dismissed L-1B Case: Computer Science

U.S. Department of Homcland Security 
20 Mass. Ave., N.W ., Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Inaaigration 
Services 
cc: NF,BRASKA SERVICE CENTER 
IN RE: Petitioner: 
Beneficiary: 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonirnrnigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101 (a)(15 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101 (a)(15)(L) 
Date: 
)(L) of the Immi igration 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Oflice in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
r Robert P. Wiemann, Director 
wtrative Appeals Offce 
LM 03 002 50584 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimrnigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals OEce (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner is an information management consulting firm. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary 
previously applied for an L-1B visa under the petitioner's Blanket L petition at the consulate and was denied. 
The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary in the position of computer consultant programmer as an L-1 B 
specialized knowledge intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the lmrmgration and 
Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. $1 101(a)(15)(L). 
The director denied the petition concluding that the beneficiary is not employed in a position that involves 
specialized knowledge. Specifically, the director stated that the petitioner has not documented the 
beneficiary's training as related to the duties assigned. The &rector determined that the petitioner's 
explanation that the beneficiary gained specialized knowledge through on-going work experience is not 
supported by other documentation. Furthermore, the director noted that while the petitioner asserts that the 
customized applications are considered proprietary work products and are not available in the general 
marketplace of computer application products, no evidence has been submitted to support this claim. The 
petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and forwarded 
the appeal to the AAO for review. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director's decision was based on a misapplication of the 
law and because the director failed to consider all of the presented evidence. 
To establish eligibility for the nonimrnigrant L-1 visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United. States, a qualiflmg organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must s&k to enter the United States temporarily to continue 
rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, 
executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(1) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are 
qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized knowledge 
capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad with a 
qualifying organization within the three years preceding the fiIing of the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was managerial, 
executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior education, training, and employment 
qualifies himher to perform the intended services in the United States; however, the work in the United States 
need not be the same work which the alien performed abroad. 
LIN 03 002 50584 
Page 3 
The issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as defined in the 
Act and the regulations. 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)@), provides the following: 
For purposes of section lOl(a)(lS)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)@) defines "specialized knowledge'' as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
A "specialized knowledge professional" is further defined at 8 C,F.R 5 214.2(1)(1)(ii)(E) as: 
[A]n individual who has specialized knowledge as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)@) of this 
section and is a member of the professions as defined in section 101(a)(32) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. 
In a Ietter attached to the petition, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary has the following job 
responsibilities: "assist in performing consulting work related to the design, development, testing and 
implementation of customized business system software applications developed by [the petitioner] 
exclusively for the Household organization." The petitioner stated that "[oJnly a fiaction of the consultants 
at [the petitioner1 have the specialized combination of skills and knowledne." The petitioner stated that the - - - 
beneficiary has Lowledge i- which is a proprietary system of the petitioner. The petitioner 
stated the beneficiary has extensive lmowledge of the client's computer systems, processes, and business 
systems applications which "includes Matrix, Cafe and the application he is currently working that we wish to 
transfer him to is COACH (Clear Organizahon Advancing Collection Handling)." The petitioner stated that 
COACH is a complex and customized application package developed exclusively for [the client]. The 
petitioner explained that in order to fully understand the COACH application, a consultant must have 
knowledge combined with technical skills that include PowerBuilder 8.0, Household PFCs, MQ-Series, 
VSAM and MS. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary has been working on COACH application for the 
past six months at Kanbay India. The petitioner also stated "[the beneficiary]. has received extensive 
corporate training, which includes client systems orientation on [the client's] business systems, and one year 
of mentoring from his project manager." 
The petitioner also provided staffing statistics and stated that it employs 1,200 computer professionals world 
wide. The petitioner stated that approximately 500 consultants are assigned to develop customized software 
for the client, Household, and 100 of those consultants are staffed in the United States at the Household client 
site. The petitioner stated that for this, there are a total of 19 computer professionals working on ths 
particular project: 17 are staffed at Kanbay India and the remaining two artre currently worhng on-site at [the 
LIN 03 002 50584 
Page 4 
client]." In support of this petition, the petitioner provided copies of the beneficiary's educational 
documents, general information about the petitioner's services, a copy of the consulting agreement with their 
client, Household, and the petitioner's financial statements. 
