dismissed L-1B Case: Electronics Manufacturing

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
identifying data deleted to 
prevent clearly ~nwarranted 
invasion of personal privacj 
PUBLIC copy 
OSfice of~dministrative ~Geals, MS 2090 
Washington, DC 20529-2090 
U. S. Citizenship 
and Immigration 
File: WAC 08 159 52513 Office: CALIFORNIA SERVICE CENTER Date: JAN 0 7 2010 
Petition: 
 Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker Pursuant to Section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 101(a)(15)(L) 
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: 
This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to 
the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office. 
If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or you have additional information that you wish to have 
considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. Please refer to 8 C.F.R. $ 103.5 for 
the specific requirements. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by 
filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of $585. Any motion must be filed within 30 
days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(i). 
erry Rhew 
hief, Administrative Appeals Office 
WAC 08 159 525 13 
Page 2 
DISCUSSION: The Director, California Service Center, denied the petition for a nonimmigrant visa. The 
matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") on appeal. The AAO will dismiss the 
appeal. 
The petitioner filed this nonimmigrant visa petition to employ the beneficiary an L-1B intracompany transferee 
with specialized knowledge pursuant to section 10 1 (a)(15)(L) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("the Act"), 
8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(L). The petitioner, an electronics manufacturer, is an affiliate of the beneficiary's foreign 
employer, located in Thailand. The petitioner seeks to employ the beneficiary in the position of Electronics Test 
Technician for a period of three years. 
The director denied the petition, concluding that the petitioner failed to establish that the beneficiary possesses 
specialized knowledge or that he has been or will be employed in a capacity involving specialized knowledge. 
In denying the petition, the director observed that the record consisted primarily of the unsupported assertions 
of the petitioner, and that such assertions were insufficient to establish the beneficiary's eligibility. The 
director found that the petitioner failed to identify any special or advanced body of knowledge which would 
distinguish the beneficiary's role from any other similarly experienced and educated electronics test technician 
within the petitioner's organization or within the electronics manufacturing industry. 
The petitioner subsequently filed an appeal. The director declined to treat the appeal as a motion and 
forwarded the appeal to the AAO. On appeal, counsel for the petitioner asserts that the director disregarded 
the petitioner's probative evidence of the beneficiary's eligibility for L-1B classification, emphasizing that the 
petitioner submitted "substantial, specific written testimony and documentary evidence" in support of its 
claim that the beneficiary is qualified for the benefit sought. Counsel further asserts that the director "willfully 
applied an illegal specialized knowledge standard to the submitted petition requiring that the petitioner 
distinguish the beneficiary's role from that of any other similarly experienced and educated Electronics Test 
Technician employed by the petitioning entity." Counsel submits a detailed brief in support of the appeal. 
To establish L-1 eligibility under section 101(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the petitioner must demonstrate that the 
beneficiary, within three years preceding the beneficiary's application for admission into the United States, has 
been employed abroad in a qualifying managerial or executive capacity, or in a capacity involving specialized 
knowledge, for one continuous year by a qualifying organization. The petitioner must also demonstrate that the 
beneficiary seeks to enter the United States temporarily in order to continue to render services to the same 
employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves specialized 
knowledge. 
The regulation at 8 C.F.R. 9 214.2(1)(3) further states that an individual petition filed on Form 1-129 shall be 
accompanied by: 
(i) 
 Evidence that the petitioner and the organization which employed or will employ the 
alien are qualifying organizations as defined in paragraph (l)(l)(ii)(G) of this section. 
(ii) 
 Evidence that the alien will be employed in an executive, managerial, or specialized 
knowledge capacity, including a detailed description of the services to be performed. 
WAC 08 159 525 13 
Page 3 
(iii) 
 Evidence that the alien has at least one continuous year of full-time employment 
abroad with a qualifying organization within the three years preceding the filing of 
the petition. 
(iv) 
 Evidence that the alien's prior year of employment abroad was in a position that was 
managerial, executive or involved specialized knowledge and that the alien's prior 
education, training, and employment qualifies himher to perform the intended 
services in the United States; however, the work in the United States need not be the 
same work which the alien performed abroad. 
The primary issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary has been or 
will be employed in a specialized knowledge capacity and whether the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge. 8 C.F.R. $9 214.2(1)(3)(ii) and (iv). 
Section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 5 1 184(c)(2)(B), provides: 
For purposes of section 101(a)(15)(L), an alien is considered to be serving in a capacity 
involving specialized knowledge with respect to a company if the alien has a special 
knowledge of the company product and its application in international markets or has an 
advanced level of knowledge of processes and procedures of the company. 
Furthermore, the regulation at 8 C.F.R. $ 2 14.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) defines "specialized knowledge" as: 
[Slpecial knowledge possessed by an individual of the petitioning organization's product, 
service, research, equipment, techniques, management or other interests and its application in 
international markets, or an advanced level of knowledge or expertise in the organization's 
processes and procedures. 
The petitioner filed the Form 1-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker, on May 13,2008. In a letter dated May 
9, 2008, the petitioner explained that the company had recently secured a major manufacturing contract with 
Cisco Systems, under which a product designed by Cisco will be manufactured at the petitioning organization's 
Thailand facility. The petitioner further discussed the beneficiary's proposed assignment within the scope of this 
contract as follows: 
The purpose of the U.S. assignment is to gain an in-depth knowledge of the various product 
model prototypes and to test and troubleshoot the prototypes' electronic circuit boards, in 
preparation of the product transfer to Thailand for manufacturing. The U.S. position requires 
specialized knowledge of the techniques and methodologies currently in place at [the foreign 
entity's] Thai facility, which will be utilized in the manufacturing program. 
Possession of specialized knowledge and skills is critical to this initiative. A team of highly 
qualified employees from [the Thai affiliate], with specialized knowledge of the manufacturing 
systems and programs in place at that facility, will assist in preparing for the product transfer and 
manufacturing program. 
