dismissed L-1B Case: Digital Film Technology

U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
identifying data deleted to U. S.CitizenshipandImmigrationServices
Office of AdministrativeAppeals, MS 2090
prevent clearly anwarranted Washington,DC 20529-2090
invasionof personalprivac) U.S.Citizenship
andImmigration
MMUC COPY services
7
File: Office:CALIFORNIASERVICECENTER Date: NOV 2 3 2010
IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:
Petition: Petitionfor aNonimmigrantWorkerPursuantto Section101(a)(15)(L)oftheImmigration
andNationalityAct, 8U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(15)(L)
ONBEHALFOFPETITIONER:
INSTRUCTIONS:
Enclosedpleasefind the decisionof the AdministrativeAppealsOffice in your case. All of the documents
relatedto this matterhavebeenreturnedto theoffice thatoriginally decidedyour case.Pleasebeadvisedthat
anyfurtherinquiry thatyoumight haveconcerningyour casemustbemadeto thatoffice.
If you believethe law wasinappropriatelyappliedby us in reachingour decision,or you haveadditional
information that you wish to haveconsidered,you may file a motion to reconsideror a motion to reopen. The
specific requirementsfor filing such a requestcan be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be
submittedto theoffice thatoriginally decidedyour caseby filing a FormI-290B,Noticeof Appealor Motion,
with a fee of $630. Pleasebe awarethat 8 C.F.R.§ 103.5(a)(1)(i)requiresthat anymotionmustbe filed
within 30daysof thedecisionthatthemotionseeksto reconsideror reopen.
Thankyou,
rry Rhew
Chief,AdministrativeAppealsOffice
www.uscis.gov
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DISCUSSION:TheDirector,CaliforniaServiceCenter,deniedthepetitionfor a nonimmigrantvisa.The
matterisnowbeforetheAdministrativeAppealsOffice(AAO)onappeal.TheAAOwill dismisstheappeal.
Thepetitioner,a Californiacorporation,filed this nonimmigrantvisa petitionto employthe beneficiaryin the
UnitedStatesasanintracompanytransfereewith specializedknowledgepursuantto section101(a)(15)(L)of the
Immi ationandNationali Act "theAct" 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(15)(L).Thepetitioneris a subsidiaryof
andboth entitiesareengagedin the development,saleand
supportof digitalfilm technologyforthemotionpictureindustry.Thepetitionerseekstoemploythebeneficiary
in thepositionof productspecialistfor aperiodof threeyears.
Thedirectordeniedthepetition,concludingthatthepetitionerfailedto establishthat the beneficiarypossesses
specializedknowledgeor that he has been and would be employedin a capacity requiring specialized
knowledge.
Thepetitionersubsequentlyfiled anappeal.Thedirectordeclinedto treattheappealasa motionandforwarded
theappealto theAAO. On appeal,counselassertsthatthedirectordisregardedthepetitioner'sevidence,took
thepetitioner'sstatementsoutof context,andapplieda highlyrestrictivestandardfor specializedknowledge.
Counselcontendsthatthecircumstancesof thiscase"fit squarelywithinwhatCongressintendedwhenit created
thespecializedknowledgecategory."Thepetitionersubmitsaletterin supportoftheappeal.
To establishL-1 eligibility undersection101(a)(15)(L)of the Act, the petitionermust demonstratethat the
beneficiary,within threeyearsprecedingthe beneficiary'sapplicationfor admissioninto the UnitedStates,has
beenemployedabroadin a qualifyingmanagerialor executivecapacity,or in a capacityinvolving specialized
knowledge,for onecontinuousyearby a qualifyingorganization.Thepetitionermustalsodemonstratethatthe
beneficiaryseeksto enterthe United Statestemporarilyin orderto continueto renderservicesto the same
employeror a subsidiaryor affiliate thereofin a capacitythat is managerial,executive,or involvesspecialized
knowledge.
I. TheLaw
Theregulationat 8 C.F.R.§214.2(1)(3)furtherstatesthatanindividualpetitionfiled on FormI-129shallbe
accompaniedby:
(i) Evidencethatthepetitionerandthe organizationwhich employedor will employthe
alienarequalifyingorganizationsasdefinedinparagraph(1)(1)(ii)(G)of thissection.
(ii) Evidencethat the alienwill be employedin an executive,managerial,or specialized
knowledgecapacity,includinga detaileddescriptionof theservicesto beperformed.
(iii) Evidencethat the alien has at least one continuousyear of full-time employment
abroadwith a qualifyingorganizationwithin the threeyearsprecedingthe filing of
thepetition.
(iv) Evidencethatthealien'sprior yearof employmentabroadwasin a positionthatwas
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managerial,executiveor involvedspecializedknowledgeandthatthe alien'sprior
education,training, and employmentqualifies him/her to perform the intended
servicesin theUnitedStates;however,theworkin theUnitedStatesneednotbethe
sameworkwhichthealienperformedabroad.
Undersection101(a)(15)(L)of the Act, an alien is eligible for classificationas a nonimmigrantif the alien,
amongotherthings,will berenderingservicesto thepetitioningemployer"in a capacitythatis managerial,
executive,or involvesspecializedknowledge." Section214(c)(2)(B)of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(B),
providesthestatutorydefinitionof specializedknowledge:
For purposesof section 101(a)(15)(L),an alien is consideredto be servingin a capacity
involvingspecializedknowledgewith respectto a companyif thealienhasa specialknowledge
of thecompanyproductanditsapplicationin internationalmarketsor hasanadvancedlevelof
knowledgeofprocessesandproceduresofthecompany.
Furthermore,theregulationat8C.F.R.§214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D)definesspecializedknowledgeas:
[S]pecialknowledgepossessedby an individual of the petitioning organization'sproduct,
service,research,equipment,techniques,managementor otherinterestsand its applicationin
internationalmarkets,or an advancedlevel of knowledgeor expertisein the organization's
processesandprocedures.
IL Discussion
The sole issueaddressedby the director is whetherthe petitionerestablishedthat the beneficiarypossesses
specializedknowledgeandthat he hasbeenandwill be employedin a capacityrequiringspecialized
knowledge.
Thepetitionerfiled theFormI-129,Petitionfor aNonimmigrantWorkeronDecember8,2009. In a letter
datedDecember3, 2009,the petitioner describedthe beneficiary's proposedduties asfollows:
As ProductSpecialistat [thepetitioner],[thebeneficiary]will beresponsiblefor utilizing his
specializedknowledge of [the petitioner's] proprietary Baselight systems,hardwareand
softwareto assistin the implementation,installation,supportandtraining of same.A native
of Spain,[thebeneficiary]will workfromhisLosAngeleshomebasein supportingSpanish
speaking clients in the United States, Latin and South America. Specifically, [the
beneficiary]will review appropriatehardwaresystemsto match new customerorders,
implementandtrain on new Baselightsystemsandperformpost-salessupportfor clients.
