dismissed L-1B Case: Computer Solutions

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
20 Massachusetts Ave. N.W. Rm. A3000 
Washington, DC 20529 
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,don of Pt'wy 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
PUBLIC COPY 
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FILE: SRC 05 103 50260 Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER Date: NT 0 4 ZUUb 
PETITION: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 110 1 (a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: SELF-REPRESENTED 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
Robert P. Wiemann, Chief 
Administrative Appeals Office 
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DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimrnigrant visa. The matter 
is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed. 
The petitioner is engaged in computer solutions and systems integration. It seeks to temporarily employ the 
beneficiary as a technical consultant in the United States and filed a petition to classify the beneficiary as a 
nonimmigrant intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge. The director determined that the 
petitioner had not established that the beneficiary possessed the requisite specialized knowledge nor that the 
intended employment required specialized knowledge, and consequently denied the petition. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence, and 
asserts that the director erroneously determined that the beneficiary did not possess specialized knowledge. 
Counsel asserts that the additional evidence provided in support of the appeal would support a finding that the 
beneficiary did indeed possess specialized knowledge. 
To establish L-1 eligibility, the petitioner must meet the criteria outlined in section 101(a)(15)(L) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 8 1101(a)(15)(L). Specifically, within three years 
preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, a qualifying organization must 
have employed the beneficiary in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a specialized 
knowledge capacity, for one continuous year. In addition, the beneficiary must seek to enter the United States 
temporarily to continue rendering his or her services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof 
in a managerial, executive, or specialized knowledge capacity. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
This matter presents two related, but distinct, issues: (1) whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge; and (2) whether the proposed employment is in a capacity that requires specialized knowledge. 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)(B), provides the following: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
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knowledge of the company produ i t and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management, or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
A letter of support dated February 22, 2005, from~irector of Human Resources, stated the 
following about the petitioner's entity: 
The petitioner provides pioneering Employee Relationship Management (ERM) solutions for 
Global 2000 organizations whose operations are complicated by multiple sites, unionized 
workforces or language localization needs. ERM is a class of enterprise software and 
services that automate and transform workplace interactions between the enterprise and its 
employees. [The petitioner] works with large organizations with distributed and mobile 
workforces and partners with industry leaders who recognize that the quality of the 
employer/employee relationship is a competitive advantage. 
With regard to the beneficiary, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary would "provide technical expertise 
and support for the implementation and delivery of technical solutions to business partners, customers and 
[other offices of the petitioner in the United States]." The petitioner further indicated that the beneficiary had 
been employed with the foreign entity for the requisite year out of the previous three and possesses 
specialized knowledge of skills, including software programming, system analysis and 
functional/performance testing that he will implement in the United States. 
Finally, a more detailed support letter, also dated February 22, 2005, indicated that the beneficiary obtained a 
Baccalaureate Degree in Electronic Engineering from D.Y. Patil College of Engineering and Technology, 
India, in 1996. This letter provided additional details regarding the beneficiary's proposed position and 
qualifications. Specifically, the petitioner stated: 
As a Technical Consultant, [the beneficiary's] responsibilities include: identify and 
investigate customer issues and questions providing reasoning and recommendations; 
determine technical specifications required to meet functional needs; develop custom jsps for 
Schedule and LOA Overrides; implement dual approval feature for timesheets; implement 
custom interfaces for Shifts, Schedules, Clocks, HR Refi-esh and Team Import Interface; 
create client specific reports; develop design documents based on functional requirements; 
and develop custom rules, conditions, and interface classes for Payroll Export, Entitlements, 
and Balances. As an IT Consultant, [the beneficiary] was previously involved in various 
engagements and tested the performance of the web portal using WILY Performance 
Monitoring; analyzed and suggested modifications in JAVA code; and performed as Onsite 
Coordinator liaising with business users and managing a team to cany out modifications. 
The director found the initial evidence submitted with the petition insufficient to warrant a finding that the 
beneficiary possessed the required specialized knowledge. Consequently, a request for evidence was issued 
on March 11, 2005, which requested more detailed evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
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knowledge of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests 
and its application in international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the 
organization's processes and procedures, and that such knowledge was not general knowledge held commonly 
through the industry. The petitioner responded on March 24, 2005. In response to the director's request, the 
petitioner provided an additional overview of its products and services, and explained that the beneficiary's 
years of experience in systems implementation consulting, business process and computer systems process 
reengineering, when combined with his specific knowledge of the petitioner's application and tools, made 
him ideally suited for providing consulting services to the petitioner's custon~er base. With regard to his 
specific duties and experience, the petitioner stated: 
Since being hired by [the petitioner], [the beneficiary] is seen as one of our most competent 
and skilled resources in whom we rely heavily to successfully serve our customers. 
