dismissed L-1B Case: Beverage Services

tdentifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly unwarranted 
invasion of persoosl prhPLg 
p1C;muc COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
P-/ 
Robert P. ~iekann, Director 
Administrative Appeals Office 
SRC 05 243 5 1804 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed the instant petition to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant intracompany transferee 
with specialized knowledge under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 
U.S.C. 4 1 10 1 (a)(15)(L). The petitioner indicated on the supplement to Form I- 129 that it is a branch of the 
foreign corporation that is authorized to engage in the sale of non-carbonated beverages in the United States. 
The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary as its cruise ship technical service support specialist. 
The director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner had not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
would be primarily employed by the United States entity in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner provided a detailed description of the 
beneficiary's proposed employment in a specialized knowledge capacity. Counsel references additional 
evidence submitted on appeal in support of the beneficiary's possession of specialized knowledge, including 
certificates of training and descriptions related to products maintained by the beneficiary in his capacity as a 
cruise ship technical service support specialist. Counsel also submits a letter from the petitioner's vice- 
president of human resources in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 4 1 101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are 
qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad with a 
qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior education, 
training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended services in the United States; 
however, the work in the United States need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and, (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
SRC 05 243 5 1804 
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Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner filed the instant nonimmigrant petition on September 6, 2005 requesting new employment of 
the beneficiary in a specialized knowledge capacity. In an appended letter, dated August 25, 2005, the 
petitioner provided the following job description for the beneficiary's proposed position of "cruiseship 
technical service support specialist": 
In this position, [the beneficiary] will oversee training and technical support on-site and in- 
house to Company employees, independent service providers, distributor partners, master 
distributors, and others. He will train regional service technicians in field procedures and 
new equipment strategies; conduct technical training seminars at various locations 
worldwide; develop training materials; schedule and execute training seminars; monitor 
technician proficiencies and adherence to procedures; ensure dispenser installation and 
service manuals are up-to-date; oversee development and distribution of installation and 
service videoltraining; interface with equipment manufacturers, vendors and design 
development group on technical items relating to dispenser quality, service ability, and 
performance. In addition, he will create and distribute technical bulletins, service alerts and 
technical training information. 
The petitioner explained that through his prior employment with the company, the beneficiary has gained 
specialized knowledge with respect to its technical operations. The petitioner stated: 
[The beneficiary] has an unusually high level of knowledge, which has made him the ideal 
person to serve as a trainer and oversee technical support on-site and in-house as well as to 
independent service providers, distributor partners, master distributors, and others. He will 
be the individual to perform 'spot' checks to monitor our service technician's proficiency, 
quality of work, and adherence to required corporate procedures. He is the individual 
responsible to diagnose and repair significant service issues while training others to handle 
routine service issues, perform preventative maintenance, and handle other technical 
problems. His geographic area of responsibility will include Port of Miami, Port Everglades, 
Port of Key West, Caribbean (including Puerto Rico and the Bahamas) and South America. 
This is a high level technical position which requires this level of specialized knowledge in 
which to perform. 
SRC 05 243 5 1804 
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In a Notice of Request for Additional Information, dated September 19, 2005, the director asked that the 
petitioner provide an explanation supporting the proposition that the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
company's processes and procedures is more advanced than others in the beneficiary's field, and "uncommon, 
noteworthy or distinguished by some unusual quality." The director also requested the following 
documentation in support of the beneficiary's proposed employment in a primarily specialized knowledge 
capacity: (1) a description of the petitioner's "unique methodologies, tools, programs, andlor applications," 
and how they are different from those used by other companies; (2) a letter from the petitioner's human 
resources director explaining the manner in which the beneficiary gained his specialized knowledge, 
including the titles and duration of pertinent training courses, and certificates confirming the completion of 
courses; (3) an explanation of the amount of time needed to train an employee to perform in the beneficiary's 
position, as well the number of employees presently occupying the same position as the beneficiary; (4) a 
copy of the beneficiary's resume; (5) a copy of the foreign entity's organizational chart reflecting the positions 
subordinate to the beneficiary; and (6) an organizational chart of the United States entity identifying the 
beneficiary's position and those employees to be supervised by the beneficiary. The director further noted 
that if the beneficiary is being transferred to the United States to provide training, the petitioner should submit 
a detailed description of the training courses to be offered by the beneficiary. 
