dismissed L-1B Case: Automated Machine Services

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
OfJe ofAdministrative Appeals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: WAC 09 028 50955 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: FEB 2 4 2010 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. fj 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. fj 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Perry Rhew 
V Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 09 028 50955 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B intracompany 
transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
("the Act"), 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is a corporation organized in the Commonwealth of The 
Northern Mariana Islands, with a branch office located in Tarnuning, Guam. The petitioning company owns and 
operates coin activated machines and automated bank teller machines. It seeks to employ the beneficiary in the 
position of senior electronics technician at its Guam office for a period of three years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
In denying the petition, the director obsenred that the petitioner failed to submit documentary evidence with 
respect to the beneficiary's specific work experience and training with the foreign entity. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO for review. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge of the petitioner's equipment acquired through four years of training, as well 
as an advanced level of knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures. Counsel submits a brief and 
additional evidence in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifLing organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (I)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
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managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himker to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. $5 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, on November 18, 2008. The petitioner 
stated that the beneficiary has been employed by the petitioner's Saipan office as an ATM Specialist and 
Computer Technician since April 2004, performing the following duties: "Adjusts & repairs coin, vending, or 
amusement machines; replaces defective mechanical & electrical parts; collects coins & bills from machines; fills 
machines with products or money." The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary will perform the same duties as a 
senior electronics technician at the petitioner's Guam office. 
In an attachment to Form 1-1 29, the petitioner further described the beneficiary's qualifications as follows: 
[Bloth the foreign affiliate and the proposed U.S. employer utilize confidential and proprietary 
processes and procedures in servicing coin-operated amusement machines and most especially 
bank-teller ATM machines. [The beneficiary] has an in-depth knowledge of this employer's 
confidential information and is therefore being petitioned under the L-1B intra-company 
Transferee category. 
As a Senior Electronics Technician at [the U.S. entity], [the beneficiary] will be required to apply 
his specialized knowledge and training in computer and electronics, to the unique area of 
servicing and maintaining Automated Teller Machines and Coin-Operated Amusement 
Machines. . . . 
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As noted, there are very sophisticated computerized systems involved in these machines, all of 
which handle cash transactions; and in particular, the ATM bank teller machines have "critical 
compliance requirements of the Patriot Act, Federal Banking Laws and the safety and security of 
the identities of the persons using the ATMs." 
The petitioner also submitted a copy of the beneficiary's employment offer for the Guam-based position, in which 
his proposed duties are described as the following: 
You will be required to apply your specialized knowledge and training in computer and 
electronics to oversee the installment, maintenance, repair and adjustments for all automated 
teller machines and coin operated amusement machines owned and operated by the Company on 
Guam. You will be responsible for collecting coins and bills from the machines, preparing 
invoices, and settling accounts with concessionaries. You will ensure that the machines are filled 
with products, money or other supplies. You will inspect and test the machines and meters to 
determine whether there are any malfunctions that require repair or maintenance. All of your 
duties must be carried out in compliance with the Patriot Act and Federal Banking Laws to 
ensure the safety and security of the identities of the persons using our machines. 
In addition, the petitioner submitted an employment verification letter indicating that the beneficiary currently 
performs the following duties: 
As an ATM Specialist and Computer Technician, [the beneficiary] is responsible for adjusting 
and repairing coin, vending or amusement machines, and replacing any defective mechanical 
and electrical parts. He is also responsible for collecting coins and bills from machines, filling 
the machines with product, inspecting machines and meters, and installing machines in 
compliance with applicable codes. [The beneficiary] is specially trained to work with ATMs and 
is knowledgeable about those requirements of the Patriot Act and Federal Banking Laws that 
apply to his job. 
The petitioner submitted an organizational chart which depicts the beneficiary as "IT SpecialistfLeague 
AdministratorJATM Programmer." 
