dismissed L-1A Case: Electrical Equipment

PrnLIC COPY 
U.S. Department uf Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
FILE: EAC 04 063 5 1420 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER 
 Date: JJUL 2 7 2006 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned 
to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
p~obert P. ~ikann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
; 
 EAC 04 063 5 1420 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be summarily 
dismissed. 
entity was incol-porated in New York in December 2000 and is engaged in the electrical equipment 
business. The U.S. entity petitioned Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) to classify the 
beneficiary as a nonimmigrant intracompany transferee (L-1 A) pursuant to section 101 (a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(L), as an executive or manager for 
three years. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the record contains insufficient evidence to demonstrate 
that the beneficiary will be employed in a managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, the 
 The appeal consisted of Form 1-290B where the 
petitioner asserts: "Mrs. 
 for employment as 
USA, Inc., the 
 The petitioner did not 
appeal. The appeal fails to adequately address the director's conclusions. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section lOl(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must the petitioner must 
meet certain criteria. Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States, a firm, corporation, or other legal entity, or an affiliate or subsidiary 
thereof, must have employed the beneficiary for one continuous year. Furthermore, the beneficiary must 
seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer 
or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
Upon review , the AAO concurs with the director's decision and affirms the denial of the petition. Based 
on the minimal documentation in the record, it cannot be determined that the petitioner has established 
that the beneficiary will be employed in a position of managerial or executive capacity. Going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of SofSii, 22 I & N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998)(citing Matter of Treasure 
Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
The petitioner does not clarify whether the beneficiary is claiming to be primarily engaged in managerial 
duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) 
of the Act. A beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on 
partial sections of the two statutory definitions. If the petitioner chooses to represent the beneficiary as 
both an executive and a manager, it must establish that the beneficiary meets each of the four criteria set 
forth in the statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition for manager. 
On review, the petitioner provided a vague and nonspecific description of the beneficiary's duties that 
fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states 
that the beneficiary's duties include "direct accountability and effective management, profitability and 
growth in the U.S.," "formulate, recommend and implement plans and procedures that provide maximum 
profit return on invested capital," "take an active role in professional activities", and "budget control." 
EAC 04 063 5 1420 
Page 3 
The petitioner did not, however, define the beneficiary's goals and policies, or clarify the role of the 
departments that the beneficiary will supervise. The petitioner suggests that the beneficiary will manage 
the sales department and the transportation department, however, the petitioner only provides a vague 
description of the business activities of these two departments. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties are primarily executive or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions 
would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
In addition, although- the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary is managing a subordinate staff, the record 
does not establish that the subordinate staff is composed of supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. A first-line supervisor will not be considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of his or her supervisory duties unless the employees 
supervised are professional. Section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act. The petitioner submitted an 
organizational chart which states that the beneficiary will supervise one transportation manager and one 
sales manager and six other employees. The chart does not provide the job titles or job descriptions of the 
six other employees. Managerial titles alone are not sufficient. The petitioner does not establish that the 
subordinate staff is composed of supervisory, professional or managerial employees. 
Furthermore, if the position offered to the beneficiary is executive in capacity, the statutory definition of 
the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex organizational 
hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's authority to 
direct the organization. Section 10 1(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1 10 1(a)(44)(B). Under the statute, a 
beneficiary must have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that 
organization. Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of managerial 
employees for the beneficiary to direct and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and 
policies of the organization rather than the day-to-operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be 
deemed an executive under the statute simply because they have an executive title or because they 
"direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise 
"wide latitude in discretionary decision making" and receive only "general supervision or direction from 
higher level executives, the board of directors, or stockholders of the organization." Id. According to the 
organizational chart for the United States entity, it appears that the president and vice president will 
supervise the beneficiary. In addition, according to the job description, the beneficiary must report to the 
president and vice president. It is unclear if the beneficiary will have a wide latitude in discretionary 
decision making. Moreover, the petition indicates that the beneficiary will supervise two departments of 
the organization, however, the petition does not submit evidence that the beneficiary will direct the 
management and establish the goals and policies of the organization. Thus, the petitioner has not 
established that the position is an executive capacity. 
In addition, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be performing duties which 
primarily require her to plan, organize, direct and control the organization's major functions by worlung 
through other managerial or professional employees in the United States. On appeal, the petitioner states 
that the beneficiary will be an "executive manager." The petitioner's general objections to the denial of 
the petition, without specifically identifying any errors on the part of the director or providing new 
'' 
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Page 4 
evidence to support that the beneficiary is in a position of managerial capacity, are simply insufficient to 
overcome the well-founded and logical conclusions the director reached based on the evidence submitted 
by the petitioner. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner's description of the stock distribution of the companies 
does not meet exactly the definitions constituting a qualifying relationship between the United States and 
the foreign entity pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(G). As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed 
qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient evidence to determine whether a 
stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The corporate stock certificate ledger, 
stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings must 
also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the 
shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Additionally, a 
petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the distribution of 
profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual control of the 
entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Tnc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986). Without full 
disclosure of all relevant documents, CIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. 
The petitioner submitted a stock certificate, number one, statin that limited liability company 
 is 
the owner of two hundred shares of the capital stock o 
 The petitioner's 200 1 Tax Return 
(Form 1120) states that the value of the petitioner's common stock was $200.00 at the end of the tax year. 
However, the 2002 Tax Return indicated at Schedule L that common stock valued at $5,000 has been 
issued, and identifies- Russia" as the petitioner's parent company. The petitioner does not 
provide any evidence of the additional shares issued in 2002 nor does it identifv the relationshir, between 
and 
 CIS is unable to determine that the claimeh foreign parent company 
owns and controls the United States entity. 
 It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any 
inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such 
inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to 
where the truth lies. Matter ofHo, 19 I&N Dec. 582,591-92 (BIA 1988). 
While not directly addressed by the director, the minimal documentation of the petitioner's business 
operations in the United States raises the issue of whether the petitioner is a qualifying organization doing 
business in the United States. Specifically, under the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G)(2) a 
petitioner must demonstrate that it is engaged in the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of 
goods or services and does not represent the mere presence of an agent or office in the United States. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied 
by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial 
decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Tnc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), 
affd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting 
that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). 
Regulations at 8 C.F.R. 3 103.3(a)(l)(v) state, in pertinent part: 
EAC 04 063 5 1420 
Page 5 
An officer to whom an appeal is taken shall summarily dismiss any appeal when the 
party concerned fails to identify specifically any erroneous conclusion of law or 
statement of fact for the appeal. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligbility for the benefit sought remains entirely with 
the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Inasmuch as counsel has failed to identify 
specifically an erroneous conclusion of law or a statement of fact in ths proceeding, the petitioner has not 
sustained that burden. Therefore, the appeal will be summarily dismissed. 
ORDER: 
 The appeal is summarily dismissed.