dismissed L-1A Case: Trading

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N. W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
File: EAC 08 108 5 1604 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: MAR 0 4 2009 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimrnigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 9 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
John F. Grissom, Acting Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 08 108 51604 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to extend the employment of the beneficiary as an 
L-1 A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws 
of the State of New Jersey and is allegedly in the "trading" business. The beneficiary was granted a one-year 
period of stay to open a new office in the United States, and the petitioner now seeks to extend the 
beneficiary's stay. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director 
erred and that the beneficiary will perform primarily qualifying duties in the United States. In support, 
counsel submits a brief. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101 (a)(] 5)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hirnlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
EAC 08 108 51604 
Page 3 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-1 29, accompanied by the following: 
(A) 
 Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying 
organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(B) 
 Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) 
 A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year 
and the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) 
 A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the 
number of employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence 
of wages paid to employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a 
managerial or executive capacity; and 
(E) 
 Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States 
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and frre or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
EAC 08 108 51604 
Page 4 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
It is not clear whether the petitioner is claiming that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial duties 
under section 101 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 101 (a)(44)(B) of the Act. 
Given the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the petitioner is asserting that the beneficiary will be 
employed in either a managerial or an executive capacity and will consider both classifications. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's proposed job duties in the United States in a letter dated February 
12,2008 as follows: 
[The beneficiary] has managerial duties to perform. He is responsible for increasing the 
business, taking major decisions about the business, and meeting with business houses for 
getting clients, meeting with Bankers, planning, budgeting etc. He takes report directly from 
the supervisor about the daily operations. 
The petitioner also claims to have "4 employees working under the supervision of [the beneficiary]." 
On March 12, 2008, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, more 
detailed descriptions of the duties of the beneficiary's claimed subordinate workers. 
In response, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart showing the beneficiary at the top of the 
organization supervising a "supervisor" who, in turn, is shown supervising a "manager," who, in turn, is 
shown supervising an administrative worker. 
Counsel also described the duties of the subordinate workers in a letter dated March 29,2008 as follows: 
1. 
 of [the petitioner] has been a long term advisor to [the 
beneficiary]. She herself has been formally educated in Foundation Art, Commercial 
Arts, Textile Designing, Website and Digital Designing. [The beneficiary] believes 
that since [the supervisor] has been a long time advisor to [the beneficiary] and aided 
him in his work, along with her extensive background in Art and Design, she would 
be the best person to supervise his company. As supervisor, [the supervisor] holds a 
key role in quality control of their US samples, shipments and products. She 
manages the staff, distributes work, and handles much of the company's finances. 
EAC 08 108 5 1604 
Page 5 
She helps [the beneficiary] develop the company budget and then oversees the 
management of assigned budgets. She also is in charge of advertising and promotion 
of the company. Human Resources and the decision to hire and fire are finalized 
together with [the beneficiary]. She also utilizes her creative side by developing new 
textile designs for the company. [footnote omitted] 
2. 
 of [the petitioner] has proven himself to be a reliable person who 
can handle himself with the utmost grace under the greatest pressure. Formally 
trained as a software engineer, [the manager] shifted gears into business finding 
running businesses to be far more satisfying. [The manager] handles the sales and 
purchases of textiles and fashion jewelry under [the supervisor's] supervision. He 
also keeps constant contact with the vendors in India that inspect the samples of 
textiles and the distributors that are in charge of shipment coming in and shipping 
out, in order to make sure transactions run as intended by [the beneficiary]. He then 
personally inspects the order procession and payment. [The manager] also lends his 
services in the inspection of textile machinery when necessary. He has been very 
effective in advising [the supervisor] on competitive pricing and seeking out special 
event opportunities in the market that are consistent with the objectives of [the 
petitioner]. 
3. 
 works closely under the supervision of [the manager] and [the 
supervisor]. 1 handles day to day responsibilities in the up keeping of the 
new company. Her past experience consists of designing traditional Indian dresses 
for men and women, custom jewelry which are consistent with South Asian culture 
and their particular designs. Her experience also consists of market research for such 
specialty items. 1 is the sole admin to [the manager] and [the supervisor] at 
the moment. Under [the manager's] supervision,. [sic] She also completes monthly 
market performance reports and calendars in a timely fashion as well as complete 
monthly expense reports. She and [the manager] will be in charge of training and 
management over others upon hiring of more staff. 
On April 17, 2008, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary will primarily perform qualifying duties in the United States. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. A petitioner cannot claim that some of the duties of the 
position entail executive responsibilities, while other duties are managerial. A petitioner may not claim that a 
EAC 08 108 51604 
Page 6 
beneficiary will be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial sections of the two statutory 
definitions. 
Title 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of 
the petition to support an executive or managerial position. There is no provision in U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the 
beneficiary is not performing qualifying duties within one year of petition approval, the petitioner is ineligible 
by regulation for an extension. In the instant matter, the petitioner has not established that the United States 
operation has reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary in a predominantly managerial or executive 
position. 