On November 17, 2008, the director issued a request for additional evidence (RFE). The director requested that 
the petitioner provide a more detailed description of the proposed position and explain any special or advanced 
duties the beneficiary will perform and how such duties are different from those of other workers employed by 
the petitioner or by other U.S. employers. The director also instructed the petitioner to explain in more detail 
exactly what is the equipment, system, product, technique or service of which the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge, and whether it is used or produced by other employers in the United States and abroad. Finally, the 
director requested that the petitioner explain how the beneficiary's training or experience is uncommon, 
noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by practitioners in the 
beneficiary's field. 
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In a response dated December 17, 2008, counsel for the petitioner stated that the beneficiary's duties will 
primarily focus on ATMs, "which due to the high level of security, can only be accessed by a few key employees 
within the company." Counsel further described the beneficiary's duties as follows: 
With regard to ATMs, [the beneficiary] will be responsible for the installation and programming 
of all the company's new and existing machines on Guam (25% of his time). He will also 
conduct all repairs and maintenance of the machines. This includes making on-site inspections of 
each machine to conduct preventative maintenance and perfom1 routine testing using 
computerized test equipment (25% of his time). . . . In addition, [the beneficiary] will use 
computerized and electrical equipment to identify and resolve any equipment malfunctions and 
replace malfunctioning parts (20% of his time). [The beneficiary] will also be responsible for 
training the ATM Service Trainee, as Petitioner requires three years work experience within the 
company before an employee is permitted to work on an ATM (10% of his time). 
Counsel stated that the beneficiary would spend his remaining time overseeing the installation, programming and 
maintenance of gaming machines and compiling periodic reports for the petitioner's chief operations officer. 
Counsel also provided the following additional information with respect to the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge: 
Due to the extremely sensitive nature of the information [the petitioner] is proprietary of, in 
addition to possessing the requisite background (a degree as a[n] Electronic Computer 
Technician), [the] Petitioner requires an employee to complete a minimum three (3) year period 
of in-house training before they are authorized to work directly on any ATMs. Such training 
includes use of the company's Remote Management System (RMS), programming of ATMs, 
and company policies and procedures, which involves an elaborate system of checks and 
balances. This ensures that the identities and accounts of persons using the ATMs remain safe 
and secure, and that the company is in full compliance with the Patriot Act and Federal Banking 
Laws. 
Such knowledge and its application is at an advance[dl level with respect to [the] Petitioner's 
processes and procedures. [The beneficiary] has been employed with [the petitioner] for four 
and one-half years, since April 2004. . . . He is fully trained in using the company's Remote 
Management System (RMS) and is one of the few key employees authorized to open and 
directly access ATMs. [The beneficiary] must enter three (3) different levels of passwords and 
have special keys in order to open the machines. The company also assigns him a high-security 
laptop that he uses to directly connect with the ATMS. [The beneficiary] can then repair, 
maintain, or reprogram [a] machine as required. Employees with such high level access and 
training can copy account numbers, steal customers' identifying information, or even divert 
funds. For these reasons, the Petitioner must only have a fully trained and trusted employee with 
specialized knowledge, such as [the beneficiary] to occupy this position. . . . 
[The beneficiary's] knowledge, and the application of that knowledge, was acquired during his 
tenure with [the] Petitioner. Such knowledge, can, of course, be taught to others who possess the 
WAC 09 028 50955 
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required background, through training, application, and the accumulation of experience with 
[the] Petitioner's processes and procedures over a period of time. 
Counsel explained that the beneficiary is being transferred to the petitioner's Guam ofice to replace the current 
senior electronics technician, who was granted L-1B status in 2007, and stated that no other employee in Guam is 
qualified for theposition. 
With respect to the petitioner's products, counsel stated that the petitioner is "the only licensed and bonded private 
operator of ATMs on Guam" with 1 1 stand-alone ATM machines and 100 game machines in operation. Counsel 
stated that the petitioner is expanding its operations and plans to operate 100 ATMs on Guam by 201 1. Counsel 
emphasized that "the failure to obtain [the beneficiary's] services on Guam will severely impede [the petitioner's] 
ability to function on the Island," and stated that "it would require an additional four years of in-house training for 
the company to prepare a U.S. employee to fill the position." 
