dismissed L-1B Case: Carpet Business

ptlBLIC COPY 
identiQing data dskted to 
prevent dmly wwmted 
invasion of pmonal privw 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Rrn. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: EAC 05 032 53444 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER Date: OEC 0 1 2006 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1 10 1 (a)(] 5)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF BENEFICIARY: 
INSTRUCTIONS : 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Administrative Appeals Office 
EAC 05 032 53444 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (MO) on appeal. The MO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking, to ~mploy the beneficiary in the position of chief 
executivelmanager as an L- 1 B nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to 
section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 9 1 10 1 (a)(] 5)(L). The 
petitioner is engaged in the carpet business and claims a qualifying relationship with 
of Turkey. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed,to establish that the position offered 
requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has such knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that 
the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the Uited States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this matter is whether the petitioner has established that the position offered requires an 
EAC 05 032 53444 
Page 3 
employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has such knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.i$ 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is cqnsidered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
,I' 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advancyl level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In a letter dated October 20, 2004 appended to the initial petition, the petitioner described the beneficiary's 
specialized knowledge and the petitioner's need of an employee possessing such knowledge as follows: 
[The beneficiary] is a key person to the business becayqe he was employed from 1995 until 
2002 by the [foreign entity] as its Business Manager and sale$ Manager. In this position he 
developed [the foreign entity's] business all over the world including Europe and the United 
States. Because of his position, he obtained an advanced level of knowledge of the 
production facilities in Turkey, the abilities of the Turkish weavers to produce various types 
of carpets and he obtained knowledge of how these carpets could be sent through various 
channels to other countries in the world in international commerce successfully. Oriental 
carpets are a very specialized field and the knowledge of what our company has produced and 
can produce is crucial to being able to explain to custdmers exactly what our capabilities are 
and how we can satisfy their needs. In addition, as sales manager, [the beneficiary] 
developed relationships with customers and is therefore able to advise them given his 
knowledge of our production facilities. While [the beneficiary] was the principal manager of 
the US affiliate, he was at the same time using his specialized knowledge to deal with 
customers including speaking with customers at various trade .shows, actively seelung out 
markets for the particular types of carpets which [the foreign entity] produces in Turkey, and 
using his knowledge of our produce [sic] to increase business. Because of his knowledge, he 
is able to import a stock of rugs in colors and designs preferred by American customers 
which are able to [be] produced economically and in good quality by thorough knowledge of 
cost and value such as the knowledge that [the beneficiary] possesses. The company has 
initiated internet marketing as well and we need inquiries, from prospective US customers. 
Finally, a merger with [a third party] is actively being pursued and for this transaction to be 
successful, it requires a person who is not only familiar with the U.S. retain market but is 
familiar with our production facilities so that a three-sided transaction will emerge which will 
satisfy all parties. For this, it is necessary to have someone in the United States to negotiate 
this deal who is thoroughly familiar with all aspects of our Turkish operation. 
EAC 05 032 53444 
Page 4 
On December 29, 2004, the director requested additional evidence establishing that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is indeed specialized. Specifically, the director reqdsted evidence demonstrating that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality that is not 
generally known by practitioners in the beneficiary's field. The director also instructed the petitioner to 
provide evidence establishing that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures is 
apart from the elementary or basic knowledge possessed by_ others. 
In response, the petitioner provided a letter dated February 13, 2005 providing more information regarding 
the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge. In the letter, the petitioner states as follows: 
[The beneficiary's] knowledge is uncommon. It is a combination of product knowledge, 
knowledge of shipping, customs and similar areas, and .knowledge of Western tastes, but 
most of all it is a unique knowledge of our very unusual business model. That is, we are not a 
large international company with many offices. Nor are we a one-unit retail store with no 
reason to be in the United States. We are in fact a medium-sized business which finds that 
having a presence in the United States on a permanent basis is a great boon to our business. 
We have certain capabilities and our U.S. customer base relies upon [the beneficiary] to guide 
them concerning our capabilities and the products and custom rug making processes. There 
are very few firms like ours, relying principally on a tourist-trade market, which have this US 
presence, and consequently the international clientele thgt we have. [The beneficiary] has 
always been our "outside" man, our "traveling salesman[."] It is he who combines the 
knowledge of our processes and costs with the knowledge of our customer base and its 
desires. Without him our business would be severely affected. Just to give an example, in 
case of a defect, [the beneficiary] must determine whether to repair or replace (given his 
knowledge of our costs and our suppliers). 
[The beneficiary] did not receive any formal school training in this business. This is a family 
business and he grew up in the store. But we can say from experience that it would take at 
least two years to train somebody to byfully knowledgeable in this business. He is the only 
person qualified to be sent to the United States since it was he who got all the foreign sales 
experience, and he is our only US employee. 
On April 25, 2005, the director denied the petition concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
position offered requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has such knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that 
the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary will be 
employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8.C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job 
EAC 05 032 53444 
Page 5 
description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. In this case, while 
the beneficiary's job description adequately describes his duties as an experienced carpet salesman, the 
petitioner fails to establish that this position requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the 
beneficiary has such specialized knowledge. 
Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary.'~ proposed position in the United States 
requires "specialized knowledge," the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to support this claim. 
