dismissed L-1B Case: Apparel Manufacturing

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
identifying drrtz da!eted to 
prevent clearly uilwai-rsnted 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Ofice ofAdministrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
- 
invasion of personal privacy 
 U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
PUBLIC CO 
V 
Services 
File: EAC 08 152 52822 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: JJN 1 2 2009 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
\Ip)(n F. Grissom 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 08 152 52822 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B intracompany transferee 
with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 
8 U.S.C. tj 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner states that it is engaged in the design and manufacture of ladies 
garments. The petitioner has employed the beneficiary in L-IB classification since April 2003 and seeks to 
continue his employment in the position of director of operations for three additional 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been and will be employed in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary holds an important position within the U.S. 
company and possesses "a type of knowledge and advanced level of expertise as well as process and 
functions, which are markedly different from the ordinary or usual, particularly in relation to the design of 
apparel specifically required by Indian customers." Counsel asserts that the petitioner submitted sufficient 
evidence to establish the beneficiary's employment in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
' The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(15)(ii) provides, in pertinent part, that the total period of stay may not 
exceed five years for aliens employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. The record shows that the 
beneficiary was first admitted to the United States in L-1B classification on April 17, 2003. The validity of 
the beneficiary's most recent L-1B petition expired on March 2,2008. Therefore, if the petitioner established 
that the beneficiary was otherwise eligible for the classification sought, the extension could not be granted 
beyond April 16, 2008, absent additional, documentary evidence of the beneficiary's absences from the 
United States. 
EAC 08 152 52822 
Page 3 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. $5 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $214.2(l)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner filed the nonimmigrant visa petition on April 28, 2008. The petitioner stated on Form 1-129, 
Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, that the beneficiary would be employed as "Director of Operations," 
responsible for "management of USA operations." The petitioner stated that it has 11 employees and is engaged 
in the design and manufacture of ladies garments. The petitioner did not provide any information regarding the 
beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States on the L Classification Supplement to Form 1-129, nor did it 
submit a statement or letter in support of the petition. 
Accordingly, on June 27, 2008, the director issued a request for further evidence (RFE), instructing the petitioner 
to provide additional evidence in support of its claim that the beneficiary will be employed in a specialized 
knowledge capacity. The director requested: a copy of the petitioner's organizational chart; information regarding 
the number of persons holding similar positions in the U.S. company; an explanation regarding how the 
beneficiary's duties are different from those of other workers employed by the petitioner or other similarly- 
employed workers; and an explanation regarding the company equipment, system, product, technique or service 
of which the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
In response to the RFE, the petitioner's vice president, 
 submitted a letter in which he attempted 
to address the director's concerns. 
 noted that the beneficiary's position requires him to utilize his 
EAC 08 152 52822 
Page 4 
"specialist knowledge of the company's business and practices" gained as a result of his ten years of experience in 
the United Kingdom and United States. Specifically, he stated that such knowledge includes expertise in cost 
cutting, staff recruitment and development, account acquisition, customer retention, as well as "business skills to 
trouble shoot in areas of the petitioning company." 
escribed the beneficiary's proposed duties as the following: 
Apply expert knowledge gained with the UK and the U.S. company over the last 10 years 
to manage and oversee events in the region, to raise the petitioning company's portfolio, 
brand awareness and increase revenue. 
Lead joint market activities in the region to help increase the petitioning company's 
business results. 
Develop propositions for new vertical and horizontal markets, using the networks and 
contacts that he has built up whilst working both here in the U.S. and for the UK company. 
Provide strategic and competitor information to the President of [the petitioner's group]. 
Leading the re-structuring of the showroom and the warehouse for the petitioning company 
to enable for stabilization . . . . 
Identify and prioritize key business opportunities. Implement short and medium-term 
business development and marketing support objectives. 
Promote greater awareness of internal policies, strategies, programs, products, services and 
opportunities to employees of the petitioning company 
Manage and co-ordinate the production of the apparel in India in both Hindi and Punjabi. 
Liaise with the customers to develop and implement service development plans. 
Ensure staff adheres to the internal policies, methods and procedures. 
Responsible for the recruitment and interviewing of new employees and on-going staff 
development. 
stated that the beneficiary has gained "extensive experience and specialist expertise in all aspects of 
the business of clothing design and manufacture" based on his five years of employment with the U.S. company, 
as well as an understanding of the company's "future business strategy, products and services." In addition, he 
indicated that the beneficiary "has a unique and in-depth knowledge of the business techniques, management style 
and customers," which is vital for business growth. 
The petitioner submitted an organizational chart which lists positions for both the United Kingdom and United 
States operations of the company. The chart does not identify any employees by name. However, it shows that the 
director of operations, the beneficiary's position, reports to the vice president and supervises a warehouse 
supervisor and warehouse team, as well as an accounts manager and accounts team. 