Counsel responded in a letter dated September 22, 2005, stressing the "one of a kind" expertise in the 
petitioner's products held by the beneficiary, and noting "no other employees in the organization worldwide 
[would] have the knowledge of the installation and repair of [the petitioner's] equipment." Counsel further 
explained "it would require years to train an individual to fill the role for which the Beneficiary is slated." In 
an appended statement, the petitioner' stated that the beneficiary has been employed with the foreign 
corporation for three years during which he acted as the "management/specialist lead person" for machine 
installations, and performed as a training and service consultant for cruise lines. The petitioner claimed that 
the beneficiary's knowledge of the installation and repair of the petitioner's equipment is not matched by any 
other employees in the organization, and that it would require a minimum of four to five years to train another 
individual. 
In the beneficiary's attached resume, the job duties associated with his position as cruise ship technical 
support specialist were outlined as: 
Establish regional based ownership with supervisory personnel reporting directly to the 
Cruise Ship Division. 
Insure [sic] the accurate collection and recording of equipment and operations related 
data (i.e. ship inventories, service agent parts inventories, time on board ship, etc.) 
Perform 'spot checks' to monitor service technician's proficiency, quality of work and 
adherence to documented procedures. 
Provide technical and operational training to service agent technicians and appropriate 
ships staff and management. 
I 
 The statement, while not signed by an individual, is presumably the requested letter from the petitioner's 
human resources director. 
SRC 05 243 5 1804 
Page 5 
Responsible for the accuracy of all 3rd part service providers' inventories[.] 
Diagnose and repair any reported service issue and all other problems encountered, 
perform quality drink checks (ratioibrix, temperature and taste), perform preventative 
maintenance, etc. 
Coordinate all ship related activities including but not limited to mechanical service, 
product delivery, warehousing, planning, training and maintenance to drive operational 
efficiencies and economics. 
On both organizational charts for the United States and foreign entities, the beneficiary was identified as one 
of three support specialists for cruise ship technical services, subordinate to a cruise ship services senior 
manager. 
The director issued a decision dated October 17, 2005, concluding that the petitioner had not demonstrated 
that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, or that the beneficiary's proffered position required the 
services of an individual possessing specialized knowledge. Following a review of the beneficiary's job 
duties, the director stated that "[they] do not appear to evidence or require specialized knowledge of products 
or methodologies which are unique to the petitioner." The director also stated that the petitioner had not 
explained how the services to be offered by the beneficiary "were unique to [the petitioner's] company," nor 
"how any of the equipment upon which the beneficiary would be working or upon which the beneficiary 
would be offering training [is] unique to their company." The director noted that there is no evidence that the 
beneficiary's skills are unique and "would not be possessed by other technicians in the field." The director 
concluded that the beneficiary's knowledge was not noteworthy or uncommon throughout the petitioning 
entity. Consequently, the director denied the petition. 
Counsel filed an appeal on November 17, 2005 contending that Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) 
erred in its denial of the nonimmigrant petition. As evidence of the beneficiary's specialized knowledge, 
counsel references additional documentary evidence submitted on appeal, including the beneficiary's 
certificates of training, "technical bulletins," and product brochures, which counsel contends identify products 
and methodologies that are "highly complex units" and not readily available to United States workers. 
In an attached statement, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary possesses the "professional traits" 
necessary to perform in the proposed position, including "proprietary knowledge and an advanced level of 
expertise on a number of very complex beverage dispensers not currently distributed in the United States." 
The petitioner notes the essentialness of the beneficiary's work experience and technical knowledge for 
diagnosing failures in its juice and coffee dispensers and malung necessary repairs. The petitioner also 
stresses the beneficiary's linguistic skills, noting that his knowledge of English, Spanish, Italian and 
Portuguese would be an asset in his proposed work location in the Miami-Ft. Lauderdale area. 
Upon review, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that 
the proposed position requires specialized knowledge. 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
SRC 05 243 5 1804 
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petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
The offered job description, which addresses broad responsibilities of the beneficiary but does not include his 
specific daily job duties, fails to demonstrate how the beneficiary's proposed position requires specialized 
knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(1)(i) (requiring that a beneficiary be admitted to the United States to be 
employed "in a position requiring specialized knowledge.") Based on the petitioner's representations, it appears 
that a primary role of the beneficiary as a cruise ship technical service support specialist would be to provide 
training on the technical and operational functions of beverage dispensers, as well as monitoring and personally 
performing repairs on the equipment. The petitioner has not provided an additional description identifying 
specific daily tasks of the beneficiary requiring specialized knowledge. The AAO notes that reciting the 
beneficiary's vague job responsibilities or broadly-cast business objectives is not sufficient; the regulations 
require a detailed description of the beneficiary's daily job duties. The petitioner has failed to answer a 
critical question in this case: What does the beneficiary primarily do on a daily basis? The actual duties 
themselves will reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 
1 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Also, there is no evidence in the record that the training provided by the beneficiary, in addition to the inspections 
and repairs performed by the beneficiary, requires the beneficiary to possess specialized knowledge. The 
petitioner's blanket statement of the beneficiary's employment in a "high level technical position which requires . . 
