dismissed L-1A Case: Import/Export

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PUBLICCOpy
U.S.Department of Homeland Security
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rm. A3000
Washington, DC 20529
u.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services
File: WAC 06 085 51662 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: NOV 01 2001
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(15)(L)
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.
R~;~~f
Administrative Appeals Office
www.uscis.gov
WAC 06 08551662
Page 2
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal.
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to extend the employment of its president as an L­
lA nonimmigrant intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § llOl(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of California and is allegedly an import/export business. The beneficiary was initially granted
two one-year periods of stay to open a new office in the United States, and the petitioner now seeks to extend
the beneficiary's stay.
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner did not establish that the beneficiary will be
employed in the United States in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel to the petitioner asserts that the director
erred and that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive.
To establish eligibility for the L-l nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or
specialized knowledge capacity.
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3) states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be
accompanied by:
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (1)(l)(ii)(G) of this section.
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed.
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of
the petition.
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior
education, training, and employment qualifies him/her to perform the intended
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the
same work which the alien performed abroad.
WAC 06 08551662
Page 3
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(14)(ii) also provides that a visa petition, which involved the opening of a
new office, may be extended by filing a new Form 1-129, accompanied by the following:
(A) Evidence that the United States and foreign entities are still qualifying
organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(1)(ii)(G) of this section;
(B) Evidence that the United States entity has been doing business as defined in
paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(H) ofthis section for the previous year;
(C) A statement of the duties performed by the beneficiary for the previous year
and the duties the beneficiary will perform under the extended petition;
(D) A statement describing the staffing of the new operation, including the
number of employees and types of positions held accompanied by evidence
of wages paid to employees when the beneficiary will be employed in a
managerial or executive capacity; and
(E) Evidence of the financial status of the United States operation.
The primary issue in the present matter is whether the beneficiary will be employed by the United States
entity in a primarily managerial or executive capacity.
Section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(44)(A), defines the term "managerial capacity" as an
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i) manages the organization, or a department, subdivision, function, or component of
the organization;
(ii) supervises and controls the work of other supervisory, professional, or managerial
employees, or manages an essential function within the organization, or a department
or subdivision of the organization;
(iii) if another employee or other employees are directly supervised, has the authority to
hire and fire or recommend those as well as other personnel actions (such as
promotion and leave authorization), or if no other employee is directly supervised,
functions at a senior level within the organizational hierarchy or with respect to the
function managed; and
(iv) exercises discretion over the day-to-day operations of the activity or function for
which the employee has authority. A first-line supervisor is not considered to be
acting in a managerial capacity merely by virtue of the supervisor's supervisory
duties unless the employees supervised are professional.
Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(44)(B), defines the term "executive capacity" as an
WAC 06 08551662
Page 4
assignment within an organization in which the employee primarily:
(i) directs the management of the organization or a major component or function of the
organization;
(ii) establishes the goals and policies ofthe organization, component, or function;
(iii) exercises wide latitude in discretionary decision-making; and
(iv) receives only general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board
of directors, or stockholders of the organization.
The petitioner does not clarify in the initial petition whether the beneficiary will primarily perform managerial
duties under section 101(a)(44)(A) of the Act, or primarily executive duties under section 101(a)(44)(B) of
the Act, although counsel on appeal appears to limit the beneficiary to an executive classification. Due to the
lack of clarity, the AAO will assume that the petitioner is asserting that the beneficiary will be employed in
either an executive or a managerial capacity and will consider both classifications.
The petitioner described the beneficiary's job duties in a letter dated January 16,2006 as follows:
Under the extended petition, [the beneficiary] will continue to oversee the operations of [the
petitioner] and she will focus on expanding the customer and client base and increasing
revenue. Some of the specific tasks she will undertake include the following:
• Oversee the development and execution of an extensive marketing plan to be carried
out by the newly hired marketing director. It is important that [the petitioner's]
marketing department complements the marketing department of the parent company
overseas. The marketing plan is expected to substantially increase the current
customer and supplier base.
