dismissed L-1B

dismissed L-1B Case: International Relations

📅 Date unknown 👤 Organization 📂 International Relations

Decision Summary

The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that her employment in the U.S. would be in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. The AAO agreed with the director's findings and dismissed the appeal.

Criteria Discussed

Specialized Knowledge

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data deMd ir 
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
Office ofAdministrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC 08 256 50681 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. tj 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. tj 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
U 
Perry Rhew 
Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 08 256 50681 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa and the 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B intracompany transferee 
with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 
8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a not-for-profit organization established under the laws of the 
District of Columbia. The petitioner is self-described as a global alliance of individuals and organizations 
dedicated to building a world of peace. It has regional branch offices worldwide, including an office in Tokyo, 
Japan. It seeks to employ the beneficiary in the position of international relations officer for a period of three 
years, based at its International Secretariat Ofice in Tarrytown, New York. 
The director denied the petition on December 3, 2008, concluding that the petitioner had failed to establish 
that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that she has been and would be employed in a 
capacity requiring specialized knowledge. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel asserts that the beneficiary has advanced 
knowledge of the petitioner's "proprietary methods of reaching people of differing cultural religious and 
linguistic backgrounds with a message of peace and encouraging specific performance on their parts in the 
acquisition of lasting peace in various nations and/or international regions." Counsel submits a detailed brief 
in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3) hrther states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
EAC 08 256 50681 
Page 3 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
Under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, an alien is eligible for classification as a nonimmigrant if the alien, 
among other things, will be rendering services to the petitioning employer "in a capacity that is managerial, 
executive, or involves specialized knowledge." Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), 
provides the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge 
of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. tj 214,2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and whether she has been and will be employed in a capacity requiring specialized 
knowledge. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker on September 30, 2008. The 
petitioner indicated that the beneficiary has been employed by its regional office in Tokyo, Japan since April 
2007 in the position of international relations officer. 
In a letter dated September 17, 2008, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary would perform the following 
duties as an international relations officer in the United States: 
Communicating and liaising with all of our national chapters throughout the world. 
Managing and overseeing online inquiries from the general public, as well as our 
international project participants; 
Creating various reports for [the petitioner] in order to monitor our progress in the 
world; 
Collecting materials and other information regarding [the petitioner's] activity for 
inclusion in our various newsletters; 
Tracking and monitoring [the petitioner's] programs conducted by all of our regional 
chapters; 
Organizing and arranging conferences in the US and abroad; 
Aiding in the planning, development and coordination of the Global Peace Festival. 
EAC 08 256 50681 
Page 4 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary performs essentially the same duties in her role as an 
international relations officer for the petitioner's Tokyo, Japan office, where she "has acquired valuable skills 
in international negotiations as well as an intimate understanding of our organization's goals, policies and 
objectives - most of which we consider highly proprietary in nature." 
the foreign entity, who further described the beneficiary's current duties as the following: 
[Slhe is responsible for communicating with [the petitioner's] Headquarters and other 
national chapters, managing online inquiries sent from [the] general public and regular 
project participants mostly within Japan and also in other countries. She's responsible for 
creating reports such as biannual progress reports to the founder and Co-Chairman of [the 
petitioner] and special reports on activities of [the foreign entity] on occasion. [The 
beneficiary] also writes articles for the monthly newsletter of [the foreign entity], Heiwa 
Taishi (Ambassadors for Peace) published for the Ambassadors for Peace (those who have 
been awarded as an Ambassador for Peace for their high achievement in working for world 
peace), partners, participants and the general public. She is responsible for collecting 
materials and writing about [the petitioner's] activities in other countries for the newsletter. 
