dismissed L-1B Case: Aviation

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W . Rm A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC-00-161-50526 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: JUN 2 9 Z)[X)5 
Petition: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
,r?iobert P. Wiemann, Director 
' Administrative Appeals Ofice 
WAC-04-1 03-54305 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The nonirnmigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center. The 
director certified his decision to the Administrative Appeals Office (MO) for review. The decision of the 
director will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as an L-1B nonimmigrant 
intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101 (a)(15)(L). The petitioner states that it was established in 1967, and 
that it is a branch of the foreign office of Delta Air Lines, Inc., located in London. The petitioner declares 74,000 
employees and a gross annual income of approximately $14.7 billion. It seeks to extend its authorization to 
employ the beneficiary for two years at an annual salary of $22,560. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and that the intended employment requires specialized knowledge.' 
In response to the notice of certification, counsel asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge and 
that the intended employment requires specialized knowledge. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 
U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(L), the petitioner must demonstrate that the beneficiary, within three years preceding the 
beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has been employed abroad in a qualifying 
managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized knowledge, for one continuous year by a 
qualifying organization and seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his or her 
services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or 
involves specialized knowledge. 
This case presents two related, but distinct, issues. The first is whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. The second is whether the intended employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
In order to prevail in this appeal, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that each of these 
requirements is satisfied. That is to say, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge that the employment requires a person who possesses this specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has special 
1 The AAO is aware of the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Delta Air 
Lines v. United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Memorandum, No. 9 8- 
3050-LFO (D.D.C. 1999). The Court held that the AAO had erred in revoking, on the grounds of gross error, L- 
1B visa petitions that the Service had approved for Delta Air Lines flight attendants. Id. at 10. It is important to 
note, however, that the Court expressly refrained from deciding that the flight attendants in that case actually 
qualified as L-1B nonimmigrants. Id. at 9. The case now before the MO does present for decision the issue the 
Court did not address: whether the flight attendants qualify as L-1B nonimmigrants. 
EAC-00-161-50526 
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knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines specialized knowledge as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes or procedures. 
On the Form 1-129 petition filed on April 27, 2000, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary is a flight attendant 
and that her duties are to: 
Ensure passenger safety and provide on board transatlantic and domestic flight services, apply 
specialized knowledge of Delta's European inflight services product to serve as flight attendant, 
crew trainer and on-board mentor. 
The petitioner explained that the beneficiary serves as a subject matter expert who participates in training and 
mentoring United States-based flight attendants, and further described the beneficiary's duties as follows: 
The flight attendants relocated by Delta from Warsaw to JFK are the only employees in its work 
force who possess specialized knowledge of that unique senice product. These flight attendants 
have been Delta's front line customer service providers for leisure and business travelers for 
Eastern and Southern Europe since Delta acquired the European routes . . . . Ths flight base was 
Delta's only flight attendant base in Europe, and the Warsaw-based flight attendants located there 
applied the particular procedures, regulations, norms, service techniques and customs that are the 
components of Delta's proprietary, European in-flight service product. Indeed, it is their 
provision of that product that is a significant factor leading customers in Europe to select Delta 
over other foreign flag (or U.S. flag) carriers. 
As a group, these flight attendants have achieved exceptional performance levels, and 
specialized knowledge and skills, including the following: 
1. Our Warsaw flight attendants have successfully serviced our international customers 
throughout Europe and are highly slulled in managing the service challenges of working with 
diverse cultural and language groups. 
2. Our Warsaw flight attendants are exceptionally adept at recognizing the potential impact our 
on-board product can have on the international customer who has limited or no understanding of 
the English language and U.S. culture. 
EAC-00-161-50526 
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3. Many have earned up to eleven years of flylng experience (including flylng time with Pan 
Am), with a majority of their flylng time serving our German and Russian passengers, including 
flying to and from Moscow and St. Petersburg, as well as to other Southern and Eastern 
European cities. 
In view of their specialized experience and proven skills in providing the distinctive Eastern 
European in-flight service product, Delta is relylng on the formerly Warsaw-based flight 
attendants to assist the company in three critical ways: 
- they are a resource for the ongoing development and refinement of that unique product and the 
Eastern European cross-cultural training and mentoring program that corresponds to it; 
- they are implementing the multifaceted cross-cultural training program for its JFK-based flight 
attendants that ultimately will be rolled out to all Delta flight attendants who service international 
routes; and 
- they are continuing to provide the Eastern European in-flight service product on transatlantic 
and domestic feed flights, during which they advise and guide U.S.-based flight attendants in the 
nuances and requirements of that product. 
