dismissed L-1A Case: Household Appliances

U.S. Department of IIomeland Securit, 
20 Mass Abe. Y \V , Rnl A3032 
Washtngton. DC 20529 
id-detadoktwlb 
prevent dearly unws- 
'n"slw of wrsooel or!m 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: WAC 04 051 50256 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVKE CENTER Date: NOV 2 8 1001 
IN RE: Pet~tioner: 
Beneficiary: 
- 
Pet~t~on: Petit~on for a Non~mmigrant Worker Pursuant to Sectlon 10 l (a)(15)(L) of the Imm~gratlon 
and Nat~onality Act. 8 U.S.C. fj 1 IOl(a)(I 5)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
Th~s IS the dec~s~on of the Admin~strat~ve Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been rehlmed to 
the office that orlglnally decided your case. Any further lnqulry must be made to that office. 
~6bex-t P. Wiemann, "ireckr 
; kdrninistratlve Appeals Office 
WAC 04 05 1 50256 
Page 2 
> 
DISCUSSION: The D~rector, Cal~fornla Serv~ce Center, denied the petitlon for a nonimrnlgrant visa. The 
matter 1s now before the Adm~nlstratlve Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO w~ll d~sy~ss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to extend the employment of its president as an L-.1A 
nonimmlgrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section lOl(a)(lS)(L) of the Immigration and Nat~onality 
Act (the.Act), 8 U.S.C. $ I lOl(a)(lSj(~). Thc petitioner is a corporation organized in the State of California 
that is engaged in the import ehold appliances. The petitioner claims 
that it is the subsidiary of o. Ltd. located in Hainan, China. The 
beneficiary was initially gra ew office in the United States and was 
subsequently granted a two-year extension of stay. The petitioner now seeks to extend the benefic~ary's stay 
for an add~t~onal three-year period. 
The director denled the petition concluding that the petltloner d~d not establish that the benefic~ary w~ll be 
employed in the Ilnlted States In a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitloner subsequently filed an appeal 1 he d~rector declined to treat the appeal as a mot~on and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for revlew. On appeal, counsel for the petitloner asserts that the beneficiary 
performs work m both an execut~ve and a managerla1 capacity. In support of th~s assertion, the petitloncr 
submits additional evrdenec 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specializ'ed knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the Un~ted States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3) states that an ind~v~dual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(I) Ev~dence that the petitloner and the organizat~on which employed or w1l1 employ the 
alien are qualifying organlzat~ons as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ir)(G) of th~s sect~on. 
(11) Ev~dence that the ahen will be employed in an executive. managenal, or spec~al~~ed 
knowledge capacity, ~ncluding a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(111) Evldence that the alien has at least one cont~nuous year'of full t~me employment 
abroad w~th a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the fillng of 
the pet~tlon. 
(IV) Evldence that the allen's pnor year of employment abroad was ~n a pos~tion that was 
managenal, executive or ~nvolved spec~al~zed knowledge and that the allen's prior 
WAC '04 05 1 50256 
Page 3 
educat~on, training, and employn~ent qual~fies hlm/her to perform the Intended 
servlces In the Un~ted States; however, the work In the United States need not be the 
same work whlch the alien performed abroad. 
The issue m the present matter IS whether the beneficiary will be employed by the Unlted States entlty In a 
pnmar~ly managerial or executive capacity. 
Section 101(a)(44)(k) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerla1 capac~ty" as an 
asslgnment w~thin an organizat~on In wh~ch the employee prln~anly: 
(I) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organlzatlon; 
(11) supervises and controls the work of other supervlsory, profess~onal, or managerial 
employees, or manages an esscntlal funct~on w~thin the organization. or a department 
or subdivision of the organlzatlon; 
(111) lf another employee or other employees are directly silpervised, has the author~ty to 
hrre and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actlons (such as 
promotion and leave authonzatlon), or ~f no other employee IS directly supervised. 
functions at a senlor level within the organlzatlonal h~erarchy or with respect to the 
funct~on managed; and 
(iv) exerc~ses discretion over the day to day operat~ons of the actlvlty or funct~on for 
whlch the employee has author~ty A first l~ne superv~sor IS not considered to be 
act~ng in a managerial capac~ty merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervlsory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
/ 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "exccut~ve capac~ty" as an 
asslgnment wtthln an organlzat~on In whlch the employee primarily- 
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision making; and 
(IV) recclves only general supervlslon or direct~on fiom hlgher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organlzatlon. 