From the latter half of 2007, she contributed to developing GPF-Japan by providing 
innovative ideas for setting key goals and concepts for GPF ongoing programs and building 
new monitoring and reporting schemes. She became responsible for tracking and monitoring 
GPF programs conducted by regional chapters of [the foreign entity]. Her insights and 
devotion to ensuring the programs being monitored regularly and coordinated for the vision 
of GPF was particularly impressive and beneficial for measuring progress of the project as a 
whole when the operation of its ongoing program is scattered in several regions in Japan. 
stated that the beneficiary is being reassigned to the United States to work for the petitioner's 
Global Peace Festival project, where she "will contribute to raising the standard of GPF world-wide." 
 He 
emphasized that the beneficiary "has extensive knowledge about the project" and can fill the position without 
the need for any additional training. He further stated: 
I recognize her as the most qualified and appropriate person for the position at [the 
petitioner's headquarters] because of her outstanding foreign language skills, abundant 
international experiences of living and participating in peace-building projects, and her ability 
to understand, communicate and work with people from different national and cultural 
backgrounds. 
On October 6,2008, the director issued a request for additional evidence (RFE). The director advised that the 
initial evidence was insufficient to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that she 
will be employed in a position requiring specialized knowledge. The director instructed the petitioner to 
submit, inter alia: (1) probative evidence showing that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy 
or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners in the beneficiary's field of 
endeavor; (2) the beneficiary's resume and training records; (3) evidence that the beneficiary possesses 
knowledge of a product or process that cannot be easily transferred or taught to another individual; (4) 
EAC 08 256 50681 
Page 5 
organizational charts for the U.S. and foreign entities; and (4) a statement describing in detail the specialized 
knowledge the beneficiary possesses. 
In a letter dated November 14, 2008, the petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary "is in no way simply a 
'skilled worker."' The petitioner further described the beneficiary's specialized knowledge as follows: 
Review of the pertinent regulation . . . reveals that [the beneficiary] possesses specialized 
knowledge of our organization's service, research, techniques, management and other 
interests that [the petitioner] has worldwide. She also possesses a very advanced level of 
knowledge and expertise in [the petitioner's] processes and procedures. 
As our International Relations Office[r], [the beneficiary] will be given the immense 
responsibility of handling all of our international relations duties between our worldwide 
headquarters in Tarrytown, New York and all of our affiliates throughout the world. It is a 
fact that outside of Asia, English has become a standard second language in many developing 
nations. In Asia, however, the English speaking abilities of our partners is seriously lacking, 
and [the beneficiary] is key in addressing those concerns as she is fluent in Japanese, Korean, 
Thai, and, of course, English. 
The petitioner reiterated the job duties provided in its initial letter, and emphasized that performance of such 
duties requires "a deep understanding of [the petitioner's] goals in effectuating peace throughout the world" 
and "an acute sensitivity to the cultural differences of all the individuals she communicates with." The 
petitioner indicated that the beneficiary "represents [the petitioner's headquarters] to the world" and "must be 
able to facilitate peaceful exchanges." The petitioner further discussed the beneficiary's qualifications: 
Again, it is not only the language skills that make [the beneficiary] perfectly and legally 
suitable for the proposed position: but her entire life experience. During the twenty-four years 
of [the beneficiary's] life, she has actually resided . . . in four different countries. In addition, 
she has spent significant time visiting 11 countries, and these experiences shaped her 
understanding of the world and cultural differences in a way that makes her exactly suited for 
the offered position at [the petitioner]. 
To work as our International Relations Officer at our worldwide headquarters means that she 
will be spending great amounts of time communicating with our affiliates from all around the 
world involving huge events . . . . All of these events require a competent individual with 
specialized knowledge of how these events fit within out [sic] organizational goals in order 
for them to be effectively carried out. 
[The beneficiary's] specialized knowledge and abilities include her possession of critical 
knowledge about [the petitioner's] world goals that are invaluable to us as an organization - 
how to bring peace, how to deliver an effective peaceful message, and, most importantly, 
EAC 08 256 50681 
Page 6 
how to encourage others to effectively communicate that message to our participants such 
that it leads to actual, measurable, positive change in the world. 
