dismissed L-1B Case: Computer Science

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
OfJice of Administrative Appeals MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
-. 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: WAC 08 027 5 1393 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: w302W3 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. fj 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 08 027 5 1393 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner, a California corporation, filed this nonimmigrant visa petition to employ of the beneficiary in the 
position of programmer analyst as an L-1B intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge pursuant to 
section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L). The 
petitioner claims to be the parent company of the beneficiary's foreign employer in India. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
Specifically, the director determined that the record does not establish that the beneficiary's computer skills 
constitute specialized knowledge or that specialized knowledge is required to perform the duties of the 
position. The director further notes that the beneficiary was employed by the foreign entity for only 15 
months prior to the filing of the instant petition and that the record is devoid of evidence establishing the 
beneficiary's acquisition of the purported specialized knowledge abroad. 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that the 
beneficiary has been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. Specifically, the petitioner 
argues that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge of a proprietary development tool called "vista web," 
which is necessary for the project on which the beneficiary will work in the United States. In support, the 
petitioner submits additional evidence pertaining to the beneficiary's project in the United States and the 
"vista web" development tool. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
WAC 08 027 51393 
Page 3 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. $5 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. !.j 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's duties abroad in the Form 1-129 as follows: 
Involved in all phases of Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) that includes Systems 
Study, DesigdArchitect, Development, Implementation, Documentation, Builds, Code 
Management, Maintenance, Enhancements and Quality Control. Worked extensively in Java 
Beans, J2EE, STRUTS and design Patterns such as MVC, OOAD, Business Delegate, Data 
Access Objects. 
The petitioner describes the beneficiary's proposed duties in the United States in the Form 1-129 as follows: 
Implementing STRUTS Framework and MVC Design paradigm for web module. Designing 
applications using MVC Architecture, OOAD (Object Oriented Analysis and Design), and 
UML. Development [sic] Java Beans to store and retrieve the date entered by the user and 
display them in the respective JSP pages. 
The petitioner also submitted the beneficiary's resume. The resume indicates that the beneficiary began working 
for the foreign employer in August 2006, approximately 15 months prior to the filing of the instant petition. The 
resume also lists the beneficiary's "technical skills" and summarizes his work experience abroad. The beneficiary 
is describes as having approximately one year of "IT Experience" and to have knowledge of various computer 
programming and scripting languages, design tools, operating systems, and software package such as, inter alia, 
Java, HTML, MS Visio 2003, Windows, MS-Office. 
WAC 08 027 5 1393 
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On December 27, 2007, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, a more 
detailed description of the beneficiary's duties, an explanation addressing how the beneficiary's duties are 
different or unique from those of other workers employed by the petitioner or in the industry at-large, and an 
explanation addressing how the beneficiary's training differs from that provided to other workers in the field of 
endeavor. 
In response, the petitioner submitted a letter dated January 15, 2008 in which it further describes the project on 
which the beneficiary will work in the United States, Right DB-Job Portal, and his proposed duties. The "job 
portal" is described as a "career website for technology and engineering professionals and the companies that seek 
to employ them." In working on this project, the petitioner describes the beneficiary's duties as follows: 
At the present time, we are in need of a Programmer Analyst to participate in this application 
development project we are performing. This project includes the use of generally accepted 
application development practices in the design, documentation and implementation areas of this 
service. 
Working with full life cycle software Development, which includes requirement & Object 
Oriented analysis, design, development, testing and documentation and writing Requirement 
Specification documents, design documents, Test cases and Analysis, User Training documents 
and Technical Help documents, Management of the work assignments, and handle the delivery 
and performance of a team, while personally taking part into [sic] the code writing, testing, bug 
fixing, technical support and documentation. 
Programmer Analyst working in applications or systems development analyze users' needs and 
design, construct, test, and maintain computer applications software or systems. Programmer 
Analyst can be involved in the design and development of many types of software, including 
software for operating systems and network distribution, and compilers, which convert programs 
for execution on a computer. In programming, or coding, Programmer Analyst instruct[s] a 
computer, line by line, how to perform a function. He also solves technical problems that arise. 
