dismissed L-1B Case: Computer Science

-"':~tifying data deleted to 
; event clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy 
PulUC COPY 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Mass. Ave. NW, Rm. A3042 
Washington, DC 20529 
U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
"7 
FILE: LIN 03 010 51767 Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER Date: FEB 2 2 2006 
PETITION: Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 10 l(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
4 bert P. Wiemann, irector 
\ Administrative Appeals Office 
LIN03 01051767 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, Nebraska Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the appeal. 
The petitioner is an information management consulting firm. The beneficiary was previously approved for 
an L- 1 B visa under a blanket petition and was temporarily employed by the petitioner. The petitioner seeks to 
employ the beneficiary in the position of computer consultant programmer as an L-1B specialized knowledge 
intracompany transferee pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 
U.S.C. $1 lOl(a)(l5)(L). 
The director denied the petition concluding that the beneficiary is not employed in a position that involves 
specialized knowledge. Specifically, the director stated that the petitioner had failed to indicate that the 
beneficiary received any more training than the general training offered to each consultant employed by the 
foreign entity. Furthermore, the director noted that while the petitioner asserts that the customized 
applications are considered proprietary work products and are not available in the general marketplace of 
computer application products, no evidence has been submitted to support this claim. The petitioner 
subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and forwarded the appeal 
to the AAO for review. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director's decision was based on a misapplication of the 
law and because the director failed to consider all of the presented evidence. 
To establish eligibility for the nonimmigrant L-1 visa classification, the petitioner must meet the criteria 
outlined in section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. Specifically, within three years preceding the beneficiary's 
application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must have employed the 
beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized knowledge capacity, for one 
continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States temporarily to continue 
rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a managerial, 
executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the alien 
are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment abroad 
with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of the petition. 
(iv) Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior education, 
training, and employment qualifies himlher to perform the intended services in the United States; 
LIN 03 010 51767 
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however, the work in the United States need not be the same work which the alien performed 
abroad. 
The issue in this proceeding is whether the beneficiary possesses "specialized knowledge" as defined in the 
Act and the regulations. 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 8 1184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
A "specialized knowledge professional" is further defined at 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(E) as: 
[A]n individual who has specialized knowledge as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(D) of this 
section and is a member of the professions as defined in section 101(a)(32) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. 
In a letter attached to the petition, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary has the following job 
responsibilities: "assist in performing consulting work related to the design, development, testing and - 
implementation of customized business system software applications developed exclusively for 
the Household organization." The petitioner stated "[olnly a fraction of the consultant the 
specialized combination of skills and knowledge possessed by [the beneficiary]." 
The petitioner stated that the beneficiary has knowledge hich is a proprietary system of the 
petitioner. The petitioner stated the beneficiary has extensive luiowledge of "[the client's] computer systems, 
processes, and business systems applications, which includes the Vision application, a complex and 
customized application package developed exclusively for [the client] as well as knowledge of the consumer 
consultants in India." 
'he petitioner also stated "[the beneficiary] has received extensive corporate training, lending business." 7 
which includes the- 
well as Client's Business an( 
The petitioner also provided staffing statistics and stated that it employs 1,200 computer professionals world 
wide. The petitioner stated that approximately 500 consultants are assigned to develop customized software 
for the client, Household, and 100 of those consultants are staffed in the United States at the Household client 
site. The petitioner explained that on the Loan Pricing Project there are "a total of 45 computer professionals 
LIN 03 010 51767 
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working on this particular project: 30 are staffed at the remaining 15 are currently working 
on-site at [the client]." In support of this petition, the petitioner provided the beneficiary's education 
documents, general information about the petitioner's services, a copy of the consulting agreement with their 
client, Household, and the petitioner's financial statements. 
In a request for evidence, the director requested evidence to establish the qualifying corporate relationship 
between the Unites States business entity and the foreign business entity. 
Additionally, the director noted that the record did not sufficiently establish that the beneficiary possessed 
specialized knowledge. The director requested that the petitioner submit evidence establishing that: the 
beneficiary possesses special knowledge of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, 
management, or other interests and its application in international markets. The director noted that although 
the beneficiary may possess an advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of the company, 
evidence must be submitted to describe and distinguish that knowledge from knowledge possessed by others 
within the organization, and the industry at large. Furthermore, the director stated that the evidence must 
establish that the beneficiary's duties for the qualifying employment abroad, and the duties in the United 
States require a person with specialized knowledge. 
