dismissed L-1A Case: Technology Services

L 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rrn. A3000 
Wash~ngton, DC 20529 
PrnLIC WPY 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: SRC 06 013 52854 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: APR 0 3 2008 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1 101 (a)(l5)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
(123.b./ 
~o%ert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
I. 
SRC 06 013 52854 
. Page 2 
I 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as its chief executive 
officer as an L-1A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a limited liability 
company organized under the laws of the State of Georgia and is allegedly engaged in the business of 
technology services and equipment sales. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
 . 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that it is a "new 
office" as defined in the regulations and that the director erred by failing to apply the more lenient "new 
office" criteria found in 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(~). Counsel further argues that, because it meets those criteria 
 . 
applicable to "new offices," the petition should be approved. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have empIoyed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
SRC 06 013 52854 
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In addition, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(~) states that if the petition indicates that the beneficiary is 
coming to the United States as a manager or executive to open or to be employed in a "new office," the 
petitioner shall submit evidence that: 
(A) 
 Sufficient physical premises to house the new ofice have been secured; 
(B) 
 The beneficiary has been employed for one continuous year in the three 
year period preceding the filing of the petition in an executive or 
managerial capacity and that the proposed employment involved 
executive or managerial authority over the new operation; and 
(C) 
 The intended United States operation, within one year of the approval 
of the petition, will support an executive or managerial position as 
defined in paragraphs (l)(l)(ii)(B) or (C) of thls section, supported by 
. 
information regarding: 
(1) 
 The proposed nature of the office describing the scope of the 
entity, its organizational structure, and its financial goals; 
(2) 
 The size of the United States investment and the fmancial 
ability of the foreign entity to remunerate the beneficiary and 
to commence doing business in the United States; and 
(3) 
 The organizational structure of the foreign entity. 
A threshold issue in this matter is whether the petitioner is a "new office" for purposes of 8 C.F.R. 5 
214.2(1)(3) and, if so, whether the more lenient standards applicable to "new offices" should apply in this 
case. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(F) defines a "new office" as: 
[A]n organization which has been doing business in the United States through a parent, 
branch, affiliate, or subsidiary for less then one year. 
Moreover, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(H) defines "doing business" as: 
[Tlhe regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods andlor services by a qualifying 
organization and does not include the mere presence of an agent or office of the qualifying 
organization in the United States and abroad. 
In this matter, the petitioner asserts under penalty of perjury in the Form 1-129 that it was established in 1999, 
that it has three employees, and that it generates over $150,000.00 in gross revenue. The petitioner also 
indicated in the L Classification Supplement to Form 1-129 that the beneficiary is not coming to the United 
States to open a new office. The petitioner further asserts in a letter dated July 11, 2005 that it "was founded 
SRC 06 013 52854 
Page 4 
in 1999 and maintains its offices in Smyrna, GA." 
As indicated above, the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish-that the 
beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. By 
requiring the petitioner to establish that the beneficiary will be employed as a manager or executive 
immediately upon his arrival in the United States, the director did not apply the "new office" criteria in 8 
C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(~) and implicitly determined that the petitioner is not a "new office" as defined in the 
regulations. 
On appeal, counsel now asserts that the petitioner is a "new office" because it was organized as a limited 
liability company less than one year prior to the filing of the instant petition. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. It was not an error for the director to honor the 
petitioner's initial request to not apply the "new office" criteria found in 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(~). 
As indicated above, the petitioner initially claimed to- have been doing business in the United States since 
1999. While the petitioner apparently changed the form of its business organization from sole proprietorship 
to limited liability company less than one year prior to the filing of the instant petition, the petitioner had 
nevertheless represented itself in the instant petition as an established business entity and had indicated that 
the beneficiary was not coming to the United States to open a "new office." If the petitioner had wanted to be 
treated as a "new office," it should have made this request when it filed the instant petition. On appeal, the 
petitioner may not make material changes to a petition in an effort to make a deficient petition conform to 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) requirements. See Matter of Izummi, 22 I&N Dec. 169, 176 
(Assoc. Co-. 1998). ~ence, the director properly applied the criteria applicable to fully, formed business 
organizations and correctly required that the petitioner establish that the beneficiary will be employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity immediately upon his arrival in the United States. 
Therefore, in view of the above, the primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be 
employed by the United States entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another-employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
SRC 06 013 52854 
page 5 
function managed; and 
, (iv) . exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization' or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petitioner does not clarify whether the beneficiary is claiming to be primarily engaged in managerial 
duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 10 1(a)(44)(B) of 
the Act. A beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial 
sections of the two statutory definitions. If the petitioner is indeed representing the beneficiary as both an 
executive and a manager, it must establish that the beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set forth in the 
statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition for manager. 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's proposed job duties in the Form 1-129 and in a letter dated July 11, 
2005. As these descriptions are clearly delineated in the record, they will not be reproduced here. Generally, 
the beneficiary is described as defining product lines and distibution channels; creating a pricing strategy; 
and creating a promotions, marketing, and communications program. The also asserts in the Form 
1-129 that it employs three individuals. 