Programmer Analyst must possess strong programming skills, but are more concerned with 
developing algorithms and analyzing and solving programming problems than with actually 
writing code. Programmer Analyst often works as part of a team that designs new hardware, 
software, and systems. 
The petitioner also submitted a letter from the foreign entity dated January 14, 2008 in which the beneficiary is 
described as working abroad as a "programmer analyst." The beneficiary is described as working on three 
different projects during his approximately 15 months of employment - compliance system, multi-party video 
conferencing, and "TradeNet." In all these projects, the beneficiary is described as using computer skills relating 
to his knowledge of, inter alia, JDK 1.5, JSP, Struts 1.1, Java Script, and Microsoft Windows. 
The petitioner did not describe any "training" provided to the beneficiary other than his university education, 
which was completed prior to his employment by the foreign entity 15 months preceding the filing of the instant 
petition. The petitioner also did not explain how the beneficiary's knowledge differs from the knowledge 
possessed by other programmers employed by the petitioning organization or in the industry at-large. 
WAC 08 027 51393 
Page 5 
On June 14, 2008, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has been or will be 
employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that the beneficiary 
has been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. Specifically, the petitioner argues that 
the beneficiary has specialized knowledge of a proprietary development tool called "vista web," which is 
necessary for the project on which the beneficiary will work in the United States. In support, the petitioner 
submits additional evidence pertaining to the beneficiary's project in the United States and the "vista web" 
development tool. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined 
at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ: 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1 756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14-1 5 (D.D.C., 1990).' 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965,967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
' 
 Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
' 
WAC 08 027 5 1393 
Page 6 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section lOl(aX1 5XL) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster 's New College Dictionary 620 (3'* ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,91" tong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), affd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd v. I.N.S., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
WAC 08 027 5 1393 
Page 7 
5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L- 1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
2 14(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on 
a case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and prove that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. 5 11 84(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the nature of the 
WAC 08 027 5 1393 
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claimed specialized knowledge. 
 Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" 
knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States or abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge. Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be 
employed in a "specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to 
support this claim. The petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which 
would distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced computer programmer 
employed by the petitioning organization or in the industry at-large. Going on record without documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 
22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a beneficiary's duties involve 
specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a matter of reiterating the 
regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724, F. Supp. 1 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), afd, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. 
Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary has approximately one year of "IT Experience" and has knowledge of 
various computer programming and scripting languages, design tools, operating systems, and software packages 
such as, inter alia, Java, HTML, MS Visio 2003, Windows, MS-Office. The petitioner further asserts that the 
beneficiary, as a computer programmer working on client projects, has used, and will use, this knowledge of 
"generally accepted application development practices" to design and develop software, and to program, or code, 
computers, which instructs "a computer, line by line, how to perform a function." On appeal, the petitioner 
asserts, for the first time, that the beneficiary also has specialized knowledge of a proprietary development tool 
called "vista web," which is purportedly necessary for the project on which the beneficiary will work in the 
United States. However, even though requested by the director, the petitioner failed to explain how the 
beneficiary's knowledge of "vista web," and'the various computer programming and scripting languages, design 
tools, operating systems, and software packages listed in the record, is different or unique from those of other 
workers employed by the petitioner or in the industry at-large. The petitioner also failed to address how the 
beneficiary's training differed from that provided to other workers in the field of endeavor. Failure to submit 
requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 
103.2(b)(I 4). 
