dismissed EB-1B Case: Research

idenwing data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwmted 
invasion of personal privacy 
PUBLIC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
LIN 04 162 51005 
PETITION: 
 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as Outstanding Professor or Researcher Pursuant to 
Section 203(b)(l)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1153(b)(l)(B) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
5 u 
v Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The employment-based immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service 
Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is a university. It seeks to classify the beneficiary as an outstanding researcher pursuant to 
section 203(b)(l)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. fj 1 153(b)(l)(B). The petitioner 
seeks to employ the beneficiary in the United States as a research scientist. The director determined that the 
petitioner had not established that it had offered the beneficiary a permanent job as of the date of filing. 
On appeal, counsel addresses only one of three concerns raised by the director. The petitioner submits a new 
letter confirming the beneficiary's terms of employment. For the reasons discussed below, this new letter does 
not overcome two of the director's concerns. 
Section 203(b) of the Act states, in pertinent part, that: 
(1) Priority Workers. -- Visas shall first be made available . . . to qualified immigrants who are aliens 
described in any of the following subparagraphs (A) through (C): 
(B) Outstanding Professors and Researchers. -- An alien is described in this subparagraph if -- 
(i) 
 the alien is recognized internationally as outstanding in a specific academic 
area, 
(ii) the alien has at least 3 years of experience in teaching or research in the 
academic area, and 
(iii) the alien seeks to enter the United States -- 
(I) 
 for a tenured position (or tenure-track position) within a university 
or institution of higher education to teach in the academic area, 
(11) 
 for a comparable position with a university or institution of higher 
education to conduct research in the area, or 
(m> for a comparable position to conduct research in the area with a 
department, division, or institute of a private employer, if the 
department, division, or institute employs at least 3 persons full-time in 
research activities and has achieved documented accomplishments in an 
academic field. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 204.5(i)(3)(iii) provides that a petition must be accompanied by: 
An offer of employment from a prospective United States employer. A labor certification is not 
required for this classification. The offer of employment shall be in the form of a letter from: 
(A) A United States university or institution of higher learning oflering the alien a 
tenured or tenure-track teaching position in the alien's academic field; 
(B) A United States university or institution of higher learning oflering the alien a 
permanent research position in the alien's academic field; or 
(C) A department, division, or institute of a private employer offering the alien a 
permanent research position in the alien's academic field. The department, division, or 
institute must demonstrate that it employs at least three persons full-time in research 
positions, and that it has achieved documented accomplishments in an academic field. 
(Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary 11 1 1 (7' ed. 1999) defines "offer" as "the act or an instance of 
presenting something for acceptance" or "a display of willingness to enter into a contract on specified terms, 
made in a way that would lead a reasonable person to understand that an acceptance, having been sought, will 
result in a binding contract." Black's Law Dictionary does not define "offeror" or "offeree." American 
Lawyer Media's (ALM) online law dictionary, available at www.law.com, defines offer as "a specific 
proposal to enter into an agreement with another. An offer is essential to the formation of an enforceable 
contract. An offer and acceptance of the offer creates the contract." Significantly, the same dictionary 
defines offeree as "a person or entity to whom an offer to enter into a contract is made by another (the 
offeror)," and offeror as "a person or entity who makes a specific proposal to another (the offeree) to enter 
into a contract." (Emphasis added.) 
In light of the above, we concur with the director that the ordinary meaning of an "offer" requires that it be made 
to the offeree, not a third party. As such, regulatory language requiring that the offer be made "to the 
beneficiary" would simply be redundant. Thus, a letter addressed to Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) 
affirming the beneficiary's employment is not a job ofler within the ordinary meaning of that phrase. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 8 204.5(i)(2), provides, in pertinent part: 
Permanent, in reference to a research position, means either tenured, tenure track, or for a term 
of indefinite or unlimited duration, and in which the employee will ordinarily have an 
expectation of continued employment unless there is good cause for termination. 
On Part 6 of the vetition. the vetitioner indicated that the ~ro~osed emvlovment was a vermanent vosition. The 
,I A 2 
petitioner submiked a letter fi-om a professor at tie 
 university, 
addressed to Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), confirming that the beneficiary's employment with the 
- - 
petitioner "is of indefinite duration, with the expectation of continued employment, but terminable at will." This 
document does not constitute a job offer fi-om the petitioner to the beneficiary. On April 21, 2005, the director 
requested evidence that the petitioner had extended a permanent job offer to the beneficiary. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a letter dated June 8, 2005, addressed "To Whom It May Concern," 
affirming that the beneficiary's employment with the petitioner "is of indefinite duration, with the expectation of 
continued employment, but terminable at will for good cause, by either party." The letter concludes that the 
of continued employment with the [petitioner] absent good cause for 
termination." 
 and the beneficiary jointly signed the letter. 
Page 4 
The director determined that the petitioner had failed to submit the initial evidence required pursuant to the 
regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 204.5(i)(3)(iii). The director further determined that a review of the petitioner's website 
revealed that professors do not have hiring authority. Finally, the director questioned whether "terminable at 
will for good cause" might be internally contradictory in nature. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director denied the petition solely because the person who signed the June 
8,2005 letter did not clearly have authority to confirm the nature of the beneficiary's employment. 
The etitioner u mits a letter dated Se tember 1 2005 addressed to the beneficiary. 
, Department Head;- Senior Administrative Director; 
 Dean; 
and the beneficiary are all signatories to the letter. The letter provides: 
This letter is offered to confirm that your employment with the [petitioner] is of indefinite 
duration, with the expectation of continued employment, but terminable at will for good 
cause by either party. Consequently, you have an expectation of indefinite continued 
employment with the [petitioner] absent good cause for termination. 
Counsel fails to acknowledge some of the concerns raised by the director. Specifically, the director stated that 
the petitioner had failed to submit the initial job offer, required initial evidence pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(i)(3)(iii). 
The new letter submitted on appeal does not resolve this concern, which was raised by the director but is not 
addressed by counsel on appeal. First, as discussed above, the common definitions of "offer" and related terms 
supports the director's conclusion that the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(i)(3)(iii) requires the submission of the 
initial job offer letter. We note that the petitioner signed the petition in Part 8, authorizing "the release of any 
information fiom my records which [CIS] needs to determine eligibility for the benefit I am seeking." Thus, the 
petitioner may also be required to submit an employment contract to establish the terms and conditions of 
employment if they are not set forth in the job offer letter. 
The director specifically requested the initial job offer letter issued to the beneficiary. In response, the petitioner 
submitted a letter that is not addressed to the beneficiary and is dated after the director's request. The purpose 
of the request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit 
sought has been established, as of the time the petition is filed. See 8 C.F.R. $8 103.2(b)(8) and (12). The 
failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the 
petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). Even if we were to conclude that the regulation and request for additional 
evidence did not place the petitioner on sufficient notice, the denial itself did. The new evidence on appeal is 
not the required initial evidence requested by the director. Specifically, while addressed to the beneficiary it 
is not the initial job offer letter and is dated after the date of filing. The petitioner must establish that it had 
offered the beneficiary a permanent job prior to that date. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(12); Matter of Kutigbuk, 
14 I&N Dec. 45,49 (Reg. Comm. 1971). 
Finally, while there may be circumstances where "at-will" employment is qualifying, it is the petitioner's 
burden to demonstrate that the employment is qualifying. Without the actual job offer and, if the letter does 
not include the terms and conditions of employment, the employment contract, the petitioner cannot meet its 
burden. 
The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.