In support of the lnltlal petltlon, the petrtioner submitted a letter dated December 4, 2003, whlch descnbed the 
beneficiary's job dutles as follows: 
WAC 04 05 1 50256 
Page 4 
I D~rect and supervrse the operation of the subs~d~ary company. 
2. Dlrect, supervise and partlc~pate m the negotlat~on for the company's Investment projects 
and sales projects. 
3. Make major decls~ons on buslness transact~ons, expanslons, staff recruitment, etc. 
4. Work out schedules and dut~es for the employees. 
5. Explore potentla1 investment projects or jolnt venture products, wh~ch meet the 
investment strategy of the parent company m Ch~na. 
6. Submit reports drrectly to the board of d~rectors of the parent company in Chma. 
The petitioner indicated on'Fonn 1-129 that it employs five people, and submitted an organizational chart 
depicting the beneficiary, a sales department mariager, a warehouse worker, a sales person. and a 
secretarylfinancial department worker. 
On December 23, 2003, the director requested addrtlonal ev~dence to establ~sh that the benefic~ary would be 
performing the duties of a manager or executlte w~th the U S. company. Specifically. the d~rector requested 
that the petltloner subnl~t a more deta~led description of the beneficlary's duties In the U S. and a copy of the 
company's organ~zat~onal chart descr~blng its managerral h~erarchy and staffing levels, including a br~ef 
description of job dut~es, educat~onal Ievel and annual salar~es/wages for all of the employees undcr the 
beneficiary's supervlslon. 
In response, the petlt~oner submitted the follow~ng descrlptron of the beneficlary's duttes. 
1. Exerc~se d~scretionary author~ty In the decls~on-making process; 
2 Make polic~es for the company In the areas of bustness planning, financ~al Issues, marketing 
onentatlon, sales strategy, customer relations and internal personnel management; 
3 Set standards for the work and general guidel~nes for each of the managerla1 poslt~ons, 
4. Make personnel decisions with regard to top and middle level managers. 
5 F~nallze business negotiations or contracts w~th other companies; 
6. Approvefd~sapprove budget and financ~al plans submitted by lower level managers. 
7. Explore potentla1 Investment projects or jolnt venture projects which meet the Investment strategy 
of the parent company In Chlna; 
8. Develop corporate plann~ng and strategies for approval by the Board of D~rectors, 
9. Subm~t reports dlrectly to the board of d~rectors of the parent company In Chlnd. 
In addition, the petitioner submitted an organizational chart that provided the following job descriptions for 
the four employees under the beneficlary's supervision: 
Financial OfficerISecretary: Asslst the presrdent in dally operation; In charge of account 
recervable and account payable. (BA degree In Busmess) 
Sales Manager: Coord~nates sales dlstnbution In Amer~ca; Determine the demand for 
products rn Amerlca; Market~ng research and market development. (College) 
WAC 04 051 50256 
Page 5 
Warehouse ClerWCustomer Servlce: Inventory, qual~ty and quantity controls of the products 
In stock. (H~gh School) 
Salesman: Represents the company by selling the products in local d~sh-lcts. In charge of 
order deliveries. (1-I~gh School) 
On January 13, 2004, the director denled the petitlon conclud~ng that the beneficiary's dut~es are not primarily 
managerial or execut~ve. The director noted that the petitloner did not establish that the beneficiary supervises 
a subordinate staff of professional, managerlal or superv~sory personnel who would relieve him from 
perfomng non-qualify~ng dutles. The director also stated that the U S. entity does not appear to have the 
organizational complexity to support an executive poslt~on 
On appeal, counsel for the pet~t~oner dlsputes the director's dec~s~on. asserting that ~t IS "arbitrary and 
capnclous and In denlal of the Petitioner and Beneficiary's due process nghts," and notlng that the dlrcctor 
approved two prevlous pet~tlons subm~tted on behalf of the beneficlary based on the same facts. Counsel 
further contends that the beneficiary performs duties In both an executive and managerlal capacity, and asserts 
that the dlrector overlooked the two professional employees supervised by the beneficlary F~nally, counsel 
contends that petitloner's "organ~zatlonal compIexttyW was not a val~d criterion for determining whether the 
beneficlary qualifies as an executive under sectlon 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of the Act. 8 U S.C. $ 1 10 I (a)(44)(B) 
Upon review of the petition and the evidence, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. When examining the executive or managerial capacity of 
the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the petitioner's description of the job duties: See 8 C.F.R. 
