dismissed L-1B Case: Biotechnology Equipment

U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
In Re: 19334956 
Appeal of California Service Center Decision 
Non-Precedent Decision of the 
Administrative Appeals Office 
Date: DEC. 6, 2021 
Form 1-129, Petition for L-lB Specialized Knowledge Nonimmigrant Worker 
The Petitioner seeks to temporarily employ the Beneficiary as a "sales engineer" in the United States 
under the L-1 B nonimmigrant classification for intracompany transferees . See Immigration and 
Nationality Act (the Act) section 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C . § 110l(a)(15)(L). The L-lB classification 
allows a corporation or other legal entity (including its affiliate or subsidiary) to transfer a qualifying 
foreign employee with "specialized knowledge" to work temporarily in the United States. 
The Director of the California Service Center denied the petition, concluding the Petitioner did not 
establish that the Beneficiary possesses a special or advanced level of knowledge and that the U.S. 
position would involve specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that it submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the Beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge and that the proffered position requires specialized knowledge. The 
Petitioner contends that the Director failed to properly consider or ignored the evidence submitted, as 
well as disregarded U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (USCIS) guidance for the adjudication 
of the petition. 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 1 
We review the questions in this matter de novo.2 Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal. 
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
To establish eligibility for the L-lB nonirnrnigrant visa classification, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary "in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge," for one continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for 
admission into the United States. Section 101(a)(l5)(L) of the Act. In addition, the beneficiary must 
seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a specialized knowledge capacity. Id. The petitioner 
must also establish that the beneficiary's prior education, training, and employment qualify him or her 
to perform the intended services in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(3). 
1 See Section 291 of the Act; Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375 (AAO 2010). 
2 See Matter of Christo 's Inc., 26 I&N Dec. 537, 537 n.2 (AAO 2015). 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Petitioner stated that it imports, sells, and distributes reagents, consumables, and biotechnological 
e:uipment. The Petitioner noted that it carries e ui ment manufactured by industry brands including 
I ] I LC]and,__----.- _______ _. The Petitioner provided a 2007 distribution 
agreement it had entered into with th~-~ company, a company located in South Korea. The Petitioner 
indicated further that the foreign entity, located in Venezuela, also engages in importing, selling, and 
distributing reagents, consumables, and biotechnological equipment. 
The Petitioner initially provided a broad overview of the Beneficiary's responsibilities as sales engineer 
for the foreign entity from 2008 to 2014. 4 The responsibilities encompassed the general duties of a sales 
engineer which included collaborating with sales representatives to promote the company's 
biotechnology equipment, prepare and deliver technical presentations to customers and prospective 
customers, arrange for demonstrations or trial installations of biotechnology equipment, develop, 
present, or respond to proposals for specific customer requirements, and recommend improved 
biotechnology equipment to clients. The Petitioner added that the Beneficiary's responsibilities also 
included providing technical support and services to clients or other staff members regarding the use, 
operation, and maintenance of biotechnology equipment and diagnosing problems with installed 
biotechnology equipment. The Petitioner did not identify the amount of time the Beneficiary spent on 
any of the responsibilities listed. The Petitioner stated that to perform the initially described duties, the 
Beneficiary was required to take extensive training with the manufacturers of the products it carries to 
gain deep knowledge about their production process and the technologies applied to the products. 
In response to the Director's request for evidence (RFE), the Petitioner described itself as "the exclusive 
and official distributor for Latin America, the Caribbean, and the State of Florida of all the products 
manufactured b~ I. ... "5 and revised the initial description of the Beneficiary's responsibilities for 
the foreign entity adding that the previously described responsibilities related to the company's line of 
ultra-low freezers, blood bank and pharmaceutical refrigerators. The Petitioner stated that the 
Beneficiary "is key personnel within organization with specialized knowledge in manufacturing 
methods, operating systems, technical features, installation, configuration, troubleshooting and repair of 
alll Is freeze dyers [sic], deep freezers, blood bank and pharmaceutical refrigerators" that it 
distributes. The Petitioner claimed that to perform the duties it had described, "the incumbent is required 
to hold a bachelor's degree in electronic engineering, the completion of the 3 intensive training sessions 
provided byLJ at its factory in South Korea, and to have a minimum 4 years of experience providing 
technical advice and service forl Is ultra[-]low freezers, and blood bank and pharmaceutical 
refrigerators." 6 
3 This company changed its name to~ ______ _.in June 2009. See http:/._I ___ ___, 
4 The Beneficiary indicates that the Beneficiary was promoted to president of the foreign entity in 2014 and was transfened 
to the Petitioner as vice president in 2016. The Beneficiaiy entered the United States the same year as an L-lA executive. 
