dismissed L-1B Case: Catering

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Room 3000 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
MAlL STOP 2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
Services 
FILE: 
 EAC 07 189 53400 
 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER 
 Date:~nv 2 6 2008 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(lS)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1 10 l(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned 
to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
hn F. Grissom, Acti Chief 
- 
f 
dministrative Appeals Office 
EAC 07 189 53400 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Vermont Service Center, denied the petition for a nonirnrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (MO) on appeal. The MO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner is a catering company. It seeks to temporarily employ the beneficiary in the United States 
as its banquet manager, and filed a petition to classify the beneficiary as a nonimmigrant intracompany 
transferee with specialized knowledge. The director denied thc petition, finding that the petitioner had 
not established that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. 
011 appeal, the petitioner submits a brief and asscrts that the director's decision was erroneous. 
Specifically, the petitioner contends that the director made a subjective assessment in reviewing the 
beneficiary's eligibility and thus his decision constituted an abuse of discretion. The petitioner submits a 
four-page brief in support of these assertions. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $ 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization 
must have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United 
States temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or 
affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall 
be accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien 
are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
howledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad 
with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended services in 
the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the same work 
which the alien performed abroad. 
Additionally, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(vi) provides that if the petition indicates that the 
beneficiary is coming to the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity to open or to be employed in a 
new office, the petitioner shall submit evidence that: 
EAC 07 189 53400 
Page 3 
(A) 
 Sufficient physical premises to house the new office have been secured; 
(B) 
 The business entity in the United States is or will be a qualifying organization as 
defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of ths section; and 
(C) 
 Thc pctitio~ler has the fi~~ai~cial abil~ty to relllunerate the bellcficlary and to 
commence doing buslness m the United States. 
Thc issue in this lilatter is whether the beneficiary posscsscs spccializcd lalowlodge as contcndcd bj thc 
petitioner, and whether he will be employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its 
application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the 
organization's processes and procedures. 
As stated above, the petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary temporarily in the United States as its 
banquet manager. In a letter of support dated March 27, 2007, the petitioner provided a lengthy 
description of the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge as implemented in his position abroad, as 
well as a description of his proposed position in the United States and the manner in which it required 
specialized knowledge. Regarding the beneficiary's foreign position and experience, the petitioner 
claimed that the beneficiary was the managing partner of the foreign entity, and that he coordinated 
business functions, such as sales and marketing, in addition to coordinating parties and functions. 
Specifically, the petitioner stated: 
[The beneficiary] operates the business of [the foreign entity] as the Managing Partner in a 
managerial capacity. [The beneficiary] interacts with the customers for planning the 
partylfunction. He suggests and with the special skills acquired by him with years of 
experience; implements decors suitable to the occasion . . . . He manages this part of his 
function with the knowledge and understanding of likes, dislikes, habits [I of the visiting 
guests. . . . 
EAC 07 189 53400 
Page 4 
[The beneficiary] recommends the menu suitable to the main course and with due 
consideration of the number of guests, their varying choices, and other. In the kitchen are 
prepared unique items to be served to the guests. The menu card . . . enlists over 100 items of 
appetizers, starters, over 50 items of chats, about 200 items of sweets, different main course, 
side dishes, [desserts] and other to choose from. [The beneficiary] guides the chefs with his 
special knowledge of the recipes developed by him over the years, directs them for the use of 
the iligredie~lts -- spices, quantities, cooking technicjucs - boiling, frying, ~cf~igerating, usc of 
the toppings, garnishing and other so as to make the items in their ultimate form presentable 
& suitable to the varying tastes of the guests from different quarters and in particular from 
IIi-Fi and group attendinglparticipatil~g [at] thc filuction. With thc sl<ills and spccializcd 
knowledge acquired by [the beneficiary] with his long years of experiences, he attains 
successful operations leading to the ultimate goal of satisfaction of the clients & their guests. 
It is on this success depends the success and growth of the company. 
The petitioner also listed other duties performed by the beneficiary in his foreign position, such as hiring 
and firing staff, contract administration, and business development. It concluded by stating that the 
beneficiary was essentially in charge of all day-to-day operations of the foreign entity. 