The petitioner's response to the RFE included a product brochure for the Tranax "Mini-Bank 1500 Series" ATM. 
The brochure mentions that "WebRMS is the most comprehensive ATM management tool available," and allows 
operators to "receive error messages" via "cell phone or via e-mail and access transaction history and cash 
management reports from any web browser." The petitioner also provided a listing of the locations of the 45 
ATMs it owns and operates in Guam and Saipan. 
On December 29, 2008, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has been or will be 
employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. In denying the petition, the director observed that 
the petitioner provided no documentation corroborating counsel's claim that the beneficiary completed three 
years of in-house training, or work assignments focused specifically on the petitioner's RMS, policies and 
procedures, nor did the petitioner specifically identify the petitioner's policies and procedures. The director 
concluded that "the lack of specificity pertaining to the beneficiary's work experience and training, 
particularly compared to others employed by the petitioner and in this industry, fails to distinguish the 
beneficiary's knowledge as specialized." 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that the beneficiary has 
been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity, and that the legal and factual conclusions 
reached by the director are in error. 
Citing to an unpublished AAO decision, counsel emphasizes that "specialized knowledge" is a "flexible 
standard that requires adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case." Counsel 
addresses the petitioner's policies as follows: 
Fraud, identity theft, and monetary thefts through ATM's is a substantial risk that any ATM 
operator must safeguard against. The ATM industry has a multitude of regulations and 
policies, put in place by the federal government and independent entities to ensure that the 
security and privacy of information is maintained. One such entity is the Accredited 
Standards Committee X-9 - Financial Services ("ASC X9"). 
WAC 09 028 50955 
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The ASC X9, also referred to as ANSI X9, is an American National Standards Institute 
accredited standards committee, and is responsible for the development of all financial 
service standards in the United States. Petitioner is required by federal law to ensure that its 
policies and procedures are in full compliance with those standards set by ASC X9. Such 
standards include the use of the Triple Data Encryption Standard (TDES) and the requirement 
that companies have documented procedures for various tasks, such as proper encryption key 
management. 
Counsel emphasizes that the beneficiary, as a senior electronics technician, is entrusted with passwords and 
encrypted keys that give him the security clearance to perform activities that involve the highest risk to ATM 
operators and are therefore only entrusted to long standing employees within the company. Counsel asserts 
that all of the beneficiary's activities "must be performed in strict compliance with ASC X9 standards and the 
company's documented procedures." 
Counsel further addresses the beneficiary's specific specialized knowledge as follows: 
In his first year with [the] Petitioner, [the] Beneficiary received and completed substantial 
training in ASC (or ANSI) X9 standards, TDES encryption key loading, ATM installation 
and programming, the Remote Monitoring System, and Tranax ATM proprietary systems. 
Tranax is the marker of the ATM Machines used by [the] Petitioner. . . . 
After completing his training, [the] Beneficiary then entered a two year in-house work 
training period, during which time he was under the supervision of the company's Chief 
Operations Officer (COO), - During this two-year period, [the] 
Beneficiary had to apply the training he had received. He worked together with - 
to install and inspect ATMs on-site. [The bleneficiary utilized the proper security protocols 
for opening, accessing, and programming the machine. He applied his training to examine the 
ATMs and determine whether there were any security breaches. He used encrypted keys and 
passwords to access highly confidential information in the ATM, and when necessary, 
reprogrammed the machine and reset passwords, all pursuant to ASC X9 standards and 
company procedures. Only after completing his two year in-house training was [the 
bleneficiary authorized to work directly and independently with the ATMs. 