2142(l)(3)(). The petitioner's description of the job duties must dearly describe the duties to be 
by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are either in ,an executive or managerial 
capacity. Id. In this-case, counsel claims that the beneficiary is performing the duties of both a manager and 
an executive. A beneficiary may not claim to be employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on 
partial sections of the two statutory definitions. A petitioner must establish that a beneficiary meets e'ach of 
the four criteria set forth in the statutory definition for executive and the statutory definition for manager if it 
is represent~ng that the beneficiary is both an executive and a manager. The petitioner has not done so in this 
. . 
matter. 
On review, the petitioner has provided a vague and nonspecific description of the beneficiaryk duties that 
fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary does on a day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner statesthat 
the beneficiary's duties include "making major decisions," "making policies," "supervising and participating 
in" sales 'projects and "exploring investment projects." The petitioner did not, however, specjfy or provide 
examples of the types of decisions or policies enacted by the beneficiary;.clarify the beneficiary's actual 
duties with respect to the sales .process, or describe what specific duties "exploring investment opportunities" 
entails. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties are primarily executive 
or managerial in nature, otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the 
regulations. Fedin Bros. Cn., Lrd. 11. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), uff'd, 905 F.2d 41' (2d. Cir. 
1990). while the beneficiary clearly performs some qualifying duties. some of his responsibilities. including 
WAC 04 05 1 50256 
Page 6 
participation in sales activities and research of investment opportunities, are not traditionally managerial in 
nature. Without detailed information regarding what specific tasks the beneficiary performs on a daily basis, 
the AAO cannot determine whether the beneficiary actually performs management-level duties related to 
sales negotiations and research of investment opportunities. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 
22 I&N Dec. 158. 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing ~ntler of Treusrrre Craff of. California, 14 I&N Dee. 190 (Reg. 
Comm.' 1972)). The actual duties themselves will reveal the true nature,of the employment. Feriin Bros. Co.. 
~fd. tl. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103; 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. ~ir: 1990)." 
In its response to the director's request for evidence. the petitioner expanded the beneficiary's duties. 
However, one third of the beneficiary's ekpanded job 'duties involve oversight of several layers of 
management that do not exist within the petitioner's organization.. For example, the beneficiary is described 
as "making personnel decisions with respect to top and mjddle level managers," "setting guidelines for each 
of the managerial positions," and "approving/disapproving budgets and financial plans submitted by lower 
level managers." The petitioner employs a warehouse clerk, a secretary, a sales person, and a sales manager, 
and the petitioner does not claim that the sales manager performs managerial duties. Nor does the petitioner 
describe any lower level employees who have responsibility for preparing budgets or financial plans. Further 
the AAO notes that the initial description of the beneficiary's personnel responsibilit~es involvcd only 
"working out schedules and job duties for the employees," which are duties typically.perforn~ed by a first-line 
supervisor. The initial job description also described the beneficiary as participating in sales projects, while 
the second desciption describes him as "finalizing" business negotiations and contracts. The purpose of the 
request for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has 
been established. 8 C.F.R. @ 103.2(b)(8). When responding to a request for evidence, a petitioner cannot offer 
a new position to the beneficiary, or materially change a position's title,.its level of authority within the 
organizational hierarchy, or its associated job responsibilities. The petitioncr must establish'that the position 
offered to the beneficiary when the petition was filed merits classification as a managerial or executive 
position. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 l&N Dec. 248, 249 (Reg. Comm. 1978). The information 
provided by the petitioner in its response to the director's request for further evidence did not clarify or 
provide more specificity to the original duties of the position, but rather added new generlc duties to the job 
description. Therefore, the analysis of this criterion will be based on the job-description submitted with the 
initial petition. 
