dismissed EB-2 NIW Case: Finance

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Non-Precedent Decision of the
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: OCT. 10, 2024 In Re: 34684231 
Motion on Administrative Appeals Office Decision 
Form 1-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers (National Interest Waiver) 
The Petitioner, a financial analyst, seeks second preference immigrant classification (EB-2) as an 
individual of exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business, or a member of the professions 
holding an advanced degree. Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) section 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1 l 53(b )(2). The Petitioner also seeks a national interest waiver of the job offer requirement attached 
to this EB-2 classification. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) may grant this 
discretionary waiver of the required job offer, and thus a labor certification, when it is in the national 
interest to do so. Section 203(b )(2)(B)(i) of the Act. 
The Director of the Texas Service Center denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner did not 
establish eligibility for the discretionary national interest waiver. We dismissed the Petitioner's 
appeal, concluding that in addition to not establishing eligibility for the discretionary national interest 
waiver, she had not established eligibility for the underlying EB-2 classification because she did not 
demonstrate that she qualified as a member of the professions holding an advanced degree or as an 
individual of exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business. 1 The Petitioner then filed combined 
motions to reopen and reconsider, which we dismissed. The matter is again before us on combined 
motions to reopen and reconsider. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Matter of Chawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369, 375-76 (AAO 2010). Upon review, we will dismiss the 
motions. 
1 As the identified reasons for dismissal were dispositive of the Petitioner's appeal, we declined to reach and reserved 
remaining arguments concerning eligibility. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (stating that "courts and 
agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach"); 
see also Matter ofL-A-C-, 26 l&N Dec. 516, 526 n.7 (BIA 2015) (declining to reach alternative issues on appeal where an 
applicant is otherwise ineligible). 
A. Motion to Reopen 
A motion to reopen must state new facts and be supported by documentary evidence. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.5(a)(2). Our review on motion is limited to reviewing our latest decision. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 103.S(a)(l)(ii). We may grant motions that satisfy these requirements and demonstrate eligibility 
for the requested benefit. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464, 473 (BIA 1992) (requiring that 
new evidence have the potential to change the outcome). 
In the previous motion to reopen, the Petitioner asserted eligibility for the underlying EB-2 
classification as both an advanced degree professional and as an individual of exceptional ability. 
Regarding the Petitioner's claim of eligibility as an advanced degree professional, we considered her 
submission of evidence demonstrating that she earned a master's degree in business administration in 
December 2021 but advised that she must demonstrate eligibility at the time of filing her petition, 
which in this case was in January 2021. See 8 C.F.R. § 103 .2(b)(1 ). We explained that her attainment 
of a master's degree subsequent to the petition's filing did not support a finding that at the time she 
filed the petition, she had "a United States advanced degree or a foreign equivalent degree," as required 
under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(i)(A). We further advised the Petitioner that a visa petition may not be 
approved at a future date after a petitioner becomes eligible under a new set of facts. Matter of 
Katigbak, 14 I&N Dec. 45, 49 (Reg'! Comm'r 1971). 
We also noted that the evidence the Petitioner submitted on motion did not support a finding that at 
the time she filed the petition, she had "a United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent 
degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty." See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(k)(3)(i)(B). We observed deficiencies in the experience letters she provided, noting that some 
of her claimed qualifying employment experience commenced prior to the completion of her 
bachelor's degree whereas other employment experience had commenced as recently as 2020. 
Because the Petitioner did not show that she had at least five years of post-baccalaureate experience 
after she completed her baccalaureate studies, we concluded that she had not established that she was 
a member of the professions holding an advanced degree at the time she filed the petition. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(k)(3)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l); see also Matter ofKatigbak, 14 I&N Dec. at 49. 
On motion, the Petitioner asserts that the documentation previously submitted establishes her 
eligibility as an advanced degree professional. She does not, however, submit any new evidence and 
does not assert any new facts supported by documentary evidence that establish her eligibility as an 
advanced degree professional or otherwise refute our determination to the contrary. 
Regarding her assertion that she alternatively qualifies as an individual of exceptional ability, we 
concluded in our previous decision that the evidence submitted on motion was insufficient to 
demonstrate that she submitted the requisite initial evidence required for this classification. 2 While 
we affirmed our previous determination that she met the evidentiary criteria pertaining to official 
academic records and licensure, we determined that the evidence she submitted on motion did not 
2 The Petitioner must initially submit evidence that meets at least three of the six evidentiary criteria at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(A)-(F) to show qualification as an individual of exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business. We 
determined that the evidence submitted in support of the previous motion did not demonstrate that the Petitioner met three 
of the six initial evidentiary criteria; as such, we did not conduct a final merits analysis to determine whether she has a 
degree of expertise significantly above that ordinarily encountered in business. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). 
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establish that she met any additional evidentiary criteria. On motion, the Petitioner maintains that she 
satisfies two additional criteria relating to relating to ten years of full-time experience at 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B) and high salary at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(D). 
Regarding her employment history, the Petitioner reasserts that the employer letters previously 
submitted demonstrate that she has at least ten years of full-time experience in the occupation as 
required by 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(B). As noted previously, the record does not demonstrate that 
the Petitioner has 10 years of full-time work experience in her specialty because the Petitioner's 
professional history began in 2014 and the instant petition was filed in 2021, seven years later. On 
motion, the Petitioner does not submit any new evidence and does not assert any new facts supported 
by documentary evidence to refute this determination or otherwise establish that she meets this 
criterion. 
