dismissed L-1A Case: Import/Export

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. s. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form 1-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 
 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
&jdp-&/ 
John F. Grissom, Acting Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 08 110 50553 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1A 
nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of the 
State of California and is allegedly in the business of "import/export of electrical products, chemical products, 
[and] general m[a]chines." 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish (1) that the beneficiary was 
employed abroad in a primarily managerial or executive capacity; or (2) that the beneficiary will be employed 
in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the director erred and that 
the beneficiary performed abroad, and will perform in the United States, primarily qualifying duties. In 
support, the petitioner submits additional evidence, including job descriptions for the beneficiary's claimed 
subordinates abroad. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies hirnlher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
WAC 08 1 10 50553 
' Page 3 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The first issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily managerial 
or executive capacity. 
Section 10 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 10 1 (a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of 
the organization; 
(ii) 
 supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial 
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department 
or subdivision of the organization; 
(iii) 
 if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to 
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as 
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised, 
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the 
function managed; and 
(iv) 
 exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for 
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be 
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory 
duties unless the employees supervised are professional. 
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an 
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily: 
(i) 
 directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the 
organization; 
(ii) 
 establishes the goals and policies of the organization, component, or function; 
(iii) 
 exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and 
(iv) 
 receives only general supervision or direction from hlgher level executives, the board 
of directors, or stockholders of the organization. 
It is not clear whether the petitioner is claiming that the beneficiary was primarily performing managerial 
duties under section 1 0 1 (a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 10 1 (a)(44)(B) of 
the Act. Given the lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the petitioner is asserting that the beneficiary 
was employed in either a managerial or an executive capacity and will consider both classifications. 
WAC 08 1 10 50553 
Page 4 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's duties abroad as "vice president" in a letter dated February 28,2008 
as follows: 
Since February 2003, the beneficiary has [been] employed as a vice president and performed 
the executive duties of company's import, export & international trade and established goals 
and policies of the company. In this position, she had full responsibility of the staffing and 
work of the company. This responsibility included the recruitment and training of the staff. 
She was also responsible exercised [sic] the complete day-to-day discretionary authority over 
the top management. She also established the goals and policies of the parent company. She 
spent all or substantially all of her time in these managerial duties while other employees 
were handling the day-to-day operation. 
The petitioner also submitted an organizational chart for the foreign employer which shows the beneficiary 
reporting directly to the "president." However, the chart does not portray the beneficiary as having any 
supervisory responsibilities over subordinate workers.' 
On March 12, 2008, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, a more 
detailed description of the beneficiary's job duties abroad and descriptions of the titles and job duties of all 
employees under the beneficiary's supervision. 
In response, the petitioner submitted an identical job description for the beneficiary and an identical 
organizational chart for the foreign employer. The petitioner did not describe the duties of any foreign 
subordinate workers. 
On June 19, 2008, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary was employed abroad in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary primarily performed qualifying duties abroad. The 
petitioner also submits job descriptions for the beneficiary's claimed subordinates abroad. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive. 
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job 
duties must clearly describe the duties performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties were 
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. A petitioner cannot claim that some of the duties of the 
position entailed executive responsibilities, while other duties were managerial. A petitioner may not claim 
- 
I 
It is noted that the director stated in her June 19, 2008 decision that the organizational chart shows the 
beneficiary supervising directly or indirectly 37 workers. However, the AAO notes that this statement is 
erroneous and that the organizational chart does not show the beneficiary supervising anyone. To the 
contrary, the 37 workers all report directly or indirectly to the president, The beneficiary, as a 
"vice president," is placed on the chart to the right of the president and no lines connect the beneficiary's 
position to any subordinate workers. Accordingly, the director's erroneous statement will be withdrawn. 
WAC 08 110 50553 
Page 5 
that a beneficiary was employed as a hybrid "executive/manager" and rely on partial sections of the two 
statutory definitions. 