. specialized knowledge," as well as the claim on appeal that the beneficiary's "training and technical knowledge" 
is essential to the installation, programming and repair of the beverage machines is not sufficient to support the 
proposition that the proposed position requires specialized knowledge. As noted above, the regulations require 
that the petitioner explain in detail why the installation, programming and repair of the petitioner's equipment 
necessitate a technical service support specialist to possess specialized knowledge, or what unusual factors 
associated with these tasks demands an employee with specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter 
of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
Moreover, the instruction manuals and inspection reports submitted on appeal, without an explanation as to why 
the operation of the dispensers requires specialized knowledge, will not satisfy the statutory requirements for the 
requested classification. It appears that the diagrams were submitted in support of the "uniqueness" of the 
petitioner's equipment. However, absent instruction from the petitioner documenting the need for specialized 
knowledge when worhng with the machines, the AAO cannot conclude that the beneficiary's proposed tasks 
require knowledge that is specialized. Moreover, while counsel stresses that the beverage dispensers are not 
presently distributed in the United States and therefore not readily accessible to United States workers, this 
factor alone does not establish a requirement for specialized knowledge. The unsupported assertions of 
counsel do not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of 
Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
The record also fails to demonstrate that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. The petitioner has not 
offered evidence distinguishing the beneficiary's knowledge as specialized. The petitioner noted that it would 
require four to five years to train an individual to perform in the proposed position. A careful review of the 
beneficiary's training record undermines the petitioner's claim, however, indicating instead that the beneficiary 
completed all training courses in approximately 21 weeks, or seven months. As there is no description of the 
SRC 05 243 51804 
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course content, it cannot be assumed that each was necessary to perform in the position of technical service 
support specialist. More importantly, there is no evidence that the completed courses imparted specialized 
knowledge on the beneficiary. In addition, counsel's mere reference to course certifications evidencing the 
completion of training courses does not, by itself, demonstrate "special training," as claimed by counsel on 
appeal. Again, counsel has not offered an explanation as to why the beneficiary's training should be considered 
"special," or should be viewed as providing the beneficiary with specialized knowledge. The unsupported 
statements of counsel on appeal or in a motion are not evidence and thus are not entitled to any evidentiary 
weight. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188-89 n.6 (1984); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 
503 (BIA 1980). 
In addition, it does not appear that the beneficiary would have received his purported specialized knowledge from 
his prior work experience. The petitioner stated that in addition to his two years as a contractor, the beneficiary's 
three years of employment with the petitioning entity provided him with the work experience necessary for the 
proposed position. As relevant factors of the beneficiary's employment history, the petitioner highlighted the 
beneficiary's completion of equipment installations and his participation in training employees and consultants, as 
well as his language skills. The petitioner has not offered evidence of how the referenced work experiences 
would have provided the beneficiary with specialized knowledge. This information is relevant to establishing 
whether the beneficiary possessed specialized knowledge at the time of filing. As in the unsupported claims 
related to the beneficiary's educational experience, the petitioner's blanket assertion that the working relationships 
developed by the beneficiary during his employment with the foreign entity would contribute to his success in the 
proffered position is not sufficient to characterize the beneficiary's knowledge as specialized. At most, the 
beneficiary's working relationships with customers, contractors and repair teams may be considered a quality that 
allows the beneficiary to successfully perform in the position of cruise ship technical service support specialist, 
yet may not be categorized as specialized knowledge. The petitioner has not documented its claims that the 
beneficiary possesses "[an] unusually high level of knowledge," "proprietary knowledge," and "[an] advanced 
level of expertise." Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 
(Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of Cal$ornia, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
It is appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 198 1) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 8 16 (R.C. 197 I).~ As stated by the Commissioner in Matter 
of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
2 
 Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," 
the AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had 
to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized knowledge" from the 
prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even refer to 
any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The Committee Report simply states 
that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying [i.e., not specifically 
incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, 
the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The 
AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, remain useful guidance concerning 
the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
SRC 05 243 5 1804 
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specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose slulls and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business' operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more alun to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a service through physical and skilled labor, 
rather than an employee who has unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. As observed in 1756, Inc., 
"[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 
at 15. The term "specialized knowledge" is relative and cannot be plainly defined. The Congressional record 
specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. No. 91- 
851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company 
that is "of crucial importance." Webster's N New College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In 
general, all employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee 
did not contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational reason to 
employ that person. An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the 
petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the 
congressional record related to that term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed 
specialized knowledge employee and the general labor market, but also between that employee and the 
remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner claimed that no other workers employed by the petitioning entity have knowledge of the 
petitioner's equipment, or possess the work experience held by the beneficiary. As noted previously, the 
petitioner indicated that it would take four to five years to train another individual for the position offered herein. 