The director stated acceptable evidence includes but is not limited to: 
1) The beneficiary's wages during the twelve-month period of employment with the foreign 
organization. Acceptable documentation is a copy of the beneficiary's foreign tax return for 
one year in the previous three which names the employer and the beneficiary, specifies the 
period for which the income was earned, specifies the income earned and shows any taxes 
paid; or complete, legible copies of the beneficiary's pay slips issued by the foreign 
organization for twelve continuous months in the previous thirty-six month period. 
2) The training provided by the organization to the beneficiary, beginning with initial new 
employee orientation to the present. Acceptable evidence includes copies of certificates, 
personnel records, andlor a letter from an authorized representative of the organization who 
has knowledge of the beneficiary's training (such as a personnel officer or training official). 
3) For the Service to make a determination that the beneficiary's knowledge is specialized[,] 
evidence must be submitted to establish the full range of positions utilized by the petitioner in 
its business. Also, submit an organizational chart showing the alien's proffered position her 
[sic] in the U.S. in relation to others in the company. 
4) Copies of brochures or booklets issued for distribution to customers and clients which 
describe the capabilities of the organization and its employees. 
Additionally, the director requested the number of individuals that are employed in the United States by 
- 
In response to the request for evidence, counsel for the petitioner provided the pay stubs for the beneficiary's 
employment with the foreign company and his foreign tax return. Additionally, counsel provided an 
LIN 03 010 51767 
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organizational chart titled Voucher Payoff Team Chart and was divided into two teams, the onsite team and 
the offshore team. The beneficiary was currently listed as a team leader and the petitioner indicated on the 
chart that the beneficiary will be coming to the U.S. to fill the onsite team lead. Counsel provided a copy of 
the L-1 Blanket certification and an attached affidavit and chart containing all related entities. Counsel also 
at the University of 
at DePaul University. The petitioner submitted a 
ccounts at~he petitioner also submitted a 
In his decision, the director concluded that the record did not establish that the proffered position in the 
United States requires an alien with specialized knowledge. Upon reviewing the evidence provided by the 
petitioner, the director determined the petitioner had not indicated that the beneficiary of the instant petition 
has received any more training than the general training offered to each consultant employed by the petitioner. 
The director did not find that the record establishes that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon or 
advanced, and not generally known by others in the field. The director also concluded that although the 
petitioner asserts that the customized applications are considered proprietary work products and are not 
available in general market place of computer application products, no evidence had been submitted to 
support this claim. Consequently, the director denied the petition. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner submits a brief in which he asserts that the director's denial of the 
petition was based on a misapplication of the statute, regulations, and current CIS guidance. Counsel submits 
additional evidence in support of the petitioner's appeal. Counsel states this additional evidence provides 
further support that the beneficiary possesses knowledge which would be difficult to impart to another 
individual without significant economic inconvenience to the petitioner. Counsel further asserts that because 
the software applications are proprietary, the beneficiary also possesses knowledge which normally can be 
gained only through prior experience with the petitioner. 
However, the AAO notes the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to provide additional evidence to the 
director. The director requested evidence that the beneficiary possesses special knowledge of the petitioner's 
product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application on 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's processes and 
procedures. Specifically, the director noted that the evidence may include training provided by the 
organization to the beneficiary including copies of certificates and/or letters from an authorized representative 
of the organization who has knowledge of the beneficiary's training. On appeal, the petitioner presents a 
training certificate issued by the petitioner to the beneficiary. The petitioner also submits a letter from its 
client stating the proprietary nature of the project that the beneficiary is assigned to and the nature of the work 
involved. Additionally, the petitioner submits evidence to demonstrate that it would not be feasible to train a 
U.S. worker for the beneficiary's position. However, this additional evidence was not submitted in response 
to the director's request, but on appeal. Any failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material 
line of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(14). The purpose of the request 
for evidence is to elicit further information that clarifies whether eligibility for the benefiuought has been 
established as of the time of filing. 8 C.F.R. $5 103.2(b)(8) and (12). 