In a request for evidence, dated October 15, 2002, the director noted that the documentation submitted was 
not sufficient to warrant favorable consideration of the petition. The director stated that the evidence failed to 
demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual 
quality that is not generally known by practitioners in the beneficiary's field of endeavor. In addition, the 
director stated that the evidence does not establish that the position abroad and the beneficiary's proposed 
position in the United States require a person with specialized knowledge. Additionally, the director noted 
that though the petitioner claimed that the beneficiary has undergone advanced training, the petitioner has not 
provided evidence of such training. 
The director noted that although the beneficiary may posses an advanced knowledge of the processes and 
procedures of the company, evidence must be submitted to describe and distinguish that knowledge fi-om 
knowledge possessed by others within the organization, and the industry at large. Furthermore, the director 
stated that the evidence must estabIish that the beneficiary's duties for the qualifying employment abroad, and 
the duties in the United States, require a person with specialized knowledge. The director noted that all 
claims of specialized knowledge be accompanied by supporting documentation. Specifically, the director 
requested evidence of training that the beneficiary has received related to the position, including dates, 
duration, and objectives of the training. 
Additionally, the director requested a copy of the lease agreement and an organizational chart as well as a 
copy of the 2001 tax return or other documents that would establish that the U.S. organization has been doing 
business as required by the regulations. 
In response to the request for evidence, counsel for the petitioner provided the pay stubs for the beneficiary's 
employment with the foreign company and his foreign tax return. Additionally, counsel provided an 
organizational chart titled Global Whirl 8.0 TEAM Structure and is divided into two teams, the onsite team 
and the offshore team. The beneficiary is currently listed as one of three offshore senior developers. Counsel 
for the petitioner stated that the beneficiary will be coming to the U.S. to fill the Onsite Coordinator position. 
Counsel provided a copy of the L-1 Blanket certification and an attached affidavit and chart 
related entities. Counsel also rovided the 2001 IRS Form 1120 Corporate Tax Returns for 
and including Form 5471 which counsel stated confirms 99% ownership of 
f 
Additionally, counsel submitted letters !?ommirector of Web Services at the University of 
Illinois and Ph.D., Associate Dean at DePaul University. The petitioner submitted a 
statement from Senior Manager of Core Accounts at Kanbay. The petitioner also submitted a 
general statemen o mnmg at the Kanbay organization. 
In his decision, the director concluded that the record did not establish that the proffered position in the 
United States requires an alien with specialized knowledge. The director determined that though the 
petitioner stated the beneficiary gained knowledge through ongoing work experience, the petitioner had not 
provided documentation that established that the knowledge was specialized. The director also noted that the 
knowledge required to adapt software into modules appropriate for client's needs and requirements is 
LIN 03 002 50584 
Page 5 
commonly found throughout the beneficiary's field. Though the petitioner had indicated that the beneficiary 
has worked with proprietary software, the director noted the petitioner did not provide any evidence to 
support this claim In conclusion, the director did not find that the record establishes that the beneficiary's 
knowledge is uncommon or advanced, and not generally known by others in the field. Consequently, the 
director denied the petition. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner submits a brief in which he asserts that the director's denial of the 
petition was based on a misapplication of the statute, regulations, and current Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (CIS) guidance. Counsel submits additional evidence in support of the petitioner's appeal. Counsel 
states this additional evidence provides further support that the beneficiary possesses knowledge which would 
be difficult to impart to another individual without significant economic inconvenience to the petitioner. 
Counsel further asserts that because the software applications are proprietary, the beneficiary also possesses 
knowledge which normally can be gained only through prior experience with the petitioner. 