WAC 08 159 525 13 
Page 4 
[The petitioner] manufactures router and switcher subassemblies (electronic equipment used in 
internet broadband technology) for Cisco. However, it is the specialized knowledge of [the 
petitioner's] specific manufacturing processes that is required for the U.S. position. The 
beneficiary has the required specialized knowledge, obtained through his employment 
experience with [the foreign entity's] manufacturing facility in Thailand. 
The petitioner further explained that all of the foreign entity's electronics test technicians receive training and 
certification in the petitioner's "360 degree" troubleshooting technique, which is described as "the best in class 
troubleshooting technique within the industry." The petitioner emphasizes that "all personnel must demonstrate 
successful troubleshooting results, as deemed by their supervisor, in an electronic networking troubleshooting 
environment for 2 years in order to remain certified." The petitioner stated that the 360 degree technique includes 
the following components: 
1) Troubleshooting techniques in Custom Design Integrated Circuits (known as ASICs), 
operating principles, and schematics of different types of Integrated Circuits. 
2) IXLA traffic generator operating techniques (unique testing equipment configured by [the 
petitioner] to test networking products, such as the routers we manufacture for Cisco). 
3) Optical networking routers troubleshooting techniques proprietary to [the petitioner] which 
include: 
a. 
 Eye Mask Diagram (a technique to evaluate networking traffic integrity); 
b. 
 Extinction Testing (a technique to evaluate the sensitivity of optical networking 
signals); 
c. 
 Bit Error Rate Testing (a technique to evaluate the robustness of the networking 
product); and 
d. CPP (a proprietary test suite designed to test networking products using Labview 
programming language). 
The petitioner stated that "due to the complexity of the unique manufacturing systems and the broad scope of the 
processes to be managed and supported, prior experience is required to overcome the challenges inherent in the 
transfer and initialization process." The petitioner stated that the beneficiary "has knowledge and experience that 
cannot be easily duplicated, and which distinguishes him from his industry peers." The petitioner described the 
beneficiary's proposed duties as the following: 
[The beneficiary] will provide engineering technical support and coordination of prototype 
builds to ensure that new assemblies are completed on time and on budget. He will provide 
feedback to engineering and support groups to ensure a smooth transition from prototype to 
production. He will review and interpret customer specifications, and provide engineering 
expertise for all technical issues related to the customer's product from conception to 
obsolescence. Working closely with Cisco engineers on the design of new products, he will 
gather, understand and convert Cisco data into usable [company] manufacturing information to 
be utilized by the manufacturing engineers at [the petitioner's] Thailand facility. He will verify 
that specifications conform to [the petitioner's], Cisco's and industry standards. Based on his 
specialized knowledge of [company-specific] manufacturing systems, he will assist in selecting 
and programming manufacturing equipment to build the product and will assist manufacturing 
WAC 08 159 525 13 
Page 5 
with the first run of the product. [The beneficiary] will develop specialized tools to automate and 
ease assembly and test development. He will develop and execute assembly and test strategies 
for new products, including DFx analysis and feedback. He will support the transition of Cisco's 
products to [the petitioner's] manufacturing to ensure successful handoffs. 
[The beneficiary] will apply his specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] test and 
manufacturing methodologies in the prototype and transfer stages of the manufacturing contract 
program and upon completion of the product transfer, he will return to Thailand to implement 
program details and assist in the production program at [the foreign entity]. 
The petitioner indicated that the beneficiary has been employed as an electronics test technician with the foreign 
entity since July 2002 and is responsible for "supporting the production of electronics data communication 
systems by ensuring that all failed circuit boards are debugged and repaired," as well as supporting test engineers 
in addressing root failure causes, and setting up debug procedures for team members to resolve circuit board 
failures in the product being manufactured at the facility. The petitioner stated that the beneficiary's current duties 
also include the following: 
[The beneficiary] provides technical expertise on assigned materials for production or customer- 
identified material problems. He performs assessments and risk analyses, as well as quality 
audits on potential suppliers. He generates product specifications and provides them to the 
supplier, and performs material qualification on prototype and sample material. He serves as the 
programlproject interface to coordinate new product launches and introductions. He translates 
customer requirements into factory activities, provides factory activity time estimates for pricing 
models, documents associated factory support activities, and develops preliminary program 
timelines for the customer quote. 
[The beneficiary] has gained specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] unique test processes 
and systems, both global and local to Thailand, many of which are proprietary to [the petitioning 
organization]. He is fluent in the IT systems and manufacturing systems utilized at [the foreign 
entity]. His specialized knowledge and experience are indispensable to the U.S. position and to 
the successful completion of the contract manufacturing project. His background and experience 
make him uniquely qualified for the U.S. project and he was selected for this assignment based 
on that specialized knowledge and experience. 
The petitioner concluded by stating that the beneficiary has "obtained a body of highly specialized knowledge of 
[company-specific] systems, technologies and processes, and has mastered [the petitioner's] proscribed [sic] 
methods." The petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary's "knowledge of the petitioner's electronic test systems, 
including the '360 degree' technique, qualifies him for the U.S. position," considering that "he has been applying 
[the petitioner's] unique troubleshooting techniques to Cisco products, including their circuit board components, 
for years at the Thai facility." 
In support of the petition, the petitioner submitted an overview of the company's services excerpted from the 
petitioner's web site, as well as a July 2007 press release regarding a four-year manufacturing contract awarded by 
Cisco systems to the petitioner for current and future sub-assemblies for Cisco products. 