Contrary to the petitioner's claims, the petitioner identified on its organizational chart two workers, in addition to 
the beneficiary, employed in the positions of cruise ship technical service support specialist. The petitioner has 
not distinguished the beneficiary's knowledge, work experience, or training from the other specialists. There is no 
evidence to support a finding that the beneficiary's position in the petitioning entity may be considered "crucial," 
particularly in light of the employment of two other technical service support specialists. While the employment 
of the beneficiary may be important to the repair of the petitioner's equipment and training of personnel, there is 
no evidence that as one of three technical service support specialists, the beneficiary should be deemed a "key" 
employee. Again, going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). Although the definition of "specialized 
knowledge" in effect at the time of Matter of Penner was superseded by the 1990 Act to the extent that the 
former definition required a showing of "proprietary" knowledge, the reasoning behind Matter of Penner 
SRC 05 243 5 1804 
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remains applicable to the current matter. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. No. 91-851, 
was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge, but that during the course of the sub-committee hearings 
on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the 
proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they 
understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and 
that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N 
Dec. at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 
9 1 st Cong. 2 10,2 18,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not 
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1 ' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") Accordingly, case law and the accompanying 
legislative reports support the finding herein that the beneficiary's employment as a technician does not rise to the 
level of specialized knowledge. 
In the present matter, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced 
than the knowledge possessed by others in the industry or employed by the petitioner, or that his work experience 
and training distinguish him as possessing specialized knowledge. While the beneficiary possesses the slulls 
required to successfully perform in the proposed position, there is insufficient evidence to differentiate the 
beneficiary as "key personnel" or a "crucial" employee. Nor does it establish employment in a position requiring 
specialized knowledge. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is 
concluded that the beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be 
employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Although the appeal will be dismissed, the AAO notes that the director erroneously stated in his decision: 
"Specialized knowledge involves proprietary knowledge and an advanced level of expertise not readily available 
in the United States job market." The current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge" at section 
214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 9 1184(c)(2)(B), as amended by the Immigration Act of 1990, contains no 
requirement that specialized knowledge be proprietary, nor does it require a test of the United States labor market. 
The MO emphasizes however, that in accordance with a 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Services (now 
CIS) memorandum, CIS is permitted to consider the beneficiary's knowledge in comparison to the general 
United States labor market in order to distinguish between specialized and general knowledge. Memorandum 
SRC 05 243 5 1804 
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from James A. Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 2 14L-P 
(March 9, 1994). This comparison is necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's skills and 
knowledge and whether the beneficiary's knowledge is actually advanced. Absent an outside group to which 
to compare the beneficiary's knowledge, CIS would not be able to "ensure that the knowledge possessed by 
the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but that it is truly 
specialized." Id. Accordingly, the director's statement is withdrawn. Notwithstanding this statement, the 
director properly applied the current statutory and regulatory requirements to the facts of this case. 
Beyond the decision of the director, an additional issue is whether the beneficiary was employed abroad by a 
qualifying organization in a managerial or executive capacity, or in a position involving specialized knowledge. 
See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(l)(ii)(A) (defining "intracompany transferee" as one who within three years preceding 
transfer to the United States was employed abroad continuously for one year by a qualifying organization in a 
capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized knowledge). The petitioner noted in its August 25, 
2005 letter that prior to the beneficiary's transfer from the foreign company in September 2005, the beneficiary 
was employed in the same position as that offered herein. Information contained on the supplement to Form 
1-129 indicates that from March 27, 2003 through the date of filing on September 6, 2005, the beneficiary was 
employed by "[the foreign entity] and its affiliate companies" in the position of cruise ship technical service 
support specialist. Based on the petitioner's representations, it is unclear who employed the beneficiary during the 
three years prior to his transfer to the United States, and more importantly, whether the beneficiary's foreign 
employer was a qualifiing organization. The petitioner is obligated to clarify the inconsistent and conflicting 
testimony by independent and objective evidence. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). With 
regard to the beneficiary's employment capacity, the record is further complicated by the beneficiary's resume, 
which indicates that from 2003 through the date of filing, the beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity 
as a "field service technician," not as a technical service support specialist as noted previously by the 
petitioner. Regardless, the petitioner does not identify whether the beneficiary was employed in a managerial, 
executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. Additionally, the offered job descriptions do not support a 
finding that the beneficiary was primarily performing managerial or executive job duties or that his former 
position involved specialized knowledge. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 
165. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden has 
not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.