LIN 03 010 51767 
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The petitioner was put on notice of required evidence and given a reasonable opportunity to provide it for the 
record before the visa petition was adjudicated. The petitioner failed to submit the requested evidence and 
now submits it on appeal. However, the AAO will not consider this evidence for any purpose. Matter of 
Soriano, 19 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1988). The appeal will be adjudicated based on the record of proceeding 
before the director. 
First, counsel claims that the "agency's written policy requires the Service to interpret the term [specialized 
knowledge] broadly" pursuant to 8 C.F.R. $214.2(l)(ii)(D). In support of this claim, counsel refers to a 1994 
memorandum written by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (now CIS) Acting Associate 
Commissioner. Counsel claims that the "guidance provided in the [I9941 memo is the current state of the law 
and, taken together with the statute and regulations, should be the standard used in determining whether an 
individual possesses specialized knowledge." Additionally, counsel disagrees with the director's use of the 
decision Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm. 1982) in his determination that CIS does not find that 
simple experience and familiarity constitutes "special knowledge" of the company product and its application 
in the international market. On appeal, counsel asserts that the director relied on the Penner case as the legal 
standard of specialized knowledge. 
Upon review of the record, counsel is incorrect in his conclusion that the director relied solely on the Penner 
decision as the legal standard of specialized knowledge. The director primarily relied on the statute and 
regulations. The director determined that the petitioner had not provided sufficient evidence that the 
beneficiary received any more training than the general training offered to each consultant employed by 
The director acknowledged that the beneficiary possesses working knowledge of the project, but that 
the evidence did not sufficiently establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon, noteworthy, or 
distinct. The director merely cites Penner in support of the proposition that "petitions may be approved for 
persons with specialized knowledge, not for skilled workers." The director further stated "[tlhe distinction 
between a skilled worker and one who will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge 
applies in this case." 
On appeal, counsel states that the beneficiary qualifies as an intracompany transferee with specialized 
knowledge based on his experience with the processes and products that are unique to the petitioner's 
organization. Counsel states there are two primary components to specialized knowledge. 
First, counsel states that the beneficiary is "intimately familiar wit specialized methodology 
used on within the Secondly, counsel states that the beneficiary has an advanced 
level of understanding of a proprietary software application developed especially for the 
[pletitioner's client." Counsel asserts that the evidence establishes that the work being performed for the 
client, including th project, is both complex, and involves knowledge that is simply not available in 
the marketplace. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the director did not fully consider the evidence presented regarding the 
specialized knowledge ossessed by the beneficiary. Counsel states that the L-1 petition contained evidence 
of training in & Counsel admits that knowledge may not by itself constitute 
specialized knowledge, but taken together with the time spent abroad learning Household's system and 
developing the unique VISION software solutions, it is the [pletitioner's contention that [the beneficiary's] 
knowledge does rise to the level of 'specialized."' Counsel refers to a job training certificate issued to the 
LIN 03 010 51767 
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beneficiary that the petitioner did not submit until the appeal, despite the director's request for this evidence. 
As noted above, the AAO will only take into consideration documents that were presented in response to the 
director's request for evidence. However, the AAO notes this certificate of completion states that the 
beneficiary completed on-the-job training in 
.f 
application of Household." Additionally, counsel 
asserts that "not all consultants receive these certi icates - they are issued only after an individual has 
completed a significant amount of on the job training on a particular client project." Without documentary 
evidence to support the claim, the assertions of counsel will not satisfy the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503, 506 
(BIA 1980). Counsel has not provided documentary evidence that not all consultants receive these 
certificates. 
Counsel asserts that the evidence provided in the petition is sufficient to demonstrate that customized 
applications being developed by the petitioner for its client are considered proprietary work products. 
Counsel refers to a letter from a senior manager for the petitioner that explained the proprietary nature of the 
petitioner's work for the client. Additionally, counsel refers to the service agreement between the petitioner 
and its client which was submitted with the petition. On appeal, counsel presents a letter from the petitioner's 
client which states "the customization and enhancement work of this application is considered both original 
and proprietary in nature." 
