dismissed L-1A Case: Wholesale Furniture

identifying data &letad to 
ptevent clearly tmwd 
inv8asioaofpasodpri~ 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave. N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
FILE: SRC 05 01 5 5008 1 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: 
u 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
SRC 05 015 50081 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its general manager as an 
L-1A nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of 
wholesale of teakwood outdoor furniture. The petitioner claims that it is a 
located in Malang-East Java, Indonesia. The beneficiary was initially 
granted L-1A classification for a one-year period in order to open a new office in the United States and the 
petitioner now seeks to extend the beneficiary's stay for two additional years. 
The director denied the petition concluding the petitioner did not establish: (1) that the beneficiary will be 
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; or (2) that the U.S. company 
was doing business for the previous year. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner notes that the beneficiary 
did not arrive in the United States until April 2004, and emphasizes that the petitioner has achieved revenues 
of approximately $250,000 during its first six months of operation. Counsel also asserts that the beneficiary 
has "specialized skills" necessary to perform the executive management function of negotiating contracts. 
Counsel further contends that the director placed undue emphasis on the number of employees supervised by 
the beneficiary in concluding that the beneficiary would not serve in a primarily managerial or executive 
capacity. Counsel submits a brief and additional evidence in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 
8 U.S.C. 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L), the petitioner must demonstrate that the beneficiary, within three years preceding 
the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has been employed abroad in a qualifying 
managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized knowledge, for one continuous year 
by a qualifying organization and seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, 
executive, or involves specialized knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
SRC05 015 50081 
Page 3 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $214.2(1)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a 
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following: 
(A) 
 Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying organizations 
as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section; 
(B) 
 Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in 
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the previous year; 
(C) 
 A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year and the 
duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition; 
(D) 
 A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the number of 
employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence of wages paid to 
employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive 
capacity; and 
(E) 
 Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation. 
The first issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States entity in a 
managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
SRC 05 01 5 50081 
Page 4 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day to day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section lOl(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
The petition was filed on October 21, 2004. In an October 12, 2004 letter, the petitioner described the 
beneficiary's duties as follows: 
[The beneficiary] continues to actively establish the new U.S. company. He continues to 
provide leadership and direction of the company; hires and trains qualified professionals to 
help in establishing the US company's operations; oversees the sales/marketing, finance and 
administrative functions, provides consulting services pertaining to the company's products; 
promotes strategic vision and monitors objectives, operating business plans, policies, budgets 
and programs. 
He has opened a business bank account with Wachovia Bank. He has also hired a Certified 
Public Accountant to oversee the financial matters of the company, and has hired two 
employees. He continues to market the products and services of [the petitioner]. He has 
attended Trade Shows in Chicago, San Francisco and other locations, and has scheduled plans 
for the coming year to be in other trade shows. 
The petitioner submitted its Florida Form UCT-6, Employer's Quarterly Report for the second quarter of 
2004, which confirmed the employment of three employees, including the beneficiary. 
The petitioner also provided the beneficiary's resume, which provides the following information regarding his 
role as general manager of the U.S. company: 
Reporting directly to the board of directors of the parent company, responsible for managing 
all aspects of the branch's business operations; setting up procedures/policies and ensuring 
goals and objectives are met; including hiring, training qualified professionals to meet the 
company objectives; responsible for the sales performance and marketing including 
SRC 05 0 15 5008 1 
Page 5 
establishing new accounts and maintaining existing accounts; contract negotiation with key 
accounts; import and export of products; organising [sic] trade shows and promotional events 
to support marketing forces; provide consultation pertaining products and services. 
On November 1, 2004, the director requested additional evidence to establish that the beneficiary would be 
employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity under the extended petition. Specifically, the 
director instructed the petitioner to submit: (I) an organizational chart listing all employees by name and title; 
(2) the duties and educational background of each employee listed on the state quarterly tax return; (3) 
evidence that the beneficiary is managing other managers and professionals; and (4) an explanation regarding 
how the beneficiary will primarily be engaged in executive duties. 