WAC 08 159 525 13 
Page 6 
On May 21, 2008, the director issued a request for additional evidence (RFE), in which he instructed the 
petitioner to submit the following documentation to establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized 
knowledge: (1) an explanation regarding how the beneficiary's current and proposed duties are special, advanced 
or otherwise different from those of other workers employed by the petitioner or other US. employers in the same 
type of position, supported by probative evidence; (2) an explanation regarding how the beneficiary's training or 
experience is uncommon, noteworthy, or distinguished by some unusual quality and not generally known by 
practitioner's in the alien's field in comparison to that of others employed by the petitioner in this field, supported 
by probative evidence; (3) information regarding the number of foreign national employees working at the U.S. 
location where the beneficiary will be assigned, including their job titles and visa status; and (4) information 
regarding the number of persons holding the same or similar position at the U.S. location where the beneficiary 
will be employed. The director emphasized that the petitioner "is required to submit probative evidence to 
corroborate the statements made in its initial filing," and advised that USCIS is required to make comparisons not 
only between the beneficiary and the general labor market, but also between the beneficiary and the remainder of 
the petitioner's workforce. 
In response to the RFE, counsel for the petitioner asserted that the director erroneously stated the L-1B standard 
by suggesting that "specialized knowledge may not be appropriate if U.S. workers employed by the petitioner are 
qualified to do the work required of the petition beneficiary," and implying that specialized knowledge positions 
must be narrowly held within the petitioner's organization. Counsel stated that such a standard is "clearly contrary 
to long standing USCIS policy and regulatory history," and cited to two legacy Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) memoranda in support of his assertions. ' Counsel asserted that "under current U.S. immigration 
laws. . . the petitioner need not establish that the beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge above that held by 
those similarly employed in the foreign organization. Rather the beneficiary must show specialized knowledge 
that is distinguishable from the generalized skill or level of expertise required to work in the occupational 
category of the proffered position." 
Counsel asserted that the beneficiary would meet either standard for L-1B classification, as it has been shown that 
his duties and skills can be distinguished from those of the petitioner's U.S. workforce, but implored the director 
to adjudicate the case in accord with the Puleo and Ohata policy memoranda. 
The petitioner also submitted a letter dated June 26,2008, in which it specifically addressed the requests raised by 
the director in the RFE. The petitioner emphasized that the fundamental reason for the beneficiary's transfer is 
due to the need for technicians "with advanced, [companyl-specific knowledge of test techniques used at the Thai 
manufacturing facility." The petitioner explained that Cisco's design and prototype facility and the petitioner's 
Thai manufacturing facility work together on product development and mass scale manufacturing for a single 
product. 
The petitioner explained that even if U.S.-based test technicians were available for the proposed assignment, they 
would not be qualified for the assignment unless they were first transferred to Thailand to become familiarized 
with the petitioner's manufacturing facility there, and then transferred back to the United States. The petitioner 
1 
See Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Assoc. Comm., INS, Interpretation of Special Knowledge, March 
4, 1994. (hereinafter "Puleo memorandum"); Memorandum of Fuji 0. Ohata, Assoc. Comm., INS, 
Interpretation of Specialized Knowledge, December 20,2002 (hereinafter "Ohata memorandum.") 
WAC 08 159 525 13 
Page 7 
emphasized that its facilities located in different countries work on a single product, and that personnel transfers 
are required to ensure integrated, successful operations. 
The petitioner noted that the Thailand facility has over 7,000 employees and that "in order to ensure that all of the 
employees who are going to be involved in the Cisco manufacturing program have the requisite product 
knowledge, certain specialized knowledge team members have come to the U.S. to have direct access to the 
product prototype and to interface directly with the customer's product design engineers for a short time." The 
petitioner explained that these employees then transfer their knowledge to other team members upon their return 
to the manufacturing facility. 
The petitioner indicated that it employs 117 test technicians in the United States, and a total of 15 at the Cisco 
facility where the beneficiary will work, but noted that "none of these technicians perform the exact duties as 
those stated in the beneficiary's proposed position." The petitioner emphasized that the beneficiary's duties are 
different from those of other similarly employed U.S. workers because "they require specialized knowledge of the 
techniques and methodologies currently in place at [the petitioner's] Thai facility." 
In response to the director's request that the petitioner describe any special or advanced duties performed by the 
beneficiary, the petitioner stated: 
The beneficiary's training and experience were described in detail in the supporting letter 
submitted with the petition; however, in response to the RFE, we note that the beneficiary's 
training and experience is uncommon, noteworthy, and distinguished by an unusual quality and 
not generally known by practitioners in this particular field, in that he has undergone [company- 
specific] training and has [company-specific] experience in how to test and troubleshoot Cisco 
products in conformance with [the petitioner's] guidelines and standards. 
The petitioner once again outlined its "360 degree" troubleshooting technique, noting that "this is an extremely 
comprehensive, in-depth electronics testing and troubleshooting technique, involving not only a unique training 
methodology but also a specific philosophy or mentality that is applied by [the petitioner's] test technicians to 
their product failure analyses." The petitioner emphasized that the technique involves a more permanent result 
compared to "superficial inspection and repair," and "produces a better, more robust and longer-lasting product 
for [the petitioner's] customers." The petitioner stated that it considers the technique to be "a significant 
competitive advantage in the industry." The petitioner hrther described the beneficiary's specialized or advanced 
duties as follows: 
As an Electronics Test Technician at [the petitioner's] manufacturing facility in Thailand, the 
beneficiary has highly specific training, knowledge and experience that cannot be easily 
duplicated, and which distinguishes him from his industry peers. Additionally, since the 
beneficiary's work at [the foreign entity] has been devoted exclusively to providing . . . 
proprietary electronic testing services on Cisco products (other technicians within the company 
service other [company's] customers), his knowledge and experience are uniquely suited to the 
proposed duties in the United States. 
