dismissed L-1B Case: Culinary Arts

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
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Office of Administrative Appeals 
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 Washington, DC 20529-2090 
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File: WAC 08 144 53557 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: AP!? 0 8 2009 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimrnigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any fkther inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. 3 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. 5 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
John F. Grissom 
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 08 144 53557 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonirnmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner, a California corporation, filed this nonimmigrant visa petition seeking to employ the beneficiary in 
the position of "Chinese cook" as an L-1B intracompany transferee with specialized knowledge to open a new 
office in the United States pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 8 
U.S.C. 9 110l(a)(15)(L). The petitioner claims to be an affiliate of a Mexican restaurant business. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that the beneficiary has 
been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. Specifically, counsel argues that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge of preparing "Mexican style Chinese food." In support, counsel 
submits a brief and additional evidence pertaining to the beneficiary's claimed specialized knowledge. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifylng managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifylng organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
WAC 08 144 53557 
Page 3 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. $5 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (vi). 
Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
In an undated letter appended to the petition, the petitioner claims that the beneficiary will "apply his special 
cooking skills to establish and expand" the restaurant in the United States and that he was worked in Mexico as a 
chef since 1994. The initial petition is otherwise devoid of evidence addressing the beneficiary's duties abroad, 
his proposed duties in the United States, or his purported specialized knowledge. 
On April 30, 2008, the director requested additional evidence. The director requested, inter alia, additional 
evidence pertaining to the ownership and control of the foreign employer and the beneficiary's job duties.' 
In response, the petitioner submitted, inter alia, a document titled "business plan" in which the petitioner 
describes its proposed business as follows: 
[The petitioner], like the parent restaurant, presents a fusion of cuisines. It serves a range of food 
from several regions of China. In addition, we add touches of northern Mexican cuisine in 
various raw materials, sauces and dishes. This fusion of multiple regions and cultures carves out 
a niche for our product that is different from the normal "Chinese" restaurant. 
1 
 It is noted that the director also requested evidence pertaining to the new office's ability to support a 
managerial or executive position within one year. 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(3)(~). As the petitioner alleges in the 
petition that the beneficiary will open a new office in a specialized knowledge capacity (8 C.F.R. 3 
214.2(1)(3)(vi)), some of the requested evidence would not be pertinent to the instant petition. The director 
ultimately denied the petition because the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary has been or will be 
employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. Accordingly, as the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo basis, 
the AAO will review the entire record of proceeding, including additional evidence submitted on appeal, in 
determining whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or will be employed in a 
specialized knowledge capacity. See Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d 997, 1002 n. 9 (2d Cir. 1989). 
WAC 08 144 53557 
Page 4 
It is contended that the beneficiary's knowledge of the preparation of the petitioner's dishes is special or advanced. 
On August 4, 2008, the director denied the petition. The director concluded that the petitioner failed to 
establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has been or will be 
employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner has satisfied the criteria for establishing that the beneficiary has 
been and will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity. Specifically, counsel argues that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge of the preparation of "Mexican style Chinese food." Counsel submits 
as evidence a "certificate" from the China Association in Mexicali in which the author claims that "[wlith [the 
beneficiary's] unique secret formulated seasonings, [the beneficiary] invented spectacular Mexican style 
Chinese food." The author also claims that the beneficiary's dishes are "one of a kind." Counsel further 
claims that the beneficiary's cooking is "not common in Mexico or, certainly, in Southern California" and that 
the dishes do not amount to "minor variations" in recipes. Finally, counsel alleges that it would be difficult to 
impart this knowledge, which is used to develop new foods and new ingredient mixtures, to another 
individual because "the beneficiary's knowledge and skills developed over a long period in two countries." 
Counsel also submits evidence indicating that the beneficiary received cooking training in China and that his 
skill has been recognized abroad. 
Upon review, the petitioner's assertions are not persuasive in demonstrating that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity as defined 
at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D). 