With regard to the beneficiary's proposed role in the United States in a specialized knowledge capacity, 
the petitioner claimed that the overall structure of the U.S. entity was identical to that of the foreign entity 
abroad. It claimed that the beneficiary would coordinate with the petitioner's president in matters related 
to administration and finance, and that he would remain in charge of coordinating functions and parties as 
well as services related to business development. The petitioner restated the exact duties acknowledged 
above with regard to the beneficiary's role in the United States company, but claimed that the 
beneficiary's proposed job duties are more complex. For example, the petitioner claimed that: 
[The beneficiary] is required to understand the requirements of his clients vis i vis the guests 
he proposes to serve and offer appropriate decor for the function. This involves slulls to 
implement overall dkcor, an atmosphere of celebration, presentation of items[,] sitting 
arrangements, services [etc.]. In the area of food preparation, he is required to oversee the 
operations of the chefs, provide them special recipes developed by him over the years as his 
proprietary skill, guide them in the use of the ingredients including the quantum thereof, and 
also direct the actual cooking techniques and suitable garnishing to ensure that the items are 
presented as unique preparations from his kitchen. He is also required to estimate the food 
consumption of each item depending on the number of guests, different items offered and the 
specific likes and choices of the guests, among other managerial duties. 
Additionally, a letter from the foreign entity dated December 25, 2006 restates the claimed duties of the 
beneficiary as set forth by the petitioner. 
The petitioner's business plan submitted in support of the petition indicates that in addition to the claimed 
specialized knowledge position of the beneficiary, the beneficiary will also be responsible for 
commencing and conduct the business of the U.S. entity. The petitioner states that the beneficiary will 
EAC 07 189 53400 
Page 5 
also be responsible for "sales, marketing and business development" and that he "will concentrate his 
energies to market the services and the products of the company." 
The director found this evidence insufficient to establish the beneficiary's eligibility, and issued a request 
for additional evidence on July 30, 2007. Specifically, the director noted that it did not appear that the 
beneficiary's knowledge was any different from that ordinarily encountered in the catering field. 
Consequently, thc director requested additional c~iilcilce establishing the beneliciarj's spccializcd 
knowledge, such as evidence that the beneficiary's laowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or 
distinguished, and not generally known by practitioners in the field or that his advanced Izno\vledge of the 
coi~lpa~~y's processes and procedures is apart from the basic ki~owlcdgc posscsscd by othcrs. The dircctor 
also requested evidence pertaining to the petitioner's size and current status, as well as doculllentation 
pertaining to the qualifying relationship between the petitioner and the foreign entity. 
The petitioner addressed these requests in a response dated March 27,2007.' The petitioner addressed the 
issue of the beneficiary's specialized knowledge by stating as follows: 
The beneficiary's knowledge of the company's processes and procedures is advanced in 
relation to other employees. A review of the organization chart of the company . . . reveals 
that [the beneficiary] controls the operations of all the sections. He controls the party 
management. He instructs, guides and supervise[s] the operations of the Party Manager and 
Ground Manager. The record of successful operations with this chart evidences the fact of 
the advanced knowledge of the [beneficiary] vis-A-vis other employees in the party 
management sector. 
 [The beneficiary] also controls the operations of the Kitchen. He 
instructs, guides and supervise[s] the operations of the Kitchen Manager and all the chefs - 
Chef (Sweets), Cooke (special), Chef (Punjabi cuisine) and chat cook. [The beneficiary] 
effectively supervise[s] these operations of the lutchen and all the different specialist 
chefJcook because of his advanced knowledge of the processes & procedures of the 
company's operations in this area as well. 
The petitioner again addressed the issue of the beneficiary's duties, and stated that they had been outlined 
in detail in the "discussion" attachment to the initial petition. The petitioner briefly addresses the 
beneficiary's "uncommon" and "distinctive" knowledge by addressing the menu card of the petitioner and 
noting that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge of the petitioner's processes and procedures 
including recipes, use of ingredients, and cooking techniques. Finally, the petitioner stated that the U.S. 
entity was postponing its commencement of commercial operations pending the beneficiary's arrival, 
noting that the beneficiary is the "key person" to establish and control the business. 