WAC 08 159 525 13 
Page 8 
[The petitioner] has established focus teams: teams of employees who work exclusively on 
products for specific customers. The beneficiary works as part of a service team organization in 
the Failure Analysis Laboratory focusing on Cisco products, including their router and switch 
subassemblies. Over the last several years, he has mastered [the petitioner's] unique test 
processes and failure analysis techniques, including the proprietary "360 degree" troubleshooting 
technique, and has demonstrated ability in troubleshooting networking products for Cisco in 
accordance with [the petitioner's] proscribed [sic] methods. 
The director denied the petition on July 15, 2008, concluding, that the petitioner failed to establish that the 
beneficiary possesses specialized knowledge or that he has been and would be employed in a capacity that 
requires specialized knowledge. In denying the petition, the director observed that the petitioner provided no 
evidence in support of its assertions regarding the beneficiary's advanced and specialized knowledge. The director 
acknowledged the petitioner's reliance on the Puleo and Ohata memoranda, but emphasized that both memoranda 
require submission of probative evidence to support a finding that the beneficiary's knowledge is either 
specialized within the industry or advanced among members of the petitioner's own workforce. 
The director found that the petitioner had not established how the beneficiary's training, experience and job duties 
are materially different from those of other electronics test technicians employed by the petitioning organization 
or in the industry at large. The director concluded that "without producing probative evidence, the petitioner 
cannot establish that the beneficiary's knowledge is noteworthy, uncommon or distinguished by some unusual 
quality." 
On appeal, counsel asserts that the petitioner "submitted substantial, specific written testimony and documentary 
evidence providing that [the beneficiary], more likely than not, is eligible for L-1B classification. Counsel asserts 
that the director disregarded such evidence "apparently based on a misstatement of case law addressing 
evidentiary standards." Counsel asserts that the director erroneously relied upon Matter of Ramirez, Matter of 
Obaigbena, and Matter of Laureano, matters which all pertain to the unsupported assertions of counsel, as a basis 
for rejecting the petitioner's statements. Counsel requests that the AAO "affirm the long-standing proposition that 
specific detailed written testimony qualifies as evidence." 
Counsel further contends that the director "applied an illegal specialized knowledge standard to the submitted 
petition, requiring that petitioner distinguish the beneficiary's role fi-om that of any other similarly experienced 
and educated Electronics Test Technician employed by the petitioning entity." Counsel cites to an unpublished 
1993 AAO decision to stand for the proposition that "the beneficiary must show specialized knowledge that is 
distinguishable from the generalized skill or expertise required to work in the occupational category of the 
proffered position." Counsel asserts that there is no requirement that the petitioner establish that the beneficiary 
possesses specialized knowledge above that held by those similarly employed in the foreign organization. 
Counsel discusses the legislative history of the regulatory definition of "specialized knowledge," noting that 
Congress specially rejected requirements that knowledge be unique or narrowly held in the organization when it 
finalized the 1987 definition, and further liberalized the definition in 1990. Counsel emphasizes that the petitioner 
enclosed in its response to the RFE copies of the Ohata and Puleo memoranda, which specifically state 
specialized knowledge does not require that the advanced knowledge be narrowly held throughout the company. 
Counsel suggests that the director willfully applied the incorrect specialized knowledge standard to the facts of 
the case. 
WAC 08 159 525 13 
Page 9 
In addition, counsel objects to the director's citation to Matter of Colley and Matter of Penner, in the notice of 
decision, asserting that these are "opinions that were deemed inapplicable by the Congressionally established 
statutory definition of specialized knowledge in 1990." Counsel asserts that the director's disregard for 
longstanding Federal immigration interpretations, the regulatory history, and the Federal statute established by 
Congress is illegal since it seeks to establish a new substantive definition of specialized knowledge without going 
through the notice and comment rule making procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Counsel concludes by stating: 
[The beneficiary's] specialized knowledge of [the petitioner's] specific testing techniques, in 
particular the '360 degree' technique, is valuable to [the petitioner's] competitiveness in the 
marketplace. The "360 degree" technique is specific to [the foreign entity's] Thailand facility and 
[the beneficiary's] knowledge of that technique thus contributes to the U.S. company's 
knowledge of foreign company operating conditions and methods. [The beneficiary] has 
extensive and significant experience with [the foreign entity]. He has completed many years of 
assignments implementing the "360 degree" technique and has thus enhanced the 
competitiveness of [the petitioner] with respect to the Cisco relationship since he has worked for 
most of those years on Cisco projects being manufactured in Thailand. [The beneficiary's] 
knowledge of the [company-specific] techniques can be gained only through prior experience 
with [the petitioner] and, as demonstrated in the previously submitted materials, such knowledge 
cannot easily be transferred or taught to another individual. 
The Standard for Specialized Knowledge 
In determining what constitutes specialized knowledge, the standards by which the AAO is bound are those 
set forth in the statutory definition of specialized knowledge itself, as provided at section 2 14(c)(2)(B) of the 
Act, USCIS regulations, and applicable precedent decisions. When a statute is ambiguous, Congress has left 
a gap for the agency to fill. See Chevron USA Znc. v. Natural Res. DeJ: Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
This is the situation here. In interpreting section 214(c)(2)(B), the AAO must rely on existing USCIS 
regulations, the applicable precedent decisions, and the legislative history of the enabling and declaratory 
statutes, as an indication of Congressional intent. 
Looking to the language of the statutory definition, Congress has provided USCIS with an ambiguous definition 
of specialized knowledge. In this regard, one Federal district court explained the infeasibility of applying a 
bright-line test to define what constitutes specialized knowledge: 
This ambiguity is not merely the result of an unfortunate choice of dictionaries. It reflects the 
relativistic nature of the concept special. An item is special only in the sense that it is not 
ordinary; to define special one must first define what is ordinary. . . . There is no logical or 
principled way to determine which baseline of ordinary knowledge is a more appropriate reading 
of the statute, and there are countless other baselines which are equally plausible. Simply put, 
specialized knowledge is a relative and empty idea which cannot have a plain meaning. Cf 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 537 (1982). 