As a threshold issue, it is noted that the petitioner's attempt on appeal to supplement the record with evidence 
pertaining to the duties of the beneficiary's claimed subordinates abroad was inappropriate and will not be 
considered by the AAO. The petitioner was put on notice of required evidence and given a reasonable 
opportunity to provide it for the record before the visa petition was adjudicated. The director specifically 
requested a list of all subordinate workers abroad and job descriptions for these workers. As the petitioner 
failed to submit this requested evidence, the AAO will not consider this evidence submitted for the first time 
on appeal. See Matter of Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 
(BIA 1988). The appeal will be adjudicated based on the record of proceeding before the director. 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
acted in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary did on a day- 
to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary established goals and policies, had ''fidl 
responsibility of the staffing and work of the company," and recruited and trained staff. However, the 
petitioner does not specifically describe these goals and policies and fails to explain what, exactly, the 
beneficiary did to "recruit" and "train" staff. Furthermore, it has not been established that having "full 
responsibility of the staffing and work of the company" is a bona fide managerial or executive duty, 
especially given that the organizational chart does not portray the beneficiary as having supervisory 
responsibilities over subordinate workers and given that the petitioner fails to describe the duties of any 
additional workers. The fact that a petitioner has given a beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has 
prepared a vague job description which includes inflated job duties does not establish that a beneficiary 
actually performed managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties were primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), ard, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
Consequently, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary primarily performed qualifiing 
duties abroad. Not only are the ascribed duties so vaguely described that it cannot be determined whether 
they were qualifying in nature, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary was relieved of 
the need to perform the non-qualifying duties inherent to her duties by a subordinate staff. Accordingly, it 
appears more likely than not that the beneficiary primarily performed administrative or operational tasks 
necessary to the provision of a service or the production of a product. An employee who "primarily" 
performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that 
one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593,604 (Comm. 1988). 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary supervised and controlled the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or managed an essential function of the organization. As 
WAC 08 110 50553 
' Page 6 
noted above, it appears that the beneficiary did not supervise any workers abroad. The organizational chart 
submitted by the petitioner indicates that all the subordinate workers claimed to be employed by the foreign 
entity are directly or indirectly supervised by the president, and not by the beneficiary. Regardless, even if 
the 37 subordinate workers claimed in the organizational chart were supervised by the beneficiary, the record 
is not persuasive in establishing that any of these workers was a supervisory, managerial, or professional 
worker. The petitioner failed to describe the job titles or duties of any of these workers even though this 
evidence was specifically requested by the director in her Request for Evidence. Failure to submit requested 
evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 
103.2(b)(14). Therefore, it appears that the beneficiary was, at most, a first-line supervisor of non- 
professional workers. A managerial employee must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the 
level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the supervised employees are professionals. 9 
101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
Moreover, as the petitioner did not establish the skill level or educational background required to perform the 
duties of the subordinate positions, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary managed 
professional employees.2 Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed 
primarily in a managerial capacity.3 
2 
In evaluating whether the beneficiary managed professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the 
subordinate positions required a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor. 
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 110l(a)(32), states that "[tlhe termprofession shall include but not 
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary 
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not 
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and 
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of 
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968); 
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). 
'~lthou~h the petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary managed an essential function of the organization, 
the record would not support this position even if taken. The term "function manager" applies generally when 
a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is primarily responsible 
for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section 101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The 
term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a petitioner claims that the beneficiary 
managed an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written job offer that clearly describes the duties 
to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the function with specificity, articulate the 
essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the beneficiary's daily duties attributed to 
managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). In addition, the petitioner's description of the 
beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary managed the function rather than performed 
the tasks related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has not provided evidence that the beneficiary 
managed an essential function. The petitioner's vague job description fails to document that the beneficiary's 
duties were primarily managerial. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent by the beneficiary 
performing her duties, the AAO cannot determine what proportion of her duties were managerial, nor can it 
deduce whether the beneficiary primarily performed the duties of a function manager. See IKEA US, Inc. v. 
US. Dept. of Justice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22,24 (D.D.C. 1999). 
WAC 08 1 10 50553 
Page 7 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary acted in an "executive" capacity. The 
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex 
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's 
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must 
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization. 
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to 
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than 
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute 
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole 
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making" 
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or 
stockholders of the organization." Id. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the beneficiary acted primarily in an executive capacity. As explained above, it appears instead 
that the beneficiary primarily performed non-qualifying tasks and served as a first-line supervisor of non- 
professional workers. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was employed 
primarily in an executive capacity. 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary primarily performed managerial or 
executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for that reason. 
The second issue in the present matter is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary will 
primarily perform managerial or executive duties in the United States. 
The petitioner described the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States in an attachment to the Form I- 
129 as follows: 
In Charge of the day-to-day operations of the company. Received only general direction 
from shareholders of parent company in China. Formulate and enforce company policies for 
sales and purchasing, operational system, and accounting payable etc. Set company business 
goals and plans in order to improve sales performance. Responsible for recruitment, training, 
supervising employees in each department and provided training for the various products. 
Setting goals for promotion activities, directing and communicating with chief of every 
department to work with each others [sic] in order to meet the sales goals. Accomplish 
industry trend research and analysis as well [as] consumer research studies to search for 
possible expansion and developmental direction for the company. Exercise discretionary 
authority over company's financial matters such as budget, operational cost, fund 
management, etc. Report the company's expansion progress and financial situation to the 
parent company on a regular basis. 