The petitioner explained that the beneficiary will be part of a team of flight attendants who will serve as 
facilitators in a Eastern European Cross-Cultural Training Program. 
On June 15, 2000, the director requested additional evidence. Specifically, the director instructed the 
petitioner as follows: 
Submit a detailed description of "Delta's proprietary, European in-flight service product" referred 
to in your letter. Submit a detailed description of the beneficiary's specialized knowledge of 
"Delta's proprietary, European in-flight service product." 
Submit Delta's corporate job description, including education, training, and experience 
requirements, for flight attendants. 
What percentage of the beneficiary's time is spent as a Module 5 facilitator? A subject matter 
expert? An on-board mentor? A flight attendants [sic]? Submit documentary evidence, such as 
personnel and payroll records, to corroborate your answers. Submit copies of all on board 
mentor program monthly reports written by the beneficiary in the last year. 
What percentage of the beneficiary's time is spent on international flights to Eastern Europe? 
Other international flights? Domestic flights? Submit documentary evidence, such as personnel 
and payroll records, to corroborate your answers. 
EAC-00-161-50526 
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In a letter dated September 6, 2000, Delta's Director of Flight Attendants asserted that the beneficiary and the 
other Warsaw-based flight attendants "are the only flight attendants who in fact know how to apply the Delta in- 
flight service product to the special needs of ow Eastern European passengers." The petitioner also submitted 
attestations from two professors, three consultants, the director of Delta's In-Flight Services Learning Center, a 
Delta pilot, and a Delta flight attendant, who argue that employees such as the beneficiary can provide credibility 
to the petitioner's training program and help Delta meet its goal of providing individualized customer service 
appropriate for customers from other cultures. While the opinions provided by these sources might help to clari~ 
why the petitioner wishes to continue to employ the beneficiary, they do not establish that the beneficiary will be 
employed in a specialized knowledge capacity within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
The petitioner submitted a subject matter expert program guide for Eastern Europe showing that the beneficiary 
will assist an instructor during a four-hour training session for other flight attendants. According to the program 
guide, the beneficiary's primary duties as a subject matter expert will be as a flight attendant. The beneficiary will 
serve as an onboard mentor "when time and situation permit." (Eastern Europe Subject Matter Expert Program 
Guide, p. 11). The beneficiary's qualifications as a subject matter expert are said to include: 
-Knowledge of historical and current cultural, political, economic, and social norms 
-First hand experience and knowledge of the region 
-Experience working Delta's Eastern European routes 
-Knowledge of the distinctive cultural norms as applied to business and leisure travel 
There is no discussion as to how the petitioner tested or measured the beneficiary's qualifications based on her 
knowledge of historical and current cultural, political, economic and social norms. 
The director found that the beneficiary is "just an experienced flight attendant with a native knowledge of Eastern 
European languages, cultures, and customs" and is not employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
In this certification proceeding, counsel asserts that the beneficiary performs an essential function by serving as a 
subject matter expert, that she devotes "100% of her time to training and mentoring Delta's U.S. flight attendants 
in this proprietary Eastern European passenger service," and that the "training and mentoring program . . . focuses 
on allowing real-world situations to serve as learning experiences for Delta's New York-based flight attendants, a 
group of some 3,600." 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description 
of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. Id. It is also appropriate for the 
AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N 
Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comrn. 198 l)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 (R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 
13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).~ As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 
Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," the AAO 
finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be 
EAC-00-161-50526 
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(Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc 
and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the 
classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge 
beyond that of a slulled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose slulls and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to cany out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's 11 New 
College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge categoly. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. No. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" 
and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully 
regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House 
Report was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee 
hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify 
under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that 
-- 
"proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the prior 
INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states that the 
Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] 
interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the 
Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO 
concludes, therefore, that the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
EAC-00-161-50526 
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they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, 
and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "shlled craft workers." Matter of Penner, id. at 
50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st 
Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include shlled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. 117, 119 (Comm. 1981). According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a 
conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the 
"key personnel" that Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and ccexecutives.") 