5 The Petitioner also provided an application for registration of fictitious name filed January 2015, adding that it is doing 
business ;iJ , I 
6 The Petitioner does not explain this addition of requirements to perform the position. The Petitioner must resolve this 
ambiguity in the record with independent, objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter ofHo, 19 I&N Dec. 
582, 591-592 (BIA 1988). Moreover, the purpose of the RFE is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility 
for the benefit sought has been established. 8 C.F.R. ~ 103.2(b)(8). When responding to an RFE, a petitioner cannot offer 
a new position to a beneficiary, or materially change a position's title, its level of authority within the organizational 
2 
The Petitioner provided several documents related to trainings comteted ly the Beneficiary including: 
a~ !training from January 26 to February 5, 2008 related to products which included an 
element of technical training; a8training from October 6 to October 8 discussing a new freezer 
model and its features and use; a training from October 25 to November 2, 2011 on new cascade 
technology and advanced training in the industrial freeze dryer; and~ I training from November 
21 to November 23, 2012 on an overview of their products. The record also included two certificates: 
one issued byl ~n May 29, 2008 indicating the Beneficiary is certified to be a factory 
authorized service techmcrnn for thel I products; and the second issued byl I Technology 
on March 1, 2020 related to a purification system as well as a fluorescence detection system and noting 
the Beneficiary is qualified in installation and service 
1
or this hroduct(s). The Petitioner does not further 
refer to thd . ltraining or the I I and Technology certificates as providing the 
Beneficiary specialized knowledge. 
III. SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE 
The issues in this matter are whether the Petitioner established that the Beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge and whether he has been employed abroad, and will be employed in the United 
States, in a specialized knowledge capacity. As a threshold issue, we must determine whether the 
Petitioner established that the Beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. If the evidence is 
insufficient to establish that he possesses specialized knowledge, then we cannot conclude that the 
Beneficiary's past and intended future employment involve specialized knowledge. 
A beneficiary is deemed to have specialized knowledge if he or she has: (1) a "special" knowledge of 
the company product and its application in international markets; or (2) an "advanced" level of 
knowledge of the processes and procedures of the company. Section 214( c )(2)(B) of the Act. A 
petitioner may establish eligibility by submitting evidence that the beneficiary and the proffered 
position satisfy either prong of the statutory definition. 
As both "special" and "advanced" are relative terms, determining whether a given beneficiary's 
knowledge is "special" or "advanced" inherently requires a comparison of the beneficiary's 
knowledge against that of others. With respect to either special or advanced knowledge, the petitioner 
ordinarily must demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is not commonly held throughout the 
particular industry and cannot be easily imparted from one person to another. The ultimate question 
is whether the petitioner has met its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the beneficiary's knowledge or expertise is special or advanced, and that the beneficiary's position 
requires such knowledge. 
Special knowledge concerns knowledge of the petitioning organization's products or services and its 
application in international markets. To establish that a beneficiary has special knowledge, the 
petitioner may meet its burden through evidence that the beneficiary has knowledge that is distinct or 
uncommon in comparison to the knowledge of other similarly employed workers in the particular 
industry. 
hierarchy, or its associated job responsibilities. A petitioner must establish that the position offered to a beneficiary, when 
the petition was filed, merits classification as the nonimmigrant classification requested. See Matter a/Michelin Tire 
C01p., 17 I&N Dec. 248, 249 (Reg'l Comm'r 1978). 
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Because "advanced knowledge" concerns knowledge of an organization's processes and procedures, 
the petitioning entity may meet its burden through evidence that the beneficiary has knowledge of or 
an expertise in the organization's processes and procedures that is greatly developed or further along 
in progress, complexity, and understanding in comparison to other workers in the employer's 
operations. Such advanced knowledge must be supported by evidence setting that knowledge apart 
from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. 
Once a petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type 
of evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized 
knowledge. We cannot make a factual determination regarding a given beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of its products 
and services or processes and procedures, the nature of the specific industry or field involved, and the 
nature of the beneficiary's knowledge. The petitioner should also describe how an employee is able 
to gain specialized knowledge within the organization and explain how and when the individual 
beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
On appeal, the Petitioner emphasizes that the Beneficiary's bachelor's degree in electronics 
engineering provides the technical skills foundatioito acgre specialized knowledge in its products. 