Counsel asserts that there are only three people in the petitioner's entire organization that possess the training 
and experience required for the position, as well as authorization to take custody of the petitioner's "Master 
Key," a 64-character encrypted code. Counsel states that "access to a Master Key is a privilege narrowly held 
within the company for obvious security reasons," and evidences the beneficiary's status as a key employee. 
Counsel asserts that the "beneficiary's combination of in house training and experience. . . .makes his 
knowledge on how to access and program Petitioner's ATMs specialized," and that "such knowledge can only 
be gained through years of prior experience with the petitioner. 
In support of the appeal, the petitioner submits several articles addressing the issue of ATM fraud and 
documentation regarding ASC X9 standards. The petitioner also provides a copy of a "Certificate of 
Completion of Training" presented to the beneficiary on March 30,2005, which states: 
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[The petitioner] recognizes your completion of the first, second and final phase of training 
provided by Tranafiautilus Hyosung ATM Authorized Service Representative. 
Additionally, you have completed intensive training in the area of key management security, 
customer identity protection and you are fully qualified to meet all requirements of the ANSI 
X9 standards. 
This document certifies that you have the proficiency and authority to install, program, 
operate, deploy, troubleshoot and repair of Tranax ATM proprietary systems, including but 
not limited to TDES encryption key loading, ATM installations. Remote monitoring system, 
and Tranax on-site warranty repair compliance. 
In addition, the petitioner submits an affidavit from who states that he was directly 
responsible for overseeing the beneficiary's training when the beneficiary was hired by the petitioner in 2004. 
states that during the beneficiary's first year with the company, he "received significant training 
in Tranax ATM proprietary systems and ANSI X9 security standards" amounting to "well-over 800 hours of 
training through both manuals and personal instruction." states that he supervised the 
beneficiary during his two years of on-the-job training, after which he was authorized to work directly and 
independently with the company's ATMs. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined 
at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
The Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. Cf: 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14-1 5 (D.D.C., 1990).' 
' Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
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While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 1 Ol(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1 756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster 's New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,9 1 st Cong. 2 10,2 18,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afSd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster. Lta'. v. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
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Page 10 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
2 14(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. C.' Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and prove that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
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Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
Analysis 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
9 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. Id. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of 
the claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States or abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge. Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be 
employed in a "specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to 
support this claim. The petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge specific 
to the petitioning organization which would distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other similarly 
experienced ATM technicians employed in the industry at large. Specifics are clearly an important indication 
of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). Any qualified ATM technician would reasonably be 
expected to know how to install, troubleshoot, repair and maintain ATMs, to be entrusted with passwords and 
keys, and to be familiar with government-and industry-mandated ASC X9 standards for financial procedures 
and transactions. Similarly, any independent operator of ATMs would reasonably develop internal procedures 
for protecting customers' identities and priwacy according to industry standards. 
In response to the RFE, counsel described the beneficiary's knowledge as "proprietary" and asserted that the 
beneficiary has received a total of three years of in-house training during the course of his employment with the 
foreign entity, including training in the use of the petitioner's "Remote Management System," programming of 
ATMs and unidentified "company policies and procedures." The petitioner did not provide any documentation of 
the training or the company's internal procedures, nor did it identify how the beneficiary's training is noteworthy 
or not generally provided to practitioners in his field, or explain how the training prepared him to perform duties 
that are different from similarly employed workers. As such, the director properly determined that the petitioner 
did not adequately document the specialized nature of the beneficiary's training, nor did it establish how 
familiarity with the company's policies and procedures rises to the level of specialized knowledge. Going on 
record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
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in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft 
of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
The petitioner now attempts to describe and document the beneficiary's training in more detail on appeal. The 
beneficiary's training certificate indicates that the beneficiary completed the "first, second and final phase of 
training provided by Tranax" and "intensive training in the area of key management security, customer identity 
protection" and is "hlly qualified to meet all requirements of the ANSI X9 standard." According to the certificate, 
the beneficiary is also authorized to "install, program, operate, deploy, troubleshoot and repair Tranax ATM 
proprietary systems," including TDES encryption key loading, ATM installation, Remote Monitoring System and 
Tranax on-site warranty repair compliance." The certificate was signed by a Tranax authorized service 
representative. While the petitioner claims that such training is "proprietary," the training must be considered 
proprietary to Tranax Technologies, Inc., an unrelated company from which the petitioner happens to purchase its 
ATMS.~ Any company operating Tranax ATMs would reasonably employ workers who have received the same 
training. The exact length and nature of the training has not been specified. The petitioner has stated that the 
training took one year to complete, but has also stated that it required 800 hours and combined studying manuals 
and "personal instruction." Regardless, the petitioner has not addressed how the beneficiary's training differed 
from that normally provided to workers in the beneficiary's field of endeavor, or identified any characteristics of 
Tranax ATMs that would set them apart from those operated by other manufacturers, such that they have 
different training requirements. 