The petitioner further stated that the beneficiary is "uniquely qualified" for the position and a "once-in-a- 
lifetime candidate" for the position, because she "possesses an extraordinary ability to work with people from 
all countries and every type of cultural background." The petitioner provided a detailed background of the 
beneficiary's life experiences, noting that such experiences are "training that could never be duplicated in the 
classroom or even through extensive field exercises." In addition, the petitioner emphasizes that the 
beneficiary is open-minded, able to embrace all sorts of cultures and ways of life with respect, and "is very 
comfortable communicating with people in developing countries." The petitioner further stated: 
This kind of sensitivity in character, that I have seen displayed in thousands of ways in her 
communication abilities, exactly defines how we want our International Relations Officer to 
present [the petitioner] to our affiliates and the world. In a nutshell, she is our ambassador as 
ambassadors of peace. That kind of cultural sensitivity and deftness of international 
communicating ability just cannot be taught; therefore we could never simply hire a U.S. 
worker and train that person to take on the proposed position. 
[The beneficiary] can see even small things from a word used in our activity reports or news 
articles about developing countries that people from developed countries would not notice 
because she was brought up in such a developing nation. We have never met anyone with the 
type of specialized abilities that [the beneficiary] possesses. 
The petitioner went on to provide a detailed description of the skills and knowledge required to perform each 
of the beneficiary's proposed job duties. The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary will spend 20 percent of 
her time "communicating and liaising with all of our national chapters throughout the world," a duty which 
requires the beneficiary's language skills and "a basic instinct and understanding of the entire cultural 
situation . . . surrounding the communication, itself." The petitioner noted that it requires the beneficiary "due 
to her understanding and appreciation of the many cultures that our organization must communicate with in 
order to effectively champion our goals for world peace," and "to make reports and proposals that are 
balanced, fair and respectful." In addition, the petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary is "intimately aware 
of our goals," and "would be a key employee in our organization because she is truly amazing at 
accomplishing such goal[s] consistently." 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary will devote another 20 percent of her time to managing and 
overseeing online inquiries from the general public and international project participants. The petitioner 
emphasized that it can only afford one international relations officer and it is essential that the position be 
filled by someone who can communicate in Japanese, Korean and English, in order to manage the volume of 
inquiries effectively. The petitioner noted that the international relations officer must also be "intimately 
familiar with [the petitioner's] overall organizational goals and our specific program goals for the Global 
Peace Festival." 
EAC 08 256 5068 1 
Page 7 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary will devote ten percent of her time to creating various reports to 
monitor the organization's progress in the world which requires "a very specialized understanding of how [the 
petitioner] wants to spread peace throughout the world and how we can improve our efforts." The beneficiary 
would devote an additional ten percent of her time to "collecting materials and other information regarding 
[organizational] activity for inclusion in our various newsletters." In this regard, the petitioner indicates that 
the beneficiary "must have a detailed understanding of the type of message we wish to convey in our various 
newsletters, brochures and announcements." Another ten percent of the beneficiary's time would be allocated 
to tracking and monitoring programs conducted by regional chapters, including direct contact with leaders of 
overseas organizations. The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary is qualified to perform this duty based on 
her understanding of the petitioner's goals and "her incredibly sharp, astute, and perceptive ability when 
communicating with those leaders." 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary would also devote 10 percent of her time to organizing and 
arranging conferences in the United States and abroad. The petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary, in her 
role with the foreign entity, "has acquired valuable skills in international negotiations as well as an intimate 
understanding of our organization's goals, policies and objectives - most of which we consider highly 
proprietary in nature because it takes extensive time and dedication to truly understand the how [sic] we wish 
to accomplish world peace." 
Finally, the petitioner indicated that the beneficiary will devote the remaining 20 percent of her time to aiding 
in the planning, development and coordination of the Global Peace Festival, and noted that she had 
experience in organizing large events during her tenure with the foreign entity. 