On January 10, 2008, the director denied the petition. Specifically, the director found that the petitioner 
failed to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge of the processes and procedures of the petitioner's 
organization is substantially different fiom, or advanced in relation to, any individual similarly employed 
1 
It is noted that while the request for evidence was issued on July 30, 2007 and the petitioner's response 
was received on October 24,2007, the letter included with the response is dated March 27,2007. 
EAC 07 189 53400 
Page 6 
in the field. 
 On appeal, the petitioner claims that the director's assessment of the beneficiary's 
qualifications was subjective and failed to specifically state the basis for the denial. The petitioner 
contends that through its initial submission and its response to the request for evidence, it provided 
substantive evidence to establish the beneficiary's specialized knowledge. 
Upon review, the AAO concurs with the director's decision. 
 While the AAO acknowledges the 
pctitioncr's asscrtio~~ that thc director's dccision is 'oricS and Sails to discuss specific Jcficicncics in thc 
evidence, the director's error is harmless because the AAO conducts a de novo review, evaluating the 
sufficiency of thc evidence in the record according to its pl-obati1.e value and credibility as rcquircd by the 
rcgulatioil at S C.F.R. $ 235a.2(d)(G). Thc AklO maintains plcll~iry po\vcr to 1-c~ic\\- cach cippcal on n rlc 
nova basis. 5 U.S.C. 557(b) ("011 appeal froill or review of the initial decision, tlie agency has all the 
powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it inay limit the issues on notice or by 
rule."); see also, Janka v. US. Dept. of Transp., NTSB, 925 F.2d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1991). The AA07s 
de novo authority has been long recognized by the federal courts. See, e.g. Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 
1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). 
As enacted by the Immigration Act of 1990, section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. tj 1184(c)(2)(B), 
provides the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Looking to the plain language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous 
definition of specialized knowledge. Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to 
enactment of the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the former INS 
definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition created by Congress: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects 
the relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate 
reading of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. 
Simply put, specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea whch cannot have a plain 
meaning. Cj Westen, fie Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
745 F.Supp. 9, 14-15 (D.D.C., 1990). 
In effect, Congress has charged the agency with making a comparison based on a relative idea that has no 
plain meaning. To determine what is special, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. 
EAC 07 189 53400 
Page 7 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
canons of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 
(1987) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, it is instructive to look at the common dictionary definitions of the terms "special" and "advanced." 
According to Webster's New World College Dictionary, the word "special" is conxi~only found to mean "of a 
kind different fi-om others; distinctive, peculiar, or unique." FJ/clhsier's New Wol.lrl College Dicfionnly, 1376 
(4th Ed. 2008). Thc dictionary dcfi~lcs thc \vord "aclvanccd" as "ahead or bcyond othcrs in pl-ogress, 
complexity, etc." Id. at 20. 
Second, looking at the term's placement withn the text of section 101(a)(15)(L), the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed 
among the higher levels of the employment hierarchy with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based 
on the context of the term within the statute, the AAO would expect a specialized knowledge cnlployee to be 
an elevated class of workers withn a company and not an ordi~~ary or average employee. See 1756, I~zc. v. 
Attourley General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14 (D.D.C., 1990). 
Third, the legislative history indicates that the origmal drafters intended the class of aliens eligble for the L-1 
classification would be "narrowly drawn" and "carehlly regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally 
H.R. Rep. No. 91-85 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750, 2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative 
history of the 1970 Act plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' 
category will not be large." Id. This legislative history has been widely viewed as supporting a narrow 
reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. 
Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in 
F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); American 
Auto. Ass'n v. Attorney General, Not Reported in F.Supp., 1991 WL 222420 (D.D.C. 1991); Fibermaster, 
Ltd. v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of 
Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6,2001)(on file with AAO). 
Although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized knowledge," 
the definition did not expand the class of persons eligible for L-IB specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 
101-649, tj 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, the legislative history indicates that that 
Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the express purpose of clarifying a 
previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101-723(I) (1990), reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710,6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that requires more specificity 
relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have exacerbated the problem."). 