In a response dated January 17, 2005, the petitioner provided the following expanded job description for the 
beneficiary: 
Manages and directs the U.S. operations 
Develop short range and long range business planning 
Establish goals and policies of company 
Use latitude in decision making and day to day operation 
Oversee work of other employees 
Receive general direction from higher management, Board of Directors of parent 
company 
Provide feedback on branch performances and recommendations to corporate office 
senior managers, and Board of Directors 
Seeking out, hiring and training qualified personnel, and can also fire staff 
Determining pricing, discounts, commissions and develop selling strategies. 
Develop market network through participations in major trade shows, advertisement, and 
by working with territorial independent sales representative. 
Determine, attend, and organize participation in trade shows including designing booths, 
preparing product information / literature and promotions. 
Responsible to develop new accounts and maintaining existing accounts including 
maintaining viable network of business contacts and prospective clients. 
Negotiate and secure contracts. 
Providing assistance in product development or custom design orders to meet customer 
specifications. 
Monitor proper and timely delivery of orders, account performance and resolve collection 
problems and account discrepancies. 
Maintain extensive communications with, including visiting, customers and dealers. 
Provide product information and presentation, design, engineering, pricing, 
manufacturing time, and quality information and processing assurance. 
The petitioner indicated that it also employed an office manager with a bachelor's degree in business 
administration who is responsible for the following duties: maintaining account receivable / payable, 
including payroll; processing orders, credit memos, letters of credit, wire transfers, substitution 
authorizations, and advise on delivery and order specifications; maintaining communication with corporate 
SRC 05 015 50081 
Page 6 
office and customers on manufacturing and shipping schedules; working with importlexport companies 
regarding schedules, shipping costs, shipment documentation and bills of lading; preparing invoices and 
ensuring payment collection; preparing documents to be processed by a hired accountant; tracking inventory 
and advising on reordering; providing company and product information; and, maintaining good customer 
relations. The petitioner also stated that it employed a secretary who performs general administrative 
functions including typing reports and correspondence, handling mail, ordering office supplies, answering 
telephone calls and arranging meetings and travel vouchers. 
In a January 18, 2005 letter, the foreign entity noted that the petitioner had hired two independent sales 
representatives, located in Chicago and Los Angeles, on a commission basis to assist with sales. 
On January 31, 2005, the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the 
beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity under the extended petition. The 
director observed that the described job duties were very general in nature, and, given the current structure of 
the company, the record was not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary would be relieved from 
performing non-qualifying duties associated with the day-to-day operations of the business. 
In an appeal filed on March 1, 2005, counsel for the petitioner emphasizes that the beneficiary did not enter 
the United States until April 2004 and has not had a full year in which to develop the business. Counsel 
asserts that the beneficiary has nevertheless been serving the petitioner in a qualifying managerial or 
executive capacity, and contends that the petitioner's office manager relieves the beneficiary from performing 
day-to-day "office functions." Counsel further claims that the beneficiary's responsibility for negotiating 
contracts with retailers is "that of an Executive Manager" and could not be delegated to lower-level personnel 
who lack the beneficiary's "specialized knowledge" gained with the foreign entity. Counsel also emphasizes 
the complexity of the petitioner's distribution network and the need to use a number of independent 
contractors to perform certain routine functions. Finally, counsel cites Mars Jewelers, Inc. v. INS, 702 F. 
Supp. 1570 (N.D. Ga. 1988) to stand for the proposition that the size of the petitioning company is irrelevant 
to a determination regarding the beneficiary's managerial or executive capacity. 
Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. Upon review of the petition and the evidence, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary would be employed in a managerial or executive capacity under the extended 
petition. When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the MO will look first to 
the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the 
job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties 
are either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
The petitioner claims that the beneficiary qualifies as a manager or executive because he occupies the highest- 
level position within the company, manages its employees, and is responsible for expansion of the business. 