As a threshold issue, it is noted that business expansion strategies and future hiring plans may not be 
considered in determining whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will be employed in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity in the United States. The petitioner must establish eligibility at 
the time of filing the nonimrnigrant visa petition. A visa petition may not be approved at a future date afier 
the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 
I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). Accordingly, only those subordinate workers, and those duties ascribed 
to the beneficiary and his subordinates at the time the instant petition was filed, may be considered in 
determining whether the record establishes that the beneficiary will more likely than not primarily perform 
qualifying managerial or executive duties in the United States. 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a 
day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will be "responsible for increasing the 
business, taking major decisions about the business, and meeting with business houses for getting clients, 
meeting with [blankers, planning, budgeting[,] etc[.]" However, the petitioner does not specifically describe 
what, exactly, the beneficiary will do in performing these duties. The record is devoid of evidence 
establishing what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day basis to "increase business," make "major 
decisions," plan, or budget. Importantly, the petitioner has not established that any of the beneficiary's duties 
pertaining to the first-line supervision of the subordinate workers, or to meeting with "business houses" and 
bankers, are qualifying duties. The fact that a petitioner has given a beneficiary a managerial or executive 
title and has prepared a vague job description which includes inflated job duties does not establish that a 
beneficiary will actually perform managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication 
of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the 
definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. 
Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), ard, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
Consequently, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary will primarily perform 
qualifying duties in his operation of the business. As noted above, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary 
will meet with "business houses for getting clients," which appears to be a marketing or sales tasks However, 
the record does not establish that the beneficiary will be relieved of the need to perform this non-qualifying 
EAC 08 108 51604 
Page 7 
task by his subordinate workers. Based on the job descriptions provided for the record, it appears that only 
the beneficiary will perform this task necessary to the provision of a service or the production of a product. 
As the record does not establish how much time the beneficiary will devote to performing these non- 
qualifying sales tasks, even assuming the other ascribed duties have been established to be managerial or 
executive in nature, which they have not (see supra), it cannot be concluded that the beneficiary will 
"primarily" perform qualifying duties. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to 
produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or 
executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the 
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization. 
As asserted in the record, the beneficiary will directly or indirectly supervise three subordinate workers. 
However, it has not been established that any of these workers is a bona fide supervisory, managerial, or 
professional worker. The petitioner claims that its four-workers are vertically organized, i.e., the beneficiary 
supervises a "supervisor," who supervises a "manager," who supervises an administrative worker. However, 
arbitrarily arranging workers in an artificial, multi-tiered organizational chart, or simply alleging that one 
worker "supervises" another, will not establish that a worker is a bona fide managerial or supervisory 
employee. Rather, it must be established that the worker has control over the employment of one or more 
subordinates and that the business needs of the enterprise could reasonably require and support such an 
organizational structure. In this matter, the petitioner has not described the subordinate employees as being 
managerial or supervisory employees. To the contrary, both the "supervisor" and the "manager" are 
described as primarily performing essential tasks, e.g., quality control, handling fmancing, developing 
budgets, advertising, promoting the company, developing textile designs, inspecting goods, processing 
payment, and inspecting machinery. Given these job descriptions and the nature and size of the business in 
general, it is not credible either of these workers is engaged in the supervision or management of subordinate 
employees. A managerial employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level 
normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. 5 
101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
Furthermore, as the petitioner failed to establish the education required to perform the duties of the 
subordinate positions, even though this evidence was requested by the director, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary will manage professional employees.' Failure to submit requested evidence 
1 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary will manage professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether 
the subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 10 1 (a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1 101 (a)(32), states that "[tlhe term profession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 8 17 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 1 1 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
EAC 08 108 51604 
Page 8 
that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). 
Accordingly, as it appears that the beneficiary will be, at most, a first-line supervisor of three subordinate 
non-professional workers, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in 
a managerial capacity.2 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section lOl(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will act primarily in an executive capacity. As explained above, it appears 
instead that the beneficiary will be primarily employed as a first-line supervisor and will perform the tasks 
necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the 
beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
Counsel cites National Hand Tool Corp. v. Pasquarell, 889 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1989), to stand for the 
proposition that the small size of a petitioner should not, by itself, undermine a finding that a beneficiary will 
2 
Counsel also argues on appeal that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization. 
However, the record does not support this argument. The term "function manager" applies generally when a 
beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible 
for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 10 1 (a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The 
term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary will 
manage an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to 
be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the function with specificity, articulate the 
essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to 
managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In addition, the petitioner's description of the 
beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary will manage the function rather than perform 
the tasks related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has not provided evidence that the beneficiary 
will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job description fails to document that the 
beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial. Also, as explained above, it appears more likely than not 
that the beneficiary will primarily be a first-line supervisor of non-professional employees and will perform 
non-qualifying administrative or operational tasks related to sales and marketing. Absent a clear and credible 
breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary performing his duties, the AAO cannot determine what 
proportion of his duties will be managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily perform 
the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 
1999). 