He successfully worked as a Technical Consultant to implement our time and 
attendance solution to one of our large-scale retail clients, as well as one of our 
manufacturing clients, with a combined employee base of over 25,000 employees; 
He has been trained through [the petitioner's "university"] and has developed a skill 
set that has created a specific focus for him in the areas of time and attendance, 
attendance management, entitlements and employee balances, as well as experience 
in our product architectures, which include PLISQL and Java. In addition, [the 
beneficiary] has honed his skills to our Reports Server, a reporting tool proprietary to 
[the petitioner] that is used to allow businesses to gather real-time data on their 
operations; 
His experience also lends himself to be knowledgeable in the area of customization, 
development of rules and reports using JAVA and Oracle, developing interfaces to 
exchange data between [the petitioner] and varying payroll systems like ADP, 
Ceridian and JCI (proprietary to our large-scale retail client). In addition, [the 
beneficiay] has strong technical knowledge in relation to the application servers used 
by [the petitioner] including WebLogic, and Oracle 9iAS. 
The petitioner concluded by stating that the beneficiary's skills and detailed knowledge of systems 
implementation, combined with assisting clients in the management of employee relationship management 
systems and their functions, was critical to the petitioner's ability to meet the business needs of its clients. 
The director determined that the record neither established that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge nor that the intended position in the U.S. is one that requires specialized knowledge, and 
concluded that the beneficiary was not eligible for the classification sought. The director specifically noted 
that the petitioner had failed to show that the beneficiary's duties and training were significantly different 
from other similarly-qualified engineers. The director concluded that the evidence submitted did not establish 
that the beneficiary's knowledge was uncommon or distinct and distinguished from other practitioners in the 
field, and consequently denied the petition. 
On appeal, counsel for the petitioner submits a brief and additional evidence in support of its assertion that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge. Counsel submits three additional documents, entitled "Profile," 
"Experience Summary," and "Business Experience Summary," and claims that the additional information 
contained therein clearly establishes that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge and that the 
proposed position requires specialized knowledge. No additional arguments were presented. 
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On review, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge nor that the intended position requires an employee with specialized knowledge. 
When examining the specialized knowledge capacity of the beneficiary, the AAO will look first to the 
petitioner's description of the job duties. See 8 C.F.R. 8 214.2(1)(3)(ii). As required in the regulations, the 
petitioner must submit a detailed description of the services to be performed sufficient to establish specialized 
knowledge. Id. 
In the present matter, the petitioner provided an abbreviated description of the beneficiary's employment in 
the foreign entity, his intended employment in the U.S. entity, and his responsibilities as a technical 
consultant. Despite specific requests by the director, namely, what specifically set apart the beneficiary's 
knowledge from other similarly trained consultants in the field, the petitioner failed to provide such 
information. The petitioner has not sufficiently documented how the beneficiary's performance of the 
proposed job duties distinguishes his knowledge as specialized. The petitioner repeatedly relies on the same 
evidence prior to adjudication in support of the petition. Despite the director's finding that the initial evidence 
submitted was insufficient, the petitioner failed to supplement the record as requested and merely resubmitted 
similar statements regarding the petitioner's business and the beneficiary's position therein. Although 
specifically requested by the director, the record contains no definitive evidence supporting the contention 
that the beneficiary's knowledge is uncommon and more advanced than similarly trained professionals in the 
field. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 3 214.2(1)(3)(viii) states that the director may request additional evidence in 
appropriate cases. Although specifically and clearly requested by the director, the petitioner failed to provide 
documentary evidence to support its claims that the beneficiary obtained a specialized level of knowledge 
through his work in the industry. The failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of 
inquiry shall be grounds for denying the petition. See 8 C.F.R. $ 103.2(b)(14). In this case, the petitioner 
relies on the AAO to accept its uncorroborated assertions that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge, both prior to adjudication and again on appeal, based merely on the contention that the petitioning 
entity has employed the beneficiary for one year and he is thus familiar with the petitioner's processes and 
procedures. These assertions, however, do not constitute evidence. Going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Sofici, 22 I&N Dec. 15 8, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 
I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
It is also appropriate for the AAO to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. 1 17, 120 (Comm. 1981) (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. 61 8 
(R.C. 1970) and Matter of LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. 816 (R.C. 1971)).' As stated by the Commissioner in 
Although the cited precedents pre-date the current statutory definition of "specialized knowledge," and 
counsel raises that very argument with regard to the director's reliance on Matter of Penner in support of the 
denial, the AAO finds them instructive. Other than deleting the former requirement that specialized 
knowledge had to be "proprietary," the 1990 Act did not significantly alter the definition of "specialized 
knowledge" from the prior INS interpretation of the term. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, 
criticize, or even refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The 
Committee Report simply states that the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of 
"[vlarying [i.e., not specifically incorrect] interpretations by INS," H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 69, 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that, the Committee Report simply restates the tautology that became section 
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Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 52 (Comm. 1982), when considering whether the beneficiaries possessed 
specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find that the occupations inherently 
qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have 
unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a slulled worker. Id. The Commissioner also provided the 
following clarification: 
A distinction can be made between a person whose skills and knowledge enable him or her to 
produce a product through physical or skilled labor and the person who is employed primarily 
for his ability to carry out a key process or function which is important or essential to the 
business firm's operation. 