Based on the current record, the AAO is unable to determine whether the claimed managertal duties constitute 
the majority of the beneficiary's duties, or whether the beneficiary primarily performs non-managerial 
administrative or operational duties. Although the director requested a specific description of the duties 
performed by the beneficiary on a daily basis, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties does 
not establish what proportion of the beneficiary's duties IS managerial in nature, and what proportion is 
actually non-managerial. See ReplrhIic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 177 ,(D.C. Cir. 1991). This failure of. 
documentation is important, because some of the beneficiary's duties, including scheduling the work of non- 
professional employees and participating in sales projects, do not fall under traditional managerial duties as 
defined in the statute. The AAO will not accept broad, unsubstantiated assertions regarding the beneficiary's 
managerial or executive' status and speculate as to .what the actual managerial or executive duties might be 
and what proportion of time the beneficiary might devote to them. 
WAC 04 051 50256 
Page 7 I 
Counsel correctly notes on appeal that the beneficiary IS not requlred to supervise personnel. However, slnce 
the petltioner clalms that the beneficiary's duties lnvolve supervising employees, the petitroner must establlsh 
that the subordlnate employees are supervisory, professlonal, or managenal. See 5 101(a)(44)(A)(i1) of the 
Act. In this case, counsel asserts that two of the beneficiary's subordinates are professional employees the 
secretaryJfinancla1 ofticer, who IS cla~med to have a bachelor's degree in buslness administration, and the 
sales manager, whoithe petltioner asserts has a "college degree." Counsel states "both employees perform 
professlonal duties in accordance w~th their respectwe titles." However, wlthout documentary ebldence to 
support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof The assertions of 
counsel do not constitute ev~dence. Matter of Obazgbena. 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988), Mutter of 
Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983), Matter of Ram~rez-Sanchez, 17 t&N Dec 503, 506 (BIA 1980). The 
petltioner has not clhmed or submitted evidence to establlsh that these employees could be classified as 
managers or superviAors, nor is there sufficient evtdence to estabhsh that they are performing professlonal 
dutles. 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professlonal employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the 
subordlnate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minlmum for entry Into the field of endeavor 
Section 101(a)(32) o{the Act. 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(32), states that "[tlhe terrnprqfesslon shall Include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
I( schools, colleges, academies, or semlnanes." The term "profess~on" contemplates knowledge or learning. not 
1 merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of spec~alized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, whlch is a reahstlc prerequisite to entry Into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 8 17 (Comm. 1988); Mutter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Mutter of Shin, 1 1 I&$ Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education required by the position, rather than the degree held 
1 
by a subordinate employee. The possession of a bachelor's degree by a subordlnate employee does not 
automatically lead to {he concluston that an employee is employed in a professional capaclty as that term 1s 
defined above. In th6 Instant case, the petitloner has not, in fact, established that a bachelor's degree IS 
actually necessary, fo4 example, to perform the admlnlstratlve and accounts payable/rcceivabie work of the 
secretarylfinancial ofucer, who is among the beneficiary's subordinates, nor has the petltloner provided a 
sufficient description of the sales manager's duties to establ~sh whether they could be considered professional. 
Go~ng on record w~thout supporting documentary evtdence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof In these proceedings. Matter of Soficl, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. Based on the above, the AAO 
concurs wrth the director's findmg that the beneficiary will not be supervismg a staff of managerial, 
supervlsory or professional employees. An ~ndlvidual whose dutles encompass duties of a first-line supervisor 
wlll not be considered to be act~ng in a managenal capaclty merely by vlrtue of his or her supervlsory duties 
unless the employees supervised are professional. Section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act. 