The second phase of the beneficiary's training, according to the petitioner, involved two years of working on 
ATMs under the supervision of the petitioner's chief operations officer, which gave the company an opportunity 
to evaluate the beneficiary's "ability and credibility," to ensure that he could be trusted to work independently. It 
appears that the beneficiary was otherwise fully qualified to perform the duties of an ATM technician upon 
earning the above-referenced certificate. While the petitioner's desire to ensure the beneficiary's trustworthiness is 
understandable, the AAO cannot equate earning the trust of one's employer with the acquisition of specialized 
knowledge. 
Accordingly, despite the petitioner's claim, the record does not establish how, exactly, the beneficiary's 
knowledge materially differs from knowledge possessed by other ATM technicians employed in the industry 
at large. The petitioner purchases its ATMs from a large supplier, receives its training from the manufacturer, 
and operates its ATMs according to industry and federally-mandated standards and guidelines. The record 
does not establish what qualities of the beneficiary's skills or the petitioner's processes are of such complexity 
that the impartation of this knowledge amounts to the acquisition of special or advanced knowledge. 
Importantly, the record is not persuasive in establishing why, exactly, any of the beneficiary's knowledge 
cannot be imparted to a similarly experienced and educated ATM technician in a relatively short period of 
time. Again, the petitioner's desire to observe an employee on the job for two years before allowing him or 
her to work independently is not relevant to a determination as to whether the beneficiary possesses and the 
position requires, specialized knowledge. 
2 According to information provided on its public web site, Tranax has sold and supported over 100,000 ATM 
and self-service terminals. See http://tranax.com/corporate (accessed on February 9,20 10). 
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Page 13 
Based on the petitioner's representations, its internal processes are simply customized versions of standard 
practices used in the industry that can be readily learned on-the-job by employees who otherwise possess the 
requisite technical background in ATM installation, troubleshooting and maintenance. For this reason, the 
petitioner has not established that knowledge of its processes and procedures alone constitutes specialized 
knowledge. 
It is appropriate for USCIS to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 120 (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. at 618 and Matter of 
LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. at 816). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. 
The AAO acknowledges the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary is one of only three employees in the 
organization who has the experience, training and authority to work independently on ATMs and is thus a 
"key employee." However, the AAO must consider this information in light of the nature of the organization. 
The petitioner is not primarily an ATM operator. It is described in its company materials as a "full service 
amusement provider" which operates competitive pool leagues, dart leagues, and coin-operated amusement 
and vending machines in addition to ATM terminals. Given that the company only operates approximately 
40-45 ATM terminals in Saipan and Guam, it has no apparent need for a large staff of trained ATM 
technicians. Therefore, the fact that the beneficiary is one of few authorized ATM technicians working for the 
company is not indicative of his possession of specialized or advanced knowledge. 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the 
knowledge possessed by ATM technicians throughout the industry. The fact that few other workers possess 
very specific knowledge of certain aspects of the petitioning organization's internal processes, security 
passwords, and access to a master key does not alone establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed 
advanced or special. All employees can be said to possess uncommon skill sets to some degree; however, a 
skill set that can be easily imparted to another similarly educated and generally experienced technician is not 
"specialized knowledge." Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the processes, procedures, and 
technologies require this employee to have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not 
been established in this matter. The fact that other workers outside of the petitioning organization may not 
have very specific knowledge regarding the petitioner's enterprise is not relevant to these proceedings if this 
knowledge gap could be closed by the petitioner by simply revealing the information to a newly hired, 
generally experienced and educated worker. 