While the 1990 Act declined to extend the "proprietary knowledge" and "United States labor market" 
references that had existed in the existing agency defhition, there is no indication that Congress intended to 
liberalize the L-IB visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the ultimate statutory definition of specialized knowledge and the 
changes made to the legacy ZNS regulatory definition, the point would be based on the nature of the 
EAC 07 189 53400 
Page 8 
Congressional clarification itself. Pnor to the 1990 Act, legacy INS pursued a bright-line test of specialized 
knowledge by including a "proprietary knowledge" element in the regulatory definition. See 8 C.F.R. 3 
214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988). By deleting ths element in the ultimate statutory definition and further 
emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," Congress created a standard that requires USCIS 
to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, based on the agency's 
expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would support a more rigid application of the 
law, Congress gave legacy INS a more flexible standard that scquires an adjudication based on the facts and 
circumstances of each individual case. CJ Po~~cc-Lc,il~il I: A.sl~c,i.c!ff, 331 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting Bi/il.c.s 1,. 1MS, 856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cis.19SS)). 
Accordingly, as a baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply skilled or 
experienced. By itself, work experience and knotvledge of a firnl's technically coillplex products will not 
equal "special knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). Specialized 
knowledge requires more than a short period of experience, otherwise "special" or "advanced" knowledge 
would include every enlployee in an organization wit11 the exception of trainees and entry-level staff. Tf 
everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be considered truly specialized. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's fundamental burden to articulate 
and prove that an alien possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 
U.S.C. 3 1184(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's 
specialized knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of 
the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the 
organization, and explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
After articulating the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of evidence 
which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A petitioner's 
assertion that the alien possesses an advanced level of knowledge of the processes and procedures of the 
company must be supported by evidence describing and setting apart that knowledge from the elementary 
or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative terms, the 
petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge relative to 
others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. 
See 8 C.F.R. tj 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be 
performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. In this case, although the petitioner submitted a 
lengthy description of the beneficiary's job duties abroad and his proposed duties in the United States, it 
fails to establish that the beneficiary's proposed position in the United States requires an employee with 
specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge. 
In the present matter, the petitioner has provided a somewhat generic description of the beneficiary's intended 
employment with the U.S. entity. Specifically, the petitioner asserts that the main functions of the 
beneficiary's proposed position will be guiding chefs in food preparation, recommending menus, estimating 
EAC 07 189 53400 
Page 9 
food consumption, and recommending dCcor for specific functions. 
 The petitioner, however, has not 
sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the proposed job duties distinguishes his 
knowledge as specialized. The petitioner repeatedly states throughout the record that the beneficiary is a key 
person and possesses specialized knowledge; however, it has failed to specifically articulate what slulls or 
training the beneficiary possesses that set him apart from other employees of the petitioner or the catering 
industry in general. Moreover, it is unclear how the beneficiary will allegedly function in a specialized 
lmowlcdgc capacity when the belleficiary is also responsible for thc salcs, marl;cting, and busincss 
dcveloymcnt of the U.S. entity. The petitioner's busincss plan indicates that the bcllcficia~y ndl be primarily 
rcsponsiblc for promoting tlle petitioner's products an(! cstnblishiiig tlie pciilioncr's clicnt basc, ;\,Iiich sug._pc.;t 
that the beneficiary will perfom duties outside the realin of specialized knowledge, and which are dccmcd to 
be traditional marketing-based duties coinn~on throughout the indushy. 