• Oversee the recruitment of new employees.
• Oversee the establishment of personnel policies for new staff.
• Negotiate and execute new contracts with new customers and suppliers.
• Represent [the petitioner] at national and international trade shows.
• Meet with current customers and potential customers.
• Oversee the budget and financial aspects of the business and direct the administrative
assistant who handles the bookkeeping.
The petitioner also claims to employ, in addition to the beneficiary, a marketing director and an office
WAC 06 08551662
Page 5
manager. The petitioner submitted an organizational chart showing the beneficiary supervising these two
subordinate employees. Moreover, the petitioner submitted 2005 Forms W-2 for the beneficiary and the
office manager and a Form 1-9 indicating that the marketing director was hired on January 1, 2006. The
instant petition was filed on January 20, 2006. Finally, the petitioner submitted a "projected" organizational
chart showing the marketing director and office manager supervising proposed staff members.
On February 7, 2006, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, an
organizational chart, which includes brief descriptions of the job duties of all subordinate employees, and
quarterly wage reports.
In response, the petitioner submitted job descriptions for the marketing director and office manager. The
marketing director's duties are described generally as designing and implementing the petitioner's marketing
plan. The petitioner also asserts that the marketing director has earned a bachelor's degree in business. The
office manager's duties are described generally as bookkeeping and office management. The petitioner also
claims to have hired a "purchasing manager" after the filing of the instant petition.
Furthermore, the petitioner submitted its quarterly wage report for the first quarter of 2006. This report
indicates that the petitioner employed only the beneficiary and the marketing director at the time the petition
was filed. The record indicates that the petitioner did not employ the office manager after December 30, 2005
and that, in her absence, the marketing director performed her duties.
On July 12, 2006, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to
establish that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial or executive capacity.
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary's duties are primarily those of an executive.
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive.
Title 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(v)(C) allows the "new office" operation one year within the date of approval of
the petition to support an executive or managerial position. Despite the one-year extension previously
approved by the director in this matter, there is no provision in Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)
regulations that allows for an extension of the one-year "new office" period. If the business does not have
sufficient staffing after one year to relieve the beneficiary from primarily performing operational and
administrative tasks, the petitioner is ineligible by regulation for an extension. In the instant matter, the
United States operation has not reached the point that it can employ the beneficiary in a predominantly
managerial or executive position.
When examining the executive or managerial capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). The petitioner's description of the job
duties must clearly describe the duties to be performed by the beneficiary and indicate whether such duties are
either in an executive or managerial capacity. Id.
The petitioner's description of the beneficiary's job duties has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act
in a "managerial" or "executive" capacity. In support of its petition, the petitioner has provided a vague and
WAC 06 08551662
Page 6
nonspecific description of the beneficiary's duties that fails to demonstrate what the beneficiary will do on a
day-to-day basis. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will "oversee" the petitioner's
operations, the recruitment of employees, and the establishment of personnel policies. However, the
petitioner does not explain what, exactly, the beneficiary will do in "overseeing" these duties when the
petitioner does not employ a subordinate staff assigned to perform the inherent non-qualifying tasks. The fact
that the petitioner has given the beneficiary a managerial or executive title and has prepared a vague job
description which includes overly broad duties does not establish that the beneficiary will actually perform
managerial or executive duties. Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties
are primarily executive or managerial in nature; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a matter
of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905
F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972).