The L-1B specialized knowledge classification requires U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to 
distinguish between those employees who possess specialized knowledge fiom those who do not possess such 
knowledge. Exactly where USCIS should draw that line is the question before the AAO. On one end of the 
spectrum, one may find an employee with the minimum one-year of experience but only the basic job-related 
skill or knowledge that was acquired through that employment. Such a person would not be deemed to possess 
specialized knowledge under section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act. On the other end of the spectrum, one may find an 
employee with ten years of experience and advanced training who developed a product or process that is narrowly 
understood by a few people within the company. That individual would clearly meet the statutory standard for 
specialized knowledge. In between these two extremes would fall, however, the whole range of experience and 
knowledge that may be found within a workplace. 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
WAC 08 144 53557 
Page 5 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. CJ: 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9,14-15 (D.D.C., 1990)~ 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) 
(citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an or- or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USCIS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster 3 New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
2 
 Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
WAC 08 144 53557 
Page 6 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,91" Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12,1969). 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-851 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-16; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd. v. INS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-1B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 5 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1 990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101 - 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codifjr the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
5 21 4.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1 988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L-1 visa classification. 
If any conclusion can be drawn from the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
214(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on 
a case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. CJ: Ponce-Leiva v. AshcroJt, 331 F.3d 
369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
WAC 08 144 53557 
Page 7 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS1s, burden to articulate 
and prove that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. § 11 84(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
$4 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed 
sufficient to establish specialized knowledge. At a minimum, the petitioner must articulate with specificity the 
nature of the claimed specialized knowledge. Merely asserting that the beneficiary possesses "special" or 
"advanced" knowledge will not suffice to meet the petitioner's burden of proof. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States or abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge. Although the petitioner repeatedly asserts that the beneficiary has been and will be 
employed in a "specialized knowledge" capacity, the petitioner has not adequately articulated any basis to 
support this claim. The petitioner has failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which 
would distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of other similarly experienced Chinese-style or Mexican- 
style restaurant cooks employed by the petitioning organization or in the industry at-large. Going on record 
without documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these 
proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of 
California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). Specifics are clearly an important indication of whether a 
beneficiary's duties involve specialized knowledge; otherwise, meeting the definitions would simply be a 
matter of reiterating the regulations. See Fedin Bros. Co., Ltd. v. Suva, 724, F. Supp. 1103 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), 
aff d, 905, F.2d 41 (2d. Cir. 1990). 
The petitioner asserts that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge of preparing one-of-a-kind 
"Mexican style Chinese food" by using "unique secret formulated seasonings" to develop new foods through 
new ingredient mixtures. The petitioner claims that this knowledge and skill developed over a long period 
of time through training and experience gained in Mexico and China. 
WAC 08 144 53557 
Page 8 
However, despite this claim, the record does not establish how, exactly, this knowledge materially differs 
from knowledge possessed by other workers employed by the petitioning organization or in the restaurant 
industry at-large. The record does not establish what qualities of these dishes are of such complexity that the 
impartation of this knowledge amounts to the acquisition of special or advanced knowledge. Importantly, the 
record is not persuasive in establishing why, exactly, any of the beneficiary's knowledge cannot be imparted 
to a similarly experienced cook in a relatively short period of time. The petitioner's unsubstantiated assertion 
that the beneficiary's knowledge of the fusion of Chinese and Mexican cuisines is unique or uncommon will 
not establish that this knowledge is truly special or advanced. Again, going on record without documentary 
evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of Soflci, 
22 I&N Dec. at 165 (citing Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190)). The petitioner does 
not articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is 
typically gained within the organization, or explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Accordingly, the record is not persuasive in establishing that the beneficiary will be a "key" employee having 
special or advanced knowledge of a company product, the application of this product, or a process or 
procedure of the petitioning organization. 
Overall, the record does not establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is substantially different from the 
knowledge possessed by restaurant cooks generally throughout the industry or by other employees of the 
petitioning organization. The fact that few other workers possess very specific knowledge of certain aspects 
of the petitioning organization's processes or products, e.g., the preparation and development of certain 
Mexican-Chinese fusion dishes, does not alone establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is indeed advanced 
or special. All employees can be said to possess uncommon and unparalleled skill sets to some degree; 
however, a skill set that can be easily imparted to another similarly educated and generally experienced 
restaurant cook is not "specialized knowledge." Moreover, the proprietary or unique qualities of the 
petitioner's dishes do not establish that any knowledge of these is "special" or "advanced." Rather, the 
petitioner must establish that qualities of the processes, procedures, and technologies require this employee to 
have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in this matter. The 
fact that other workers outside of the petitioning organization may not have very specific, proprietary 
knowledge regarding the petitioner's dishes is not relevant to these proceedings if this knowledge gap could 
be closed by the petitioner by simply revealing the information to a newly hired, generally experienced 
worker. 