Furthermore, counsel asserts that the director erred in rejecting the opinion letters that were provided in the 
petition. The director stated "it is noted that they have made their observations from a simple review of the 
beneficiary's experience and proposed project assignment, rather than based on objective evidence." Counsel 
asserts that both "experts" based their statements on "a first hand understanding of the nature of software 
development and technical skills." Counsel sums up each expert's work experience. Counsel states that "it is 
the [pletitioner's contention that [CIS] abused its discretion by dismissing these opinions due to a conclusion 
that the information provided was not objective." 
On review, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has been and will be employed in a 
specialized knowledge capacity as required in 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). 
In examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's 
description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed description 
of the services to be performed that is sufficient to establish that the beneficiary will be employed in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. Id. In the present case, the petitioner submitted a general job description, 
which was stated above. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge of GlobalLink 
and the client's proprietary computer programs and software that are required in order to satisfactorily execute 
the job duties. The petitioner generally stated that the beneficiary will assist in performing consulting work 
related to the design, development, and testing of software applications developed for the client. The 
petitioner described different computer programs and projects of which the beneficiary has knowledge. 
However, the petitioner did not provide a detailed job description that establishes the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge or that the position requires specialized knowledge. Specifics are clearly an important indication 
of whether a beneficiary's duties require specialized knowledge, otherwise meeting the definitions would 
simply be a matter of reiterating the regulations. Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989), afd, 905 F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
LIN 03 010 51767 
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Furthermore, the petitioner has not provided any evidence that the beneficiary has received any more training 
than other consultants for the petitioner. The petitioner has failed to differentiate the beneficiary's knowledge 
from that of others in the petitioner's company. The petitioner merely stated the beneficiary "has received 
extensive corporate training, which includes the ethodology the [sic] governs the life 
cycle of a pro' c well as Client's Business and Systems and have [sic] participated in sessions 
conducted b II overseas consultants in India." The petitioner did not establish that this training or 
the knowledge received from this training is any more specialized than anything the other employees receive. 
Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting 
the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. 
Comm. 1972). 
In addition, counsel asserts on appeal that the beneficiary's knowledge, experience, skills, and training 
differentiate him from the other consultants of the petitioner, since "only a relatively small number possess 
the type of experience to warrant transfer to the United States to perform implementation and customization 
work and only a limited number are actually transferred." Counsel refers to statistical information that was 
provided by the petitioner in the initial petition. However, the petitioner simply stated that more than one 
third of their consultants are assigned to develop software for their client, and of these 500 consultants, one- 
fifth are staffed in the United States working on this client's projects. The petitioner explained that on the 
Loan Pricing Project there are "a total of 45 computer professionals working on this particular project: 30 are 
staffed nd the remaining 15 are currently working on-site at [the client]." Yet the petitioner 
has notpro.ldedditional job descriptions of computer consultant positions located at the 
client site. The lack of evidence in the record makes it impossible to draw a comparison between the 
consultants assigned to the client in general and those with specialized knowledge. Again, simply going on 
record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof 
in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Craft of California, supra. Also, the assertions of counsel do not 
constitute evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, supra; Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, supra. Therefore, the director 
correctly concluded that the beneficiary's knowledge does not distinguish the beneficiary from other 
consultants that work for the petitioner. 
Additionally, counsel continues to refer to the beneficiary's training as evidence of the 
beneficiary's specialized knowledge. However, by counsel's own admission, knowledge - 
is not sufficient to establish specialized knowledge but it must be taken into consideration in conjunction with 
the beneficiary's knowledge of the client's computer software. Furthermore, the letter from the petitioner's 
senior manager of core accounts stated "consultants who develop these software applications have been 
trained methodologies and development techniques, includin proprietary 
system used to coordinate offshore development." Based on this statement. it would appear that all . . 
c~nsultants who develop applications for clients must receive training f here fore, based on the 
evidence provided, the fact that the beneficiary has had training in not rise to the level of 
"special knowledge". 
Counsel asserts that CIS abused its discretion by dismissing the "expert opinion letters" that were submitted 
in response to the request for evidence. Counsel's assertions are not persuasive. Counsel did not provide 
evidence, such as a resume, to establish that the authors of the opinion letters should be considered experts. 
