dismissed L-1B Case: Cigar Manufacturing

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W., Rrn. 3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
PUBLIC COPY 
File: EAC 07 075 501 68 Office: VERMONT SERVICE CENTER 
 Dat8~~ 0 1 2006 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonirnmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 1 0 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101 (a)(l5)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
&J 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Oflice 
EAC 07 075 50168 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The petition for a nonimmigrant visa was approved by the U.S. Consulate in Manila, 
Philippines. Upon Wher review, the Director, Vermont Service Center, determined that the approval may 
have been issued in error and subsequently issued a notice of intent to revoke. The director ultimately 
revoked the approval. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The 
appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant petition seeking to employ the beneficiary as its administrative 
manager/comptroller as an L-1B intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 
10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner is an 
Illinois corporation engaged in the production and distribution of cigars. The petitioner seeks to employ the 
beneficiary from February I, 2007 until January 3 1,20 10. 
The director revoked the approval of the nonimmigrant visa petition based on the determination that the 
petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that she has been and 
would be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. 
On appeal, counsel disputes the director's findings, asserting that the petitioner had previously responded to 
Citizenship and Immigration Services' (CIS) request for additional evidence (WE) and that the approval was 
based on CIS'S comprehensive review, which included the petitioner's RFE response. 
To establish eligibility for the L-1 nonimmigrant visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United 
States. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue rendering his 
or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, executive, or 
specialized knowledge capacity. 
The employer filed the nonimmigrant visa petition on January 22,2007. In a letter dated November 16,2006, the 
petitioner stated that the applicant was employed abroad as an off~ce rnanagerJcontroller for the foreign entity 
since 1998 and that her duties included the following: banking, transfer of funds, money changing; approving 
payroll; approving accounts payable; interpreting Tagalo; supervising and managing the office; purchasing 
supplies; performing quality control duties; obtaining shipping quotes and tracking shipments; and performing 
various tasks associated with human resources. The petitioner claimed that the beneficiary "has unique insider's 
knowledge of the tobacco industry" and is therefore able to "guide with the packaging and marketing of [the 
petitioner's] finished product." The petitioner asked that the beneficiary be allowed to come to the United States 
in order to "assist in the daily warehouse operations and act as [the presidentl's [plrofessional [alssistant and 
[c]ontroller." The petitioner stated that the beneficiary's U.S. job duties would be the same as those she currently 
performs in the Philippines and added that the beneficiary would also supervise production in the United States. 
The key issues addressed by the director are whether the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge and 
whether the beneficiary was employed abroad and will be employed by the petitioner in a capacity that 
requires specialized knowledge. 
EAC 07 075 50168 
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As enacted by the Immigration Act of 1990, section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 11 84(c)(2)(B), provides 
the statutory definition of specialized knowledge: 
For purposes of section IOl(a)(lS)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special knowledge 
of the company product and its application in international markets or has an advanced level of 
knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 214.2(1)(l)(ii)@) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In revoking the petition, the director concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge or that she has been and would be employed in a capacity requiring specialized 
knowledge. The director determined that the duties the beneficiary performed while employed at the foreign 
entity and would perform for the U.S. entity do not require specialized and complex knowledge. The director 
mher found that training others in the company's patented processes does not involve specialized knowledge. 
Lastly, the director noted that the job descriptions submitted in response to the RFE were significantly different 
from the job descriptions submitted initially in support of the petition, indicating that this discrepancy gives CIS 
reason to doubt which duties the beneficiary would actually perform. 
In a brief dated February 28, 2008, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge of the company's patented processes and relies heavily on the fact that existing patents restrict other 
companies in the industry from using similar procedures. 
Upon review, and for the reasons discussed herein, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary was employed abroad and would be employed in the 
United States in a capacity requiring specialized knowledge. 
A. Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
The L-IB specialized knowledge classification requires USCIS to distinguish between those employees that 
possess specialized knowledge from those that do not possess such knowledge. Exactly where USCIS should 
draw that line is the question before the AAO. On one end of the spectrum, one may find an employee with the 
minimum one year of experience and the basic job-related skill or knowledge that was acquired through that 
employment. Such a person would not be deemed to possess specialized knowledge under section 101(a)(l5)(L) 
of the Act. On the other end of the spectnun, one may find an employee with ten years of experience and 
advanced training who developed a proprietary process that is limited to a few people within the company. That 
individual would clearly meet the statutory standard for specialized knowledge. In between these two extremes 
would fall, however, a whole range of experience and knowledge. 
EAC 07 075 50168 
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Looking to the plain language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous 
definition of specialized knowledge. Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of 
the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the former INS definition is equally 
illuminating when applied to the definition created by Congress: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordmry knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ: 
Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
745 F.Supp. 9,14-15 (D.D.C., 1990). 
In effect, Congress has charged the agency with making a comparison based on a relative idea that has no plain 
meaning. To determine what is special, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the canons 
of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized knowledge 
category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) (citing INS 
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1 987)). 
