dismissed L-1B Case: Animation And Film Production

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U S. Cltlzenship and Immigration Services 
Office ofAdmrnlstratlve Appeals, MS 2090 
identifying data deleted to 
 Washington, DC 20529-2090 
prevent clearly unwamted U.S. Citizenship 
invasion of personal privry 
 and Immigration 
Services 
File: WAC 05 020 53956 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: 
 NQV 2 5 zoo9 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (a)(] 5)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. $ 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
&f,?i:inistrative Appeals Office 
WAC 05 020 53956 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner, a California corporation, filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as 
an L- 1 B intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 1 0 1 (a)( 1 5)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner claims to be a subsidiary 
of DCD Korea, located in Seoul, Korea. The petitioner, a movie production and distribution company, seeks to 
employ the beneficiary in the position of producer for a period of three years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director reached an erroneous conclusion based on the evidence submitted, 
and that the petitioner's business is dependent upon the beneficiary's "advanced and specialized knowledge of 
the Korean digital animation and computer graphics industries; his years of experience in the field; and the 
network of key personnel he has developed." Counsel submits a brief and additional evidence in support of 
the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
WAC 05 020 53956 
Page 3 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himfher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The sole issue addressed by the director is whether the petitioner established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. $5 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 11 84(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
On the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary's role in the 
United States will be to "oversee all production and distribution of animated movies, television programs, 
computer and video games and programs." 
In a letter submitted in support of the petition, the petitioner explained that the U.S. entity was established to 
facilitate animated co-productions between Hollywood and Korea across the film and television disciplines. The 
petitioner discussed the beneficiary's qualifications as follows: 
The success of the operations of [the foreign entity] and [the petitioner] are dependent on the 
specialized knowledge of its key personnel. [The beneficiary] has the specialized knowledge and 
expertise in the areas of film production, distribution, and marketing that are vital to the success 
of these organizations. He has derived this knowledge through years of experience in the area of 
animated film production and distribution both within our organization and others. [The foreign 
entity] and [the petitioner] have ongoing production ventures for which [the beneficiary's] 
immediate presence is required. 
[The beneficiary] will fill the position of Producer at [the petitioning company]. In this position 
he will be responsible for the production, distribution, marketing and production supervisor of 
various projects as listed on the Project List attached, and those future projects that the two 
WAC 05 020 53956 
Page 4 
companies undertake from time to time. Specifically, the beneficiary will form production 
companies for each project undertaken, will establish limited liability company status for such 
companies during the life of the project and will terminate the companies once the project is 
completely distributed or licensed; he will handle all aspects of the project, fiom the creative to 
the conceptual, to the legal, financial, business and distribution of production. He will be in 
complete control of the project through its development, implementation, and creation with other 
partner producers. [The beneficiary] will be responsible for negotiating suficient funds for the 
project, for ensuring that the project is kept on or under budget, for coordination of all 
departments involved with the project, for ensuring that the project remains on schedule. Once 
the project is completed, he will be responsible for marketing the project through making 
exhibition arrangements, negotiating and finalizing distribution deals, and exposing the final 
project to the end consumer and peer groups. He will be required to maintain regular 
communication with [the foreign entity] regarding the development and implementation of each 
project. 
To perform these duties the Producer must have specialized knowledge in the areas of 
production, distribution and financing, particularly as they apply to the field of animated films, 
television shows and computer and FK for films. 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary has been employed by the foreign entity in the position of producer since 
2002, with responsibility for "negotiating, overseeing and implementing every area of the production process." 
With respect to the petitioner's activities, the petitioner stated that "the nature of the projects and the creative style 
thereof are unique to the Korean movie and digital graphics industry" and therefore "the position of Producer 
thereof cannot be filled by a person with general movie production knowledge and skills." 
The petitioner submitted a company profile in which it outlined its projects in production. The petitioner indicates 
that its co-productions "combine the story telling expertise of Hollywood with the cost effective and eficient high 
quality of the Korean animation studios." The petitioner also submits a copy of the beneficiary's resume, in which 
he summarizes his experience in animation, commercial and video game production, and distribution, marketing 
and sales. The beneficiary indicates that from June 1997 until February 2003, he served as CEO and Founder of 
DAL: Digital Arts and Sciences Lab in the United States and Korea. The petitioner submitted a "certification of 
employment" from DCD Korea, dated June 28, 2004, which indicates that the beneficiary served in the position 
of "Head of Producer" since June 2003. The petitioner submitted copies of various agreements for film and other 
projects naming the petitioning company or foreign entity as producer. 