The director denied the petition on December 3, 2008, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that 
the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that she has been or would be employed in a position 
requiring specialized knowledge. In denying the petition, the director found that the position appears to 
require skills and proficiencies that are basic to any international relations officer position, rather than any 
specialized or advanced knowledge that is specific to the petitioning organization. The director noted that the 
beneficiary has not completed any training during her employment with the organization, thus raising doubts 
regarding the complexity and specialized nature of any organization-specific knowledge she might have 
gained. The director further found that the evidence of record did not establish that knowledge of the 
petitioner's internal methods, policies or procedures rises to the level of specialized knowledge that is 
uncommon and more advanced than similarly experienced workers in the beneficiary's field. The director 
stressed that "insider knowledge of a company's operations does not automatically constitute special or 
advanced knowledge," as "any job training at any company will provide any employee with knowledge about 
the procedures that are germane to that organization." 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the denial of the petition was legally and factually incorrect. 
Counsel asserts that the petitioner maintains that "there is nobody that it has ever met in the world with the 
specialized qualifications that [the beneficiary] brings to the table both as a result of her extensive training and 
experience she has received while working for [the foreign entity] and through her own intrinsic skills, 
abilities, and upbringing." 
EAC 08 256 5068 1 
Page 8 
Counsel suggests that by determining that the beneficiary is merely a skilled worker, the director diminished 
the importance and complexity of the duties she performs as an international relations officer. Counsel notes, 
for example, that the beneficiary's responsibility for communicating with the petitioner's national chapters 
worldwide "requires that [the beneficiary] 'put on her international relations cap' which differs for each and 
every organization she must communicate with while simultaneously adhering to [the petitioner's] mission of 
peace and sensitivity," and "adjust instantly to very sensitive and delicate social, cultural and language-related 
differences, nuances and methods of communication." Counsel asserts that the beneficiary "has such an 
astute, sharp, and accurate understanding of [the petitioner] that nobody [the petitioner's] officers have ever 
met, trained, worked with, or employed can match her abilities, knowledge, and understanding." 
Counsel further asserts: 
[The beneficiary] has advanced knowledge of [the petitioner's] developed proprietary 
methods of reaching people of differing cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds with a 
message of peace and encouraging specific performance on their parts . . . . This is essential 
to [the petitioner's] competitiveness in the peace brokering industry - one not occupied by 
very many organizations to begin with. This is knowledge that can only be gained through 
experience with [the petitioner] as a trusted member of [the petitioner] and absolutely cannot 
be easily transferred or taught to others. 
Counsel also responds to the director's observation that "the beneficiary was able to function within [the 
petitioner's] methodologies and procedures immediately after joining the foreign entity." Counsel contends 
that "only a top, small percentage of International Relations Officers could perform the duties . . . and here is 
why: [the beneficiary's] background makes her particularly unique." Counsel notes that the petitioner 
explained at length "how [the beneficiary] was so uniquely qualified even before her employment with [the 
foreign entity] commenced and specifically how those qualifications were built upon by [the foreign entity] 
through her employment there . . . ." 
Counsel contests the director's findings with respect to the beneficiary's lack of "training classes" with the 
foreign entity, asserting that "there are no classes dedicated to teaching peace production and marketing," and 
"no classes that can teach people about being sensitive to developing nations who struggle daily." Counsel 
maintains that the beneficiary's "classes were essentially her life before she got to [the petitioner]: Her time in 
Thailand, Korea, Japan, the United States and England is a part of this." 
Counsel explains that the beneficiary's "extensive training and exposure to proprietary operations commenced 
very soon after her arrival at [the foreign entity]," because she was hired "with the equivalent of an advanced 
degree in life and cross-cultural sensitivity." Counsel states that the foreign entity "built upon her prior 
experiences by teaching and introducing her to its internal and proprietary methods of spreading peace and 
love and harmony through the world," and "continues to share . . . everything about its core goals in making 
the world a better place to live . . . ." 
Counsel requests that the AAO review the entirety of the record and consider the fact that the petitioning 
organization is not a typical "for-profit" company in determining whether the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. 