The AAO does not discount the likelihood that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced ATM technician. 
There is no indication, however, that the beneficiary has any knowledge that exceeds that of any experienced 
ATM technician. As discussed, the petitioner has not submitted probative evidence to establish that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not 
generally known in the beneficiary's field of endeavor. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the 
WAC 09 028 50955 
Page 14 
beneficiary's knowledge is any more advanced or special than the knowledge held by a skilled worker. See 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Based on the evidence presented, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge or that he was or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, 
the appeal will be dismissed. 
The AAO acknowledges the petitioner's claim that USCIS previously approved an L-1B nonimmigrant 
petition filed on behalf of another beneficiary for the position of senior electronics technician at the 
petitioner's Guam office. Each nonimmigrant petition filing is a separate proceeding with a separate record 
and a separate burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. 5 103.8(d). In making a determination of statutory eligibility, 
USCIS is limited to the information contained in that individual record of proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. 5 
103.2(b)(16)(ii). Due to the lack of evidence of eligibility in the present record, the AAO finds that the 
director was justified in denying the present request to classify the instant beneficiary as an L-1B specialized 
knowledge worker. 
Finally, the AAO notes that, as of November 28, 2009, it appears that the petitioning company is no longer a 
qualifying organization. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 
shall be accompanied by "[elvidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ 
the alien are qualifying organizations." Title 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(i)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" 
as a firm, corporation, or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifLing relationships specified in 
the definitions of a parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (I)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or 
will be doing business in the United States and at least one other country." 
The petitioner is a corporation established under the laws of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands (CNMI). Based on the evidence of record, the petitioner's only other location is a branch office 
located in Guam. 
Public Law 110-229, the Consolidated Natural Resource Act of 2008 (CNRA), amended the 1976 Covenant, 
Pub. L. No. 94-241, sec. 1, 90 St. 263, 48 U.S.C. 1801 note (1976), between the CNMI and the United States 
to extend the INA to the CNMI beginning on November 28, 2009. Employers in the CNMI are considered 
U.S. employers on or after that date, and aliens employed in CNMI will no longer be "employed abroad" for 
immigration purposes. Employment in CNMI prior to November 28, 2009 continues to be considered 
"employment abroad." See generally, Memorandum of Donald Neufeld, Acting Assoc. Dir., USCIS, Effect of 
the CNRA, Title VZI of Public Law 110-229, Classzfication of Aliens under Section IOl(a)(I5)(L) and 
203(b)(l)(C) (November 23, 2009). 
If an employer located in the CNMI continues to meet the definition of a qualifying organization pursuant to 8 
C.F.R. 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) in that there remains a foreign entity as required by that definition (i.e, one that is 
outside the CNMWnited States), the CNMI employer may petition for qualifying employees who are 
currently employed in the CNMI. Here, the petitioner's only offices are located in Guam and CNMI and, 
based on the evidence of record, there is no branch, parent, subsidiary or affiliate doing business outside the 
United States. Thus, while the beneficiary's employment in the CNMI prior to November 28, 2009 continues 
to be considered employment with a qualifying foreign organization, it appears that all of the petitioner's 
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Page 15 
operations are presently located in the United States for immigration purposes. In order to meet the definition 
of "qualifying organization" there must be a United States employer doing business in the United States and 
in at least one other country. If this appeal were not being dismissed for the reasons set forth above, this 
would preclude the petitioner's continued eligibility for the benefit sought. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, the petitioner has not met that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.