The Petitioner also refers to the letter authored b which indicates that the Beneficiary has 
mastered the technology principles and concepts tha applies to its products and that such "deep 
knowledge" is critical for the sales and distribution of its products in Latin America and the Caribbean 
and through its U.S. affiliate. 7 The Petitioner adds that the Beneficiary became proficient in the use 
and application of his specialized knowledge in October 2011, 4 years after he started employment 
with the foreign affiliate as a sales engineer. 
The Petitioner contends that the knowledge of its product lines cannot be gained without training with 
the equipment manufacturer and years of experience in selling and servicing its line of products, thus 
the knowledge is uncommon in thl generl labor market. The Petitioner, however, provides little 
information on why knowledge of s products should be considered distinct and uncommon 
within the industry. The Petitioner claims that thel I products differ from other brands because 
they are equipped with COSCO M ( combination of single compressor operation mode) technology and 
VIP (vacuum insulation panel) and use thd lsystem. However, the COSCOM technology 
is not proprietary and appears to be used throughout the refrigeration/freezer industry. Likewise, VIP, 
a type of insulation, and Auto Cascjde, a tmethod to control temperatures, is common in comparable 
products. As these components of s products appear common in this industry, it is not clear 
why the Beneficiary's knowledge of this technology should be considered distinct or uncommon in 
comparison to the knowledge of other similarly employed workers in the particular industry. Here, 
the Petitioner has not provided the required detail and the necessary comparisons to demonstrate that 
the Beneficiary's knowledge is distinct and uncommon. 
The P~r asserts on apP.eal that the Director did not properly consider the Beneficiary's training 
at theL__Js factory on theLJproducts as evidence of the Beneficiary's specialized knowledge. 
However, company-specific knowledge must still be either advanced or special to conclude that it 
qualifies as specialized knowledge as set out in the regulations. In this matter, the Beneficiary's first 
7 This letter also provides an overview of the three trainings the Beneficiary attended a~s factory in South Korea. 
4 
D training ( l O days in 2008) provided a broad overview of theD products including principal 
components, electrical and control components, how to diagnose a problem in an ultra-low freezer and 
welding and recharging refrigerant in an ultra-low freezer. The Petitioner does not explain why this 
general knowledge is special or advanced knowledge. Similarly, the two-day training in 2010 on a 
new freezer model and its components and the seven-day training in 2011 on the new cascade 
technology does not appear to be intensive or to provide advanced or special knowledge. Although 
the trainings relate td I specific products, it is reasonable to conclude that other professionals in 
this industry likely hold their own company-specific knowledge in order to sell, promote, and 
distribute products, and to provide services to their customers. The Petitioner has not demonstrated 
that the underlying knowledge necessary to understand the technical aspects ofl ts products is 
uncommon or distinct or is knowledge apart from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by 
others within the industry. The Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary possesses knowledge 
that cannot be easily transferred to a qualified technician with a general background in the sale of 
biotechnology equipment. 
The Petitioner points out that its distribution agreement withl I states tha~ I's warranty does 
not extend to its products which have been improperly repaired or altered or modified. The Petitioner 
asserts that its potential buyers thus require that it "provide technical support by technicians certified 
by the manufacturer to protect manufacturer's warranty on the equipment." We note thatD does 
not make this requirement and that the record does not document that the Beneficiary is a technician 
making repairs to its customers' equipment. Moreover, although thel lletters certify that the 
Beneficiary attended three trainings, the letters do not certify that he is an authorized technician. 
We further note that the emails provided by the Petitioner to demonstrate the Beneficiary's technical 
knowledge do not include evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the Beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge. The emails include: a string of emails in December 2009 of the Beneficiary 
requestilg assiyance in fixing a compressor problem 8; emails dated in the October 2012 time frame 
from the sales manager informing the Beneficiary of the diagnosis of a temperature problem 
and offering a resolution 9; July 2013 emails requesting the Beneficiary's opinion on deleting a function 
and the Beneficiary's rednonse: la string of emails (June/July 2014) from a client informing the 
Petitioner of failures in th equipment and the Beneficiary's requests tol I that the client be 
compensated; and an undated letter from a technical service company informing the Beneficiary of 
damage tol I equipment and noting the repairs made. Although the Beneficiary may need basic 
technical knowledge to communicate with the I I sales team, service companies, and its clients, 
these email exchanges do not demonstrate that the Beneficiary possesses special (uncommon or 
distinct) or advanced (greatly developed or further along in progress, complexity, and understanding) 
knowledge o~'s products. 