However, the AAO notes the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to provide additional evidence to the 
director. The director requested evidence that the beneficiary possesses special knowledge of the petitioner's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application on 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's processes and 
procedures. Specifically, the director noted that the evidence may include training provided by the 
organization to the beneficiary including copies of certificates andlor letters fiom an authorized representative 
of the organization who has knowledge of the beneficiary's training. On appeal, the petitioner presents a 
training certificate issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary. The petitioner also submits a letter fiom its 
client stating the proprietary nature of the project that the beneficiary is assigned to and the nature of the work 
involved. Additionally, the petitioner submits evidence to demonstrate that it would not be feasible to train a 
U.S. worker for the beneficiary's position. However, this additional evidence was not submitted in response 
to the director's request, but on appeal. Any failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material 
line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(14). The purpose of the request 
for evidence is to elicit finther information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefit sought has been 
established as of the time of filing. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.2(b)(8) and (12). 
The petitioner was put on notice of required evidence and given a reasonable opportunity to provide it for the 
record before the visa petition was adjudicated. The petitioner failed to submit the requested evidence and 
now submits it on appeal. However, the AAO will not consider this evidence for any purpose. Matter of 
Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988). The appeal will be adjudicated based on the record of proceeding 
before the director. 
Counsel claims that the "agency's written policy requires the Service to interpret the term [specialized 
knowledge] broadly" pursuant to 8 C.F.R. $2 14.2(l)(ii)@). In support of this claim, counsel refers to a 1994 
memorandum written by an Acting Associate Commissioner of the former Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS), now CIS. Counsel claims that the "guidance provided in the 119941 memo is the current state 
of the Iaw and, taken together with the statute and regulations, should be the standard used in determining 
whether an individual possesses specialized knowledge." 
Upon review of the record, counsel is incorrect in his conclusion that the director applied an incorrect legal 
standard of specialized knowledge. The director primarily relied on the statute and regulations. The director 
determined that the petitioner had not provided sufficient evidence that the beneficiary received any more 
LIN 03 002 50584 
Page 6 
training than the general training offered to each consultant employed by the petitioner. The director 
acknowledged that the beneficiary possesses working knowledge of the project, but that the evidence did not 
sufficiently establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinct. The director 
noted that the petitioner claimed that the beneficiary has worked with proprietary software but did not provide 
any evidence to support this claim. 
On appeal, counsel states that the beneficiary qualifies as an intracompany transferee with specialized 
knowledge based on his experience with the processes and products that are unique to the petitioner's 
organization. Counsel states there are two primary components to the beneficiary's specialized knowledge. 
First, counsel states that the beneficiary is "intimately familiar with GlobalLink, a specialized methodology 
used only within the Petitioner's organization." Secondly, counsel states that the beneficiary has an advanced 
level of understanding of CAFEICOACH, a proprietary sohare developed for the petitioner's client. 
Counsel asserts that the evidence establishes that the work being performed for the client, including the 
CAFE/COACH project, is both complex and involves knowledge that is simply not available in the 
marketplace. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director &d not fully consider the evidence presented regarding the 
specialized knowledge possessed by the beneficiary. Counsel states that the L-1 petition contained evidence 
of training in GlobalLink. Counsel admits that "GlobalLink knowledge may not by itself constitute 
specialized knowledge, but taken together with the time spent abroad learning [the client's] system and 
developing the unique C&/COACH software solution, it is the Ip'letitioner's contention that [the 
beneficiary's] knowledge does rise to the level of 'specialized."' Counsel refers to a job training certificate 
issued to the beneficiary that the petitioner did not submit until the appeal, despite the director's request for 
this evidence. As noted above, the AAO will only take into consideration documents that were presented in 
response to the director's request for evidence. However, the AAO notes this certificate of completion states 
that the beneficiary completed on-the-job training in ccCollection application (cAF~) of [the client]." 
Additionally, counsel asserts that "not all consultants receive these certificates - they are issued only after an 
individual has completed a significant amount of on the job training on a particular client project." Without 
documentary evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfjr the petitioner's burden of 
proof. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BLA 1988); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 
503, 506 (BIA 1980). Counsel has not provided documentary evidence that not all consultants receive these 
certificates. 