[The beneficiary]will alsobe responsiblefor troubleshooting,aswell asassistingwith the
integrationof Baselightwith third partyproductsandnetworks.
The petitionerstatedthat the beneficiaryhasbeenemployedby its parentcompany"in the specialized
knowledgepositionof ProductSpecialist"sinceApril 2008. Thepetitionerindicatedthat he "assists[the
foreignentity's]Europeanclientsin theimplementation,testing,trainingandmodificationsof theirBaselight
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systems,performingdemonstrationsat client sitesandthroughremoteaccess." The petitionerfurther
describedthebeneficiary'sbackgroundasfollows:
[Thebeneficiary]earneda Bachelorsdegreewith First ClassHonorsfrom the Ravensbourne
Collegeof DesignandCommunicationof theUniversity of Sincethenshe[sic] has
gainedmore than (2) years of professionaland specializedexperiencein the digital film
technologiesfield with [thepetitioningorganization]andits Baselightproducts.Throughhis
career in compositing technologiesand color correction for film, [the beneficiary] has
amasse credits for severalinternationalfilms including Coque (2009), Where
(2009), (2008),an 2007). His expertknowledgeandextensive
experienceabroad in the film technologiesfield, with [the petitioner's parent] and its
proprietary and unique technologiesare critical to his being chosento serveas Product
Specialistat [thepetitioningcompany].
With respectto the petitioningorganizationandits products,the petitionerstatedthat it "designs,develops
andmanufacturesintegratedsolutionsfor theDigital Intermediary(DI) processanddigital postproduction-
producingproductsand servicesthat fit the real needsof the motion picture profession." The petitioner
indicated that its products "are designedwith a deep knowledge and understandingof production
requirementsandarecreatedto fit into andcomplementexistingDI workflows."
The petitioneralso provided additional informationregardingthe DI post-productionprocessand how its
productswork within thatprocess,asfollows:
DI post productionis the processof shootingon film, scanningthe entire featureto film
quality datafiles, applyingthe creativeprocessandthen recordingthis datamasterbackto
film. This methodof intermediatepost productionprocessopenedup a completelynew
creativefield, and is now employedin virtually all TV programsand over three hundred
(300)featurefilmsthusfar. DI representsa completeshiftthatis comparableto thechange
from linear editing to non-linearsystemsa decadeago. In watchingthe developmentof DI
over the past several years, it has had a transformative impact on post-production,
revolutionizingtheway theentiremotionpicturebusinessis conducted.
The implementationof a complete digital workflow to createdigitally masteredmovies is
extremely challenging,becausethe specificationis working at the very edge of today's
technology.. . . [Thepetitioner's]DI postproductiontechnologiesaresettingthestandardsin
thefield. Onesuchtechnologyis [thepetitioner's]digital colorgradingtechnologyBaselight,
which was developedin houseby its team of technologyexperts. The highly advanced
Baselightsystemallowscolorcorrectionandfinishingin motionpicturefilms duringtheDI
post-productionprocess.As a result,Directorsof Photography(DPs)andcinematographers
can go inside a particularframe in the movie and isolatea particularwindow or face,
changingcolors in just that part of the frame. In fact, [the petitioner's]Baselightcolor-
gradingtechnologyhas beenusedon ma'or Holl wood motion ictures,including the
Academy-awardwinningdirector '. . . .
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In order for DPs and cinematographersto becomeinvolved in the digital post-production
processand utilize it more, digital grading must be in real time and interactive. [The
petitioner's]Baselight technologyusesimage processingsoftware running on a standard
computer platform, with collaborative processingto achieve the required speed and
throughput.In additionto its currentBaselightsystemsdevelopedin the UnitedKingdom,
[thepetitioner]is currentlycreatinga newcomputersystemfor theentirerangeof BaseLight
products,which will include eight dual-coreprocessors,increasingthe speedof all of its
systemsmultiple times. In addition, [the petitioner] is developinga new purposebuilt
computer platform system for the entire range of Baselight grading systems. The
implementationof theseextremelycomplexandadvancedDI post-productioncolor grading
technologiesrequirethe servicesof an individual who alreadypossesseshighly specialized
andcomplexknowledgeof [thepetitioner's]uniqueandproprietaryBaselighttechnologies.
The petitioner statedthat the beneficiary is "ideally suited to participatein the implementationof new
Baselighttechnologiesin the United States,as he currentlyperformsthesedutiesin connectionwith client
Baselightsystemsin theUnitedKingdom." Thepetitionerindicatedthat it considersBaselightto be"thekey
productto secure[thepetitioner's]staturein theHollywoodfilm industryasa leaderin DI post-production
technologies."
The petitioner'ssupportingevidenceincludedseveralpressreleasesregardingthe company'sproductsand
servicesfrom 2006,and additionalproductdatasheetsandproduct informationfrom the petitioner'spublic
website.
Thedirectorissueda requestfor additionalevidence("RFE") onDecember21,2009. Thedirectorrequested,
inter alia, the following: (1) a more detailed descriptionof the beneficiary'sduties abroad,including
timelinesfor training andexperience,aswell asa moredetaileddescriptionof the proposedpositionin the
United States;(2) informationregardinghow the beneficiary'straining, educationand employmentqualify
him for the intendedposition in the United States;(3) a more detailedexplanationof exactlywhat is the
equipment, system, product, technique, researchor service of which the beneficiary has specialized
knowledge,along with an explanationand documentationshowing the skills the beneficiary possesseswith
respectto the petitioner'sproducts;(4) anexplanationasto how the dutiesthe beneficiaryperformedabroad
and thosehe will perform in the United Statesdiffer from those performedby others employedby the
petitioneror by otheremployersin similar positions;(5) documentaryevidenceof the beneficiary'sadvanced
or specializedknowledgeor duties;(6) evidenceof specializedor advancedtraining that the beneficiaryhas
receivedandevidenceof anytraining thatthe beneficiarywill provideto otherworkersin the United States;
and (7) an explanationas to how the beneficiary'straining or experienceis uncommon,noteworthy,or
distinguishedby someunusualquality andnot generallyknownby practitionersin the beneficiary'sfield.
Finally,the directorrequestedorganizationalchartsfor the U.S.andforeignentities,informationregarding
thenumberof workerseachcompanyemploys,andinformationregardingthenumberof foreignworkersthe
petitioneremploys.