WAC 08 159 52513 
Page 10 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. 9, 14- 15 (D.D.C., 1990).~ 
While Congress did not provide explicit guidance for what should be considered ordinary knowledge, the 
principles of statutory interpretation provide some clue as to the intended scope of the L-1B specialized 
knowledge category. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 1 12, 123 (1 987) 
(citing INSv. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207,94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). 
First, the AAO must look to the language of section 214(c)(2)(B) itself, that is, the terms "special" and 
"advanced." Like the courts, the AAO customarily turns to dictionaries for help in determining whether a word in 
a statute has a plain or common meaning. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 109 F.3d 965, 967-68 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(using Webster's Dictionary for "therefore"). According to Webster's New College Dictionary, the word "special" 
is commonly found to mean "surpassing the usual" or "exceptional." Webster's New College Dictionary, 1084 
(3rd Ed. 2008). The dictionary defines the word "advanced" as "highly developed or complex" or "at a higher 
level than others." Id. at 17. 
Second, looking at the term's placement within the text of section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Act, the AAO notes that 
specialized knowledge is used to describe the nature of a person's employment and that the term is listed among 
the higher levels of the employment hierarchy together with "managerial" and "executive" employees. Based on 
the context of the term within the statute, the AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to 
occupy an elevated position within a company that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 
1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
Third, a review of the legislative history for both the original 1970 statute and the subsequent 1990 statute 
indicates that Congress intended for USClS to closely administer the L-1B category. Specifically, the original 
drafters of section 10 l(a)(15)(L) of the Act intended that the class of persons eligible for the L-1 classification 
would be "narrowly drawn" and "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91- 
851 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2750,2754, 1970 WL 5815. The legislative history of the 1970 Act 
plainly states that "the number of temporary admissions under the proposed 'L' category will not be large." Id. In 
addition, the Congressional record specifically states that the L-1 category was intended for "key personnel." 
See generally, id. The term "key personnel" denotes a position within the petitioning company that is "[olf 
crucial importance." Webster 's New College Dictionary 620 (3rd ed., Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing 
Co. 2008). Moreover, during the course of the sub-committee hearings on the bill, the Chairman specifically 
questioned witnesses on the level of skill necessary to qualify under the proposed "L" category. In response 
to the Chairman's questions, various witnesses responded that they understood the legislation would allow 
"high-level people," "experts," individuals with "unique" skills, and that it would not include "lower 
categories" of workers or "skilled craft workers." See H.R. Subcomm. No. 1 of the Jud. Comm., Immigration 
Act of 1970: Hearings on H.R. 445,91" Cong. 210,218,223,240,248 (Nov. 12, 1969). 
Although 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General was decided prior to enactment of the statutory definition of 
specialized knowledge by the Immigration Act of 1990, the court's discussion of the ambiguity in the legacy 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definition is equally illuminating when applied to the definition 
created by Congress. 
WAC 08 159 525 13 
Page 1 1 
Neither in 1970 nor in 1990 did Congress provide a controlling, unambiguous definition of "specialized 
knowledge," and a narrow interpretation is consistent with so much of the legislative intent as it is possible to 
determine. H. Rep. No. 91-85 1 at 6, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2754. This interpretation is consistent with legislative 
history, which has been largely supportive of a narrow reading of the definition of specialized knowledge and the 
L-1 visa classification in general. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 15-1 6; Boi Na Braza 
Atlanta, LLC v. Upchurch, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2372846 at *4 (N.D.Tex., 2005), afd 194 
Fed.Appx. 248 (5th Cir. 2006); Fibermaster, Ltd. v. LNS., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1990 WL 99327 (D.D.C., 
1990); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Action 00-2977-LFO (D.D.C. April 6, 2001)(on file with 
AAO). 
Further, although the Immigration Act of 1990 provided a statutory definition of the term "specialized 
knowledge" in section 214(c)(2) of the Act, the definition did not generally expand the class of persons eligible 
for L-I B specialized knowledge visas. Pub.L. No. 101-649, 9 206(b)(2), 104 Stat. 4978, 5023 (1990). Instead, 
the legislative history indicates that Congress created the statutory definition of specialized knowledge for the 
express purpose of clarifying a previously undefined term from the Immigration Act of 1970. H.R. Rep. 101- 
723(I) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6749, 1990 WL 200418 ("One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem."). While the 1990 Act declined to codify the "proprietary knowledge" and "United 
States labor market" references that had existed in the previous agency definition found at 8 C.F.R. 
5 214.2(1)(l)(ii)(D) (1988), there is no indication that Congress intended to liberalize its own 1970 definition of 
the L-l visa classification. 
Although counsel objects to the director's reliance on any law or legislative history that pre-dates the 1990 
Act and the statutory definition of specialized knowledge, counsel has not pointed to any committee report or 
floor statements that undermine the statement of the original enacting Committee that admissions "will not be 
large" and that the category will be "carefully regulated and monitored" by USCIS. Instead, counsel 
consistently attributes to the 1990 Act, without citing any specific legislative history, a blanket intent to 
"broaden" the definition of specialized knowledge. The unsupported assertions of counsel do not constitute 
evidence. Matter of Obaigbena, 19 I&N Dec. 533, 534 (BIA 1988); Matter of Laureano, 19 I&N Dec. 1 
(BIA 1983); Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I&N Dec. 503,506 (BIA 1980). 
The Committee Report relating to the 1990 Act does state that Congress intended to "broaden1' the L-1 
category in general by making four specifically enumerated changes: allowing accounting firms to participate 
in the program, incorporating the "blanket petition" program into the statute, changing the overseas 
employment requirement to one year within the three years prior to admission, and enlarging the period of 
admission for managers and executives to seven years. H.R. Rep. 101-723(I), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. 