i 
Counsel further asserts1 on appeal that, even if the benefic~ary IS not supervising a staff of managenal, 1 
professional or supervisory employees, he nevertheless meets the requirements of "managenal capac~ty" 
because he manages seyeral essential functions, "lnclud~ng all of the business negotlations the company 
conducts. Since [the petitloner] is a tradlng company, negotlations for sales and Investment projects are ~ts 
core bustness. The ~enelficiaq has ultimate authority over these decisions, wh~ch falls with~n the letter of the 
I 
WAC 04 05 1 50256 
Page 8 r 
detinil~on of 'manager~al' at 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(1)(il)(B)(2)." Counsel's assertion is not persuasive. The term 
"functton manager" applles generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a 
subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" withln the 
organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(44)(A)(ii). The term "essential 
function" is not defilned by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an 
essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties to be 
performed, i.e. identify the function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of thc function, and 
establish the propo$on of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. 8 
C.F.R.4 21'4.2(1)(3)(1i). In addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily .duties must 
demonstrate that the beneficiary Inatrages the function rather than perforrru the duties related to thcfunction. 
An employee who, primarily performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not 
considered to be emp'ioyed in a managerial or executive capacity. Boyang, Ltd. v. I. N.S., 67 F.3d 305 (Table), 
1995 WL 576839 (9t'h Cir, 1995)(citing Matter of C'l~urch Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 
(Cornm. 1988)); while the petitioner claims on appeal that the beneficiary manages the "business 
negotiation" inchdink sales and investment negotiations, the petitioner has not actually identified the function 
with specificity or established the beneficiary's daily duties associated with managing the function. Further, 
the description of the/beneficiaryls duties suggests that he directly participates in business, contract and sales 
negotiations, and the :;petitioner has not described other employees who perform any non-managerial duties 
related to the functioh. For these reasons, the AAO cannot detkmine whether the beneficiary is primarily 
performing the duties bf a function manager. See IKEA US, It~c. v. US. Dkpt. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22. 24 
(D.D.C. 1999). 
Counsel correctly observes that a company's size or "organlzatlonal complexity" alone, without taklng into 
account the reasonable needs of the organization, may not be the determln~ng factor In denylng a visa to a 
mult~national manager or executlve. See sectlon 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(44)(C) 
However, it 1s appropnate for CIS to consider the slze of the petit~oning company In conjunction with other 
relevant factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the 
non-managermi or non-execut~ve operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct 
bus~ness In a regular and continuous manner. See, e g Sj~stronzw Corp v INS, 153 F. Supp 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C 
2001) If staffing levels are used as a factor In determlnlng whether an indtv~dual is acting In a manager~al or 
euecut~ve capac~ty, CIS must take into account the reasonable needs of the organization in llght of the overall 
purpose and stage of development of the organi~atton. In dolng so, CIS reviews the totality of the record. 
including descnptlons ,'of a benefic~ary's dut~es and hts or her subordinate employees, the nature of the 
petitioner's business, the employment and remuneration of employees and any other facts contnbutlng to a 
complete understand~ng of a beneficiary's actual role In a business, when examlntng the n~anagertal or 
executlve capaclty of a beneficiary. 
At the time of fi ling, the petitioner was a three-year old import and wholesale distribution company with gross 
annual income in exceis of $739,000. Although the company employs staff who are responsible for U.S. 
sales, warehousing/inventory, clerical tasks, and routine bookkeeping, the petitioner does not employ anyone 
who is claimed to mainpin relationships with foreign suppliers or purchase products to be sold in the United 
States by the petitioner. ;Although the petitioner claims that the beneficiary manages all business negotiations, 
it has not established th+t anyone, other than the beneficiary, is responsible for negotiating with its s'uppliers. 
WAC 04 05 1 50256 
Page 9 I 
If he IS actually pe{fonn~ng these negotiations. ~t is noted that an employee who prlrnarily performs the tasks 
necessary to produce a product or to provlde servlces is not considered to be employed rn a managerlal or r 
executive capacity., Boyang, Ltd. v. I.N S., 67 F.3d 305 (Table), 1995 WL 576839 (9th Cir, 1995)(c1ting 
Mafter of Church iScientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988)). Regardless. the 
1 reasonable needs of the petltioner serve only as a factor in evaluating the lack of staff in the context of 
reviewing the cla~med managerlal or executlve duties. The petltioner must strll establtsh that the beneficiary 
is to be employed m the Unlted States in a primarily managerlal or executlve capacity, pursuant to sections li 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) or the Act. As d~scussed above, the petitioner has not established this essent~al 
element of ehg~biIit$. I 
Counsel noted that CIS approved other pet~t~ons that had been prevrously filed on behalf of the benefic~ary, 
and that all part~es had relied on the pnor approvals to make declslons to further Invest m the United States. 