On November 9, 2004, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has been or will be 
employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. The director found that the petitioner had not 
demonstrated how the beneficiary's knowledge in the areas of film production, distribution and marketing is 
different from or surpasses the ordinary or usual knowledge of other similarly experienced workers in the 
petitioner's industry. The director acknowledged that, although the beneficiary likely possesses valuable 
experience based on his ten years of relevant work experience, his knowledge does not amount to an 
WAC 05 020 53956 
Page 5 
advanced level of expertise with respect to the petitioning organization's processes, and therefore does not 
constitute specialized knowledge as the term is defined in the Act. In this regard the director noted that the 
petitioner did not demonstrate that its parent company employs production, distribution and marketing 
techniques that are out of the ordinary in the industry. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that the beneficiary has 
been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. Counsel refers to the statutory and 
regulatory definitions of "specialized knowledge," and to a 1994 legacy Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) memorandum which outlines possible characteristics of an alien who possesses specialized 
knowledge.' Counsel provides a detailed account of the beneficiary's employment history and projects to date, 
and states that the beneficiary "has been a key player in the digital animation industry in Korea" since 1997. 
Counsel further states: 
[The beneficiary] is and has been an essential and integral part of [the petitioner], [the foreign 
entity] and the Korean animation entertainment industry generally. His professional 
association with [the foreign entity] dates back to 2002 with his production of "Circus of 
Bremen" an animated 3D film . . . . 
[The beneficiary's] role as Chief Producer for [the foreign entity] and [the petitioner] 
encompasses various disciplines, including negotiation and networking, management, and an 
understanding of the operations of the creative, technical and business ends of the 
entertainment industry, especially as it relates to digital animation. [The beneficiary] has a 
strong and credible presence in the digital entertainment industry and a strong and reliable 
network of necessary professionals. This is amply evidenced by the numerous contracts and 
deals that he has personally negotiated and finalized. He has an advanced knowledge and 
understanding of the digital animation and computer graphics industries in Korea and of the 
entertainment industry in Hollywood. 
Counsel further indicates that "the specialized nature of the knowledge that [the beneficiary] possesses is 
manifest in the organizations that are willing to partner with him; the trust and confidence that these private 
organizations and the Korean government itself have placed in him through their endorsement of him and 
their investment in organizations in which he has an interest; and the execution and success of the project he 
has worked on and towards." Counsel contends that the beneficiary possesses "a unique combination of 
skills, qualifications and aptitudes," and "special and advanced knowledge of the product and process of the 
petitioner and its overseas parent company." 
' See Memorandum of James A. Puleo, Acting Exec. Assoc. Comm., INS, "Interpretation of Special 
Knowledge" (March 9, 1994)(hereinafter "Puleo memorandum. ") 
WAC 05 020 53956 
Page 6 
In support of the appeal, the petitioner submits three letters of recommendation dated in May 2003. The AAO 
notes that all three letters appear to have been written in support of a prior H-1B classification petition filed 
on the beneficiary's behalf. The letters include a statement from chief executive officer of 
FXDigital Co. Ltd., who states that the beneficiary "understands the digital animation and computer graphics 
industries in Korea and also the entertainment industrv in Hollvwood." The petitioner also submits a letter 
from Director of the Planning and Management Bureau under the Ministry and Information 
and Communication of the Korean Government. states that the Korean government is actively 
supporting Korea's digital animation and computer graphic industry because of growing worldwide market 
demand for the country's engineering skills and technologies. He states that it is his understanding that "[the 
beneficiary] is the only Korean person who has a good understanding of and networking in the Korean digital 
animation/computer graphics industry and also spent significant time building channels of promotion and 
marketing in the U.S." similarly, president of SOVIK Venture Capital Co. Ltd. in Korea, 
states that the beneficiary "is the first person with backgrounds in Korean high-tech industry who established 
a significant network and reputation in the Hollywood circles." 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions and evidence are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary 
has specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as 
defined at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
The Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. C' 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9,14-15 (D.D.C., 1990).~ 
2 
 Although 1756, Inc, v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
WAC 05 020 53956 
Page 7 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 1 Ol(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1 756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster S New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,9lSt Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-85 1 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Brm 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchwch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at "4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), affd 194 
WAC 05 020 53956 
Page 8 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifjing a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codifj the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
fj 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
2 14(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and prove that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
WAC 05 020 53956 
Page 9 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
5 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of the 
claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Analysis 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States or abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge. 