However, the fact that an individual has a managerial or executive job title and exercises discretion over a 
company's operations does not necessarily establish eligibility for classification as an intracompany transferee in 
a managerial or executive capacity within the meaning of section 101(a)(44) of the Act. The actual duties 
themselves reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
SRC 05 015 50081 
Page 7 
Although the petitioner has provided a lengthy description of the beneficiary's duties, portions of the 
description merely paraphrase the statutory definition of executive capacity at section 101(a)(44)(B) of the 
Act, while other portions are too vague to convey an understanding of what duties the beneficiary will 
perform on a day-to-day basis. General, over-broad statements such as "promotes strategic vision," "manages 
and directs the U.S. operation," "establish goals and policies of company," and "use latitude in decision 
making and day to day operation," do not assist the AAO in assessing the beneficiary's actual tasks. 
Conclusory assertions regarding the beneficiary's employment capacity are not sufficient. Merely repeating 
the language of the statute or regulations does not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. Fedin Bros. Co., 
Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. at 1108; Avyr Associates, Inc. v. Meissner, 1997 WL 188942 at *5 (S.D.N.Y.). 
Furthermore, the petitioner's descriptions of the beneficiary's duties include a number of operational tasks 
that do not fall under tradition definitions of managerial or executive capacity. For example, the petitioner 
indicates that the beneficiary is responsible for developing a marketing network, advertising, designing and 
preparing trade show exhibits and product literature, developing and maintaining client accounts and business 
contacts, providing product development and design assistance to customers, maintaining communications 
and visiting customers and dealers, and providing product information and presentations. These duties are 
more indicative of an employee who directly performs marketing, sales and customer service functions than 
of an employee performing primarily managerial or executive duties associated with these activities. 
Notwithstanding counsel's assertion on appeal that the petitioner's office manager relieves the beneficiary 
from performing "office functions," the petitioner has not established that either of the beneficiary's 
subordinates relieve him fi-om performing the business' day-to-day sales, marketing and customer support 
functions. Given that the U.S. entity was established for the purpose of marketing and selling the foreign 
entity's products in the United States and Canada, it is reasonable to conclude, and has not been shown to be 
otherwise, that the beneficiary devotes a substantial proportion of his time to these operational sales and 
marketing activities. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to 
provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See 
sections 10 l(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial 
or executive duties); see also Matter of Church Scientology Int'l., 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988) 
Although the petitioner stated that it utilizes two sales representatives on a commission basis to assist the 
beneficiary, the petitioner has not submitted documentary evidence to corroborate the existence of these 
commissioned sales representatives, identified when they were hired, or described the nature and scope of the 
services they provide. Additionally, the petitioner has not explained how the services of the contracted 
employees obviate the need for the beneficiary to perform the above-mentioned non-qualifying duties 
associated with the petitioner's sales, marketing and customer service functions. Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comrn. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
The definitions of executive and managerial capacity have two parts. First, the petitioner must show that the 
beneficiary performs the high-level responsibilities that are specified in the definitions. Second, the petitioner 
must show that the beneficiary primarily performs these specified responsibilities and does not spend a 
majority of his or her time on day-to-day functions. Champion World, Inc. v. INS, 940 F.2d 1533 (Table), 
1991 WL 144470 (9th Cir. July 30, 1991). 
SRC 05 015 50081 
Page 8 
The test is basic to ensure that a person not only has the requisite authority, but that a majority of his or her 
duties are related to operational or policy management, not to the supervision of lower level employees, 
performance of the duties of another type of position, or other involvement in the operational activities of the 
company. Here, the petitioner fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be 
managerial functions and what proportion would be non-managerial. The petitioner lists the beneficiary's 
duties as including both managerial and administrative or operational tasks, but fails to quantify the time the 
beneficiary spends on them. This failure of documentation is important because several of the beneficiary's 
daily tasks, as discussed above, do not fall directly under traditional managerial or executive duties as defined 
in the statute. For this reason, the AAO cannot determine whether the beneficiary is primarily performing the 
duties of a manager or executive. Se, e.g., IKEA US, Inc. v. US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 
(D.D.C. 1999). The petitioner has failed to show that non-qualifying duties will not occupy the majority of 
the beneficiary's time. 