The petitioner also submitted a "proposed" organizational chart for the United States operation in which the 
beneficiary is vaguely described as supervising administration, marketing, and the warehouse. 
It is noted that the petitioner indicates in the L Classification Supplement to Form 1-129 that the beneficiary is 
not coming to the United States to open a new office. 
WAC 08 1 10 50553 
Page 8 
On March 12, 2008, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, a more 
detailed organizational chart, a brief job description for each subordinate worker, and quarterly wage reports. 
In response, the petitioner failed to submit any additional evidence pertaining to the current staffing of the 
United States operation. 
On June 19, 2008, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary will be employed in a primarily managerial or executive capacity. 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary will primarily perform qualifying duties. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive. 
Once again, when examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first 
to the petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of 
the job duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such 
duties will be either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id. 
In this matter, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties fails to establish that the beneficiary 
will act in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of the petition, the petitioner has submitted a 
vague and non-specific job description which fails to sufficiently describe what the beneficiary will do on a 
day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will be in charge of day-to-day 
operations; formulate sales, purchasing, and operations policies; set goals and plans; recruit and train 
employees; conduct research studies; and exercising authority over finances. However, the petitioner does 
not specifically describe these goals, plans, and policies and fails to establish that being in charge of 
operations, recruiting and training staff, conducting research studies, and exercising authority over finances 
are bona fide managerial or executive duties. Once again, the fact that a petitioner has given a beneficiary a 
managerial or executive title and has prepared a vague job description which includes inflated job duties does 
not establish that a beneficiary will actually perform managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an 
important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties will be primarily executive or managerial in nature; 
otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., 
Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, afd, 905 F.2d 41. Going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of 
Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. 
Consequently, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary will primarily perform 
qualifying duties. Not only are the ascribed duties so vaguely described that it cannot be determined whether 
they will be qualifying in nature, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary will be 
relieved of the need to perform the non-qualifying duties inherent to her duties by a subordinate staff. To the 
contrary, it appears that the beneficiary will be the petitioner's only employee. Future hiring plans may not be 
considered in determining whether the beneficiary will primarily perform qualifying duties immediately upon 
petition approval. The petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa petition. 
A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes eligible under 
a new set of facts. Matter of Michelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Cornm. 1978). Accordingly, it 
WAC 08 1 10 50553 
Page 9 
appears more likely than not that the beneficiary will primarily perform the administrative or operational tasks 
necessary to the provision of a service or the production of a product. An employee who "primarily" 
performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" 
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101 (a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that 
one "primarily" perform the enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. 
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other 
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential hnction of the organization. 
As noted above, it appears that the beneficiary would be the petitioner's only employee in the United States 
upon petition approval. Therefore, it has not been established that the beneficiary will supervise and control 
any personnel. Likewise, it has not been established that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of 
the organization. As noted above, in order to establish that a beneficiary will manage an essential function, 
the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary will manage 
the function rather than perform the tasks related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has not 
provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job 
description fails to document that the beneficiary's duties will be primarily managerial. Accordingly, it 
appears that the beneficiary will primarily perform non-qualifying operational or administrative tasks, and the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial capacity. 
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. As 
explained above, it appears instead that the beneficiary will primarily perform non-qualiflmg administrative 
or operational tasks as the petitioner's sole employee in the United States. Therefore, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity. 
In reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner has, federal courts have generally agreed 
that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) "may properly consider an organization's small size 
as one factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. 
US. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval 
Republic of Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175, 1 78 (D.C. Cir. 199 1); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 41,42 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25,29 (D.D.C. 2003)). Furthermore, 
it is appropriate for USCIS to consider the size of the petitioning company in conjunction with other relevant 
factors, such as a company's small personnel size, the absence of employees who would perform the non- 
managerial or non-executive operations of the company, or a "shell company" that does not conduct business 
in a regular and continuous manner. See, e.g. Systronics Corp. v. INS, 153 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 
Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or 
executive duties in the United States, and the petition may not be approved for that rea~on.~ 
4 
As noted above, the petitioner indicates in the L Classification Supplement to Form 1-129 that the beneficiary 
is not coming to the United States to open a new office. However, in the event the instant petition was 
considered using the "new office" criteria set forth at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(~), the petition would be denied 
for lack of initial evidence. 8 C.F.R. 
 103.2(b)(8)(ii). The record is devoid of evidence describing the 
nature, scope, structure, or financial goals of the enterprise. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(v)(C)(l). Furthermore, the 
WAC 08 1 10 50553 
Page 10 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
director specifically requested a copy of the petitioner's business plan and feasibility study. However, the 
petitioner failed to submit these documents or address their unavailability. Once again, failure to submit 
requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
3 103.2(b)(14).