Likewise, the petitioner did not provide a breakdown of how much time the beneficiary will devote to the
many duties ascribed to her. This is particularly important in this matter because many of the duties listed by
the petitioner appear to be non-qualifying administrative or operational tasks which will not rise to the level
of being managerial or executive in nature. For example, the petitioner states that the beneficiary will
negotiate and execute contracts with new customers and suppliers, represent the petitioner at trade shows, and
meet with current customers and potential customers. However, such duties constitute non-qualifying
administrative or operational tasks. As the organizational chart and job descriptions for the subordinate
employees fail to identify any workers who will relieve the beneficiary of the need to perform the non­
qualifying tasks inherent to both these duties and the management of the business in general, it must be
concluded that she will perform these tasks. As the petitioner has not established how much time the
beneficiary will devote to such non-qualifying tasks, it cannot be confirmed that she will "primarily" be
employed as a manager or an executive. An employee who "primarily" performs the tasks necessary to
produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily" employed in a managerial or
executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act (requiring that one "primarily" perform the
enumerated managerial or executive duties); see also Matter af Church Scientology International, 19 I&N
Dec. 593, 604 (Comm. 1988).
The petitioner has also failed to establish that the beneficiary will supervise and control the work of other
supervisory, managerial, or professional employees, or will manage an essential function of the organization.
As explained in the organizational chart, wage reports, and job descriptions for the subordinate staff members,
the beneficiary appears to supervise one subordinate employee, the marketing director, who was hired
approximately three weeks before the filing of the instant petition. However, the petitioner has not
established that this employee will be primarily engaged in performing supervisory or managerial duties. To
the contrary, it appears that this employee will perform the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide
a service, e.g., marketing and, in the absence of the office manager, bookkeeping and clerical tasks.
Furthermore, the petitioner's actual and planned employment of additional staff after the filing of the instant
petition is not relevant to the instant petition and may not be used to qualify the beneficiary as a managerial or
executive employee. The petitioner must establish eligibility at the time of filing the nonimmigrant visa
petition. A visa petition may not be approved at a future date after the petitioner or beneficiary becomes
eligible under a new set offacts. Matter ofMichelin Tire Corp., 17 I&N Dec. 248 (Reg. Comm. 1978).
WAC 0608551662
Page 7
In view of the above, it appears that the beneficiary will primarily be a first-line supervisor of a non­
professional employee, the provider of actual services, or a combination of both. A managerial employee
must have authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor,
unless the supervised employees are professionals. Section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of
Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. Moreover, the petitioner has not established that the
beneficiary will manage professional employees. I Therefore, the petitioner has not established that the
beneficiary will be employed primarily in a managerial capacity.'
'In evaluating whether the beneficiary manages professional employees, the AAO must evaluate whether the
subordinate positions require a baccalaureate degree as a minimum for entry into the field of endeavor.
Section 101(a)(32) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § IlOI(a)(32), states that "[t]he term profession shall include but not
be limited to architects, engineers, lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and teachers in elementary or secondary
schools, colleges, academies, or seminaries." The term "profession" contemplates knowledge or learning, not
merely skill, of an advanced type in a given field gained by a prolonged course of specialized instruction and
study of at least baccalaureate level, which is a realistic prerequisite to entry into the particular field of
endeavor. Matter of Sea, 19 I&N Dec. 817 (Comm. 1988); Matter of Ling, 13 I&N Dec. 35 (R.C. 1968);
Matter of Shin, 11 I&N Dec. 686 (D.D. 1966). Therefore, the AAO must focus on the level of education
required by the position, rather than the degree held by the subordinate employee. The possession of a
bachelor's degree by a subordinate employee does not automatically lead to the conclusion that an employee
will be employed in a professional capacity as that term is defined above. In the instant case, the petitioner
has not, in fact, established that a bachelor's degree is actually necessary to perform the duties of the
marketing director.