First, it is instructive to look at the common dictionary definitions of the terms "special" and "advanced." 
According to Webster's New World College Dictionary, the word "special" is commonly found to mean "of a 
kind different from others; distinctive, peculiar, or unique." Webster's New World College Dictionary, 1376 (4th 
Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "ahead or beyond others in progress, complexity, etc." 
Id. at 20. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 10 1 (a)(15)(L), the AAO notes that specialized 
knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among the higher 
levels of the employment hierarchy with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on the context of the 
term within the statute, the AAO would expect a specialized knowledge employee to be an elevated class of 
workers within a company and not an ordinary or average employee. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 
F.Supp. 9,14(D.D.C., 1990). 
Third, the legislative history indicates that the original drafters intended the class of aliens eligible for the L-1 
classification would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. 
Rep. No. 91-85 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of 
the 1970 Act plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be 
large." Id. This legislative history has been widely viewed as supporting a narrow reading of the definition of 
specialized knowledge and the L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 
EAC 07 075 50168 
Page 5 
at 15-16; Boi Na Braza Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at "4 
(N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); American Auto. Ass'n v. Attorney General, Not 
Reported in F.Supp., 1991 WL 222420 (D.D.C. 1991); Fibemaster, Ltd. v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 
WL 99327 (D.D.C., 1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. ofJustice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 
2001)(on file with MO). 
Although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized knowledge," the 
definition did not expand the class of persons eligible for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101 -649, 
3 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, the legislative history indicates that Congress created the 
statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the express purpose of clariwg a previously undefined term 
fi-om the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101-723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 
1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized 
knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to 
extend the "proprietary knowledge" and "United States labor market" references that had existed in the existing 
agency definition, there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize the L-1B visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the ultimate statutory definition of specialized knowledge and the changes 
made to the legacy INS regulatory definition, the point would be based on the nature of the Congressional 
clarification itself. Prior to the 1990 Act, legacy INS pursued a bright-line test of specialized knowledge by 
including a "proprietary knowledge" element in the regulatory definition. See 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)@) (1988). 
By deleting this element in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of 
"special knowledge," Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can 
only be determined on a case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright- 
line standard that would support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave legacy INS a more flexible 
standard that requires an adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. C' Ponce- 
Leiva v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir.1988)). 
Accordingly, as a baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply skilled or 
experienced. By itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not 
equal "special knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comrn. 1982). Specialized knowledge 
requires more than a short period of experience, otherwise "special" or "advanced" knowledge would include 
every employee in an organization with the exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an 
organization is specialized, then no one can be considered truly specialized. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's hdamental burden to articulate and 
prove that an alien possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 
1184(c)(2)(B). 
 USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
After articulating the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of evidence which 
establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A petitioner's assertion 
EAC 07 075 50168 
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that the alien possesses an advanced level of knowledge of the processes and procedures of the company must 
be supported by evidence describing and setting apart that knowledge from the elementary or basic 
knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative terms, the petitioner 
should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge relative to others in the 
petitioner's workforce and, if necessary to establish its claim, relative to similarly employed workers in the 
petitioner's industry. 
B. Analysis 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 
8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services performed and to 
be performed sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. In this case, the petitioner fails to establish that the 
beneficiary's foreign and U.S. positions require an employee with specialized knowledge or that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge. In the present matter, the petitioner's descriptions of the beneficiary's 
foreign and prospective job duties are deficient. 
The job description submitted initially in the petitioner's November 16, 2006 support letter vaguely 
enumerated office management tasks, which could be applied to any office setting in a variety of retail-based 
operations. Although the petitioner claimed that the beneficiary acquired "insider's knowledge" of the 
tobacco industry through training and work experience, there was little indication that her knowledge reached 
a level at which it could be deemed specialized. 
After CIS issued its RFE on February 2, 2007, the petitioner claimed that the beneficiary has been and would 
be charged with quality control responsibilities, which call for oversight of the petitioner's patented cigar 
manufacturing process. However, the petitioner failed to enumerate the specific job duties that were and 
would be entailed in such oversight. Simply stating that the beneficiary would oversee the manufacturing 
process does not convey a meaningfkl understanding of how the beneficiary has and would continue to carry 
out this broad job responsibility. Precedent case law has clearly established that the actual duties themselves 
reveal the true nature of the employment. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989)' affd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). The AAO can only assume that the office duties previously 
attributed to the beneficiary's position have and would continue to enable the beneficiary to carry out her 
oversight responsibilities. However, the petitioner failed to explain how such duties qualifj. the beneficiary as 
a specialized knowledge employee. Thus, even if the AAO were to find that there were no inconsistencies 
between the beneficiary's initial and subsequent job descriptions, neither job description establishes that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, which was and would continue to be required for her foreign 
and U.S. positions, respectively. 