The petitioner'sresponseto the RFE includeda letter datedJanuary11,2010 fro the
foreign entity'sdirector. statedthat the beneficiaryhasbeenemployedby the foreign entity
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sinceFebruary2008asa productspecialist. letter includedthe following descriptionof the
beneficiary'sduties:
(1) ProductTraining(50%)
• CreatingBaselightsystemstrainingimplementationplans;
• Conductingtraining sessionsfor newandexistingclientstimelinesandschedules;
• Identifyingclient-specificchallengesandtrainingissues;
• Incorporatingproductupdatesintotrainingmaterials;and
• Following upwith client questionsandissuespresentedin trainings.
(2) Clientinstallationmanagement(20%)
• Understandingclient expectations,in orderto meettheirneeds;
• Reviewof existingclienttechnicalcapabilities,systemsanduserneeds;
• Coordinatingwith the onsite installationteamto addressclients' needson resourcingand
executionoftheprojects;and
• Performingproductinstallationfollowup.
(3) Productsupport(30%)
• Provideproductionsupportfor our uniqueBaselightfilm technologyproducts;
• Reviewingclientneedsto assurecompatibilitywith existingsystems;
• Creatingongoingclientrelationshipto assistwith futuresales;
• Resolutionandescalationof clientproblemareas;and
• Executionof backupandcontingencyplanswhenneeded.
furtherdescribedthebeneficiary'sclaimedspecializedknowledgeasfollows:
We operate in a unique niche and target our products to a very specific industry. In
performingthedutiesstatedabove,thebeneficiarydevelopedaveryuniquesetof specialized
skills which he putsto work on behalfof our clientele. He is beingchosento work in the
United Statesbaseduponhis experienceandtraining with our Baselightproducts,products
which aremanufacturedandmarketedexclusivelyby our company.
[The petitioner] manufactureshigh value systemsfor the post productionof featurefilms,
commercialsandtelevision[programs].Thesystemsaretechnicallycomplexandtypically
costaminimumof $300,000perunit.Theyareoperatedby creativepeoplewhorequireusto
provideextensivefield supportbefore,duringandlongafterthe installation. Thisrequires
individualswith in-depthknowledgeof the softwareas well as the customizedhardware
platformit runson.
As you canseetheproduct[thepetitioner]manufacturesandsellsis veryuniqueandhighly
technical,for useby the highly specializedfilm technologyprofessionalswho work for our
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client companies. Accordingly, we must have highly trained professionalslike [the
beneficiary]availableto assist,trainandprovideongoingsupportto ourclients.
With respectto the beneficiary'sspecific qualifications statedthat the beneficiary "has
spearheadedour efforts in businessdevelopmentin Mexico and Latin America," and noted that he
"understandsthe culturalandtechnologicalissuestypical of film andtelevisionproductioncompaniesin the
region."Thepetitionerfurtherstated:
His personalunderstandingof new,foreignandunfamiliarworkflows for creatingmovies
andvisual effectshelpsour internationalclientswith newtechniquesandcapabilities,which
helps our customersbe more competitivein an increasinglyinternationalmovie creation
market. Thisknowledge,which is heldby ourall of our [sic] employeesin atechnicalrole,is
recognizedby our clients. In addition,he has languageskills and knowledgeof Linux
operating systems. Much of [the beneficiary's] knowledge is based on his extensive
experiencewith our products and unique installation and support methodologies. It
accordinglysetshim apartassuchknowledgeis notcommonto othersin his field.
With almosttwo (2) yearsof employmentat [the petitioner'sparentcompany],[the
beneficiary]hasgaineda wide rangingin-depthknowledgeof our entireproductrange,all of
which is specializedandextraordinarilyunique. Trainedin our proprietaryLinux operating
systemandwith the knowledgeof how our customersusethe productsto createmoviesand
visual effects,hehasa uniqueanduncommonknowledgeof our systems.Becausewe area
smallto mediumsizecompany,we takeour time to hire the right peoplewho we feel fit the
company'sbackground,skill requirementsand havethe ability to learnour systems. [The
beneficiary]is suchanindividual.
Thepetitioneralsosubmitteda letterdatedJanuary11,2010,in which it provideda positiondescriptionfor
the proposedposition that is identical to that provided for the beneficiary'scurrentjob, as recitedabove.
Finally, the petitionersubmittedthe requestedorganizationalchartsfor the U.S. andforeignentities,and
indicated that the foreign entity has 56 employees,while the U.S. company has eight employees. According
to the charts,the foreign entity'ssupportteamincludessix systemssupportemployeesandfour application
supportemployees,of which the beneficiaryis one. The foreign entity also employs 12 software
developmentstaffandeighthardwaredevelopmentstaff. Thepetitioner'semployeesincludea president,two
salespersonnel,a worldwide supportmanager,two productspecialists,a seniorsoftwaredeveloperandan
office manager.
ThedirectordeniedthepetitiononJanuary27,2010,concludingthatthepetitionerfailedto establishthatthe
beneficiarypossessesspecializedknowledgeorthathehasbeenorwouldbeemployedin apositionthatrequires
specializedknowledge.In denyingthepetition,thedirectorfoundthatthebeneficiary'sdutieswouldnotrequire
"a specializedknowledgeof the petitioning company'sproduct,processesor proceduresthat significantly
surpassesthe ordinaryor usualknowledgeof the remainderof the petitioner'sworkforce." The director
highlightedthepetitioner'sstatementthatthe beneficiary'sknowledge"is heldby . . .all of our employeesin a
technicalrole."Thedirectornotedthata claimthatthebeneficiaryis uniqueamonga subsetof thepetitioner's
workforce,suchas, one of a few technicalresources,will not be persuasiveif the petitioner'sdefinition of
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specializedknowledgeis sobroadthatit includesthemajorityof itsworkforce.Thedirectoracknowledgedthe
petitioner'sclaimthat the beneficiary's knowledgeis basedon his "extensiveexperience"with the company's
products,butnotedthatmerefamiliaritywith anorganization'sproductor servicedoesnot constitutespecialized
knowledgeundersection214(c)(2)(B)of theAct. Thedirectorconcludedthatthepetitioner"hasnot furnished
evidencesufficientto demonstratethat the beneficiary'sdutiesinvolveknowledgeor expertisebeyondwhat is
commonlyheldin hisfield orwithin thepetitioner'sorganization."
Onappeal,thepetitionerassertsthat"thismatterfits squarelywithin whatCongressintendedwhenit createdthe
specializedknowledgecategory."Thepetitionercontendsthatthedirector'sdecision:"(1) ignoresa greatdealof
theevidenceprovidedin theinitial filing andtheresponseto requestfor evidence;(2)takesthelanguagefromour
initial filing andRFEresponseoutof context;and(3) is seekingto imposea standardfor specializedknowledge
whichis sohighlyrestrictive,it is practicallyimpossiblefor anyone,eventruespecialistslike [thebeneficiary],to
qualify."