2Whilethe petitioner has not argued that the beneficiary will manage an essential function of the organization,
the record nevertheless would not support this position even if taken. The term "function manager" applies
generally when a beneficiary does not supervise or control the work of a subordinate staff but instead is
primarily responsible for managing an "essential function" within the organization. See section
101(a)(44)(A)(ii) of the Act. The term "essential function" is not defined by statute or regulation. If a
petitioner claims that the beneficiary is managing an essential function, the petitioner must furnish a written
job offer that clearly describes the duties to be performed in managing the essential function, i.e., identify the
function with specificity, articulate the essential nature of the function, and establish the proportion of the
beneficiary's daily duties attributed to managing the essential function. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(ii). In
addition, the petitioner's description of the beneficiary's daily duties must demonstrate that the beneficiary
manages the function rather than performs the duties related to the function. In this matter, the petitioner has
not provided evidence that the beneficiary will manage an essential function. The petitioner's vague job
description fails to document what proportion of the beneficiary's duties would be managerial functions, if
any, and what proportion would be non-managerial. Also, as explained above, the record establishes that the
beneficiary will primarily be a first-line manager of a non-professional employee and/or will perform non­
qualifying operational or administrative tasks. Absent a clear and credible breakdown of the time spent by the
beneficiary performing her duties, the AAO cannot determine what proportion of her duties will be
managerial, nor can it deduce whether the beneficiary will primarily perform the duties of a function manager.
See IKEA US, Inc. v. Us. Dept. ofJustice, 48 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D.D.C. 1999).
WAC 06 08551662
Page 8
Similarly, the petitioner has failed to establish that the beneficiary will act in an "executive" capacity. The
statutory definition of the term "executive capacity" focuses on a person's elevated position within a complex
organizational hierarchy, including major components or functions of the organization, and that person's
authority to direct the organization. Section 101(a)(44)(B) of the Act. Under the statute, a beneficiary must
have the ability to "direct the management" and "establish the goals and policies" of that organization.
Inherent to the definition, the organization must have a subordinate level of employees for the beneficiary to
direct, and the beneficiary must primarily focus on the broad goals and policies of the organization rather than
the day-to-day operations of the enterprise. An individual will not be deemed an executive under the statute
simply because they have an executive title or because they "direct" the enterprise as the owner or sole
managerial employee. The beneficiary must also exercise "wide latitude in discretionary decision making"
and receive only "general supervision or direction from higher level executives, the board of directors, or
stockholders of the organization." !d. For the same reasons indicated above, the petitioner has failed to
establish that the beneficiary will be acting primarily in an executive capacity. The job description provided
for the beneficiary is so vague that the AAO cannot deduce what the beneficiary will do on a day-to-day
basis. Moreover, as explained above, it appears that the beneficiary will be primarily employed as a first-line
supervisor and will be performing tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide a service. Therefore, the
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be employed primarily in an executive capacity?
Counsel correctly observes that a company's size alone, without taking into account the reasonable needs of
the organization, may not be the determining factor in denying a visa to a multinational manager or executive.
See § 101(a)(44)(C) of the Act. However, in reviewing the relevance of the number of employees a petitioner
has, federal courts have generally agreed that CIS "may properly consider an organization's small size as one
factor in assessing whether its operations are substantial enough to support a manager." Family, Inc. v. U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, 469 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9 th Cir. 2006) (citing with approval Republic of
Transkei v. INS, 923 F.2d 175,178 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Fedin Bros. Co. v. Sava, 905 F.2d 41,42 (2d Cir. 1990)
(per curiam); Q Data Consulting, Inc. v. INS, 293 F. Supp. 2d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2003). Furthermore, the
reasonable needs of the petitioner will not supersede the requirement that the beneficiary be "primarily"
employed in a managerial or executive capacity as required by the statute. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B)
3It is noted that counsel to the petitioner cited the unpublished opinion in Matter ofIrish Dairy Board, A28­
845-42 (AAO Nov. 16, 1989), in support of his contention that the beneficiary is primarily employed as an
executive. In that decision, the AAO recognized that the sole employee of the petitioner could be employed
primarily as a manager or executive provided he or she is primarily performing executive or managerial
duties. However, counsel's reliance on this decision is misplaced. First, counsel has furnished no evidence to
establish that the facts of the instant petition are analogous to those in the unpublished decision. Second,
while 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) provides that AAO precedent decisions are binding on all CIS employees in the
administration of the Act, unpublished decisions are not similarly binding. Third, as explained above, the
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary will be primarily employed in an executive or managerial
capacity. This is paramount to the analysis, and a beneficiary may not be classified as a manager or an
executive if he or she will not be primarily performing managerial or executive duties regardless of the
number of people employed by the petitioner. Therefore, as the petitioner has not established this essential
element, the decision in Matter of Irish Dairy Board would be irrelevant even if it were binding and
analogous.