Counsel argues on appeal that the director placed undue emphasis on the petitioner's limited number of 
employees at the time the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
5 1101(a)(44)(C), if staffing levels are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a 
managerial or executive capacity, CIS must take into account the reasonable needs of the organization, in 
light of the overall purpose and stage of development of the organization. In the present matter, however, the 
regulations provide strict evidentiary requirements for the extension of a "new office" petition and require CIS 
to examine the organizational structure and staffing levels of the petitioner. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(D). 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. fj 214,2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows the "new office" operation one year within the date of 
approval of the petition to support an executive or managerial position. There is no provision in CIS 
regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year period. If the business does not have sufficient 
staffing after one year to relieve the beneficiary from primarily performing operational and administrative 
tasks, the extension cannot be approved. Although the petitioner employs an office manager and a secretary 
who perform some of the day-to-day administrative and operational tasks of the business, based on the 
petitioner's representations, the beneficiary is clearly not relieved fi-om performing non-qualifying tasks such 
as meeting with vendors and customers, preparing product information and displays for trade shows, 
marketing the petitioner's products, negotiating sales, and providing customer and product support. 
Counsel cites Mars Jewelers, Inc. v. INS, 702 F.Supp. 1570, 1573 (N.D. Ga. 1988), to stand for the 
proposition that the small size of a petitioner will not, by itself, undermine a finding that a beneficiary will act 
in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. Counsel has furnished no evidence to establish that the facts 
of the instant petition are analogous to those in Mars Jewelers, Inc. v. INS. It is noted that the case cited by 
counsel relates to an immigrant visa petition, and not the extension of a "new office" nonimmigrant visa. As 
the new office extension regulations call for a review of the petitioner's business activities and staffing after 
one year, the case cited by counsel is distinguishable based on the applicable regulations. See 8 C.F.R. tj 
214.2(1)(14)(ii). Additionally, in contrast to the broad precedential authority of the case law of a United 
States circuit court, the AAO is not bound to follow the published decision of a United States district court in 
matters arising within the same district. See Matter of K-S-, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993). Although the 
reasoning underlying a district judge's decision will be given due consideration when it is properly before the 
AAO, the analysis does not have to be followed as a matter of law. Id. at 71 9. As counsel has not discussed 
the facts of the cited matter, it will not be considered in this proceeding. 
SRC 05 015 50081 
Page 9 
The AAO recognizes the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary had only six months to establish the business, 
as he did not enter the United States until April 2004. The petitioner provided no explanation for the 
beneficiary's delayed entry to the United States. Again, going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 
22 I&N Dec. at 165. Regardless, any request for an extension of a petition that was originally approved as a 
new office must be evaluated under the criteria set forth at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(14)(ii) and establish the 
beneficiary's eligibility as of the date of filing. Again, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C) allows 
the "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of the petition to support an executive or 
managerial position. There is no provision in CIS regulations that allows for an extension of this one-year 
period. 
The AAO acknowledges that the record contains numerous references to the future objectives of the U.S. 
operation, outlining the petitioner's participation in upcoming trade shows. However, business activity that 
occurs after the date of filing is not probative of the petitioner's eligibility as of the filing date. The MO is 
not required to consider evidence of speculative future activity. The petitioner must establish eligibility at the 
time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the 
petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N 
Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978). While the beneficiary may have achieved significant accomplishments toward 
establishing the petitioner's operations in the United States, the petitioner has not shown that it has reached 
the point that he will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity as of the date this petition 
was filed. 