This portion of the report, however, made no mention of any intent to broaden the specialized knowledge visa 
classification. 
In a separate paragraph that was not enumerated as one of the four changes, the Committee Report discussed 
the new specialized knowledge definition. The paragraph begins by stating: "One area within the L visa that 
requires more specificity relates to the term 'specialized knowledge.' Varying interpretations by INS have 
exacerbated the problem." Given that the term was previously undefined by Congress, it is clear that the first 
sentence of the paragraph attributes the previous confusion as to what constituted specialized knowledge to 
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the failure of the 1970 Act to define the term. The second sentence of the paragraph, in turn, simply notes 
that the "varying interpretations" adopted by the INS through the regulations, precedent decisions, and 
memoranda had contributed to the confusion over the applicable definition. There is no indication in the 
Committee Report that Congress otherwise intended the new definition to be considered as part of the 
enumerated changes that specifically "broadened" the L-1 category. Instead, the paragraph is conspicuously 
neutral. 
The AAO notes that the Committee Report does not take issue with the specifics of the previous INS 
interpretations and does not state an intent to "broaden" the "narrow class" of aliens that Congress initially 
stated would be eligible for the classification. The 1990 Committee Report does not reject, criticize, or even 
refer to any specific INS regulation or precedent decision interpreting the term. The report simply states that 
the Committee was recommending a statutory definition because of "[vlarying interpretations by INS." H.R. 
Rep. No. 101-723(1), at 69, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6749. Beyond that statement, the Committee Report 
simply restates the tautology that became the statutory definition of specialized knowledge. There is nothing 
in the legislative history to indicate that Congress intended to specifically liberalize or broaden the specialized 
knowledge classification, other than the narrow changes made by the statute itself: the deletion of the 
"proprietary knowledge" and "United States labor market" references that had existed in the agency 
definition. 
Moreover, the AAO notes that the precedent decisions that predate the 1990 Act are not categorically 
superseded by the statutory definition of specialized knowledge. The AAO generally presumes that Congress 
is knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. 
Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently concluded that the 
AAO's reliance on such authority was appropriate. Brazil Quality Stones v. ChertofJ; --- F.3d ---, 2008 WL 
2675825 11.10 at "4 (9th Cir., July 10, 2008). 
Although the cited precedents pre-date the current 1990 Act, the AAO finds them instructive. While the 
underlying definitions of specialized knowledge that were discussed in the decisions are now superseded by 
the statutory definition, the general issues and the case facts themselves remain cogent as examples of how 
the INS applied the law to the real world facts of individual adjudications. For example, USCIS must 
distinguish between skilled workers and specialized knowledge workers when making a determination on an 
L-1B visa petition. The distinction between skilled and specialized knowledge workers has been a recurring 
issue in the L-1B program and is discussed at length in the INS precedent decisions, including Matter of 
Penner. See 18 I&N Dec. at 50-53 (discussing the legislative history and prior precedents as they relate to the 
distinction between skilled and specialized knowledge workers). 
Accordingly, the director's citation of precedents that predate the Immigration Act of 1990 is not 
objectionable, as long as the director's decision is narrowly tailored to address issues that were not directly 
superseded by the statutory definition. If the director were to apply the precedent decisions in support of a 
"proprietary knowledge" requirement or a reference to "knowledge not available on the U.S. labor market," 
then the use of the precedents would be objectionable. The director, however, did not do so in this case. 
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If any conclusion can be drawn fi-om the enactment of the statutory definition of specialized knowledge in section 
214(c)(2)(B), it would be based on the nature of the Congressional clarification itself. By not including any strict 
criterion in the ultimate statutory definition and further emphasizing the relativistic aspect of "special knowledge," 
Congress created a standard that requires USCIS to make a factual determination that can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis, based on the agency's expertise and discretion. Rather than a bright-line standard that would 
support a more rigid application of the law, Congress gave the INS a more flexible standard that requires an 
adjudication based on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. C' Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 33 1 F.3d 
369,377 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89,91 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
To determine what is special or advanced, USCIS must first determine the baseline of ordinary. As a 
baseline, the terms "special" or "advanced" must mean more than simply "skilled" or "experienced." By 
itself, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically complex products will not equal "special 
knowledge." See Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. 49, 53 (Comm. 1982). In general, all employees can 
reasonably be considered "important" to a petitioner's enterprise. If an employee did not contribute to the 
overall economic success of an enterprise, there would be no rational economic reason to employ that person. 
An employee of "crucial importance" or "key personnel" must rise above the level of the petitioner's average 
employee. In other words, specialized knowledge generally requires more than a short period of experience; 
otherwise special or advanced knowledge would include every employee in an organization with the 
exception of trainees and entry-level staff. If everyone in an organization is specialized, then no one can be 
considered truly specialized. Such an interpretation strips the statutory language of any efficacy and cannot 
have been what Congress intended. 
Considering the definition of specialized knowledge, it is the petitioner's, not USCIS's, burden to articulate 
and prove that the beneficiary possesses "special" or "advanced" knowledge. Section 214(c)(2)(B) of the Act, 
8 U.S.C. 5 11 84(c)(2)(B). USCIS cannot make a factual determination regarding the beneficiary's specialized 
knowledge if the petitioner does not, at a minimum, articulate with specificity the nature of the claimed 
specialized knowledge, describe how such knowledge is typically gained within the organization, and explain 
how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
Once the petitioner articulates the nature of the claimed specialized knowledge, it is the weight and type of 
evidence which establishes whether or not the beneficiary actually possesses specialized knowledge. A 
petitioner's assertion that the beneficiary possesses advanced knowledge of the processes and procedures of 
the company must be supported by evidence describing and distinguishing that knowledge from the 
elementary or basic knowledge possessed by others. Because "special" and "advanced" are comparative 
terms, the petitioner should provide evidence that allows USCIS to assess the beneficiary's knowledge 
relative to others in the petitioner's workforce or relative to similarly employed workers in the petitioner's 
specific industry. 