Preliminarily, the AAO acknowledges that the beneficiary is undoubtedly a "key employee" within the 
petitioner's organization, and one who occupies an elevated position as head producer with the foreign entity. 
His value to the organization and his qualifications for the position of producer of the U.S. office are not in 
question. However, the determination as to whether he possesses specialized knowledge specific to the 
petitioning organization and is employed in a position requiring application of such knowledge is a separate 
issue that it unrelated to his status as a key employee. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a "specialized 
knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. The 
petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge specific to the petitioning 
organization which would distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced 
producers in the industry at-large. Going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 
(Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; 
otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. 
Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724, F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
WAC 05 020 53956 
Page 10 
The petitioner has stated that "the nature of the projects and the creative style thereof are unique to the Korean 
movie and digital graphics industry," but the petitioner has not provided any additional explanation as to how 
the beneficiary's familiarity with the Korean digital animation industry in general would constitute specialized 
knowledge that is particular to the petitioner's organization. In fact, the letters submitted on appeal, which pre- 
date the beneficiary's employment with the foreign entity, confirm that he acquired the claimed specialized 
knowledge prior to joining the petitioner's claimed parent company. While knowledge need not be 
proprietary in order to be considered specialized, the petitioner must still establish that the knowledge 
possessed by the beneficiary and utilized in the proposed position is in fact specific to the petitioning 
organization, and somehow different from that possessed by similarly-employed personnel in the industry. 
As noted by the director, the petitioner has not identified any aspect of its production, distribution and 
marketing techniques or methodologies that would set it apart from any other company in the industry, other 
than relying on unsupported assertions regarding the unique "creative style" of the Korean digital animation 
industry in general. 
The beneficiary is also claimed to have a unique combination of skills, aptitudes and industry connections 
which span both the Korean digital animation industry and the Hollywood marketing and distribution 
industry. This combination of skills, experience and professional contacts undoubtedly makes the beneficiary 
valuable to the petitioner, but such characteristics are not indicative of special or advanced knowledge that the 
beneficiary gained with the petitioner's organization. Accordingly, despite the petitioner's claim, the record 
does not establish how, exactly, the beneficiary's knowledge materially differs from knowledge possessed by 
other experienced personnel employed as producers in the digital animation industry. The claim that the 
beneficiary is the "only Korean person" with knowledge of and connections within the Hollywood 
entertainment industry is not adequately supported by any documentary evidence, nor is such a claim relevant 
to an analysis of the claimed specialized knowledge. The beneficiary's experience working within specific 
entertainment industry sectors and his professional relationships with individual players within these sectors, 
has not been shown to have given him knowledge that can be considered specific to the petitioning 
organization. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary meets several possible characteristics of an 
alien who possesses specialized knowledge, as outlined in the 1994 Puleo memorandum. Specifically, the 
petitioner states that the beneficiary possesses knowledge that is valuable to the employer's competitiveness 
in the marketplace; is qualified to contribute to the U.S. employer's knowledge of foreign operating 
conditions; has been utilized abroad in a capacity involving significant assignments which have enhanced the 
employer's productivity, competitiveness or financial position; possesses knowledge which, normally, can be 
gained only through prior experience with that employer; and possesses knowledge of a product or process 
which cannot be easily transferred or taught to another individual. While these factors may be considered, the 
regulations specifically require that the beneficiary possess an "advanced level of knowledge" of the 
organization's process and procedures, or a "special knowledge" of the petitioner's product, service, research, 
equipment, techniques, or management. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As discussed above, the petitioner has not 
established that the beneficiary's knowledge rises to the level of specialized knowledge contemplated by the 
WAC 05 020 53956 
Page 11 
regulations, or that his knowledge, even if it could be considered specialized or advanced, relates specifically to 
the petitioning organization. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. 
 See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. 
 The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. Accordingly, the petition will be denied. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.