The petitioner was given another opportunity to supplement the record with more detailed information 
regarding the beneficiary's job duties. Specifically, on December 6, 2007, the director issued a notice of 
intent to revoke (NOIR) approval of the nonimmigrant petition. The notice expressly instructed the petitioner 
to describe the beneficiary's typical work week and to assign a specific percentage of time to each of the 
beneficiary's job duties such that it would allow the director to make a proper assessment as to whether a 
EAC 07 075 50168 
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significant portion of the beneficiary's time is spent performing job duties that require specialized knowledge 
(assuming, arguendo, that the beneficiary possesses such specialized knowledge). Again, the petitioner's 
response was vague, indicating that 40% of the beneficiary's time is attributed to overseeing the 
manufacturing of cigars; 30% of her time is attributed to training other employees in the company's patented 
processes; 10% is attributed to communicating with the foreign affiliate in the Philippines; and the remaining 
10% is attributed to sharing her knowledge with the research and development branch of the U.S. entity. 
Again, the petitioner failed to cite specific job duties that would be involved in carrying out these broad job 
responsibilities. 
That being said, the petitioner has described and documented the cigar manufacturing process, which has 
been patented. However, the AAO does not find that this process is specialized such that understanding, 
overseeing, and training others with regard to this process requires specialized knowledge. While the AAO 
does not dispute that the petitioner's process for manufacturing cigars is unique in comparison to other 
processes in the industry, the petitioner still fails to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge of this process 
andlor product is special or advanced, especially as compared to other similarly employed persons within the 
cigar industry. Moreover, the beneficiary's knowledge of this process is not specialized when compared to 
other employees within the same entity, particularly those who carry out the process in manufacturing the 
petitioner's product. As such, the petitioner has also failed to explain how the beneficiary's knowledge of the 
petitioner's unique process is special or advanced as compare to others within the same entity. Therefore, it 
cannot be concluded that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's cigar manufacturing process imparts a 
knowledge that can be deemed special or advanced. As previously stated, knowledge of a fm's technically 
complex products will not equal "special knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 53. 
Furthermore, the record does not support a finding of eligibility based on at least one additional ground that 
was not previously addressed in the director's decision. Namely, 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that an 
individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by evidence that the petitioner and the 
organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph 
(l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. The regulation and case law confm that ownership and control are the factors 
that must be examined in determining whether a qualifying relationship exists between United States and 
foreign entities for purposes of this visa classification. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N 
Dec. 593 (BIA 1988); see also Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); 
Matter ofHughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comrn. 1982). In the context of this visa petition, ownership refers to 
the direct or indirect legal right of possession of the assets of an entity with full power and authority to 
control; control means the direct or indirect legal right and authority to direct the establishment, management, 
and operations of an entity. Matter of Church Scientology International, 19 I&N Dec. at 595. 
In the present matter, section 1, item 10 of the Form 1-129 Su lement L indicates that the petitioner and the 
beneficiary's foreign employer are both wholly owned by The regulatory definition found in 
8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(L) identifies this type of common ownership as an affiliate relationship.' Despite 
the petitioner's claim and its submission of the U.S. entity's State of Illinois Articles of Incorporation, the 
1 
 It is noted for the record that the petitioner erroneous checked the box for "parent" in section 1, item 10 of the Form I- 
129 Supplement L to describe its relationship with the beneficiary's foreign employer. While this error is noted for the 
record, it has no bearing on the AAO's finding in the present matter. 
EAC 07 075 50168 
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petitioner has provided no documentation to establish either company's ownership. It is noted that going on 
record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
in these proceedings. Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft 
of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
As general evidence of a petitioner's claimed qualifying relationship, stock certificates alone are not sufficient 
evidence to determine whether a stockholder maintains ownership and control of a corporate entity. The 
corporate stock certificate ledger, stock certificate registry, corporate bylaws, and the minutes of relevant 
annual shareholder meetings must also be examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact 
number issued to the shareholder, and the subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate 
control. Additionally, a petitioning company must disclose all agreements relating to the voting of shares, the 
distribution of profit, the management and direction of the subsidiary, and any other factor affecting actual 
control of the entity. See Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362. Without full disclosure 
of all relevant documents, CIS is unable to determine the elements of ownership and control. 
As the petitioner has not presented corroborating evidence establishing that owns the U.S. entity 
and the beneficiary's foreign employer, as claimed, the AAO cannot determine whether the two entities have a 
qualieing relationship. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify a11 of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1 043 (E.D. Cal. 200 I), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). Therefore, based on the additional ground for ineligibility addressed in the above 
paragraphs, this petition must be revoked. 
The approval of the petition will be revoked for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an 
independent and alternative basis for the revocation. When the AAO revokes approval of a petition based on 
multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its 
discretion with respect to all of the AAO's enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 
2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. 8 U.S.C. 8 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.