Thepetitioneremphasizesthatit develops,manufacturesandsellsitsproductsto averynarrowtargetmarket,and
thattheproductsrequire"agreatdealof experienceandtrainingin orderto developexpertise."Thepetitioner
statesthatthebeneficiaryis "anapplicationsengineerwith verydetailedknowledgeof post-productionworkflow,
and also providesa direct link to the eamwho adaptthe productfor use by customersin the
Americas." In addition,thepetitionerindicatesthatthebeneficiary"uniquelycombinescompanyheadquarters
providedproducttrainingandspecializationwith Spanishnativelanguageskillssothathecanworkwith Spanish
speakingcustomersin theUnitedStatesandLatin Americaandfeedbacktheirrequirementsto his colleaguesin
theUSAandtheUK."
With respectto the beneficiary'sknowledgeof the petitioner's"highly specializedarray of technologically
complexproducts,"thepetitionerstates:
Theexpertknowledgeof thesesystemsis confinedto veryfew - it is unavailablein thegeneral
labormarket. Of ourown employeesin theUK andtheUSA, ONLY thosein a technicalrole,
meaningproduct specialists,engineersand their supervisors,have the requisitetechnical
knowledgein orderto understandandutilize theseproducts. Of our 56 employeesabroad,only
7 possessthis knowledge,andof our U.S.employees,only onepossessesthis specialized
knowledge,eventhoughotheremployeespossessamoregeneraltechnicalknowledgethatdoes
notapproachtherequiredspecificityneededto succeedintheProductSpecialistposition.
The petitionerallegesthat "USCISdid not take into accountthe highly uniquenarrowmarketnichethat this
productoccupies."Thepetitionerreiteratesthatfew of its employeesoccupywhatit considersto be "technical
roles,"andstatesthat,amongthe currentU.S.staff,only oneemployee,the petitioner'sworldwidesupport
manager,possessesthe specializedknowledgepossessedby the beneficiary. The petitionerassertsthatthe
beneficiary"is being chosento work in the United Statesbasedupon his experienceand training with our
Baselightproducts. . . for which he hasa specializedknowledgewhich exceedsthat of the overwhelming
majorityof ourtechnicalstaff."
Theonly additionalevidencesubmittedin supportof theappealis a slightlyrevisedorganizationalchartfor the
foreignentityonwhichthebeneficiaryis identifiedas"ApplicationSupportLatinAmerica"withina support
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departmentthatincludesa headof support,a headof applicationssupport,a headof systemsupport,a system
specialist,a Europeansupportposition,a systemsupportengineer,two applicationsupportengineers,a scanner
supportperson,andasupportcoordinator.
Upon review, and for the reasonsdiscussedbelow, the petitioner's assertionsare not persuasivein
demonstratingthatthe beneficiaryhasspecializedknowledgeor that he will be employedin a specialized
knowledgecapacityasdefinedat8C.F.R.§214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D).
StandardforSpecializedKnowledge
Lookingto thelanguageof thestatutorydefinition,CongresshasprovidedUSCISwith anambiguousdefinition
of specializedknowledge. In this regard,oneFederaldistrict court explainedthe infeasibilityof applyinga
bright-linetestto definewhatconstitutesspecializedknowledge:
This ambiguityis not merelytheresultof anunfortunatechoiceof dictionaries.It reflectsthe
relativisticnatureof the conceptspecial.An item is specialonly in the sensethat it is not
ordinary;to definespecialonemustfirst definewhat is ordinary.. . . Thereis no logical or
principledwayto determinewhichbaselineof ordinaryknowledgeis amoreappropriatereading
of the statute,andtherearecountlessotherbaselineswhich areequallyplausible. Simplyput,
specializedknowledgeis a relativeand emptyideawhich cannothavea plain meaning.Cf
Westen,TheEmptyIdeaofEquality,95Harv.L.Rev.537(1982).
1756,Inc.v.AttorneyGeneral,745F.Supp.9,14-15(D.D.C.,1990).1
While Congressdid not provideexplicitguidancefor whatshouldbe consideredordinaryknowledge,the
principlesof statutoryinterpretationprovide someclue as to the intendedscopeof the L-1B specialized
knowledgecategory.NLRBv. UnitedFood& CommercialWorkersUnion,Local23,484U.S.112,123(1987)
(citingINSv.Cardoza-Fonseca,480U.S.421,107S.Ct.1207,94L.Ed.2d434(1987)).
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and
"advanced."Like thecourts,theAAO customarilyturnsto dictionariesfor helpin determiningwhetherawordin
astatutehasaplainor commonmeaning.See,e.g.,In reA.H RobinsCo.,109F.3d965,967-68(4thCir. 1997)
(usingWebster'sDictionary for "therefore").Accordingto Webster'sNewCollegeDictionary,theword "special"
is commonlyfoundto mean"surpassingtheusual"or "exceptional." Webster'sNewCollegeDictionary, 1084
(3rdEd.2008).Thedictionarydefinestheword"advanced"as"highlydevelopedor complex"or "ata higher
levelthanothers."Id. at 17.
Second,lookingattheterm'splacementwithin thetext of section101(a)(15)(L)of theAct, theAAO notesthat
specializedknowledgeis usedto describethenatureof a person'semploymentandthatthetermis listedamong
1 Although1756,Inc. v. AttorneyGeneralwasdecidedprior to enactmentof the statutorydefinitionof
specializedknowledgebytheImmigrationAct of 1990,thecourt'sdiscussionof theambiguityin thelegacy
ImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS) definition is equallyilluminatingwhenappliedto thedefinition
createdbyCongress.
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thehigherlevelsof theemploymenthierarchytogetherwith "managerial"and "executive"employees.Basedon
thecontextof thetermwithin thestatute,theAAO thereforewouldexpecta specializedknowledgeemployeeto
occupyan elevatedpositionwithin a companythat risesabovethat of an ordinaryor averageemployee.See
1756,Inc.v.AttorneyGeneral,745F.Supp.at 14.
Third, a review of the legislativehistory for both the original 1970statuteandthe subsequent1990statute
indicatesthat Congressintendedfor USCISto closelyadministerthe L-1B category. Specifically,the original
draftersof section101(a)(15)(L)of theAct intendedthatthe classof personseligiblefor the L-1 classification
wouldbe"narrowlydrawn"and"carefullyregulatedandmonitored"byUSCIS.SeegenerallyH.R.Rep.No.91-
851(1970),reprintedin 1970U.S.C.C.A.N.2750,2754,1970WL 5815.Thelegislativehistoryof the 1970Act
plainlystatesthat"thenumberof temporaryadmissionsundertheproposed'L' categorywill notbelarge."Id. In
addition,the Congressionalrecordspecificallystatesthat the L-1 categorywas intendedfor "key personnel."