Counsel asserts that the evidence provided in the petition is sufficient to demonstrate that customized 
applications being developed by the petitioner for its client are considered proprietary work products. 
Counsel refers to a letter fiom a senior manager for the petitioner that explained the proprietary nature of the 
petitioner's work for the client. Additionally, counsel refers to the service agreement between the petitioner 
and its client which was submitted with the petition. On appeal, counsel presents a letter from the petitioner's 
client which states "the custornization and enhancement work of this application is considered both original 
and proprietary in nature.'' 
Furthermore, counsel asserts that the director erred in rejecting the opinion letters that were provided in the 
petition. The director stated "it is noted that they have made their observations fiom a simple review of the 
beneficiary's experience and proposed project assignment, rather than based on objective evidence." Counsel 
asserts that both "experts" based their statements on "a fust hand understanding of the nature of somare 
development and technical skills." Counsel sums up each expert's work experience. Counsel states that "it is 
LIN 03 002 50584 
Page 7 
the Ip]etitionerYs contention that [CIS] abused its discretion by dismissing these opinions due to a conclusion 
that the informittion provided was not objective." 
On review, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a 
specialized knowledge capacity as required in 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. $214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description 
of the services to be performed that is sufficient to establish that the beneficiary will be employed in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. Id. In the present case, the petitioner submitted a general job description, 
which was stated above. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge of GlobalLink 
and the client's proprietary computer programs and software that are required in order to satisfactorily 
execute the job duties. The petitioner generally stated that the beneficiary will assist in performing consulting 
work related to the design, development, and testing of software applications developed for the client. The 
petitioner described different computer programs and projects of which the beneficiary has knowledge. 
However, the petitioner did not provide a detailed job description that establishes the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge or that the position requires specialized knowledge. Specifics are clearly an important indication 
of whether a beneficiary's duties require specialized knowledge, otherwise meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Sava, 724 F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), aFd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
Furthermore, the petitioner has not provided any evidence that the beneficiary has received any more training 
than other consultants for the petitioner. The petitioner has failed to differentiate the beneficiary's knowledge 
&om that of others in the petitioner's company. The petitioner merely stated the beneficiary "has received 
extensive corporate training, which includes client systems orientation on Household business systems, one 
year of mentoring from his project manager, nine months of onsite experience at Household." The petitioner 
did not establish that this training or the knowledge received from this training is any more specialized than 
anything the other employees receive. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is 
not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
In addition, counsel asserts on appeal that the beneficiary's knowledge, experience, skills, and training 
diffaentiate him from the other consultants of the petitioner, since "only a relatively small number possess 
the type of experience to warrant transfer to the United States to perform implementation and customization 
work and only a limited number are actually transferred." Counsel refers to statistical information that was 
provided by the petitioner in the initial petition. However, the petitioner simply stated that more than one 
third of their consultants are assigned to develop software for their client, and of these 500 consultants, one- 
fifth are staffed in the United States working on this client's projects. The petitioner states that for the 
WHIRL 8.0 project, there are 25 computer professionals working on this particular project: 23 are staffed at 
Kanbay India and the remaining two are currently working on-site at [the client].'' Yet the petitioner has not 
provided any additional job descriptions of the Kanbay computer consultant position's located at the client 
site. The organizational chart provided by the petitioner indicates three positions on the Onsite Kanbay team. 
The lack of evidence in the record makes it impossible to draw a comparison between the consultants 
assigned to the client in general and those with specialized knowledge. Again, simply going on record 
without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in 
these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Crafi of California, 14 l&N at 190. Also, the assertions of counsel do 
LIN 03 002 50584 
Page 8 
not constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N at 534; Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N at 506. 
Therefore, the director correctly concluded that the beneficiary's knowledge does not distinguish the 
beneficiary from other consultants that work for the petitioner. 