As stated above, it is the petitioner's fundamental burden to articulate and prove that an alien possesses 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 11 84(c)(?)(B). IJSClS 
cannot malcc a factual detcnllination regarding the beneficiary's specialized la~on.ledgc if the petitioner 
does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized lulolvledgc, 
describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain how and when the 
beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
No details were provided regarding the type of specific training, if any, the beneficiary received during 
his employment with the foreign entity. The petitioner claims that the beneficiary has developed recipes 
over the years but does not identify such recipes or explain why the beneficiary's knowledge of these 
recipes sets him apart from other employees or similarly-trained personnel in the industry. Essentially, 
the petition is based on the petitioner's claim that the beneficiary is a key person in the company, since he 
will supervise both the banqueting and business functions of the petitioner. While the AAO notes that the 
beneficiary's position is certainly important to the petitioner's fledgling business, the fact that the 
beneficiary seems to be responsible for the overall management of the company does not impart him with 
specialized knowledge as contemplated by the regulatory definitions. Going on record without 
supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
In this matter, the petitioner has omitted any discussion of the nature of the beneficiary's knowledge. For 
example, what truly distinguishes the beneficiary's slulls from other employees of the foreign entity or 
proposed employees of the petitioner? Are there specific techniques or undisclosed ingredients employed in 
the beneficiary's recipes that are not commonly shared with other employees of the company? The petitioner 
provides no details regarding any aspects of the petitioner's business which would distinguish the petitioner's 
processes or procedures, such as its recipes and catering services, as uncommon, and thus suggest that the 
beneficiary's knowledge was likewise uncommon. 
In the present matter, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's training, work experience, 
or knowledge of the catering industry is more special or advanced than the knowledge possessed by others 
employed by the petitioner, or in the industry. It is clear that the petitioner considers the beneficiary to be an 
EAC 07 189 53400 
Page 10 
important employee of the organization. The AAO, likewise, does not dispute the fact that the beneficiary's 
knowledge has allowed him to competently perform his job in the foreign entity. However, the successful 
completion of one's job duties does not establish possession of specialized knowledge or establish 
employment that requires specialized knowledge. 
For this reason, the petitioner has not established that the proposed U.S. position requires specialized 
l;no~\;ledgc. Jhrhile the position of baniluct manager may sequirc a comprchcilsivc 1;non.lcdgc of thc 
manner in \vhich to prepare recipes, estimate consumption, 2nd recommend specific dtcor for filnctions, 
t11i.1-e is no doc~~rnci~tation, othc~- than tlic pctifi~ll~';.'~ :l~~~lfiOll.j, that tllc I>i'~'li'fi~;a;j' IIILIS~ i)OSSi'S> 
advanced, "spccialized lalowledge" as dcfincct in the regulations and the Act. 
Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the beneficiary does not possess specialized 
knowledge, nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. For 
this reason, the appeal will be disniissed. 
Bcyond thc decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that a qualifying relationship 
exists between the foreign entity and the U.S. company. The petitioner claims on Form 1-129 that the 
petitioner in this matter is the subsidiary of the foreign entity,. However, it claims on 
Schedule K-1 of its 
 Income for 2006, that it is owned by two 
individuals, namely, 
 These documents indicate that 
90% of the petitioner and 
 owns 10%. 
Moreover, in response to the request for evidence, the petitioner submitted additional evidence that 
. . 
further contradicts these claims. On a e 25 
"" andm 
ner's operating agreement, it states that the 
members of the petitioner are 
 . Additionally, it submits a copy of its share 
ledger, indicating that certificate number one was issued to 
 for 100 units. 
The regulation and case law confirm that ownership and control are the factors that must be examined in 
determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and foreign entities for 
purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 
1988); see also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of 
Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to the 
direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to 
control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, 
management, and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 
595. 
The petitioner's assertions that a qualifying relationship exists is not supported by the numerous 
conflicting documents. There are three different forms of evidence that suggest three alternative owners 
of the petitioner. Since the petitioner cannot definitively establish that the foreign entity, Jay Caterers, 
owns the entity as claimed, the qualifying relationship upon which the petitioner bases this petition cannot 
be established. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by 
independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice 
. EAC 07 189 53400 
Page 11 
unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 
19 I&N Dec. 582,591-92 (BIA 19881.~ 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied 
by the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial 
decision. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), 
afd. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting 
that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis). 
When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge 
only if she shows that the AAO abused it discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. 
See Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 
F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit 
sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, that burden 
has not been met. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 
2 
 It should also be noted that, upon review of the records on file with the Secretary of State of 
Pennsylvania, the U.S. entity was not established until October 19, 2007, contrary to the petitioner's 
assertions. Specifically, the petitioner claims on Form 1-129 and in its letter of support dated March 27, 
2007 that it was established in 2003. As discussed above, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve 
any inconsistencies in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile 
such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing 
to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. at 59 1-92.