The petitioner has failed to identify any specialized or advanced body of knowledge which would distinguish 
the beneficiary's role from that of other people with experience in the manufacture, importation, and sale of 
Turkish rugs. Going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the 
burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Rec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter 
of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important 
indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise meeting the definitions 
would simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d-Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of the petitioner's products, 
customers, and service as well as of the petitioner's processes and procedures. The petitioner also asserts that 
the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon. In support of these arguments, the petitioner relies entirely on the 
beneficiary's years of experience of working with the petitioner's rugs, knowing the petitioner's customers and 
their preferences, and understanding the petitioner's unique "business model." Also, while the petitioner 
admits that the beneficiary did not receive any special training, it makes the unsubstantiated assertion that it 
would take two years to train a replacement. The petitioner does not clarify if this purported training would 
be required for any replacement or only for replacements with no experience with the petitioner's product or 
business model. Again, going on record without documentary- evidence is not sufficient for purposes of 
meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
Despite the petitioner's assertions, the record does not reveal the material difference between the petitioner's 
business model, customers, products, or service and those of other Turlush rug importers and retailers. While 
the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary gained his knowledge of the petitioner's business and products from 
years of working for the petitioner and the foreign entity, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is different from the knowledge of the sale and importation of Turkish rugs possessed by others 
generally throughout the industry. Again, specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise meeting the definitions would simply be a 
matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724, F. Supp. 1103, afS'd, 905 F.2d 
41 .' 
1 
On appeal, counsel to the petitioner provides a letter dated May 26, 2005 in an attempt to bolster the 
argument that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. The petitioner was put on notice of required 
evidence and given a reasonable opportunity to provide it for the record before the visa petition was 
adjudicated. The petitioner failed to submit the requested evidence in response to the director's Request for 
Evidence and now submits it on appeal. However, the AAO will not consider this evidence for any purpose. 
EAC 05 032 53444 
Page 6 
The AAO does not dispute the likelihood that the beneficiary is an experienced carpet salesman who would 
be a valuable asset to the petitioner. However, it is appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job 
duties and consider the importance of the beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, 
management operations, or decision-making process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 117, 120 (Comm. 
198l)(citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 
1971)). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering whether the beneficiaries 
possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations 
inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. Rather, the 
beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Id. 
The Commissioner also provided the following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily for 
his ability to cany out a key process or function which is important or essential to the business 
firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" 
is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 
"[s]imply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 F. Supp. 
9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-l category was intended for "key 
personnel." See generally, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" 
denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's 11 New College 
Dictionaly 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered 
"important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of 
an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of "crucial 
importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. Accordingly, 
based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the AAO 
must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general labor 
market, but also between the employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. While it may be 
correct to say that the beneficiary in the instant case is a highly skilled and productive employee, this fact 
alone is not enough to bring the beneficiary to the level of "key personnel." 
Moreover, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of the 
specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982). The decision noted that the 1970 House 
Report, H.R. REP. NO. 91-851, stated that the number of admissions under the L-l classification "will not be 
large" and that "[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be 
See Matter of Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988); Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1988). 
The appeal will be adjudicated based on the record of proceeding before the director. 
EAC 05 032 53444 
Page 7 
carefully regulated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that 
the House Report was silent on the subject of specialized Gowledge, but that during the course of the sub- 
committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of slull necessary 
to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses 
responded that they understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with 
"unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Matter 
of Penner, id. at 50 (citing H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration Act of 1970: Hearings on 
H.R. 445,91a Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Penner than an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that the specialized knowledge worker classification was not 
intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[m]ost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Penner, "[sluch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also, 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. at 
15 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees 
with specialized knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives.") 
A 1994 Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)) 
memorandum written by the then Acting Associate Commissioner -also directs CIS to compare the 
beneficiary's knowledge to the general United States labor market and the petitioner's workforce in order to 
distinguish between specialized and general knowledge. The Associate Commissioner notes in the 
memorandum that "officers adjudicating petitions involving specialized knowledge must ensure that the 
knowledge possessed by the beneficiary is not general knowledge held commonly throughout the industry but 
that it is truly specialized." Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 214L-P (March 9, 
1994). A comparison of the beneficiary's knowledge to the knowledge possessed by others in the field is 
therefore necessary in order to determine the level of the beneficiary's skills and knowledge and to ascertain 
whether the beneficiary's knowledge is advanced. In other words, absent an outside group to which to 
compare the beneficiary's knowledge, CIS would not be able to "ensure that the knowledge possessed by the 
beneficiary is truly specialized." Id. The analysis for specialized knowledge therefore requires a test of the 
knowledge possessed by the United States labor market, but does not consider whether workers are available 
in the United States to perform the beneficiary's job duties. 
As explained above, the record does not distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge as more advanced than the 
knowledge possessed by others with experience in the sale and importation of Turkish rugs. As the petitioner 
has failed to document any materially unique qualities to the petitioner's business model, products, customers, 
or service, the petitioner's claims are not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary would be a "key" 
employee. There is no indication that the beneficiary has any knowledge that exceeds that of any employees 
EAC 05 032 53444 
Page 8 
with experience in the sale and importation of Turkish rugs, or that he has received special training in the 
company's methodologies or processes which would separate him from any other employee of the foreign 
entity. 
The legislative history of the term "specialized knowledge7' provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded 
that the beneficiary would not be employed in the United States in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, it is noted that instead of properly filing a petition requesting new 
employment, the petitioner requested a "change in previously approved employment" in Part 2 of the Form I- 
129, thereby attempting to avoid the required disclosures in Part 4 regarding previously denied petitions. This 
petition was filed on November 16, 2004. Although the petitioner's initial "new office" petition (EAC 02 124 
54285) was approved on or about November 15, 2002, the beneficiary's subsequent L-1 renewal petition 
(EAC 04 031 53289) was denied by the director on or about June 28, 2004. The regulations at 8 C.F.R. tj 
214.2(1)(2)(i) state that " [flailure to make a full disclosure of previous petitions filed may result in a denial of 
the petition." As the petitioner failed to fully disclose the denial of the previously filed petition, this petition 
will be denied as a matter of discretion. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp: 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afyd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.