WAC 06 08551662
Page 9
of the Act, 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(44). Accordingly, in this matter, the petitioner has failed to establish that the
beneficiary will primarily perform managerial or executive duties, and the petition may not be approved for
that reason.
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary had been employed
abroad for at least one continuous year in a position that was managerial, executive, or involved specialized
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2(l)(3)(iii) and (iv).
In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted a letter dated January 25, 2004 from the foreign entity in
which it described the beneficiary's position abroad as "trade development manager." The foreign entity
vaguely described the beneficiary's duties abroad as "establishing and maintaining business relationships with
customers and suppliers, negotiating contracts, and directing import and export logistics" and claimed that the
beneficiary supervised "a staff of six sales personne1."
Upon review, the petitioner has not described the beneficiary as performing primarily qualifying duties
abroad. To the contrary, the petitioner has submitted a job description indicating that the beneficiary
primarily performed non-qualifying duties, e.g., working directly with customers and negotiating contracts
and serving as a first-line supervisor of sales staff. As indicated above, an employee who "primarily"
performs the tasks necessary to produce a product or to provide services is not considered to be "primarily"
employed in a managerial or executive capacity. See sections 101(a)(44)(A) and (B) of the Act; see also
Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 604. A managerial employee must have
authority over day-to-day operations beyond the level normally vested in a first-line supervisor, unless the
supervised employees are professionals. Section 101(a)(44)(A)(iv) of the Act; see also Matter of Church
Scientology International,19 I&N Dec. at 604.
Accordingly, the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary had been employed abroad for at least one
continuous year in a position that was managerial, executive, or involved specialized knowledge, and the
petition may not be approved for this additional reason.
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with
the foreign employer because it failed to establish that the foreign employer is currently doing business.
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by
"(e]vidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying
organizations." See also 8 c.P.R. § 2I 4.2(l)(l4)(ii)(A). Title 8 C.P.R. § 214.2(l)(l)(ii)(G) defines a
"qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the
qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in
paragraph (l)(1)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing business." "Doing business" is defined in pertinent
part as "the regular, systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services." 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(H).
In this matter, the record is devoid of evidence of the foreign entity currently being engaged in the regular,
systematic, and continuous provision of goods and/or services. While the petitioner submitted a letter from the
foreign entity dated over one year prior to the filing of the instant petition, a 1999 Chinese business license, a
company brochure, and a 2005 tax document, these documents are not probative of current business activity
WAC 0608551662
Page 10
abroad. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting
the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158 , 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing
Matter of Treasure Craft ofCalifornia, 14 I&N Dec. 190).
Accordingly, the petitioner has not established that it and the foreign entity are still qualifying organizations.
For this additional reason, the petition may not be approved.
The initial approval of an L-IA new office petition does not preclude CIS from denying an extension of the
original visa based on a reassessment of petitioner's qualifications. Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed.
Appx. 556, 2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004) . Despite any number of previously approved petitions , CIS
does not have any authority to confer an immigration benefit when the petitioner fails to meet its burden of
proof in a subsequent petition. See section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See
Spencer Enterprises , Inc. v. United States, 229 F . Supp. 2d 1025 , 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001) , aff'd, 345 F .3d 683
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dar v. INS, 891 F .2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews
appeals on a de novo basis).
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons , with each considered as an independent and
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's
enumerated grounds . See Spencer Enterprises , Inc., 229 F. Supp.2d at 1043 .
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving el igibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be
dismissed.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.
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