Furthermore, the petitioner did not disclose which specific documents the "experts" reviewed in rendering 
their opinions. Therefore, the AAO does not have the information needed in order to evaluate what objective 
LIN 03 010 51767 
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evidence the experts based their opinion on. The AAO may, in its discretion, use as advisory opinions 
statements submitted as expert testimony. However, where an opinion is not in accord with other information 
or is in any way questionable, the AAO is not required to accept or may give less weight to that evidence. 
Matter of Caron International, 19 I&N Dec. 79 1 (Comm. 1988). 
On appeal, counsel also refers to a 1994 INS memorandum as a guide for interpreting the statutory definition 
of specialized knowledge. Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner, MS, 
Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, CO 214L-P (March 9, 1994). In the memorandum, the 
Commissioner noted that specialized knowledge is not limited to knowledge that is proprietary, exclusive, or 
unique, but also includes knowledge that is "different from that generally found in [a] particular industry." 
Counsel argues that the beneficiary's training in the petitioner's software programs and applications that were 
created for the client establishes that the beneficiary's knowledge rises to the level of "specialized." Upon 
review, counsel does not explain how the beneficiary's knowledge is different than that of other computer 
consultants in the industry. Simply because the beneficiary has knowledge of computer software programs 
and applications that were created for the petitioner's client, does not necessarily distinguish the beneficiary 
from another computer consultant. The petitioner has failed to differentiate the beneficiary's knowledge from 
that of others in the industry. Simply going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not 
sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Treasure Crafi of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972). 
Counsel asserts the "[tlhe guidance provided in the Puleo memo is the state of the law . . . ." However, with 
regard to counsel's reliance on the 1994 Associate Commissioner's memorandum, it is noted that the 
memorandum was intended solely as a guide far employees and will not supercede the plain language of the 
statute or the regulations. Although the memorandum may be useful as a statement of policy and as an aid in 
interpreting the law, it was intended to serve as guidance and merely reflects the writer's analysis of the issue. 
An agency's internal personnel guidelines "neither confer upon [plaintiffs] substantive rights nor provide 
procedures upon which [they] may rely." Lou-Herrera v. Trominski, 231 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 
2000)(quoting Fano v. OrNeill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1264 (5th Cir.1987)). CIS memoranda merely articulate 
internal guidelines for INS personnel; they are not "law" and do not establish judicially enforceable rights. 
As discussed, the petitioner has not submitted probative evidence to establish that the beneficiary's knowledge 
is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known in the alien's 
place of employment. 
Regarding the precedent decision that was cited by the director, counsel states that the legal landscape has 
changed since Matter of Penner, supra, was decided. Counsel asserts that "[iln the 1990 Act, Congress 
relaxed the standards for specialized knowledge required for the L-1B subcategory." However, other than 
deleting the former requirement that specialized knowledge had to be "proprietary," the 1990 amendment did 
not greatly alter the definition of the term. 
Prior to the Immigration Act of 1990, the statute did not provide a definition for the term "specialized 
knowledge." Instead, the regulations defined the term as follows: 
"Specialized knowledge" means knowledge possessed by an individual whose advanced level 
of expertise and proprietary knowledge of the organization's product, service, research, 
LIN 03 010 51767 
Page 10 
equipment, techniques, management, or other interests of the employer are not readily 
available in the United States labor market. This definition does not apply to persons who 
have general knowledge or expertise which enables them merely to produce a product or 
provide a service. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D)(1990). 