EAC 08 108 51604 
Page 9 
act in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. The AAO notes that counsel has furnished no evidence to 
establish that the facts of the instant petition are analogous to those in National Hand Tool Corp., where the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in favor of the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 
Furthermore, in National Hand Tool Corp., the courts emphasized that the former INS should not place undue 
emphasis on the size of a petitioner's business operations in its review of an alien's claimed managerial or 
executive capacity. The AAO has long interpreted the regulations and statute to prohibit discrimination 
against small or medium-size businesses. However, consistent with both the statute and the holding of 
National Hand Tool Corp., the AAO has required the petitioner to establish that the beneficiary's position 
consists of primarily managerial or executive duties and that the petitioner will have sufficient personnel to 
relieve the beneficiary fiom having to primarily perform operational andlor administrative tasks. Like the 
court in National Hand Tool Corp., we emphasize that our holding is based on the conclusion that the 
petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or executive duties; 
our decision does not rest on the size of the petitioning entity. 889 F.2d at 1472, n.5. 
Finally, it is important to note that, in reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, 
federal courts have generally agreed that USCIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one 
factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. US. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 13 13, 13 16 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval Republic of 
Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 41,42 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2003)). Furthermore, it is 
appropriate for USCIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant 
factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non- 
managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business 
in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that rea~on.~ 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary was employed 
abroad in a position that was primarily managerial or executive in nature. 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(1)(3)(iv). 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's job duties abroad in a letter dated February 22,2008 as follows: 
[Gleneral management; taking and making policy decisions for the company, hiring and 
firing of senior Presidential employees; negotiations with customers and vendors and other 
entities including governmental authorities. As a President he is responsible to supervise all 
business affairs. 
3 
Counsel cited the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) as authority. It must be noted that the FAM is not binding 
upon USCIS. See Avena v. INS, 989 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997); Matter of Bosuego, 17 I&N 125 (BIA 1979). 
The FAM provides guidance to employees of the Department of State in carrying out their official duties, 
such as the adjudication of visa applications abroad. The FAM is not relevant to this proceeding. 
EAC 08 108 51604 
Page 10 
In response to the director's Request for Evidence, counsel hrther described the beneficiary's duties abroad 
in a letter dated March 29,2008 as follows: 
In 2004, with the knowledge and experience of the textile machinery industry, [the 
beneficiary] established [the foreign employer] which customizes textile machines. He 
simultaneously wore both the hat of a Production Manager and that of a Supervisor. [The 
beneficiary] prevailed in keenly honing in on his customers' needs, tailoring textile machines 
accordingly. 
Leading a team of 20 employees, his first and foremost duty was to establish priorities in 
order to expedite the work flow and production while maintaining the highest quality of 
standards. Second, it was to oversee the purchasing of all equipment, unfinished goods and 
supplies, and oversee the budget and finances. [The beneficiary] personally oversaw the 
management to establish production and quality control standards and the development of 
new machinery. He planned, developed and helped implement operating procedures to 
improve the quality of his products. 
Upon review, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a 
primarily managerial or executive capacity. The beneficiary's vague job description fails to describe the 
beneficiary as primarily performing managerial or executive duties abroad. Similar to the United States 
position, it appears that the beneficiary primarily performed non-qualifying tasks in his "management" of the 
foreign employer. First-line supervisory tasks associated with the start up and operation of the foreign 
business have not been proven to be qualifying managerial or executive duties. Furthermore, the record is 
devoid of evidence pertaining to the duties of the "team of 20 employees" which the beneficiary allegedly 
supervised. Absent job descriptions for the subordinate workers, it cannot be determined whether the 
beneficiary supervised other managerial, supervisory, or professional workers or whether he was relieved of 
the need to perform non-qualifying tasks by a subordinate staff. Once again, going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily 
managerial or executive capacity, and the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are 
qualifying organizations. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by 
"[elvidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying 
organizations." Likewise, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(14)(ii)(A) requires petitioners seeking to 
extend "new office" petitions to submit "[elvidence that the United States and foreign entities are still 
qualifying organizations." Title 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm, 
corporation, or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the 
definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or 
will be doing business." A "subsidiary" is defined in part as a corporation "of which a parent owns, directly or 
EAC 08 108 51604 
Page 11 
indirectly, more than half of the entity and controls the entity." 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(K). An "affiliate" is 
defuled in part as ''[o]ne of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same parent or 
individual." 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(1)(L)(l). 
In this matter, the petitioner claims that both it and the foreign employer are owned and controlled by the 
beneficiary. However, the record is devoid of evidence establishing that the beneficiary owns either entity. 
The record is also devoid of evidence establishing that the foreign employer is "doing business" as defined in 
the regulations. Once again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Crafi of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190. If all required initial evidence is not submitted with the petition, USCIS in its discretion may 
deny the petition for lack of evidence. 8 C.F.R. fj 103.2(b)(8)(ii). Accordingly, the petition shall be denied 
for this additional reason. 
The previous approval of an L-1A petition does not preclude USCIS from denying an extension based on a 
reassessment of the petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. Appx. 556, 2004 WL 
1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). Despite any number of previously approved petitions, CIS does not have any 
authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of proof in a subsequent 
petition. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. t.j 1361. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be 
dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.