On October 22, 2005, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, an 
organizational chart for the United States entity, detailed job descriptions for each employee, tax returns, and 
wage reports. 
In response, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart showing the beneficiary reporting to the 
president of the petitioner. The beneficiary, however, is not shown to have any supervisory or managerial 
responsibilities over any existing employees. The positions shown to be subordinate to the beneficiary's 
position are vacant. The petitioner also submitted a job description for the president which indicates that this 
employee will allegedly direct and manage the organization. Fmally, the petitioner submitted a letter dated 
December 15, 2005 in which it indicates that the petitioner has no W-2 employees. The beneficiary will be 
the petitioner's first employee. 
SRC 06 013 52854 
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On February 1, 2006, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner did not 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. 
On appeal, counsel did not directly address the director's determination that the petitioner failed to establish 
that the beneficiary will be employed as an executive or manager. 
Upon review, the h0 concurs with the director's decision and will dismiss the appeal. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the proposed job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description 
of the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such 
duties are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. The petitioner must specifically state whether the 
beneficiary will be primarily employed in a managerial or executive capacity. As explained above, a 
petitioner cannot claim that some of the duties of the position entail executive responsibilities, while other 
duties are managerial. A beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely 
on partial sections of the two statutory definitions. 
The petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act 
in a "managerial" capacity. In support of its petition, the petitioner has provided a vague and nonspecific 
description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day 
basis. For example, the petitioner states generally that the beneficiary will define product lines and 
distribution channels; create a pricing strategy; and create a promotions, marketing, and communications 
program. However, the petitioner never defines its product, pricing, or marketing plans and never explains 
what, exactly, the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis to perform these many duties. The fact that the 
petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial title and has prepared a vague job description does not 
establish that the beneficiary will actually perform managerial duties. Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting 
the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. 
Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
 Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
Likewise, the petitioner did not provide a breakdown of how much time the beneficiary will devote to the 
many duties ascribed to him. This is particularly important in this matter because the duties listed by the 
petitioner appear to be non-qualifying administrative or operational tasks which do not rise to the level of 
being managerial or executive in nature when the tasks inherent to these duties are to be performed by the 
beneficiary. As the organizational chart and job descriptions fail to identify any existing employees who will 
relieve the beneficiary of the need to perform these non-qualifying tasks, it must be concluded that he will 
perform these tasks. -~n employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to 
provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See 
sections 1 0 1 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 
1988). 
SRC 06 013 52854 
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The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supdrvise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
As explained in the organizational chart and letter dated December 15,2005, the petitioner has no employees. 
The beneficiary will be its first W-2 employee, and the president, who also allegedly owns and controls the 
organization, will supervise the beneficiary. Therefore, as the beneficiary will have no supervisory or 
managerial responsibilities, the petitioner has not established that he will supervise or control other 
employees. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a 
managerial capacity.' 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual ,will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction fiom higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be acting primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided 
for the beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day 
1 
While the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization, 
the record nevertheless would not support ths position even if taken. The term "function manager" applies 
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is 
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 
101(a)(44)(A)(ii)' of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by, statute or regulation. If a 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written 
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the 
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the 'function, and establish the proportion of the 
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing 'the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In 
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary 
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has 
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job 
description fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be managerial functions, if 
any, and what proportion would be non-managerial. Also, as explained above, the record establishes that the 
beneficiary will primarily nonqualifying operational or administrative tasks. Absent a .clear and 
credible breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine 
what proportion of his .duties would be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will be 
primarily performing the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. 
Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
SRC 06 013 52854 
Page 8 
basis. Moreover, as explained above, the beneficiary will be performing the tasks necessary to produce a 
product or to provide a service. Finally, the job description for the "president" of the petitioner reveals that he 
will direct 'the organization and not the beneficiary. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
It is appropnate for Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) to consider the size of the petitioning 
company in conjunction with other relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of 
employees who would perform the non-managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell 
- 
 company" that does not conduct business in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g., Systronics Corp. v. 
INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). The size of a company may be especially relevant when CIS notes 
discrepancies in the record and fails to believe that the facts asserted are true. Id. In this case, the petition 
contains serious inconsistencies which undermine the credibility of the petition. For example, in the Form I- 
129, the petitioner asserts that it employs three persons and has gross revenue of over $150,000.00 and net 
income of over $100,000.00. However, the supporting documents provided in response to the director's 
Request for Evidence reveal that the petitioner does not have, and never had, any employees. Likewise, the 
tax documents for the owner of the predecessor sole proprietor, which he also submitted in response to the 
Request for Evidence, indicate that he generated $13,000.00 in gross receipts, and $9,557.00 in net profit, 
from the business in 2004. The petitioner offers no explanation for this serious inconsistency, and the 
averments in the Form 1-129 appear to be simply false. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, 
of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and suffic~ency of the remaining evidence offered in support 
of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591 (BIA 1988). 
In view of the above, the AAO finds that the petitioner knowingly submitted the Form 1-129 containing false 
statements in an effort to mislead CIS on an element material to the beneficiary's eligibility for a benefit 
sought under the immigration laws of the United States. See 18 U.S.C. $5 1001, 1546. The AAO hereby 
enters a finding of fraud. 
Accordingly, in this matter, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will be primarily 
performing managerial or executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish that it has a qualifying 
relationship with the foreign entity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by: 
Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are 
qualifying organizations as dehed in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
Title 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(i)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, or other legal 
entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, branch, 
affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing business." A 
"subsidiary" is defined in pertinent part as a corporation "of which a parent owns, directly or indirectly, more than 
half of the entity and controls the entity." 
SRC 06 013 52854 
Page 9 
In this matter, the petitioner, a limited liability company, asserts that it owns 5 1% of the foreign entity. In support 
of this assertion, the petitioner submitted a "Stock Agreement" dated May 1, 2005 as evidence that the foreign 
entity conveyed 5 1 out of 100 shares of stock to the petitioner thus establishing, if true, that the petitioner is the 
parent of the foreign employer, a subsidiary. However, the petitioner also submitted a "Bill of Sale of Business" 
, which indicates that the beneficiary sold his 51% interest in the foreign employer to 
the principal owner of the petitioner. Finally, the petitioner submitted a translated copy of 
the foreign entity's certificate of incorporation which indicates 'in Article 4 that the beneficiary owns a 30% 
interest, or 300 out of 1,000 shares, in the foreign entity. 
Both the Bill of Sale of Business and the foreign entity's certificate of incorporation are fundamentally 
' 
inconsistent with the petitioner's description of its ownership and acquisition of the foreign entity. Not only does 
the petitioner fail to explain its acquisition of a 51% interest in the foreign entity in May 1, 2005 when Mr. 
had already acquired a 51% interest several months earlier, the petitioner does not address how the 
foreign entity could "sell" 51% of its stock when the translated certificate of incorporation indicates that all of the 
foreign entity's stock had already been issued to individuals. The petitioner also fails to address how the . 
beneficiary could "sell" a 51% ownershp interest in the foreign entity to anyone when the certificate of 
incorporation indicates that he only received a 30% ownershp interest in 2002. It is incumbent upon the 
petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to 
explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective 
evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 591-92. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that it and the foreign entity are qualifying organizations. For 
this additional reason, the petition may not be approved. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary has been 
employed abroad in an executive or managerial capacity. In response to the director's Request for Evidence, 
the petitioner submitted an organizational chart for the foreign entity and described the beneficiary's job 
duties abroad. As this chart and this description are clearly delineated in the record, they will not be 
reproduced here. Generally, the beneficiary is described as being engaged in sales, marketing, negotiating 
contracts with vendors and customers, and supervising two "sales engineers." 
Upon review, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has been employed abroad in an executive 
or managerial capacity. In support of its petition, the petitioner has provided a vague and nonspecific 
description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day 
basis. Moreover, it appears that the beneficiary is primarily engaged in performing non-qualifying 
administrative or operational tasks, e.g., sales, marketing, and contracting. Likewise, the beneficiary appears 
to be a first-line supervisor of non-professional employees. A managerial employee must have authority over 
day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised 
employees are professionals. See Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. As the 
petitioner has vaguely described the beneficiary's two subordinate employees as engineers without fully 
disclosing their educational or slull levels, it cannot be confirmed that these employees are "professionals." 
Therefore, as it appears that the beneficiary is employed as a first-line supervisor and/or is performing the 
. tasks necessary to provide a service or produce a product, the petitioner has not established that he is 
employed abroad in a managerial capacity. 
SRC 06 01 3 52854 
Page 10 
Likewise, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has been employed abroad in an executive 
capacity. As explained above, the beneficiary is performing the tasks necessary to produce a product or to 
provide a service and/or is a first-line supervisor. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary has been employed abroad in an executive capacity. 
i 
An application or petition that fails' to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denieb by 
the MO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the MO'reviews 
. . 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an\ independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the MO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDER: The AAO finds that the petitioner knowingly submitted documents containing false 
statements in an effort to mislead CIS on an element material to the beneficiary's 
eligibility for a benefit sought under the immigration laws of the United States.