EAC 08 256 50681 
Page 9 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge or that she will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined at 8 
C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. Cj 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1 982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14-15 (D.D.C., 1990).' 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 1 12, 123 (1 987) 
(citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965,967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1 756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F .Supp . at 14. 
1 
 Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the lmmigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (lNS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
EAC 08 256 50681 
Page 10 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section lOl(a)(IS)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster S New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,91" Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd v. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-IB specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 4 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
2 14(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
EAC 08 256 50681 
Page 11 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. 
 As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and prove that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. $ 11 84(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
Analysis 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. Id At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of 
the claimed specialized knowledge. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge. While the petitioner has provided a detailed description of the beneficiary's duties, the AAO 
EAC 08 256 50681 
Page 12 
concurs with the director that the beneficiary's responsibilities are not dissimilar from those normally 
performed by employees of comparable organizations and require her to handle various types of internal and 
external communication, perform data collection, prepare reports and assist with the organization of events. 
The petitioner asserts, however, that due to the unique nature of its peace-brokering mission, the role could 
not be performed by the typical skilled worker trained in international and public relations, but rather requires 
language skills, cultural sensitivity, cultural understanding, and other intrinsic talents unique to the 
beneficiary, as well as knowledge of the petitioner's "mission statement, goals and particular system of 
international relations in promoting [its] goals." 
The AAO will first address whether the beneficiary's "intrinsic abilities" have any bearing on a determination 
as to whether she possesses specialized knowledge. The record shows that the beneficiary speaks four 
languages, has resided in four different countries, has traveled extensively to different parts of the world, and 
has a record of participation in international peace projects and service projects. The petitioner emphasizes 
that the beneficiary is open-minded, able to embrace all sorts of cultures and ways of life with respect, and "is 
very comfortable communicating with people in developing countries." While these are all admirable qualities 
and consistent with the petitioner's own mission statement, the AAO cannot find that the beneficiary's life 
experiences and innate abilities, which the petitioner claims are absolutely essential to her performance as an 
international relations officer, constitute specialized knowledge specific to the petitioning organization. The 
petitioner may find the beneficiary to be a perfect fit for their organization based on the talents, skills, life 
experiences, and shared viewpoints she possessed when she was hired, and may even deem these qualities to 
be impossible to find in another individual. However, these personal traits do not establish the beneficiary's 
eligibility for L-1B classification. 
The petitioner emphasizes that it is the combination of the beneficiary's innate skills, talents and experiences 
and her knowledge of the petitioner's "mission statement, goals and particular system of international relations 
in promoting organizational goals" and "proprietary method of spreading peace and love and happiness" 
which makes the beneficiary's knowledge truly advanced and specialized. The AAO notes that while the 
petitioner devoted several pages of explanation regarding the beneficiary's life experiences gained prior to 
joining the foreign entity, the petitioner has not explained in any detail the "system of international relations" 
or "proprietary methods" it uses to achieve its peace-brokering goals, or how the beneficiary's knowledge of 
such system is advanced within the organization. As noted above, the petitioner must articulate with 
specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge and describe how such knowledge is typically 
gained within the organization. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient 
for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 
(Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
The AAO concurs with counsel that the petitioner is not required to establish that it offers classes or other 
formal training to its employees, but it must still demonstrate how knowledge of and experience with its 
internal systems, methods and procedures alone constitutes specialized knowledge. While the current 
statutory and regulatory definitions of "specialized knowledge" do not include a requirement that the 
beneficiary's knowledge be proprietary, the petitioner cannot satisfy the current standard merely by stating 
that the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge is proprietary. The knowledge must still be either 
"special" or "advanced." The petitioner's goals and mission statement are set forth in the organization's 
published documentation, which is readily available to the public. While the petitioner indicates that the 
EAC 08 256 50681 
Page 13 
beneficiary embraces and supports the petitioner's goals, and is able to effectively communicate and further 
these goals, the petitioner has not explained how knowledge of the petitioner's goals and mission statement 
would rise to the level of specialized knowledge. 