The director denied the petition on August 26, 2008, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity requiring 
specialized knowledge. In denying the petition, the director acknowledged the petitioner's response to the RFE, 
but found that letter was submitted without any corroborating evidence relating to the claimed 
specialized knowledge. The director hrther found that the organizational chart was deficient, as it did not 
identify the job duties of other employees as requested and did not assist USCIS in making comparisons between 
the knowledge possessed by the beneficiary and that possessed by other company employees. 
EAC 08 152 52822 
Page 5 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner states: 
[The beneficiary] will assume the important position of Director Operations. [He] possesses the 
advanced level specialized knowledge in all aspects of the business of clothing design and 
manufacture. 
Such advanced level of specialized knowledge of the business techniques, management style and 
customers will enhance the marketing of the petitioner's products in the competitive garment 
industry, particularly in the large Indian community in the greater New York area. 
[The beneficiary] must be intimately familiar with the organization's future business strategy, 
products and services, management and coordination of the production of apparel in India. 
The above description of [the beneficiary's] duties fully establishes that she [sic] possesses 
advanced specialized knowledge of Indian made apparel which is clearly not available in the 
United State[s] and, therefore, will be employed in the qualifying capacity in accordance with 8 
CFR 5 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii). 
Accordingly, [the beneficiary's] duties with the petitioner will be of the type that requires his 
advanced level of expertise and proprietary knowledge of the petitioner's product, i.e., the 
manufacture and production of apparel in India which expertise and knowledge are not in the 
current market readily available in the United States. Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 
1982). 
It should be noted that [the beneficiary] possess the type of advanced level specialized 
knowledge and expertise that are different from the ordinary or usual, particularly in relation to 
the design of apparel specifically required by Indian customers. The techniques used by [the 
beneficiary] are definitely not readily available in the U.S. job market. 
In short [the beneficiary] definitely possesses a type of knowledge and advanced level of 
expertise as well as process and functions, which are markedly different from the ordinary or 
usual design and cuts available in the United States. 
It can be reasonably stated that the employment of [the beneficiary] is valuable and critical for 
the petitioner to remain competitive in the marketplace for garment and apparel primarily gears 
[sic] towards Indian populations in the United States. 
Upon review, counsel's assertions are not persuasive. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
has specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as 
defined at 8 C.F.R. § 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
EAC 08 152 52822 
Page 6 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ 
Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 53 7 (1 982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14-15 (D.D.C., 1990).~ 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AA0 must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
I 756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F .Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 10 1 (a)( 15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L- 1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 \;VL 5815. The legislative history ofthe 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster 's New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
2 
 Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
EAC 08 152 52822 
Page 7 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,919 Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd. v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the tern 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
4 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L-1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
2 14(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Cf: Ponce-Lelva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
EAC 08 152 52822 
Page 8 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 4 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual 
determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, 
articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
4 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of the 
claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge. Although the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a 
"specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. 
The petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish the 
beneficiary's role from that of other operations managers employed in the apparel manufacturing industry. 
For example, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary has developed "business skills" for troubleshooting 
areas for improvement, "expertise" in cost-cutting efficiency and staff recruitment and development, and 
"expertise in all aspects of the business of clothing design and manufacture." Such knowledge and expertise 
would likely be possessed by any manager in the industry and is not specific to the petitioning company. 
The record is devoid of any documentary evidence that the beneficiary's position involves special knowledge 
of the petitioning organization's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other 
interests as required in the regulations. While the petitioner claims that the beneficiary utilizes specialized 
knowledge of the petitioner's business strategy, products, services, business techniques, management style 
and customers, the petitioner has not described how he utilizes this knowledge, provided evidence or 
otherwise described the techniques, strategies, and management style used by the petitioner's group, or 
EAC 08 152 52822 
Page 9 
adequately explained how the beneficiary gained his claimed specialized knowledge, other than stating that he 
was employed by the petitioner's overseas affiliate for five years. Given that the petitioning company is more 
than 25 years old, it is not evident that the beneficiary's knowledge is comparatively "advanced" within the 
organization. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) 
(citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Here, the petitioner has indicated that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge as a result of his 
employment with the foreign entity, which gave him "intimate knowledge" of the company's strategies, 
techniques and products. However, the record contains no detailed employment history for the beneficiary, 
and the petitioner does not claim that he received any special training, such that the AAO could determine 
exactly what "special" or "advanced" knowledge the beneficiary possesses or how he acquired it. Finally, the 
petitioner states that the beneficiary's knowledge could only be gained by prior experience with the company 
abroad and that his knowledge could not easily be transferred to another employee. Again, no evidence has 
been submitted to support these claims. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Id. At 165. The petitioner 
indicates that merely working within the petitioner's group for a significant length of time in "various 
positions" is sufficient to bestow "special knowledge" or an "advanced level of knowledge." While it may be 
correct to say that the beneficiary is an experienced employee, this fact alone is not enough to bring the 
beneficiary to the level of specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel attempts to distinguish the petitioner's operations and the beneficiary's knowledge from 
that generally held in the garment manufacturing industry by noting that the beneficiary must be intimately 
familiar with "the manufacture and production of apparel in India which expertise and knowledge are not in 
the current market readily available." Counsel further emphasizes that Indian-manufactured garments are 
"markedly different from the ordinary or usual design and cuts available in the United States." However, 
knowledge of Indian garment designs and manufacturing processes is not in fact specific to the petitioning 
organization. It is reasonable to believe that many U.S. companies have counterparts in India which design 
and manufacture garments which are then imported for distribution among the Indian community in the 
United States. Regardless, the record contains no documentary evidence regarding the type of garments 
manufactured by the petitioning organization or the location of its manufacturing facilities. The petitioner is 
simply described as a ladies garment manufacturer with an affiliate in the United Kingdom. Without 
documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of 
proof. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 
533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N 
Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the petitioner had submitted documentation to establish that it designs Indian 
garments which are manufactured in India, the petitioner has not explained how this business model would 
automatically impart the petitioner's employees with specialized knowledge. Based on the limited evidence in 
the record, it appears that the beneficiary himself is not involved in the design or manufacturing of garments, 
but rather, according to the petitioner's organizational chart, oversees the petitioner's warehouse manager and 
account manager. Therefore, it appears that his duties would be related to overseeing warehouse and account 
functions rather than design and manufacturing. 