Counsel further states that denial of the petition for the extension under these circumstances results In a 
violation of the pebtfoner's and the beneficiary's due process nghts. The director's decislon does not lndlcate 
whether he rev~ewed the prror approvals of the other nonlmmigrant petrtlons. If the previous non~mm~grant 
petitions were approved based on the same unsupported and contradictory assert~ons that are conta~ned in the 
current record, the approval would constitute matenal and gross error on the part of the director. The AAO 1s 1 not required to approve applications or petitions where el~glb~lity has not been demonstrated, merely because 
of prlor approvals tgat may have been erroneous. See, e g. Mutter of Clturclt Scientology Internatronal, 19 
I&N Dec 593, 5971 (Comm. 1988). It would be absurd to suggest that CIS or any agency must treat 
acknowledged errorslas binding precedent. Sitssr,~ Engg Ltd 1,. Montgomery, 825 F.2d 1084. 1090 (6th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1008 (1988). 
Furthermore, the AAO's authonty over the servlce centers 1s comparable to the relationship between a court 
of appeals and a distnct court. Even if a service center dlrector had approved the nonlmmigrant petttlons on 
behalf of the benefidary, the AAO would not be bound to follow the contradictory dec~sion of a service 
center. Loursrana Philharmonic Orchestra v. INS, 2000 WL 282785 (E D. La.), affd, 248 F.3d 1139 (5th Cir. 
2001), cert denled, 122 S.Ct. 5 1 (2001). 
The Admln~strative Appeals Office, like the Board of Immigration Appeals. 1s without authonty to apply the 
doctr~ne of equ~table istoppel so as to preclude a componcnt part of CIS from undertaking a lawful course of 
actron that ~t IS empowered to pursue by statute or regulation See Mutter ofHertlandez-Puente, 20 J&N Dec 
335, 338 (BIA 1991) 1 Estoppel is an equitable form of relief that 1s ava~lable only through the courts 1 he 
junsdict~on of the ~dhnlstrative Appeals Office is llrnited to that authonty spec~fically granted to ~t by the I Secretary of the Unlt~d States Department of Homeland Security. See DHS Delegation Number 0150 1 
(effectwe March 1, 20;103); see also 8 C.F R. 5 2.1 (2004). The jurisdiction of the AAO is l~mited to those 
matters described at 8 C F R. fj 103.l(f)(3)(E)(n1) (as In effect on February 28,2003) Accordingly. the AAO 
has no authonty to addi-ess the petitioner's equitable estoppel cla~rn 
The fact that an mdlmdhl manages a small business does not necessanly establish eligibility for classification as 
an ~ntracompany transferee m a managerial or executive capac~ty within the meaning of sectlon 101(a)(44) of the 
Act. On review, the record as presently const~tuted 1s not persuasive In demonstrating that the benefic~ary has 
been or will be employed In a pnrnarily managenal or executive capac~ty. The descnptlon of the beneficiary's 
'I 1 ! 
I 
WAC 04 051 5025,6 
Page 10 
I 
duties provided in \esponse to the Service's request for additional infmation is vague and therefore does not 
clarify what the beneficiary actually does'on a daily basis. l'he petitioner has not demonstrated that the 
li beneficiary will be primarily supervising a subordinate staff of professional. managerial, or supervisory 
personnel. or primarily managing an essential hnction within the organization. Further, the record is not 
persuasive that the beneficiary functions at a senior level within an organizational hierarchy other than in position 
title. Based on the .'kvidence submitted, it cannot be found that the beheficiary will be employed primarily in a 
qualifying managerikl or executive capacity. For this reason, the petition may not be approved. 
li 
In visa petition pro$eedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1362. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, thc 
i director's decis~on will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
,, 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.