Seegenerally,id. The term "key personnel"denotesa position within the petitioningcompanythat is "[o]f
crucial importance."Webster'sNew CollegeDictionary 620 (3'ded., HoughtonMifflin HarcourtPublishing
Co. 2008). Moreover,duringthe courseof the sub-committeehearingson thebill, the Chairmanspecifically
questionedwitnesseson the level of skill necessaryto qualify underthe proposed"L" category. In response
to the Chairman'squestions,variouswitnessesrespondedthat they understoodthe legislationwould allow
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower
categories"of workersor "skilled craft workers."SeeH.R. Subcomm.No. 1of theJud.Comm.,Immigration
Act of 1970:HearingsonH.R.445,91®'Cong.210,218,223,240,248(Nov.12,1969).
Neitherin 1970nor in 1990did Congressprovidea controlling,unambiguousdefinitionof "specialized
knowledge,"anda narrowinterpretationis consistentwith somuchof the legislativeintentasit is possibleto
determine.H.Rep.No.91-851at6,1970U.S.C.C.A.N.at2754.Thisinterpretationisconsistentwithlegislative
history,whichhasbeenlargelysupportiveof anarrowreadingof thedefinitionof specializedknowledgeandthe
L-1 visa classificationin general. See1756,Inc. v. AttorneyGeneral,745 F.Supp.at 15-16;Boi Na Braza
Atlanta,LLC v. Upchurch,Not Reportedin F.Supp.2d,2005WL 2372846at *4 (N.D.Tex.,2005),affd 194
Fed.Appx.248(5thCir. 2006);Fibermaster,Ltd.v. IN.S., Not Reportedin F.Supp.,1990WL 99327(D.D.C.,
1990);DeltaAirlines,Inc. v. Dept.of Justice,Civ. Action00-2977-LFO(D.D.C.April 6, 2001)(onfile with
AAO).
Further, althoughthe Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutorydefinition of the term "specialized
knowledge"in section214(c)(2)of theAct, thedefinitiondid not generallyexpandtheclassof personseligible
for L-1Bspecializedknowledgevisas.Pub.L.No. 101-649,§206(b)(2),104Stat.4978,5023(1990).Instead,
the legislativehistoryindicatesthat Congresscreatedthe statutorydefinition of specializedknowledgefor the
expresspurposeof clarifyinga previouslyundefinedterm from the ImmigrationAct of 1970. H.R. Rep.101-
723(I)(1990),reprintedin 1990U.S.C.C.A.N.6710,6749,1990WL 200418("OneareawithintheL visathat
requiresmorespecificityrelatesto the term 'specializedknowledge.'Varyinginterpretationsby INS have
exacerbatedthe problem."). While the 1990Act declinedto codify the "proprietaryknowledge"and "United
Stateslabor market" referencesthat had existedin the previousagencydefinition found at 8 C.F.R.
§214.2(l)(1)(ii)(D)(1988),thereisnoindicationthatCongressintendedto liberalizeitsown1970definitionof
theL-1 visaclassification.
If anyconclusioncanbedrawnfromtheenactmentofthestatutorydefinitionof specializedknowledgein section
214(c)(2)(B),it wouldbebasedonthenatureof theCongressionalclarificationitself. By notincludinganystrict
criterionin theultimatestatutorydefinitionandfurtheremphasizingtherelativisticaspectof "specialknowledge,"
Congresscreateda standardthatrequiresUSCISto makeafactualdeterminationthatcanonlybedeterminedona
case-by-casebasis,basedontheagency'sexpertiseanddiscretion.Ratherthana bright-linestandardthatwould
supporta morerigid applicationof the law, Congressgavethe INS a moreflexiblestandardthatrequiresan
adjudicationbasedonthefactsandcircumstancesof eachindividualcase.Cf Ponce-Leivav.Ashcroft,331F.3d
369,377(3dCir.2003)(quotingBairesv.INS,856F.2d89,91(9thCir.1988)).
To determinewhat is specialor advanced,USCISmustfirst determinethe baselineof ordinary. As a
baseline,the terms"special"or "advanced"mustmeanmorethan simply "skilled" or "experienced."By
itself, work experienceandknowledgeof a firm's technicallycomplexproductswill not equal"special
knowledge."SeeMatter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general,all employeescan
reasonablybe considered"important"to a petitioner'senterprise. If an employeedid not contributeto the
overalleconomicsuccessof anenterprise,therewould beno rationaleconomicreasonto employthat person.
An employeeof "crucial importance"or "key personnel"mustriseabovethe level of the petitioner'saverage
employee.In otherwords,specializedknowledgegenerallyrequiresmorethana shortperiodof experience;
otherwise special or advancedknowledge would include every employeein an organizationwith the
exceptionof traineesandentry-levelstaff. If everyonein an organizationis specialized,thenno onecanbe
consideredtruly specialized. Suchan interpretationstripsthe statutorylanguageof any efficacy andcannot
havebeenwhatCongressintended.
Consideringthe definition of specializedknowledge,it is the petitioner's,not USCIS's,burdento articulate
and establishby a preponderanceof the evidencethat the beneficiarypossesses"special" or "advanced"
knowledge.Section214(c)(2)(B)of the Act, 8 U.S.C.§ ll84(c)(2)(B). USCIScannotmakea factual
determinationregardingthe beneficiary'sspecializedknowledgeif the petitionerdoesnot, at a minimum,
articulatewith specificitythenatureof theclaimedspecializedknowledge,describehowsuchknowledgeis
typicallygainedwithintheorganization,andexplainhowandwhenthebeneficiarygainedsuchknowledge.
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of
evidencewhich establisheswhether or not the beneficiary actually possessesspecializedknowledge. A
petitioner'sassertionthatthebeneficiarypossessesadvancedknowledgeof theprocessesandproceduresof
the company must be supportedby evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the
elementaryor basic knowledgepossessedby others. Because"special" and "advanced"are comparative
terms, the petitioner should provide evidencethat allows USCIS to assessthe beneficiary's knowledge
relativeto othersin the petitioner'sworkforce or relativeto similarly employedworkers in the petitioner's
specificindustry.
Analysis
Turning to the questionof whetherthe petitionerestablishedthat the beneficiarypossessesspecialized
knowledgeandwill beemployedin acapacityrequiringspecializedknowledge,uponreview,thepetitioner
hasnot demonstratedthat this employeepossessesknowledgethat may be deemed"special"or "advanced"
under the statutorydefinition at section214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, or that the petitioner will employ the
Page12
beneficiaryin acapacityrequiringspecializedknowledge.Thedecisionof thedirectorwill beaffirmedasit
relatesto this issueandtheappealwill bedismissed.