Accordingly, despite the petitioner's claim, the record does not establish how, exactly, this knowledge 
materially differs from knowledge possessed by other workers employed by the petitioning organization or by 
computer programmers in the industry at-large. The record does not establish what qualities of his computer 
skills, as well as his claimed knowledge of the "vista web" development tool, are of such complexity that the 
impartation of this knowledge amounts to the acquisition of special or advanced knowledge. Importantly, the 
record is not persuasive in establishing why, exactly, any of the beneficiary's knowledge cannot be imparted 
to a similarly experienced and educated computer programmer in a relatively short period of time. Again, 
going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
in these proceedings. Matter of Sofficci, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190)). The petitioner does not articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized 
knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, or explain how and 
when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. Crucially, as the beneficiary has only been employed abroad 
WAC 08 027 51393 
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for 15 months prior to the filing of the petition, it is not credible that the beneficiary was able to acquire 
knowledge that is tmly special or advanced jn his first 3 months of employment so that he was able to be 
employed abroad in a specialized knowledge capacity for the requisite 1-year period. Accordingly, the record 
is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary has been or will be a "key" employee having special or 
advanced knowledge of a company product or service, the application of this product or service, or a process 
or procedure of the petitioning organization. As the beneficiary has apparently received no special training in 
"vista web" or any of the listed computer skills, and as the beneficiary had only had 3 months of work 
experience prior to the commencement of the requisite 1-year period of foreign employment in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary's knowledge is truly 
special or advanced. 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the 
knowledge possessed by computer programmers generally throughout the industry or by other employees of 
the petitioning organization. The fact that few other workers possess very specific knowledge of certain 
aspects of the petitioning organization's processes or products, e.g., vista web, does not alone establish that 
the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed advanced or special. All employees can be said to possess uncommon 
and unparalleled skill sets to some degree; however, a skill set that can be easily imparted to another similarly 
educated and generally experienced computer programmer is not "specialized knowledge." Moreover, the 
proprietary or unique qualities of vista web do not establish that any knowledge of this development tool is 
"special" or "advanced." Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the processes, procedures, and 
technologies require this employee to have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not 
been established in this matter. The fact that other workers outside of the petitioning organization may not 
have very specific knowledge regarding the petitioner's enterprise is not relevant to these proceedings if this 
knowledge gap could be closed by the petitioner by simply revealing the information to a newly hired, 
generally experienced and educated worker. 
The AAO does not discount the likelihood that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced computer 
programmer. There is no indication, however, that the beneficiary has any knowledge that exceeds that of 
any experienced computer programmer, or that he has received special training in the company's 
methodologies or processes which would separate him from any other worker employed within the 
petitioner's organization or in the industry at-large. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is any more advanced or special than the knowledge held by a skilled worker. See 
Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Based on the evidence presented, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge or that he was or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, 
the appeal will be dismissed. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are 
qualifying organizations. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(i) states that a petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be accompanied by 
"[elvidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien are qualifying 
organizations." Title 8 C.F.R. 4 214.2(i)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, 
or other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifying relationships specified in the definitions of a 
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Page 10 
parent, branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing 
business." "Subsidiary" is defined in part as a legal entity "of which a parent owns, directly or indirectly, more 
than half of the entity and controls the entity." 8 C.F.R. $ 2 14.2(1)(1)(ii)(K). 
In this matter, the petitioner claims that it owns and controls the foreign employer. However, the record contains 
unresolved inconsistencies, which undermine this claim and call into question the true ownership and control of 
the foreign employer. For example, the petitioner submitted a "certificate" dated January 1,2008 which indicates 
that it owns " 100% Equity Shares" in the foreign employer, an Indian company. This ownership structure is also 
discussed in the foreign employer's company minutes from August 10, 2006. However, the foreign employer's 
"Memorandum of Association" dated October 2, 2003 lists two individuals as the owners of its equity shares. 
This conflicting ownership structure also appears in the foreign employer's "Articles of Association" dated 
October 3, 2003. The record is devoid of evidence establishing when, or if, these shares were ever sold to the 
petitioner. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies in the record by independent 
objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies will not suffice unless the 
petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 
582, 591-92 (BIA 1988). Once again, going on record without documentary evidence is not sufficient for 
purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing 
Matter of Treasure Crap of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190)). 
Accordingly, as it has not been established that the petitioner truly owns and controls the foreign employer, 
the petitioner has failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are qualifying organizations. It has also 
not been established that the beneficiary was employed abroad by a qualifying organization for 1 year as it 
has not been established when the petitioner acquired the foreign employer's equity shares, assuming this 
acquisition ever took place. Therefore, the petition may not be approved for these additional reasons. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 200 I), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). 
The petition will be denied for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an independent and 
alternative basis for denial. When the AAO denies a petition on multiple alternative grounds, a plaintiff can 
succeed on a challenge only if it is shown that the AAO abused its discretion with respect to all of the AAO's 
enumerated grounds. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1043. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.