The beneficiary serves as one of several team facilitators in a module for training other flight attendants, and is 
not the primary instructor. As noted by the director, the beneficiary spent, at most, 44 hours out of the five-month 
period of February 2000 to June 2000 as a training co-facilitator. Accordingly, it is reasonable to infer from the 
evidence of record that the remainder of her duties -- actually, the majority of her time -- must have been 
consumed in functioning as a mentor and flight attendant. To the extent that her duties as a mentor include 
preparing the monthly mentoring report, it is noted that the report is a simple one-page format consisting of five 
questions asking the beneficiary to discuss situations encountered in the past month, and to make suggestions. 
The beneficiary's responses include discussions of her role as a Russian interpreter to make safety 
announcements. The beneficiary's reports also note that she explained cultural customs to flight attendants, such 
as the custom of some patrons viewing the flight attendants as servants. From these reports, it is clear that much 
of the "mentoring" simply involves the beneficiary's own linguistic abilities and cultural background in 
performing her primary duties as flight attendant. The petitioner's own subject matter expert training manual 
indicates that the beneficiary will serve as a mentor to the extent that her duties as a flight attendant permit. There 
is no evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that her duties involve specialized 
knowledge as defined by 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
The director found that the beneficiary's slulls as a subject matter expert appear to consist of little more than the 
fact that she is a flight attendant who happens to be &om Eastern Europe. Counsel asserts that the beneficiary and 
the other Warsaw Flight Attendants spend "100% of their time as subject matter experts." This is true only to the 
extent that the beneficiary and the other Warsaw Flight Attendants may be considered to be natives of Eastern 
Europe. The knowledge of foreign customs, cultures, and history possessed by the beneficiary as the result of her 
multicultural life experiences does not constitute an advanced level of knowledge of the processes and procedures 
of the petitioning organization, and has no bearing on the beneficiary's eligibility for classification as an 
intracompany transferee on the basis of specialized knowledge. Even if it were established that the beneficiary 
has an appreciable amount of international experience and cultural awareness as a result of her background and 
EAC-00-161-50526 
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her experience as an international flight attendant, such knowledge cannot be considered as specialized 
knowledge of the company product or an advanced level of knowledge of company processes and procedures. 
The record does not establish that the beneficiary has advanced or special knowledge of the petitioner's product 
and its application in international markets. The beneficiary's origins in Eastern Europe and her employment 
experience with the foreign organization may have given her knowledge that is useful in performing her duties, 
but it cannot be the case that any usefbl slull is to be considered special or advanced knowledge. One's native 
knowledge of a language and culture is not, by itself, specialized knowledge. Nor is experience as a flight 
attendant specialized knowledge. Nor, however useful it may be, does the combination of these slulls qualify as 
specialized knowledge. In fact, contrary to counsel's assertions, the beneficiary's knowledge of the company 
product, or of the processes and procedures of the foreign company, has not been shown to be substantially 
different from, or advanced in relation to, that of any airline attendant of any airline company. Counsel argues 
that the beneficiary's training and experience have given her knowledge which is special because it is specific to 
Delta Air Lines. However, it is to be expected that job training offered by Delta Air Lines would pertain to Delta 
Air Lines' procedures exclusively. Not all in-house training can be considered to qualify as specialized 
knowledge. 
Nor does the evidence of record establish that the intended employment requires possession of specialized 
knowledge. In essence, the beneficiary's position is that of a flight attendant. She spends a relatively small 
amount of time (a maximum of 44 hours total in the five months from February to June 2000) "facilitating" 
training. Most of her "mentoring," as noted, involves her use of her language skills to perform flight attendant 
duties. Again, as usehl as those skills may be, they are not specialized knowledge. 
It is also important to note that Congress created the L-1 nonirnrnigrant classification to facilitate the transfer to 
the United States of aliens who did not fit with any pre-existing classifications. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 3, 
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2751-52. The actual duties that the beneficiary performs, however, 
are those of a flight attendant. So long as a flight attendant otherwise complies with the regulations that govern 
admission of nonirnrnigrant crewmembers, episodic or periodic participation in training sessions for flight 
attendants -- either as a trainer or as a trainee -- is consistent with crewmember status. As the director noted in hs 
decision, the evidence of record supports the conclusion that the proper classification for this nonimrnigrant flight 
attendant is the classification for alien crewmembers, under section 101(a)(15)@) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
I lOl(a)(l5)(D). 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded 
that the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that she would be 
employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For ths reason, the petition may not be approved. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. 
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ORDER: The decision of the hector dated December 7, 2000 is affirmed. The petition 
is denied.