In examiningthe specializedknowledgeof the beneficiary,theAAO will look to thepetitioner'sdescriptionof
thejob dutiesandthe weightof the evidencesupportingany assertedspecializedknowledge.See8C.F.R.
§214.2(l)(3)(ii).Thepetitionermustsubmitadetailedjob descriptionoftheservicestobeperformedsufficientto
establishspecializedknowledge.Id.
Thepetitioner'sinitialdescriptionof thebeneficiary'scurrentandproposedjob dutieswasvagueandcouldhave
describedthedutiesof anyproductsupportspecialist. Specifically,thepetitionerindicatedthatthebeneficiary
hasbeenandwill be usinghis knowledgeof the petitioner'ssoftware,hardwareand applicationsto assistin
installing,supportingandprovidingtrainingin thepetitioner'sproduct. Thepetitionerexplainedthat it designs,
manufactures,sells and supportsproprietaryindustry-leadingproductsin the digital post-productionfield;
however,thepetitionerfailed to identify what specificallyconstitutesthe beneficiary'sspecializedknowledge,
howhegainedsuchknowledge,andhowtheknowledgeistypicallygainedwithin theorganization.
Therefore,the directorissuedan extremelydetailedrequestfor evidenceand instructedthe petitionerto
"specificallyidentifyanddocument"theskillsthebeneficiarypossesseswith respectto thepetitioner'sproducts.
The petitionersubsequentlyprovideda lengthierdescriptionof specifictasksassociatedwith the beneficiary's
training,installationandsupportresponsibilities,but failedto providethe type of technicaldetailsthat would
supportthepetitioner'sclaimthatthis individualbeneficiary'sknowledgeis bothspecializedwithin the industry
andadvancedwithin thepetitioner'sorganization.Goingon recordwithout supportingdocumentaryevidence
is not sufficientfor purposesof meetingthe burdenof proof in theseproceedings.Matter ofSoffici, 22 I&N
Dec.158,165(Comm.1998)(citingMatterof TreasureCraftof Cahfornia,14I&N Dec.190(Reg.Comm.
1972)). Rather,thepetitioner'sspecializedknowledgeclaimswerelargelybasedonthefactthatits productsare
proprietary,highlytechnical,expensive,andmarketedto anichesegmentof themotionpictureindustry.
While the current statutory and regulatory definitions of "specialized knowledge" do not include a
requirementthatthe beneficiary'sknowledgebeproprietary,the petitionercannotsatisfythecurrentstandard
merely by claiming that the beneficiary'spurportedspecializedknowledgeis proprietary.The knowledge
must still be either "special" or "advanced."As discussedabove,the elimination of the bright-line
"proprietary"standarddidnot,in fact,significantlyliberalizethestandardsfor theL-1B visaclassification.
Furthermore,the fact that the beneficiarysells its productswithin a niche industry doesnot necessarily
establishthatanyknowledgeof suchproductsmustbespecialized.Giventhepetitioner'sclaimsthatvirtually
everytelevision show and hundredsof moviesare createdusing the DI processfor which the petitioner's
productsaredesigned,theAAO finds it reasonableto assumethatthereareother,similarcolorgradingand
managementproductsavailableto post-productionstudios. Therefore,whiletheAAO acknowledgesthatthe
petitioner'sfield of expertiseis muchnarrowerthangeneral"softwareengineering,"thefactthatthecompany's
servicesarehighlyspecializedortargetedatacertainindustry,withoutmore,is insufficientto establishthatany
individualemployeewithin thecompanypossessesor is requiredto utilize specializedknowledge.
On appeal,the petitionerassertsthat the beneficiary'sspecializedknowledgeis basednot only on his
experiencewith thepetitioner'sproducts,buthislanguageskills,his"knowledgeof Linux operatingsystems,"
Page13
andhis experiencewith thepetitioner's"uniqueinstallationandsupportmethodologies."TheAAO notesthat
neitherthe Spanishlanguagenor Linux is specificto thepetitioningorganizationandthusthepetitionerhas
notestablishedhowknowledgeof eitherconstitutesspecializedknowledge.With respectto thepetitioner's
"uniqueinstallationand supportmethodologies,"the AAO notesthat suchmethodologieswere never
mentioned,muchlessdocumentedin the initial petitionfiling or in responseto therequestfor evidence.The
petitionerhad ampleopportunityto identify and documentthe beneficiary'sspecializedknowledgeprior to
the denial of the petition. Furthermore,other than a fleeting referenceto these "methodologies"in the
appellatebrief, therecordremainsdevoidof anyevidenceor explanationto establishhow knowledgeof such
methodologieswould riseto the level of specializedknowledgewithin thecompany.Again, goingon record
without supportingdocumentaryevidenceis not sufficient for purposesof meetingthe burdenof proof in
theseproceedings.Matter of Soffici,22 I&N Dec. at 165(citing Matter of TreasureCraft of California, 14
I&N Dec.190(Reg.Comm.1972)).
Reviewing the precedentdecisionsthat precededthe Immigration Act of 1990,there are a number of
conclusionsthatwerenotbasedonthesupersededregulatorydefinition,andthereforecontinueto applyto the
adjudicationof L-1B specializedknowledgepetitions.In 1981,the INS recognizedthat "[t]he modern
workplacerequiresahighproportionof techniciansandspecialists."Theagencyconcludedthat:
Mostemployeestodayarespecialistsandhavebeentrainedandgivenspecializedknowledge.
However,in view of the [legislativehistory], it cannot beconcludedthat all employeeswith
specializedknowledgeor performinghighly technicaldutiesareeligible for classificationas
intracompanytransferees.The HouseReportindicatesthe employeemustbe a "key" person
andassociatesthis employeewith "managerialpersonnel."
Matter of Colley,18I&N Dec.at 119-20.
In a subsequentdecision,theINS lookedto thelegislativehistoryof the 1970Act andconcludedthata "broad
definitionwhichwouldincludeskilledworkersandtechnicianswasnotdiscussed,thusthelimitedlegislative
historyavailablethereforeindicatesthat anexpansivereadingof the 'specializedknowledge'provisionis not
warranted." Matter ofPenner, 18I&N Dec. at 51. The decisioncontinued:
[I]n view of the HouseReport,it cannotbe concludedthat all employeeswith any level of
specializedknowledgeor performinghighly technicaldutiesareeligible for classificationas
intra-companytransferees.Such a conclusionwould permit extremely large numbersof
personsto qualify for the "L-1" visa. The HouseReport indicatesthat the employeemustbe
a "key" personand"thenumberswill notbelarge."