Analysis 
In examining the specialized knowledge of the beneficiary, the AAO will look to the petitioner's description of 
the job duties and the weight of the evidence supporting any asserted specialized knowledge. See 8 C.F.R. 
3 214.2(1)(3)(ii). The petitioner must submit a detailed job description of the services to be performed sufficient to 
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establish specialized knowledge. Id. 
Upon review, the petitioner in this case has failed to establish either that the beneficiary's position in the 
United States or abroad requires an employee with specialized knowledge or that the beneficiary has 
specialized knowledge. The beneficiary's current and proposed job duties appear to be typical of an 
electronics test technician working in the manufacturing sector. Counsel and the petitioner assert, however, 
that some positions require company-specific knowledge that the beneficiary gained in Thailand, as well as 
experience with the petitioner's processes and procedures, and therefore could not be performed by the typical 
skilled worker. 
Therefore, the first question before the AAO is whether the beneficiary's knowledge of and experience with 
the petitioner's proprietary tools, processes and methodologies alone constitutes specialized knowledge. While 
the current statutory and regulatory definitions of "specialized knowledge" do not include a requirement that 
the beneficiary's knowledge be proprietary, the petitioner cannot satisfy the current standard merely by 
establishing that the beneficiary's purported specialized knowledge is proprietary. The knowledge must still 
be either "special" or "advanced." As discussed above, the elimination of the bright-line "proprietary" 
standard did not, in fact, significantly liberalize the standards for the L-IB visa classification. 
Reviewing the precedent decisions that preceded the Immigration Act of 1990, there are a number of 
conclusions that were not based on the superseded regulatory definition, and therefore continue to apply to the 
adjudication of L- 1 B specialized knowledge petitions. In 198 1, the INS recognized that "[tlhe modem 
workplace requires a high proportion of technicians and specialists." The agency concluded that: 
Most employees today are specialists and have been trained and given specialized knowledge. 
However, in view of the [legislative history], it can not be concluded that all employees with 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intracompany transferees. The House Report indicates the employee must be a "key" person 
and associates this employee with "managerial personnel." 
Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 1 19-20. 
In a subsequent decision, the INS looked to the legislative history of the 1970 Act and concluded that a "broad 
definition which would include skilled workers and technicians was not discussed, thus the limited legislative 
history available therefore indicates that an expansive reading of the 'specialized knowledge' provision is not 
warranted." Matter of Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 5 1. The decision continued: 
[I]n view of the House Report, it cannot be concluded that all employees with any level of 
specialized knowledge or performing highly technical duties are eligible for classification as 
intra-company transferees. Such a conclusion would permit extremely large numbers of 
persons to qualify for the "L-1" visa. The House Report indicates that the employee must be 
a "key" person and "the numbers will not be large." 
Id. at 53. 
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According to the reasoning of Matter of Penner, work experience and knowledge of a firm's technically 
complex products, by itself, will not equal "special knowledge." USCIS must interpret specialized knowledge 
to require more than fundamental job skills or a short period of experience. An expansive interpretation of 
specialized knowledge in which any experienced employee would qualify as having special or advanced 
knowledge would be untenable, since it would allow a petitioner to transfer any experienced employee to the 
United States in the L-1B classification. 
The proprietary specialized knowledge in this matter is stated to include the proprietary "360 degree" 
troubleshooting technique, and the "unique manufacturing systems and programs" currently in place at the 
petitioner's Thailand facility. The petitioner emphasizes that the "360 degree" technique is the "best in class 
troubleshooting technique within the industry." However, all technology manufacturing firms develop 
internal tools, methodologies, procedures and best practices for ensuring the quality and functionality of 
manufactured products. Other than stating that its troubleshooting technique is "best in class," the petitioner 
did not attempt to explain how its troubleshooting techniques differ from those implemented by other firms 
who manufacture electronics components. The petitioner indicates that all Failure Analysis and Electronics 
Technicians receive training and certification in the 360 degree technique, but it has neither documented nor 
specified the amount or type of training involved in the certification process. The petitioner indicates that a 
technician must "demonstrate successful troubleshooting results" for two years in order to remain certified, 
but the record contains no information regarding the length of the initial training and certification process. 
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the processes involved are particularly complex or different compared 
to those utilized by other companies in the industry, or that it would take a significant amount of time to train 
an electronics test technician who had no prior experience with the petitioner's family of companies. 
Moreover, the petitioner has not submitted evidence that the instant beneficiary completed the training and 
remains certified in the process, nor has it explained how the 360 degree process would be utilized in the U.S. 
position. Going on record without supporting documentary evidence is not sufficient for purposes of meeting 
the burden of proof in these proceedings. Matter of SofJici, 22 I&N Dec. 158, 165 (Comm. 1998) (citing 
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972)). 
The petitioner vaguely refers to the "complexity of the unique manufacturing systems" and "broad scope of 
the processes to be managed and supported" as a basis for requiring the services of an electronics test 
technician who possesses prior experience with the Thai entity. However, the petitioner has not elaborated 
upon what makes the foreign entity's manufacturing systems "unique" or what specific processes are managed 
or supported. The petitioner appears to be one of many manufacturers that contract with Cisco to provide 
electronics components, so it is reasonable to believe that Cisco requires some degree of standardization in 
production across different contracted manufacturers. The petitioner has not identified the specific Cisco 
product or products to be manufactured in Thailand or indicated whether such products are manufactured by 
any other contractors. For all of these reasons, the petitioner has not established that knowledge of the "360 
degree" troubleshooting technique and the company's vaguely defined manufacturing processes alone 
constitutes specialized knowledge. The petitioner does not articulate or document how specialized knowledge 
is typically gained within the organization, or explain how and when the beneficiary gained such knowledge. 