The AAO does not discount the likelihood that the beneficiary is a skilled and experienced cook. There is no 
indication, however, that the beneficiary has any knowledge that exceeds that of any experienced Mexican or 
Chinese cook, or that he has received special training in the company's methodologies or processes which 
would separate him from any other worker employed within the petitioner's organization or in the industry at- 
large. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary's knowledge is any more advanced or 
special than the knowledge held by a skilled worker. See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Based on the evidence presented, the petitioner has not established that the beneficiary has specialized 
knowledge or that he was or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. For this reason, 
the appeal will be dismissed. 
WAC 08 144 53557 
Page 9 
Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner failed to establish that it and the foreign employer are 
qualifying organizations. 
The petitioner claims in the L Classification Supplement to Form 1-129 that the beneficiary is coming to the 
United States to open a "new office." If the petitioner indicates that the beneficiary is coming to the United 
States in a specialized knowledge capacity to open or be employed in a new office, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. 
4 214.2(1)(3)(vi) requires the petitioner to submit evidence that "[tlhe business entity in the United States is or 
will be a qualifying organization as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section" See also 8 C.F.R. 5 
214.2(1)(3)(i). Title 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(G) defines a "qualifying organization" as a firm, corporation, or 
other legal entity which "meets exactly one of the qualifymg relationships specified in the definitions of a parent, 
branch, affiliate or subsidiary specified in paragraph (l)(l)(ii) of this section" and "is or will be doing business." 
An "affiliate" is defined in part as "[olne of two subsidiaries both of which are owned and controlled by the same 
parent or individual." 8 C.F.R. 5 214.2(1)(1)(L)(I). 
In this matter, the petitioner claims that it and the foreign restaurant are owned and controlled by the same 
- 
individual, . Although the petitioner submitted organizational documents for the united States 
operation indicating that owns a majority of the issued stock, the record is devoid of evidence 
establishing that owns and The only 
evidence pertaining to the ownership and is an undated letter submitted in 
response to the Request for Evidence in which operate the restaurant as a sole 
proprietor. However, the petitioner did not submit any evidence corroborating this claim, even though 
evidence of ownership and control was requested by the director. Once again, going on record without 
documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting the burden of proof in these proceedings. 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190. If the required initial evidence is not submitted 
with the petition or does not demonstrate eligibility, USCIS may in its discretion deny the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 
103.2(b)(8)(ii). Failure to submit requested evidence that precludes a material line of inquiry shall be grounds 
for denying the petition. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.20>)(14). The non-existence or other unavailability of required 
evidence creates a presumption of ineligibility. 8 C.F.R. 5 103.20>)(2)(i). 
Furthermore, the record contains inconsistencies regarding the operation of the foreign employer, which 
undermines the credibility of the petition and the petitioner's claim that the is an ongoing, 
bona fide business concern. For example, the petitioner claims in its "business plan" that the "parent 
restaurant has been in operation for 3 years." However, the foreign employer's purported accountant indicates 
in a letter dated March 19,2008 that the beneficiary has worked for since 1994. Also, the 
statement from the China Association in Mexicali submitted on appeal indicates that the beneficiary has 
worked fosince 1995. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to resolve any inconsistencies 
in the record by independent objective evidence. Any attempt to explain or reconcile such inconsistencies 
will not suffice unless the petitioner submits competent objective evidence pointing to where the truth lies. 
Matter of Ho, 19 I&N Dec. 582, 591-92 (BL4 1988). Doubt cast on any aspect of the petitioner's proof may, 
of course, lead to a reevaluation of the reliability and sufficiency of the remaining evidence offered in support 
of the visa petition. Id. at 591. 
Accordingly, as the petitioner failed to establish that it has a qualifying relationship with the foreign 
employer, the petition may not be approved for this additional reason. 
' WAC 08 144 53557 
Page 10 
An application or petition that fails to comply with the technical requirements of the law may be denied by 
the AAO even if the Service Center does not identify all of the grounds for denial in the initial decision. See 
Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2001), afd, 345 F.3d 683 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also Dor v. INS, 891 F.2d at 1002 n. 9 (noting that the AAO reviews appeals on a de novo 
basis). 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. $ 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.