Additionally, counsel continues to refer to the beneficiary's training in GlobalLink as evidence of the 
beneficiary's specialized knowledge. However, by counsel's own admission, knowledge of GlobalLink alone 
is not sufficient to establish specialized knowledge but it must be taken into consideration in conjunction with 
the beneficiary's knowledge of the client's computer software. Furthermore, the letter from the petitioner's 
senior manager of core accounts stated "consultants who develop these software applications have been 
trained in Kanbay methodologies and development techniques, including GlobalLink, Kanbay's proprietary 
system used to coordinate offshore development." Based on this statement, it would appear that all 
consultants who develop applications for clients must receive training in GlobalLink. Therefore, based on the 
evidence provided, the fact that the beneficiary has had training in GlobalLink does not rise to the level of 
"special knowledge." 
Counsel asserts that CIS abused its discretion by dismissing the "expert opinion letters" that were submitted 
in response to the request for evidence. Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. Counsel did not provide 
evidence, such as a resume, to establish that the authors of the opinion letters should be considered experts. 
Furthermore, the petitioner did not disclose which specific documents the "experts" reviewed in rendering 
their opinions. Therefore, the AAO does not have the information needed in order to evaluate what objective 
evidence the experts based their opinion on. The AAO may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinions 
statements submitted as expert testimony. However, where an opinion is not in accord with other information 
or is in any way questionable, the AAO is not required to accept or may give less weight to that evidence. 
Matter of Caron International, 19 I&N Dec. 791 (Comm. 1988). 
On appeal, counsel also refers to a 1994 INS memorandum as a guide for interpreting the statutory definition 
of specialized knowledge. Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner, INS, 
Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 214L-P (March 9, 1994). In the memorandum, the 
Commissioner noted that specialized knowledge is not limited to knowledge that is propriebry, exclusive, or 
unique, but also includes howledge that is "different from that generally found in [a] particular industry." 
Counsel argues that the beneficiary's training in the petitioner's software programs and applications that were 
created for the client establishes that the beneficiary's knowledge rises to the level of "specialized." Upon 
review, counsel does not explain how the beneficiary's knowledge is different than that of other computer 
consultants in the industry. The claim that the beneficiary has knowledge of computer software programs and 
applications that were created for the petitioner's client does not necessarily distinguish the beneficiary from 
another computer consultant. The petitioner has failed to differentiate the beneficiary's knowledge from that 
of others in the industry. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient 
for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N at 190. 
Counsel asserts the "[tlhe guidance provided in the Puleo memo is the state of the law . . . ." However, with 
regard to counsel's reliance on the 1994 Associate Commissioner's memorandum, it is noted that the 
memorandum was intended solely as a guide for employees and will not supercede the plain language of the 
statute or the regulations. Although the memorandum may be useful as a statement of policy and as an aid in 
interpreting the law, it was intended to serve as guidance and merely reflects the writer's analysis of the issue. 
As discussed, the petitioner has not submitted probative evidence to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge 
LM 03 002 50584 
Page 9 
is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known in the alien's 
place of employment. 
Counsel asserts that "[iln the 1990 Act, Congress relaxed the standards for specialized knowledge required for 
the L-1B subcategory." However, other than deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had 
to be "proprietary," the 1990 amendment did not greatly alter the definition of the term. 
Prior to the Immigration Act of 1990, the statute did not provide a definition for the term "specialized 
knowledge." Instead, the regulations defined the term as follows: 
"Specialized knowledge" means knowledge possessed by an individual whose advanced level 
of expertise and proprietary knowledge of the organization's product, service, research, 
equipment, techniques, management, or other interests of the employer are not readily 
available in the United States labor market. This definition does not apply to persons who 
have general knowledge or expertise which enables them merely to produce a product or 
provide a service. 