Id. at 53. In the present matter, the evidence of record demonstrates that the beneficiary is more akin to an 
employee whose skills and experience enable him to provide a specialized service, rather than an employee 
who has unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled worker. Moreover, the petitioner's 
failure to submit a more detailed discussion of the beneficiary's day-to-day duties or the nature of the training 
he received creates a presumption of ineligibility. Although the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary 
received training from the petitioner's own "university," the nature of the training received, and the manner in 
which such training distinguishes the skills of the beneficiary from other technical consultants in the industry, 
is unclear. 
In this matter, the petitioner continually repeats the claim that the beneficiary's services are essential in order 
to satisfy the business needs of its clients. However, there is no significant evidence contained in the record 
that establishes that the beneficiary's services are fundamental to the petitioner's business. For example, the 
beneficiary's resume, submitted on appeal, indicates that part of his duties consisted of "mentor[ing] new 
Technical Consultants to ease their transition into [the petitioner]." The petitioner claims that the 
beneficiary's knowledge is highly specialized and unique, yet despite the director's requests, the petitioner 
failed to submit any documentation that would distinguish the services provided by the beneficiary from those 
provided by any of his fellow technical consultants working for the petitioner. Again, the petitioner asserts 
that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge, yet omits any detail with regard to how this knowledge was 
obtained, and why his knowledge is different from other similarly trained consultants employed by the 
petitioner or the industry in general. As previously stated, going on record without supporting documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 
22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
It should be noted that the statutory definition of specialized knowledge requires the AAO to make 
comparisons in order to determine what constitutes specialized knowledge. The term "specialized 
knowledge" is not an absolute concept and cannot be clearly defined. As observed in 1756, Inc. v. Attorney 
General, "[slimply put, specialized knowledge is a relative . . . idea which cannot have a plain meaning." 745 
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990). The Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended 
for "key personnel." See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-851, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750. The term "key 
personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "of crucial importance." Webster's 11 New 
College Dictionary 605 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2001). In general, all employees can reasonably be 
considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the overall economic 
success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. An employee of 
214(c)(2)(B) of the Act. Id. The AAO concludes, therefore, the cited cases, as well as Matter of Penner, 
remain useful guidance concerning the intended scope of the "specialized knowledge" L-1B classification. 
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"crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average employee. 
Accordingly, based on the definition of "specialized knowledge" and the congressional record related to that 
term, the AAO must make comparisons not only between the claimed specialized knowledge employee and 
the general labor market, but also between that employee and the remainder of the petitioner's workforce. 
Here, the petitioner makes no claim that the beneficiary's knowledge is more advanced than other consultants 
in the industry, despite the director's specific request for evidence affirming this proposition. There is no 
evidence to refute the proposition that a technical consultant with comparable experience gained by working 
with a competitor of the petitioner is not sufficient for this position. No discussion whatsoever has been 
submitted of the nature of the training and experience that its employees receive that is so different and 
unique from the training its competitors provide to their technical consultants. Additionally, the petitioner has 
not provided any information pertaining to the exact day-to-day duties of the beneficiary as compared to the 
daily duties of other technical consultants. Nor did the petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's knowledge, 
work experience, or training from that of its other employees. Other than the petitioner's continued assertions 
that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, there is no independent evidence corroborating these 
claims. The lack of tangible evidence in the record makes it impossible to classify the beneficiary's 
knowledge of technical fabrics as advanced and precludes a finding that the beneficiary's role is of crucial 
importance to the organization. 
 As previously stated, simply going on record without supporting 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for the purpose of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Soffici, 22 I&N Dec. at 165. 
