dismissed EB-2 NIW Case: Business

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: NOV. 16, 2023 In Re: 29319616 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (National Interest Waiver) 
The Petitioner seeks second preference immigrant classification, as well as a national interest waiver 
of the job offer requirement attached to this EB-2 classification. See Immigration and Nationality Act 
(the Act) section 203(b )(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b )(2). 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding the Petitioner had not 
established that a waiver of the required job offer, and thus of the labor certification, would be in the 
national interest. We dismissed a subsequent appeal. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to 
demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 
375-76 (AAO 2010). Upon review, we will dismiss the motion. 
I. LAW 
A motion to reconsider must establish that our prior decision was based on an incorrect application of 
law or policy and that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence in the record of proceedings 
at the time of the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). Our review on motion is limited to reviewing our 
latest decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(ii). We may grant motions that satisfy these requirements and 
demonstrate eligibility for the requested benefit. 
While neither the statute nor the pertinent regulations define the term "national interest," we set forth 
a framework for adjudicating national interest waiver petitions in the precedent decision Matter of 
Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884 (AAO 2016). Dhanasar states that after a petitioner has established 
eligibility for EB-2 classification, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may, as matter 
of discretion, 1 grant a national interest waiver if the petitioner demonstrates: (1) that the foreign 
national's proposed endeavor has both substantial merit and national importance; (2) that the foreign 
national is well positioned to advance the proposed endeavor; and (3) that, on balance, it would be 
beneficial to the United States to waive the requirements of a job offer and thus of a labor certification. 
1 See also Poursina v. USCIS, No. 17-16579, 2019 WL 4051593 (Aug. 28, 2019) (finding USCIS ' decision to grant or 
deny a national interest waiver to be discretionary in nature). 
II. ANALYSIS 
On motion, the Petitioner contends we did not adequately review the record before us on appeal, but 
he does not sufficiently identify or discuss the aspects of the submitted evidence that he believes we 
overlooked. Contrary to the Petitioner's assertion, we reviewed and considered the entire record of 
proceeding de nova prior to making our determinations on appeal. 
On appeal, we ultimately concluded that since the record did not establish the national importance of 
the Petitioner's specific proposed endeavor, as required under Dhanasar's first prong, he had not 
demonstrated eligibility for a national interest waiver as a matter of discretion. We also reserved his 
appellate arguments regarding his eligibility under Dhanasar 's second and third prongs, as considering 
them would have served no meaningful purpose. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) 
(stating that agencies are not required to make "purely advisory findings" on issues that are 
unnecessary to the ultimate decision); see also Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 526 n.7 (BIA 
2015) (declining to reach alternative issues on appeal where an applicant is otherwise ineligible). For 
the sake of brevity, we incorporate our previous analysis of the record and will repeat only certain facts 
and evidence as necessary to address the Petitioner's assertions on motion to reconsider. Our previous 
decision in this matter was ID# 27461772 (AAO JUN. 13, 2023). 
As a preliminary matter, the Petitioner alleges in the motion brief that his documents "were not 
properly analyzed by the Service, violating the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States of America." The Fourth Amendment in part prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV. We conclude the Petitioner's citation to the Fourth Amendment is not relevant 
to the matter at hand as he has not explained how we violated his Fourth Amendment rights in 
dismissing his appeal. Citing to an authority that is not relevant to the grounds of the unfavorable 
decision will not meet the requirements of a motion to reconsider. See Matter ofO-S-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 
56, 58 (BIA 2006) ("A motion to reconsider is not a mechanism by which a party may file a new brief 
before the Board raising additional legal arguments that are unrelated to those issues raised before the 
Immigration Judge and on appeal."). 
On motion, the Petitioner also contests the correctness of our prior decision, asserting we did not 
consider the evidence of record under the preponderance of evidence standard. Except where a 
different standard is specified by law, the "preponderance of the evidence" is the standard of proof 
governing immigration benefit requests. See Matter ofChawathe, 25 I&N Dec. at 369; see also Matter 
o_fMartinez, 21 I&N Dec. 1035, 1036 (BIA 1997); Matter ofSoo Hoo, 11 I&N Dec. 151,152 (BIA 
1965). Accordingly, the "preponderance of the evidence" is the standard of proof governing national 
interest waiver petitions. See 1 USCIS Policy Manual, E.4(B), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual. 
While the Petitioner asserts on motion that he has provided evidence sufficient to demonstrate his 
eligibility for a national interest waiver, he does not further explain or identify any specific instance 
in which we applied a standard of proof other than the preponderance of evidence in dismissing the 
appeal. 
The Petitioner further contends on motion that we did not "substantiate" the basis for our conclusion 
that his business plan did not demonstrate that his endeavor would have "substantial positive 
econom[ic] effects," and alleges that we only "superficially" analyzed the prospective impact of the 
jobs that were forecast to be created in the business plan. We disagree. 
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In dismissing the appeal, we observed that the Petitioner's business plan did not reflect that his 
company's future business activities and staffing levels stand to provide substantial economic benefits 
to specific regions or to the United States. We noted that the plan respectively forecasts five-year tax 
generation of $6 million, revenue of $1 7.7 million, and payroll expenses of $14 million. It also 
contemplates state, regional, and national business expansion for his company, but the business plan 
did not establish the benefits to the regional or national economy resulting from the company's profits 
and revenues would reach the level of "substantial positive economic effects" contemplated by 
Dhanasar. Id. at 890. Similarly, we acknowledged that although the Petitioner claims the business 
would create "about one hundred and eighty-five (185) jobs for U.S. workers across the United States," 
but he did not demonstrate that such future staffing levels would provide substantial economic benefits 
to Florida or the region or U.S. economy more broadly at a level commensurate with national 
importance. 
We also explained that the submitted evidence did not demonstrate that such hiring figures would 
utilize a significant population of workers in the area or would substantially impact job creation and 
economic growth, either regionally or nationally. Id. On motion, the Petitioner does not adequately 
address the conclusions we expressed in our previous decision that the record lacked probative 
evidence sufficient to demonstrate that his proposed endeavor has broader implications rising to the 
level of having national importance or that it would offer substantial positive economic effects. 
Importantly, he does not identify how our conclusions were based on an incorrect application of law 
or policy - other than the vague and generalized assertions discussed above. 
Regarding the motion to reconsider, we stress again that to establish merit for reconsideration of our 
latest decision, a petitioner must both state the reasons why the petitioner believes the most recent 
decision was based on an incorrect application oflaw or policy; and it must also specifically cite laws, 
regulations, precedent decisions, and/or binding policies they believe we misapplied in our prior 
decision. As in this case, a petitioner cannot meet the requirements of a motion to reconsider by 
broadly disagreeing with our conclusions; the motion must demonstrate how we erred as a matter of 
law or policy. See Matter of O-S-G-, 24 I&N Dec. at 56 (finding that a motion to reconsider is not a 
process by which the party may [seek] reconsideration by generally alleging error in the prior 
decision). 
Although we acknowledge the Petitioner's submission of a brief: we determine the Petitioner does not 
sufficiently address the conclusions we reached in our immediate prior decision or provide reasons for 
reconsideration of those conclusions. Moreover, the brief lacks any cogent argument as to how we 
misapplied the law or USCIS policy in dismissing the prior motion to reconsider. 
In light of the above, we conclude that this motion does not meet all the requirements of a motion to 
reconsider and must therefore be dismissed pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4). 
ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. 
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