The proprietary specialized knowledge in this matter is also stated to include proprietary goals, policies and 
objectives, and "unique strategies, procedures, operations and objectives." However, based on the petitioner's 
representations, these goals, objectives, strategies and policies, were readily learned on-the-job by the 
beneficiary. Presumably, such knowledge could also be readily learned by others who have the requisite 
international relations background and experience with similar organizations. Furthermore, it is reasonable to 
believe that the petitioner expects all of its professional and executive-level employees to be intimately 
familiar with its internal processes and methodologies for carrying out its mission. The fact that the 
beneficiary may have additional language and communications skills and life experiences which assist her in 
excelling in her duties does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge specific to the petitioning 
organization is indeed special or advanced. 
It is appropriate for USCIS to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 120 (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. at 6 18 and Matter of 
LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. at 816). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. 
The AAO acknowledges that the specialized knowledge need not be narrowly held within the organization in 
order to be considered "advanced." However, it is equally true to state that knowledge will not be considered 
"special" or "advanced" if it is universally or even widely held throughout a company. If all similarly 
employed workers within the petitioner's organization receive essentially the same training, or in this case, 
the same exposure to the petitioner's internal processes, then mere possession of knowledge of the petitioner's 
processes and methodologies does not rise to the level of specialized knowledge. The L-1 B visa category was 
not created in order to allow the transfer of all employees with any degree of knowledge of a company's 
processes. If all employees are deemed to possess "special" or "advanced" knowledge, then that knowledge 
would necessarily be ordinary and commonplace. 
The petitioner has not successfully demonstrated that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes 
and procedures gained during her 18 months of employment with the foreign entity is advanced compared to 
other similarly employed workers within the organization. As noted above, the petitioner's attempts to 
distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as advanced based on her innate talents and her life experience is not 
persuasive. The petitioner must establish that qualities of its strategies, objectives, goals, methods and "system 
of international relations" require this employee to have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. 
This has not been established in this matter. The petitioner has not provided any information that would assist 
the AAO in comparing the beneficiary's company-specific knowledge with that of other employees, such that 
it can be classified as relatively advanced. 
EAC 08 256 50681 
Page 14 
According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex 
products, by itself will not equal "special kn~wled~e."~ An expansive interpretation of specialized knowledge in 
which any experienced employee would qualify as having special or advanced knowledge would be untenable, 
since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the United States in L-1B classification. 
The term "special" or "advanced" must mean more than experienced or skilled. In other terms, specialized 
knowledge requires more than a short period of experience, otherwise, "special" or "advanced" knowledge would 
include every employee with the exception of trainees and recent recruits. 
The AAO does not dispute that the beneficiary is a talented employee who has been, and would be, a valuable 
asset to the petitioner. However, as explained above, the record does not distinguish the beneficiary's 
knowledge as more advanced than the knowledge possessed by other people employed by the petitioning 
organization or by workers employed elsewhere. 
 The 
 petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the 
beneficiary's training, work experience, or knowledge of the company's processes is more advanced than the 
knowledge possessed by others employed by the petitioner, or that the processes used by the petitioner are 
substantially different from those used by other non-profit organizations with similar missions. The petitioner 
has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is any more advanced or special than the 
knowledge held by a skilled worker. See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. 
 See 1756, Znc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. 
 The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. Accordingly, the petition will be denied. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
2 
 As observed above, the AAO notes that the precedent decisions that predate the 1990 Act are not categorically 
superseded by the statutory definition of specialized knowledge, and the general issues and case facts themselves 
remain cogent as examples of how the INS applied the law to the real world facts of individual adjudications. 
USCIS must distinguish between skilled workers and specialized knowledge workers when making a 
determination on an L-1B visa petition. The distinction between skilled and specialized workers has been a 
recurring issue in the L-1B program and is discussed at length in the INS precedent decisions, including Matter of 
Penner. See 18 I&N Dec. at 50-53. (discussing the legislative history and prior precedents as they relate to the 
distinction between skilled and specialized knowledge workers). 
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