The claim that the beneficiary has specialized knowledge, without submitting any documentation of the 
training he received or the manner in which the beneficiary gained such knowledge, is insufficient. Although 
the petitioner generally discusses the petitioner's products or services, the lack of specific information with 
regard to the beneficiary and his role in these products and services precludes the AAO from clearly 
understanding the actual role of the beneficiary in the petitioner's organization. While the beneficiary's skills 
and knowledge may contribute to the successfulness of the petitioning organization, this factor, by itself, does 
not constitute the possession of specialized knowledge. Therefore, while the beneficiary's contribution to the 
economic success of the corporation may be considered, the regulations specifically require that the 
beneficiary possess an "advanced level of knowledge" of the organization's process and procedures or a 
"special knowledge" of the petitioner's product, service, research, equipment, techniques, or management. 8 
C.F.R. $ 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). As determined above, the beneficiary does not satisfy the requirements for 
possessing specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, the petitioner submits additional lists of qualifications and duties of the petitioner, but provides no 
clear argument or objection in opposition of the director's findings. Once again, absent the identification of a 
specific error on the part of the director and accompanying evidence to establish such a finding, the petitioner 
has failed to provide any independent or objective evidence which shows that the beneficiary's knowledge of 
the petitioner's products or processes is so unique or advanced that it differs significantly from other similarly 
trained engineers in the industry. The petitioner overlooks the fact that the beneficiary is undoubtedly one of 
many technical consultants in the workforce today. It is fair to conclude that most people employed in this 
line of work must also have an understanding of the specific industry in which the petitioner is engaged. The 
petitioner seems to focus on this aspect of the beneficiary's background as the key element of the beneficiary's 
qualifications. The petitioner does not, however, offer any evidence that the beneficiary has uncommon, 
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advanced, or proprietary knowledge of the petitioner's unique processes or procedures.2 Instead, the argument 
is that the beneficiary's knowledge of the petitioner's products and processes through his one year of 
employment with the foreign entity gives him specialized knowledge. 
Additionally, in Matter of Penner, the Commissioner discussed the legislative intent behind the creation of 
the specialized knowledge category. 18 I&N Dec. 49. The decision noted that the 1970 House Report, H.R. 
No. 91-851 stated that the number of admissions under the L-1 classification "will not be large" and that 
"[tlhe class of persons eligible for such nonimmigrant visas is narrowly drawn and will be carefully regulated 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Id. at 5 1. The decision further noted that the House Report 
was silent on the subject of specialized knowledge but that, during the course of the sub-committee hearings 
on the bill, the Chairman specifically questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the 
proposed "L" category. In response to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they 
understood the legislation would allow "high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and 
that it would not include "lower categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." Id. at 50 (citing H.R. 
Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., I~nnzigration Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445, 91st Cong. 210, 21 8, 
223,240,248 (November 12, 1969)). 
Reviewing the Congressional record, the Commissioner concluded in Matter of Pelzlzer that an expansive 
reading of the specialized knowledge provision, such that it would include skilled workers and technicians, is 
not warranted. The Commissioner emphasized that that the specialized knowledge worker classification was 
not intended for "all employees with any level of specialized knowledge." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 
53. Or, as noted in Matter of Colley, "[mlost employees today are specialists and have been trained and given 
specialized knowledge. However, in view of the House Report, it can not be concluded that all employees 
with specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees." 18 I&N Dec. at 119. According to Matter of Pen~zer, "[sluch a conclusion would 
permit extremely large numbers of persons to qualify for the 'L-1' visa" rather than the "key personnel" that 
Congress specifically intended. 18 I&N Dec. at 53; see also 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 15 (concluding that 
Congress did not intend for the specialized knowledge capacity to extend to all employees with specialized 
knowledge, but rather to "key personnel" and "executives."). 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. See 1756, Inc., 745 F. Supp. at 16. Based on the evidence presented, it is concluded that the 
beneficiary does not possess specialized knowledge; nor would the beneficiary be employed in a capacity 
requiring specialized knowledge. For this reason, the appeal will be dismissed. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 3 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
director's decision will be affirmed and the petition will be denied. 
2 
 Although the fact that a beneficiary has experience with a proprietary product or procedure does not serve as 
prima facie evidence that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge, when such a claim is made, 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) must carefully evaluate the claimed knowledge and the depth of 
the beneficiary's experience in order to determine whether it rises to the level of specialized knowledge as 
contemplated by 8 C.F.R. fj 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). Thus, while a beneficiary is no longer required to have 
specialized knowledge, such knowledge can still be a basis for this determination. 
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ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.