All employees can be said to possess unique skill or experience to some degree. Moreover, the proprietary 
qualities of the petitioner's process or product do not establish that any knowledge of this process is 
"specialized." Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the unique process or product require this 
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employee to have knowledge beyond what is common in the industry. This has not been established in this 
matter. 
It is appropriate for USCIS to look beyond the stated job duties and consider the importance of the 
beneficiary's knowledge of the business's product or service, management operations, or decision-making 
process. Matter of Colley, 18 I&N Dec. at 120 (citing Matter of Raulin, 13 I&N Dec. at 618 and Matter of 
LeBlanc, 13 I&N Dec. at 816). As stated by the Commissioner in Matter of Penner, when considering 
whether the beneficiaries possessed specialized knowledge, "the LeBlanc and Raulin decisions did not find 
that the occupations inherently qualified the beneficiaries for the classifications sought." 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Rather, the beneficiaries were considered to have unusual duties, skills, or knowledge beyond that of a skilled 
worker. Id. 
The AAO acknowledges that the specialized knowledge need not be narrowly held within the organization in 
order to be considered "advanced." However, it is equally true to state that knowledge will not be considered 
"specialtt or "advanced" if it is universally or even widely held throughout a company. If all similarly 
employed workers within the petitioner's organization receive essentially the same training, then mere 
possession of knowledge of the petitioner's processes and methodologies does not rise to the level of 
specialized knowledge. The L-1B visa category was not created in order to allow the transfer of all 
employees with any degree of knowledge of a company's processes. If all employees are deemed to possess 
"special" or "advanced" knowledge, then that knowledge would necessarily be ordinary and commonplace. 
The petitioner has not successfully demonstrated that the beneficiary's knowledge of the company's products 
gained during his employment with the foreign entity is advanced compared to other similarly employed 
workers within the organization. Counsel emphasizes that the U.S. company employs few electronics test 
technicians at the intended worksite. However, the fact that the beneficiary would be one of few technicians 
assigned to the United States in relation to the specific Cisco contract is not sufficient to establish that his 
knowledge is specialized or advanced. There is no explanation as to why the beneficiary was chosen for the 
U.S.-based position over other technicians from the Thai facility and the AAO cannot assume that it was 
because he is deemed to have advanced knowledge of the company's policies and procedures. The petitioner 
indicates that all electronics test technicians employed by the foreign facility are trained and certified in the 
360 degree troubleshooting technique, so completion of such training would not be considered advanced 
knowledge within the organization. 
The petitioner indicates that its technicians are specialized by client, and that not all of them have experience 
in testing and manufacturing components for Cisco products. Given this scenario, it appears that any 
electronics technician employed by the petitioner's group of companies would be deemed to have specialized 
knowledge, because they would all have "narrowly tailored" knowledge that is relatively rare within the 
company. This interpretation of "specialized knowledge" is untenable as it would essentially allow the 
petitioner to utilize the L-1B classification for virtually any employee who had one year of experience. 
Rather, the petitioner must establish that qualities of the particular process or product require an individual to 
have knowledge beyond what is common among its workforce, or to establish that the beneficiary has 
advanced knowledge of the product. This has not been established in this matter. The fact that other workers 
may not have the same level of experience with a particular product is not enough to equate to special or 
advanced knowledge if the gap could be closed by the petitioner by simply revealing the information to a 
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similarly trained or experienced employee who has worked on a similar product. 
 While the AAO 
acknowledges that there will be exceptions based on the facts of individual cases, an argument that an alien is 
unique among a small subset of workers, will not be deemed facially persuasive if a petitioner's definition of 
specialized knowledge is so broad that it would include the majority of its workforce. 
The AAO does not doubt that the beneficiary is a valuable employee who is capable of performing the work 
described, nor does it doubt that the work is important to the petitioner's manufacturing efforts. As discussed 
above, beneficiaries of L-IB petitions should be more than merely skilled, but rather must be shown to carry 
out key processes or functions. Based on the context of the term "specialized knowledge" within the statute, the 
AAO therefore would expect a specialized knowledge employee to occupy an elevated position within a company 
that rises above that of an ordinary or average employee. See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, 745 F.Supp. at 14. 
In this case, the petitioner has only established that the beneficiary is an experienced employee who fills a 
position the petitioner considers important. However, the beneficiary has been and will be working as a 
technician. While it is the beneficiary's actual job duties and not his job title that determine whether he 
possesses specialized knowledge, it is evident that as one of many technicians working for the foreign entity 
in the manufacturing field, he does not play a leading role in product and process development activities. 
Rather, it is likely that he works under the direction of electronics engineers and supervisors and follows 
standard procedures in performing his job duties. The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary 
performs unusual duties or that he is employed primarily to carry out a key process or function. See Matter of 
Penner, 18 I&N Dec. at 52. 
Therefore, the claim that the petitioner does not employ electronics technicians with exactly the same 
experience as the beneficiary at the intended U.S. worksite who could readily perform the intended duties 
does not automatically lead to a conclusion that the instant beneficiary must possess specialized or advanced 
knowledge. Contrary to counsel's assertions on appeal, the petitioner did not distinguish the beneficiary in 
terms of his training and experience. 
The legislative history for the term "specialized knowledge" provides ample support for a restrictive 
interpretation of the term. In the present matter, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the beneficiary 
should be considered a member of the "narrowly drawn" class of individuals possessing specialized 
knowledge. 
 See 1756, Inc. v. Attorney General, supra at 16. 
 The record does not establish that the 
beneficiary has specialized knowledge or that the position offered with the United States entity requires 
specialized knowledge. 
In visa petition proceedings, the burden of proving eligibility for the benefit sought remains entirely with the 
petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. fj 1361. Here, that burden has not been met. Accordingly, the 
appeal will be dismissed. 
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.