Furthermore, although the Petitioner claimed that it would take an individual at least four years to 
become proficient with I ts equJment, {t did not provide a path for becoming proficient or 
establish that achieving proficiency i s equipment is synonymous with attaining specialized 
knowledge. In fact, other than claiming that the Beneficiary became proficient in the use and 
8 The record does not include documentation that the Beneficiary makes the repairs but rather that solutions are conveyed 
to clients or service companies to make the repairs. 
9 The Beneficiary requested training on this issue, but the record does not include evidence that the training occurred. 
5 
application of his specialized knowledge four years after he started employment with the foreign 
affiliate, the Petitioner did not describe a progression of knowledge during the course of the 
Beneficiary's foreign employment or demonstrate that the Beneficiary's knowledge increased in its 
level of complexity to reach a specialized level of knowledge. We note that the Petitioner may be 
claiming that the Beneficiary possessed specialized knowledge at some point prior to his four-year 
anniversary employment date, but as the record does not provide a timeline or evidence of the 
development of the claimed specialized knowledge, this claim is unsupported. That is, the record does 
not include detailed descriptions of the Beneficiary's past assignments and how those assignments 
included progressively responsible duties. Additionally, the Petitioner does not offer an analysis or 
describe how it determined that the sales engineer position required four years of experience to become 
proficient in the use and application of the claimed specialized knowledge. Without some analysis or 
corroborating evidence, the Petitioner's claim is arbitrary and unsupported. 
We also note that the Petitioner's distribution agreement wit~ I executed in 2007, does not define 
the territory in which the Petitioner may exercise its exclusive rights. In response to the Director's 
RFE and on appeal, the Petitioner states that its exclusive distributorship territory is Latin America, 
Mexico, and the State of Florida. The Petitioner does not explain who markets! I's products in 
the United States outside of Florida and Internet research shows tha~ loroducts are sold by other 
companies in the United States. The record does not include a comparison of the Beneficiary's 
knowledge to the lowledr of other professionals in the United States and remaining international 
market which sell or similar products. This leaves substantial uncertainty whether the 
Beneficiary's training and foreign employment can be considered specialized as defined by the 
regulations. Further, as it appears that other professionals in the United States and elsewhere have 
knowlelge ofi ~ lproducts, the Petitioner's claim that it requires the Beneficiary's knowledge 
because as shut down its training facility during the Covid crisis is unpersuasive. That is, the 
commonality of knowledge ofl Is products undermines a claim that the knowledge cannot be 
easily imparted to others. We also reiterate that the Petitioner has not established that the Beneficiary 
acquired specialized knowledge by attending the general trainings provided by I I Thus, the 
Petitioner has not demonstrated that more likely than not the Beneficiary possesses knowledge that is 
special or advanced 10 as that knowledge relates to the products it promotes, sells, and distributes. 11 
Finally, on appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the Director ignored guidance set out in the Adjudicator's 
Field Manual (AFM) § 32.6( e) regarding factors that may be considered when determining whether a 
beneficiary's knowledge is specialized. The Petitioner repeats the same assertions discussed above as 
demonstrating the factors listed. However, as discussed, the record lacks reliable evidence 
establishing how the Beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge is distinct or uncommon in the 
particular industry, lacks persuasive evidence establishing how the Beneficiary gained the knowledge 
that is claimed to be specialized, and lacks detailed information regarding the Beneficiary's 
assignment with the foreign entity which is claimed to have resulted in his gaining specialized 
knowledge. Moreover, the AFM is not a substitute for statutory or regulatory provisions and does not 
10 The record does not include sufficient information to allow us to compare the Beneficiary's knowledge of company 
processes and procedures to that of others within the petitioning company and its foreign subsidiary. Therefore, the record 
does not support a claim that his knowledge is "advanced" and thus is deficient in this regard. 
11 The Petitioner does not provide supporting evidence of brands or products, other than the ~products, that it sells 
and distributes. As noted above, it does not refer to the Beneficiary's training with other companies as providing the 
Beneficiary specialized knowledge. 
6 
have the effect of binding case law precedent or USCIS policy. An agency's internal personnel 
guidelines "neither confer upon [plaintiffs] substantive rights nor provide procedures upon which 
[they] may rely." Loa-Herrera v. Trominski, 231 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 2000)(quoting Fano v. 
O'Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1264 (5th Cir.1987)). 
Because the Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Beneficiary possesses special or advanced 
knowledge, we need not address whether the Beneficiary has been employed abroad in a position 
involving specialized knowledge or would be employed in the United States in a specialized 
knowledge capacity. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
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