Regarding her claim that she satisfies the evidentiary criterion related to high salary, the Petitioner 
submits a letter on motion from her current employer stating that she received a raise to her annual 
salary as well as a cash bonus in 2023, thereby demonstrating that her current remuneration totals 
$230,000. The Petitioner asserts that this letter, coupled with a webpage printout indicating that the 
median annual wage of financial analysts in New York is $92,557, demonstrates that 
she satisfies this criterion. 
While we acknowledge the documentation submitted on motion, these materials relate to career 
achievements occurring after she filed the petition in January 2021. As explained previously, the 
Petitioner must demonstrate eligibility at the time she filed the petition and cannot rely on facts not 
yet in existence at the time of filing to establish her eligibility. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(l); Matter of 
Katigbak, 14 T&N Dec. at 49. The submitted evidence, therefore, does not establish that she 
"commanded a salary, or other remuneration for services, which demonstrates exceptional ability" as 
set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(3)(ii)(D) as of petition's filing date. On motion, the Petitioner has not 
provided new facts or documentary evidence to show that she was an individual of exceptional ability 
in the sciences, arts, or business at the time she filed the petition. 
In our previous decision, we also affirmed our prior determination that the Petitioner did not 
sufficiently document her proposed endeavor in the United States to demonstrate that it will likely 
have national importance. See Matter of Dhanasar, 26 I&N Dec. 884, 889 (AAO 2016). We 
determined that the evidence submitted on motion, including her business plan, did not demonstrate 
that the Petitioner's work as a financial analyst would likely impact the field of finance or that its 
potential prospective impact has national implications within the field. We further determined that the 
Petitioner failed to show that the level of the purported impact of her proposed endeavor would likely 
reach the level national importance or that the economic effects, including the possible creation of 25 
positions, constitute "substantial positive economic effects" discussed in Matter ofDhanasar. Finally, 
we noted that merely working in an important field is insufficient to establish the national importance 
of the Petitioner's specific proposed endeavor. 
On motion, the Petitioner does not present any new facts and does not submit any new evidence with 
regard to our determination that her proposed endeavor did not have national importance. The 
Petitioner rather highlights previously submitted evidence and asserts that she has demonstrated that a 
waiver of the required job offer, and thus of the labor certification, would be in the national interest. The 
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Petitioner's submissions on motion to reopen have not demonstrated that her proposed endeavor will 
likely reach the level of national importance. 3 
For the reasons outlined above, the Petitioner has not provided new facts to establish that we erred in 
dismissing the prior motion. Because the Petitioner has not established new facts that would warrant 
reopening of the proceeding, we have no basis to reopen our prior decision. 
B. Motion to Reconsider 
A motion to reconsider must establish that our prior decision was based on an incorrect application of 
law or policy and that the decision was incorrect based on the evidence in the record of proceedings 
at the time of the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). Our review on motion is limited to reviewing our 
latest decision. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(ii). We may grant motions that satisfy these requirements and 
demonstrate eligibility for the requested benefit. 
We dismissed the Petitioner's previous motion to reconsider on the basis that it did not provide reasons 
for reconsideration that were supported by citations to appropriate statutes, regulations, or precedent 
decisions, and it did not show that our decision dismissing the appeal was incorrect based on the 
evidence of record at the time of the decision. On motion, the Petitioner does not claim that our 
previous decision dismissing the motion to reconsider was based on an incorrect application of law or 
policy or that it was incorrect based on the evidence in the record at the time of our decision. Her 
statement in support of the motion does not point to any factual, legal or policy error in our prior 
decision. In fact, her statement is fundamentally identical to the statement supporting her previous 
motion to reconsider our dismissal of her appeal. 
Here, the Petitioner disagrees with our conclusions without demonstrating how we erred as a matter 
of law or policy. See Matter of O-S-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006) (finding that a motion to 
reconsider is not a process by which the party may submit in essence, the same brief and seek 
reconsideration by generally alleging error in the prior decision). Simply disagreeing with our 
conclusions, without showing how we misapplied law or pointing to policy that contradicts our 
analysis of the evidence, is not sufficient to reconsider our decision. As discussed above, we have 
considered all additional materials and assertions the Petitioner submitted on motion and conclude that 
they are insufficient to establish her eligibility for the EB-2 classification or the discretionary national 
interest waiver. 
The scope of a motion is limited to "the prior decision" and "the latest decision in the proceeding." 
8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l )(i), (ii). The Petitioner's contentions in her current motion merely reargue facts 
and issues we have already considered in our previous decision. See, e.g., Matter of O-S-G-, 24 I&N 
Dec. at 58. The Petitioner may disagree with our previous decision, but she has not shown that we 
erred in our decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3). 
3 The Petitioner has not satisfied the first prong of the Matter of Dhanasar framework, and she has not demonstrated 
eligibility for a national interest waiver. As the identified reasons for dismissal are dispositive of the Petitioner's motion 
to reopen, we decline to reach and hereby reserve remaining arguments concerning eligibility under the Matter ofDhanasar 
framework. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. at 25; Matter olL-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. at 526 n.7. 
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In conclusion, although the Petitioner has submitted additional evidence in support of her motion to 
reopen, she has not established new facts relevant to our previous decision that would warrant 
reopening of the proceedings. Additionally, on motion to reconsider, she has not demonstrated that 
our previous decision was based on an incorrect application of law or policy or that our previous 
decision was incorrect based on evidence in the record at the time we issued the decision. Therefore, 
the combined motions will be dismissed. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(4). 
ORDER: The motion to reopen is dismissed. 
FURTHER ORDER: The motion to reconsider is dismissed. 
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