Id. at53.
According to the reasoningof Matter of Penner,work experienceand knowledgeof a firm's technically
complexproducts,by itself,will notequal"specialknowledge."USCISmustinterpretspecializedknowledge
to requiremorethan fundamentaljob skills or a shortperiod of experience.An expansiveinterpretationof
specializedknowledgein which any experiencedemployeewould qualify as havingspecialor advanced
knowledgewould beuntenable,sinceit would allow a petitionerto transferanyexperiencedemployeeto the
Page14
UnitedStatesin theL-1B classification.
Theproprietaryspecializedknowledgein this matteris statedto includethe petitioner'sproprietaryBaselight
product and related componentsof its digital film product line. The petitionerattributesthe beneficiary's
specializedknowledgeof thisproductto his20 monthsof experienceandtrainingwith theforeignentity,and
statesthat suchknowledgecan only be gainedthroughsuch"considerable"experienceandtraining. The
petitioneralsoreferstothebeneficiary'scareerin "compositingtechnologiesandcolorcorrectionfor film" among
hisqualifications,butprovidesnoadditionaldetailsregardinghispriorexperienceanditsrelevancetohiscurrent
work.
Thepetitionerhasmadeseveralreferencesto thebeneficiary'scompany-providedtrainingreceivedduringhis
employmentwith theforeignentity. TheRFEissuedonDecember21,2009advisedthepetitionerthatit should
provideatimelineforthetrainingandexperiencethebeneficiarygainedduringhisemploymentwiththeforeign
entity, provide evidenceof specialor advancedtraining the beneficiaryhas received,and explainhow the
beneficiary'strainingorexperienceisuncommonorunusualcomparedto othersemployedbythepetitionerorin
thefield of endeavor.Whilethepetitionerreferredgenerallyto thebeneficiary'strainingin responseto theRFE,
it failedto specificallyaddressanyof theserequests.Any failure to submitrequestedevidencethat precludesa
materialline of inquiry shallbegroundsfor denyingthepetition.8 C.F.R.§ 103.2(b)(14).
As such,the petitionerhasnot specifiedthe amountor type of training its productspecialistsreceivein the
company'sproductsor processesand thereforeit cannotbe concludedthat the technologyis significantly
different comparedto that developedby othercompaniesin the industry,or that it would take a significant
amountof timeto trainanexperiencedsystemsor applicationsspecialistin thedigital cinemafield who had
no prior experiencewith thepetitioner'sorganization.Further,thepetitionerhasneitheridentifiedwith any
specificitynor documentedanytraining receivedby the beneficiarysincejoining the foreign entity, nor has
the petitionerarticulatedor documentedhow specializedknowledgeis typically gainedwithin the
organization,or explainedhowandwhenthebeneficiarygainedsuchknowledge.
Thepetitionerofferedlittle informationspecificto thebeneficiaryandhis backgroundotherthanprovidinghis
job description,confirming that he hadbeenemployedby the petitioner for approximately20 months,and stating
that he has a Bachelorsdegree,and a "careerin compositing technologiesand color correction for film." The
petitionerhassubmittedmultiplepressreleasesfrom2006establishingthatthepetitioner'sproductsweremaking
an impactin the industrysignificantlybeforethebeneficiaryjoined the foreignentity asa productspecialistin
April 2008.If hedid in facthavea careerasacoloristin thefilm industry,it is quitepossiblethathewasalready
trainedin theuseof Baselightproductspriortojoining theforeignentity.2 Furthermore,thepetitionerindicates
thatthebeneficiaryhasbeenperformingthedutiesof aproductspecialistsincehewashired,thussuggestingthat
apersonwith relevantindustryexperiencecouldstepintotherolewithouttheneedfor completionof atraining
program.Overall,theminimalevidenceis insufficientto establishthatthepetitioner'semployeesin general,
2TheAAO notesthatthe"ServiceandSupport"sectionof thepetitioner'spublicwebsiteincludesaregister
of morethan40 freelancecoloristswith considerableBaselightexperience.See"ServicesandSupport
FreelanceRegister,http://www.filmlight.ltd.uk/servicessupport/freelanceregister(accessedon November
19,2010),copyincorporatedinto recordof proceeding.
Page15
or the beneficiary in particular, have beenrequiredto undergoany extensivetraining in the company's
productsandsystems.
All employeescanbesaidto possessuniqueskill or experienceto somedegree.Moreover,theproprietary
qualities of the petitioner'sprocessor product do not establishthat any knowledge of this processis
"specialized."Rather,thepetitionermustestablishthat qualitiesof theuniqueprocessor productrequirethis
employeeto have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry, and knowledge that is not
commonplacewithin thecompanyitself. Thishasnotbeenestablishedin this matter.
It is appropriatefor USCIS to look beyond the statedjob duties and considerthe importanceof the
beneficiary'sknowledgeof the business'sproductor service,managementoperations,or decision-making
process.Matter of Colley, 18I&N Dec. at 120(citing Matter of Raulin, 13I&N Dec. at 618 andMatter of
LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. at 816). As statedby the Commissionerin Matter of Penner,when considering
whetherthe beneficiariespossessedspecializedknowledge,"the LeBlancandRaulin decisionsdid not find
thatthe occupationsinherentlyqualifiedthe beneficiariesfor the classificationssought."18I&N Dec.at 52.
Rather,thebeneficiarieswereconsideredto haveunusualduties,skills, or knowledgebeyondthat of a skilled
worker.Id.
TheAAO acknowledgesthatthe specializedknowledgeneednot benarrowlyheldwithin the organizationin
orderto beconsidered"advanced." However,it is equallytrueto statethatknowledgewill not beconsidered
"special"or "advanced"if it is universallyor evenwidely held throughouta company. If all similarly
employedworkers within the petitioner's organizationreceive essentiallythe sametraining, then mere
possessionof knowledgeof the petitioner's processesand methodologiesdoes not rise to the level of
specializedknowledge. The L-1B visa categorywas not createdin orderto allow the transferof all
employeeswith anydegreeof knowledgeof a company'sproducts. If all employeesaredeemedto possess
"special"or "advanced"knowledge,thenthatknowledgewould necessarilybeordinaryandcommonplace.
Further,while theAAO acknowledgesthattherewill beexceptionsbasedonthefactsof individual cases,an
argumentthatanalienis uniqueamonga smallsubsetof workerswill not bedeemedfacially persuasiveif the
majorityof thepetitioner'sworkforcewouldfall withinthepetitioner'sdefinitionof "specializedknowledge"
workers.