8 C.F.R. 5 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D)(1990). 
Although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized knowledge," 
Congress did not give any indication that it intended to expand the field of aliens that qualify as possessing 
specialized knowledge. Although the statute omitted the term "proprietary knowledge" that was contained in 
the regulations, the statutory definition still calls for "special knowledge" or an "advanced level of 
knowledge," similar to the original regulation. Neither the 1990 House Report nor the amendments to the 
statute indicate that Congress intended to expand the visa category beyond the "key personnel" that were 
originally mentioned in the 1970 House Report. H.R. REP, No. 9 1-85 1,1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 
WL 5815. Considered in light of the original 1970 statute and the 1990 amendments, it is clear that Congress 
intended for the class of nonimmigrant L-1 aliens to be narrowly drawn and carefully regulated, and to this 
end provided a specific statutory definition of the term "specialized knowledge" through the Immigration Act 
of 1990. 
Finally, it is noted that the statutory definition still requires the AAO to make comparisons in order to 
determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" is a comparative 
concept and cannot be plainly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 
(D.D.C. 1990), "[s]imply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain 
meaning." Neither counsel nor the petitioner provided sufficient evidence to compare the beneficiary's 
position and the claimed specialized knowledge of the beneficiary with other positions within industry or in 
the petitioner's company. Even though the director specifically requested evidence of the beneficiary's 
training, the petitioner did not provide evidence of such training in its response. Instead, the petitioner 
provided a statement which described the training that all consultants receive. The director specifically 
requested evidence of training that the beneticiary has received related to the position, including dates, 
duration, and objectives of the training. Again, the petitioner did not provide this information. Failure to 
submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 
8 C.F.R. 8 103.2(b)(14). Additionally, the director requested an organizational chart showing the 
beneficiary's proffered position in relation to others in the company. Although the petitioner provided an 
LIN 03 002 50584 
Page 10 
organizational chart, it was vague and did not show the beneficiary's position in relation to other Kanbay 
consultants working for the client. 
The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." See 
generally, H.R. REP. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" denotes a position 
within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." See Webster's IINav College Dictionary 605 
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a 
petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, 
there would be no rational reason to employ that person. Accordingly, an employee of "crucial importance" 
or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the 
AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general 
labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. Here, the 
petitioner has not indicated that the beneficiary is one of a specific number of employees that have received 
the "specialized knowledge" training. Because the petitioner does not specifically provide this information, 
the AAO cannot conclude that the beneficiary is a specialized knowledge employee and does not represent the 
petitioner's average employee. While it may be correct to say that the beneficiary is a highly skilled and 
productive employee, this fact alone is not enough to bring him to the level of "key personnel." 
In the present case, the petitioner has not provided evidence of the beneficiary's specialized knowledge. The 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge because of his training in GlobalLink and hs 
knowledge of the client's proprietary applications and software but has not provided any evidence. Thus, as 
the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary possesses a special knowledge of the petitioner's product 
or an advanced level of knowledge of the company's processes or procedures, the director reasonably 
determined that the beneficiary does not qualify as a specialized knowledge worker. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO notes that the petitioner has submitted conflicting information 
regarding the claimed ownership of the petitioning corporation. To establish eligibility for this visa 
classification, the petitioner must establish that there is a qualifying relationship between the beneficiary's 
overseas employer and the U.S. petitioner. 8 C.F.R: 5 214.2(1)(3)(i . In the resent matter, the petitioner 
submitted a statement indicating that. owns ) and has 99% ownership of 
f However, it is noted that the 2001 IRS Form 1120 U.S. Corporation 
Income Tax return for indicates that owns 42.5 percent of the common 
stock of the petitioning corporation. This evidence directly contradicts the petitioner's claimed relationship 
and raises questions regarding the ownership of the remaining 57.5 percent of the company's outstanding 
shares. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and 
sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 
591 (BIA 1988). The petitioner did not submit copies of the corporate stock certificates, stock certificate 
ledger or registry, corporate bylaws, or the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings that must be 
examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, and the 
subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, 
Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Cornm. 1982). For this additional 
reason, the petition must be denied. In addition, it is recommended that the director review the petitioner's 
approved blanket petition for possible revocation or amendment. 
~rn 03 002 50584 
Page 11 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for deniaI in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Sqp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). For this additional reason, the petition must be denied. 
in visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 29 1 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1361. The petitioner has not sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.