Finally, counsel's reference to the beneficiary's possession of "specialized knowledge" pursuant to the 
definition at 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(O) is misplaced and has no bearing on a determination regarding the 
beneficiary's eligibility for an extension of L-1A status as a manager or executive employee of the petitioning 
company. The MO will therefore not evaluate counsel's claim that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. The petitioner's claims regarding the complexity of its business and the specialized nature of the 
beneficiary's role are not sufficient to elevate the beneficiary's position to one which is primarily managerial 
or executive as those terms are defined at sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $5 
1 10 1 (a)(44)(A) and (B). 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed in 
a primarily managerial or executive capacity. For this reason, the petition will not be approved. 
The second issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has been doing business in the United States for 
the previous year as required by 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(B). 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(H) defines "doing business" as "the regular, systematic, and 
continuous provision of goods and/or services by a qualifying organization and does not include the mere 
presence of an agent or office of the qualifying organization in the United States and abroad." 
The beneficiary was previously granted L-1A classification for a one-year period in order to open a new 
office in the United States. The previous petition, SRC 04 022 50156, was approved on November 4, 2003 
with a validity period of November 4,2003 until November 3,2004. 
SRC 05 015 50081 
Page 10 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary was admitted to the United States for the first time on April 11, 
2004. In support of the instant petition, the petitioner submitted its Florida Forms UCT-6, Employer's 
Quarterly Wage Report, for the first two quarters of 2004; business correspondence dated September 28, 
2004; a sales order dated September 19, 2004; four purchase orders dated May, July and August 2004; and a 
packing list for documents shipped from the foreign entity on September 21,2004. 
On November 1, 2004, the director instructed the petitioner to submit evidence, including sales receipts and 
invoices, to establish that the U.S. company has been doing business for the previous year. 
In a response dated January 17, 2005, counsel for the petitioner again noted that the beneficiary did not arrive 
in the United States until April 11, 2004, and that, prior to his entry, "all sales transactions for the company's 
products were processed directly with the parent company . . . ." The petitioner submitted documentation 
establishing that the foreign entity has exported its products to the United States since January 2003, along 
with a letter of payment requested dated October 2004, purchase orders, and a letter from a client confirming 
an order from the petitioner in September 2004. 
The director denied the petition on January 3 1, 2005, concluding that the petitioner had not established that 
the U.S. company was doing business for the previous year. Specifically, the director stated: "The petitioner 
submitted purchase orders, invoices and a wire transfer. No other evidence was submitted to established [sic] 
that the U.S. Company is doing regular, and systematic business for the previous year." 
On appeal, counsel asserts that since the office "officially opened" on May 1,2004 and there is therefore only 
a "six month track record" to establish the regular and systematic conduct of business. Counsel also 
emphasizes the seasonal nature of the petitioner's business and notes that the petitioner did not have an 
opportunity to complete a full cycle of industry trade shows. The petitioner submits evidence of recent 
business activities and upcoming trade shows in support of the appeal. 
Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(C) provides that a 
petition to extend a visa petition that involved the opening of a new office be accompanied by evidence that 
the United States entity has been doing business as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) of this section for the 
previous year. Since the approval of a new office petition is granted for no more than one year, the regulations 
implicitly require that the new office be operational, i.e., engaged in the provision of good and/or services, as 
soon as it is granted authorization to employ an intracompany transferee in the new office. 
Upon review of the evidence submitted by the petitioner, it has not established that the U.S. entity has been 
doing business since the initial new office petition was approved on November 4, 2003. While some delay 
between the approval of the petition and the beneficiary's admission to the United States in L-1A status is to 
be expected, the beneficiary in this case did not re-locate to the United States until six months after the 
approval of the petition, and nearly two months following the issuance of his L-1 visa on February 20, 2004. 
The petitioner has provided no explanation for this lengthy delay in opening its United States office. Going on 
record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
SRC 05 0 15 5008 1 
Page 11 
The record as presently constituted contains minimal evidence of business activities conducted since May 
2004, and no evidence of business conducted prior to that date. Accordingly, the petitioner has not established 
that it has been doing business for the previous year as required by 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(14)(ii)(B). For this 
additional reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.