Although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized knowledge," 
Congress did not give any indication that it intended to expand the field of aliens that qualify as possessing 
specialized knowledge. Although the statute omitted the term "proprietary knowledge" that was contained in 
the regulations, the statutory definition still calls for "special knowledge" or an "advanced level of 
knowledge," similar to the original regulation. Neither the 1990 House Report nor the amendments to the 
statute indicate that Congress intended to expand the visa category beyond the "key personnel" that were 
originally mentioned in the 1970 House Report. H.R. REP. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 
WL 5815. Considered in light of the original 1970 statute and the 1990 amendments, it is clear that Congress 
intended for the class of nonimmigrant L-1 aliens to be narrowly drawn and carefully regulated, and to this 
end provided a specific statutory definition of the term "specialized knowledge" through the Immigration Act 
of 1990. The AAO concludes, therefore, that Matter of Penner remains useful guidance concerning the 
intended scope of "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
Finally, it is noted that the statutory definition still requires the AAO to make comparisons in order to 
determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized knowledge" is a comparative 
concept and cannot be plainly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F. Supp. 9, 15 
(D.D.C. 1990), "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain 
meaning." Neither counsel nor the petitioner provided sufficient evidence to compare the beneficiary's 
position and the claimed specialized knowledge of the beneficiary with other positions within industry or in 
the petitioner's company. Even though the director specifically requested evidence of the beneficiary's 
training, the petitioner did not provide evidence of such training in its response. Instead, the petitioner 
provided a statement which described the training that all consultants receive. The director specifically 
requested evidence to establish a full range of positions utilized by the petitioner in its business. Again, the 
petitioner did not provide this information. Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line 
of inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.2(b)(14). Additionally, the director 
requested an organizational chart showing the beneficiary's proffered position in relations to other in the 
company. Although the petitioner provided an organization chart, it was confusing and vague and did not 
show the beneficiary's position in relation to other Kanbay consultants working for the client. 
The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." See 
generally, H.R. REP. No. 91-85 1, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key personnel" denotes a position 
within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." See Webster's II New College Dictionary 605 
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be considered "important" to a 
petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic success of an enterprise, 
there would be no rational reason to employ that person. Accordingly, an employee of "crucial importance" 
or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
LIN 03 010 51767 
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Based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that term, the 
AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and the general 
labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. Here, the 
petitioner has not indicated that the beneficiary is one of a specific number of employees that have received 
the "specialized knowledge" training. Because the petitioner does not specifically provide this information, 
the AAO cannot conclude that the beneficiary is a specialized knowledge employee and does not represent the 
petitioner's average employee. While it may be correct to say that the beneficiary is a highly skilled and 
productive employee, this fact alone is not enough to bring him to the level of "key personnel." 
In the present case, the petitioner has not provided evidence of the beneficiary's specialized knowledge. The 
petitioner claims that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge because of his training his 
knowledge for the client's proprietary applications and software but has not provided any evidence. Thus, as 
the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary possesses a special knowledge of the petitioner's product 
or an advanced level of knowledge of the company's processes or procedures, the director reasonably 
determined that the beneficiary does not qualify as a specialized knowledge worker. 
Beyond the decision of the director, the AAO notes that the petitioner has submitted conflicting information 
regarding the claimed ownership of the petitioning corporation. To establish eligibility for this visa 
classification, the petitioner must establish that there is a qualifying relationship between the beneficiary's 
overseas employer and the U.S. petitioner. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(i). In the present matter, the petitioner has 
submitted a copy of "blanket petition" approval notice and supporting affidavit. See generally, 8 C.F.R. 
tj 214.2(1)(4). The affidavit asserts that the petitioner and the overseas employer are both "100% owned and 
controlled by thereby representing that they are qualifying affiliates. This 
affidavit was signed Februa 2002. However, it is noted that the 2001 IRS Form 1120 U.S. Corporation 
Income Tax return indicates that owns 42.5 percent of the common 
stock of the petitioning corporation. This evidence directly contradicts the petitioner's claimed relationship 
and raises questions regarding the ownership of the remaining 57.5 percent of the company's outstanding 
shares. Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and 
sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support of the visa petition. Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 
591 (BIA 1988). The petitioner did not submit copies of the corporate stock certificates, stock certificate 
ledger or registry, corporate bylaws, or the minutes of relevant annual shareholder meetings that must be 
examined to determine the total number of shares issued, the exact number issued to the shareholder, and the 
subsequent percentage ownership and its effect on corporate control. Matter of Siemens Medical Systems, 
Inc., 19 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1986); Matter of Hughes, 18 I&N Dec. 289 (Comm. 1982). For this additional 
reason, the petitioner must be denied and the appeal will be dismissed. In addition, it is recommended that the 
director review the petitioner's approved blanket petition for possible revocation or amendment. 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by the 
AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), affd. 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989)(noting that the AAO reviews 
appeals on a de novo basis). For this additional reason, the petition must be denied. 
The petition will be denied and the appeal dismissed for the above stated reasons, with each considered as an 
independent and alternative basis for the decision. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving 
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eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1361. 
The petitioner has not sustained that burden. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.