EAC 08 152 52822 
Page 10 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex 
products, by itself will not equal "special knowledge."3 An expansive interpretation of specialized knowledge in 
which any experienced employee would qualify as having special or advanced knowledge would be untenable, 
since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the United States in L-IB classification. 
The term "special" or "advanced" must mean more than experienced or skilled. 
Importantly, the record is not persuasive in establishing why, exactly, any of the beneficiary's company- 
specific knowledge, such as its "methodology" cannot be imparted to a similarly experienced garment 
industry manager, in a relatively short period of time. The lack of detail with respect to explaining the 
company-specific knowledge required for the position precludes a finding that such knowledge is truly 
specialized or advanced. Again, going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes 
of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the 
knowledge possessed by experienced managers in the petitioner's industry. The fact that workers outside the 
organization have not been exposed to the petitioner's specific processes and strategies does not alone 
establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed advanced or special. All employees can be said to possess 
unique skill sets to some degree; however, a skill set that can be easily imparted to another similarly educated 
and generally experienced employee is not "specialized knowledge." Moreover, the petitioner has not 
submitted evidence that any knowledge of its products, strategies or methodologies can be considered 
"special" or "advanced." Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the petitioner's processes, 
procedures, and technologies require this employee to have knowledge beyond what is common in the 
industry. This has not been established in this matter. There is no indication that the beneficiary has any 
knowledge of the company's methodologies or processes which would truly separate him from any other 
similarly-employed worker within the petitioner's organization or in the industry at-large. 
Therefore, based on the evidence presented and applying the statute, regulations, and binding precedents, the 
petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that he has been or would be 
employed in the United States in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will 
be dismissed. 
The AAO notes for the record that the petitioner did not file the petition for an extension within the required 
time frame. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(14)(i) provides, in pertinent part, that a petition extension 
may be filed only if the validity of the original petition has not expired. In the present case, the beneficiary's 
authorized period of stay expired on March 2, 2008. However, the petition for an extension of the 
As observed above, the AAO notes that the precedent decisions that predate the 1990 Act are not categorically 
superseded by the statutory definition of specialized knowledge, and the general issues and case facts themselves 
remain cogent as examples of how the INS applied the law to the real world facts of individual adjudications. 
USCIS must distinguish between skilled workers and specialized knowledge workers when making a 
determination on an L-1B visa petition. The distinction between skilled and specialized workers has been a 
recurring issue in the L-1B program and is discussed at length in the INS precedent decisions, including Matter of 
Penner. See 18 I&N Dec. at 50-53. (discussing the legislative history and prior precedents as they relate to the 
distinction between skilled and specialized knowledge workers). 
EAC 08 152 52822 
Page 11 
beneficiary's L-1A status was filed on April 28, 2008, almost two months following the expiration of the 
beneficiary's status. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 8 214.1(~)(4), an extension of stay may not be approved for an 
applicant who failed to maintain the previously accorded status or where such status expired before the 
application or petition was filed. As the extension petition was not timely filed, it is noted for the record that 
the beneficiary is ineligible for an extension of stay in the United States. 
The AAO acknowledges that USCIS previously approved two L-1B nonimmigrant petitions filed on behalf of 
the beneficiary. The prior approvals, however, do not preclude USCIS from denying an extension of the visa 
petition based on a reassessment of the petitioner's qualifications. See Texas A&M Univ. v. Upchurch, 99 Fed. 
Appx. 556,2004 WL 1240482 (5th Cir. 2004). 
If other nonimmigrant petitions were approved based on the same unsupported assertions that are contained in 
the current record, the approvals would constitute material and gross error on the part of the director. Neither 
the director nor the AAO is required to approve applications or petitions where eligibility has not been 
demonstrated, merely because of prior approvals that may have been erroneous. See, e.g. Matter of Church 
Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593, 597 (Comm. 1988). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.