Thepetitionerhasnotsuccessfullydemonstratedthatthebeneficiary'sknowledgeof thecompany'sproducts
gainedduring his employmentwith the foreign entity is advancedcomparedto other similarly employed
workerswithin the organization.As notedby the director,the petitionerstatedin its letterdatedJanuary11,
2010that all of its employeeswho servein "technicalroles" havea similar understandingof the petitioner's
productsand their applicationsin the film industry. On appeal,the petitioner statesthat "of our own
employeesin the UK andthe USA, ONLY thosein a technicalrole, meaningproductspecialists,engineers
and their supervisors,have the requisitetechnicalknowledgein order to understandand utilize these
products."Thepetitionergoeson to statethat of theseemployees,only sevenemployeesin the United
Kingdom and one in the United Statespossessthis "specializedknowledge"while the other employees
possess"a more generaltechnicalknowledgethat doesnot approachthe requiredspecificity neededin the
ProductSpecialistposition." Thus,the petitionerstatesthat the statementwastakenout of contextby the
director.
Page16
It appearsthatthe petitioneris claimingon appealthat a productspecialistwith 20 monthsof company
experiencewho installs and supportsproductsand trains clients, possessesspecializedor advanced
knowledgecomparedto the remainderof the petitioner'sstaff, which includes,for example,softwareand
hardwaredevelopmentengineers,industrialandmechanicaldesigners,anda physicist,who actuallydesigned,
developedandengineeredthe productsover the years. Basedon the petitioner'sstatementson appeal,only
the former employeewould be consideredto be employedin a "technicalrole" requiringspecialized
knowledge. Furthermore,thereappearsto be a furtherdivision of knowledgeamongthe petitioner'sproduct
specialists.For example,althoughtwo of thepetitioningcompany'sU.S. workerssharethe beneficiary'sjob
title of "productspecialist,"the petitionerclaimsthat only the "worldwide supportmanager,"amongtheU.S.
staff,possessesspecializedknowledge.Absentsomeadditionalexplanationor rationalefromthepetitioner
it is entirely unclearwhy an employeewho installs and supportsthe petitioner'sproductsfor clients is
employedin a "specialized"technicalrole while theengineerwho designedtheproductis not, andwhy some
productspecialistspossessspecializedknowledgeandothersdo not. Rather,it is reasonableto concludethat
all of theseemployeesarein facttechnicalemployeesandthattheyareknowledgeablewith respectto the
petitioner'sproductsandtheir applicationsin theindustry.
ThepetitioneremphasizesonappealthattheU.S.companycurrentlyemploysonly onepersonwho possesses
thesamespecializedknowledgeasthebeneficiary.However,thefactthatthebeneficiarywouldbeoneof
onlytwo "specialized"employeesintheUnitedStatesisnotsufficientto establishthathisknowledgeistruly
specializedor advanced.The petitionerindicatesthat it specificallyrequiresthe servicesof a Spanish-
speakingproductspecialistto supportLatin andSouthAmericanclients. Thereis no otherexplanationasto
why the beneficiarywaschosenfor the U.S-basedpositionover otherworkerswho areclaimedto havethe
sametypeof experienceandtheAAO cannotconcludethat it wasbecauseheis deemedto haveanadvanced
knowledgeof the company'sproductsor processes. All of the foreign entity'stechnicalemployeeswould
reasonablyhaveknowledgeof the company'sdigital post-productionproducts.By this logic, any of them
would qualify for L-1B classificationif offereda positionworking in the United Statesaslong astheywere
working for theforeignentityfor overoneyear.
Accordingto thereasoningof MatterofPenner,work experienceandknowledgeof a firm'stechnicallycomplex
products,by itself will not equal "specialknowledge."3 An expansiveinterpretationof specializedknowledgein
which anyexperiencedemployeewould qualify ashavingspecialor advancedknowledgewould beuntenable,
sinceit wouldallow apetitionerto transferanyexperiencedemployeeto theUnitedStatesin L-1B classification.
The term "special"or "advanced"must meanmore than experiencedor skilled. In other terms,specialized
3As observedabove,theAAO notesthattheprecedentdecisionsthatpredatethe 1990Act arenotcategorically
supersededbythestatutorydefinitionof specializedknowledge,andthegeneralissuesandcasefactsthemselves
remaincogentasexamplesof howtheINSappliedthelawto therealworldfactsof individualadjudications.
USCIS must distinguishbetweenskilled workers and specializedknowledgeworkers when making a
determinationon an L-1B visa petition.The distinctionbetweenskilledandspecializedworkershasbeena
recurringissuein theL-1B programandis discussedatlengthin theINSprecedentdecisions,includingMatterof
Penner.See18I&N Dec.at 50-53.(discussingthelegislativehistoryandprior precedentsastheyrelateto the
distinctionbetweenskilledandspecializedknowledgeworkers).
Page17
knowledgerequiresmorethanashortperiodof experience,otherwise,"special"or "advanced"knowledgewould
includeeveryemployeewiththeexceptionoftraineesandrecentrecruits.
Thepetitionerhasnotsuccessfullydemonstratedthatthebeneficiary'sknowledgeof thecompany'sproducts
gainedduringhis employmentwith the foreignentityis advancedcomparedto othersimilarlyemployed
workerswithin theorganization.TheAAO doesnotdisputethepossibilitythatthebeneficiaryis a skilled
and experiencedemployeewho hasbeen,and would be, a valuableassetto the petitioner. However,the
petitioner has not establishedthat familiarity with its proprietary products alone constitutesspecialized
knowledge,andhasfailedto demonstratethatthebeneficiary'straining,work experience,or knowledgeof the
company'sproductsis moreadvancedthantheknowledgepossessedby othersemployedby thepetitioner,or
thattheproductsdevelopedby thepetitioneraresubstantiallydifferentfrom thoseusedby othercompaniesin
thepetitioner'sindustry.As thepetitionerhasfailedto documentanyspecialor advancedqualitiesattributable
to the beneficiary'sknowledge,the petitioner'sclaimsarenot persuasivein establishingthat the beneficiary,
whileperhapshighlyskilled,wouldbea"specializedknowledge"employee.
The legislative history for the term "specializedknowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive
interpretationof the term. In the presentmatter,the petitionerhas not demonstratedthat the beneficiary
should be considereda member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessingspecialized
knowledge. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. The record does not establishthat the
beneficiaryhas specializedknowledgeor that the position offered with the United Statesentity requires
specializedknowledge.
In visapetitionproceedings,theburdenof provingeligibility for thebenefitsoughtremainsentirelywith the
petitioner.Section291of theAct, 8 U.S.C.§ 1361.Here,thatburdenhasnotbeenmet. Accordingly,the
appealwill bedismissed.
ORDER: Theappealis dismissed.