting shares. This directly contradicts the petitioner's claim that it is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
foreign entity. In addition, the corporate documents pertaining to the U.S. petitioner are confusing. For
example, the Form 1-129 indicates thatthe petitioner has been in business since 1996. However, the record
contains articles of incorporation for the petitioner in the state of New Jersey (June 30, 2000), North Carolina
(November 21, 2002), and California (March 11, 2003). No ownership information has been submitted for
these entities. More importantly, it makes unclear the identity of the true petitioner in this matter, since all
three are separate corporate entities. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the
record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not
suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of
Ho, 19 1&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), aff'd. 345 F.3d 683
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that theAAO reviews
appeals on a de novo basis).
r
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 01361. Here, that burden has not been met:' Accordingly, the
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
L
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